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Introduction
1 INTRODUCTION
In 1966 Finn Seyersted published amajor study concentrating on peace support
operations and international humanitarian law that is still frequently cited.1
The question inevitably arises as to the utility of a new study. Hasn’t Seyersted,
and legal scholarship and practice in the intervening years, settled all the
questions concerning the application of international humanitarian law to peace
support operations? This study is based on the presumption that this is not
the case.
There are several reasons for a re-examination of peace support operations
and international humanitarian law. First, at the time Seyerstedwrote his study
the United Nations was the only international organization that carried out
peace support operations. Since that time other organizations have also become
engaged in the field, most notably the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO). The answers to questions concerning the application of international
humanitarian law to peace support operations by this organization are not
necessarily the same as in the case of the United Nations.
Secondly, there is no consensus in legal scholarship on the answers to be
given even to questions raised byUnitedNations operations. The basic premise
that United Nations forces must respect a body of international humanitarian
law is almost unanimously accepted, but there is considerable controversy
about the legal basis for such an obligation. Other important questions, such
as whether there are residual obligations for troop contributing states, have
not been resolved.
Thirdly, there has been a number of important developments in recent years
that needs to be taken into account. Some of these changes relate to the nature
of peace support operations, such as the creation of operations that are man-
dated to administer a territory during a transitional phase. Other changes relate
more directly to the applicable law, such as the adoption of the Convention
on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel in 1994,2 and the
1 F. Seyersted, United Nations Forces in the Law of Peace and War (1966).
2 Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel, 9 December 1994,
34 ILM (1995) 482.
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Bulletin on the Observance of International Humanitarian Law by United
Nations Forces issued by the United Nations Secretary-General in 1999.3
Finally, previous studies have often focused more on the applicability of
international humanitarian law to peace support operations than on the sub-
sequent question of international responsibility for breaches of international
humanitarian law. This subsequent question is however highly important to
the victims of breaches. The question of international responsibility and ac-
countability is also high on the international legal community’s agenda. The
International LawCommission (ILC) has recently placed the topic ‘responsibility
of international organizations’ on its agenda and the International Law Asso-
ciation (ILA) has created a committee to study the accountability of international
organizations.
2 RESEARCH OBJECTIVE AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS
This study examines the scope and content of responsibility and accountability
for breaches of international humanitarian law by peace support operations.
It is concerned with the responsibility and accountability of states and inter-
national organizations, not of individuals. This is why it does not include a
discussion of the International Criminal Court (ICC), which potentially has an
important role to play in preventing and punishing breaches of international
humanitarian law by and against peace support operations. However, the ICC
is only concerned with individual criminal responsibility.
The central question can be broken down into three main questions. First,
to which legal entity must the conduct of a peace support operation be attri-
buted? Principles for the attribution of conduct to states are set out in inter-
national humanitarian law instruments and in the ILC’s Draft Articles on State
Responsibility,4 but the principles for the attribution of conduct to international
organizations aremuch less developed. It is also necessary to examinewhether
conduct that is attributable to an international organization can also be attri-
buted to one or more states.
Secondly, what is the scope of international humanitarian law rules which
are binding on states and international organizations, that take part in peace
support operations? To which international humanitarian law treaties a state
is party can be established without much effort. The scope of customary
international law rules of international humanitarian law that are binding on
states is less clear, though the publication of a useful study by the International
Committee on the Red Cross on customary international law is expected.
3 Secretary-General’s Bulletin, Observance byUnitedNations Forces of InternationalHuman-
itarian Law of 6 August 1999, UN Doc. ST/SGB/1999/13.
4 Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its fifty-third session, 23 April
– 1 June and 2 July – 10 August 2001, UN Doc. A/56/10, at 43.
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International organizations, however, are not parties to international human-
itarian law treaties, and whether and to what extent customary international
law and general principles of law apply to them is controversial. One also
has to consider the consequences of the special role and nature of the United
Nations Security Council. Does this special role exempt the Council, and peace
support operations established by it, from the application of international
humanitarian law?
Finally, who is entitled to invoke responsibility and accountability for
breaches of international humanitarian law by peace support operations, and
which mechanisms are available to invoke them? International responsibility
and its invocation are traditionally conceived as a relationship between states.
International organizations have now joined this group, though the precise
conditions under which this has occurred are not yet clear. Individuals could
traditionally not invoke international responsibility. Their state of nationality
could make a claim on their behalf on the basis of diplomatic protection, but
such a claim was based on the state’s own interest and not that of the indi-
vidual. This paradigm has come under pressure from human rights law, which
grants individuals rights and, in certain cases, the capacity to invoke inter-
national responsibility for breach of those rights. In the light of claims that
international humanitarian law also grants rights to individuals, an examina-
tion of the possibilities for individuals to invoke responsibility for a breach
of those rights by a peace support operation is in order. Such an examination
is also justified by the present attention, in legal and international relations
scholarship, for the accountability of international organizations, as illustrated
by the work of the ILA committee on this topic. In the work on accountability
of international organizations there is a strong focus on the accountability
toward individuals that are harmed or potentially harmed by activities of
international organizations. Although it is difficult to outline the precise legal
framework in which accountability operates, it is certain that it has important
consequences for international organizations, including for their international
responsibility as a component of accountability.
The purpose of this study is to contribute to an understanding of the role
of international humanitarian law in peace support operations. It is intended
in the first place as a contribution to the academic debate. A deliberate attempt
has also been made, however, in particular through making proposals for the
establishment of mechanisms to invoke responsibility and accountability in
Chapter VI, to make a practical contribution to the protection of persons in
time of armed conflict or occupation.
3 METHODOLOGY AND MATERIALS
A primary focus of this study is to discuss and analyze the present state of
public international law as it applies to peace support operations and inter-
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national humanitarian law. This is commonly referred to as the lex lata. In
comparisonwith other fields of law, establishing the law as it is in international
law presents particular difficulties. As Rosenne argues, this is due to: the
substance of the material; its widely diffused, interdisciplinary and un-
systematic presentation; the broad variety of primary source-materials to be
examined; the many languages in which they are written; the relative in-
accessability of much of this material; and, above all, the essential character-
istics of public international law.5 This study is based on a wide variety of
materials. These include in the first instance those referred to in Article 38
of the Statute of the International Court of Justice to be applied by the Court
in settling disputes. The list in the article should be regarded as pointing
toward the materials where the answer in terms of public international law
can be found.6
Other materials, not mentioned in Article 38 but nevertheless commonly
regarded as valid legal materials have also been used. This category includes
in particular resolutions of international organizations.
This study makes relatively extensive reference to legal literature and to
the deliberations of private bodies devoted to the study of international law.
The latter include in particular the work of the Institut de Droit International
(IDI) and the ILA. These materials are part of the “teachings of the most highly
qualified publicists” mentioned in Article 38 of the Statute of the ICJ, even
though that Article refers to them only as subsidiary materials. Because there
are relatively few ‘primary’ materials such as treaties or state practice in the
areas of international law that are the subject of this study, such as the law
of the responsibility of international organizations, the teachings of publicists
take on greater importance than theywould if more ‘primary’ sources existed.
This kind of material is particularly open to the criticism that it reflects national
or personal prejudices. This criticism however applies to any interpretation
of the law,which is done in the light of ideals and ethico-legal principles which
are at its basis and within its sociological context.7
The latter applies in particular to the part of this study that is devoted to
the law as it ought to be, or lex ferenda. In this part there is extensive reference
to the recommendations of non-governmental organizations, such as Amnesty
International. This study argues that the proposals that are made will have
certain salutory practical results. At the same time, the proposals are reflective
of the author’s policy preferences.
5 S. Rosenne, Practice and Methods of International Law 1 (1984).
6 Id., at 18.
7 See H.J. Morgenthau, Positivism, Functionalism, and International Law, 34 American Journal
of International Law 260 (1940), in particular at 269.
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4 OBJECT OF STUDY
The object of this study is the conduct of peace support operations. In parti-
cular, this study focuses on peace support operations under the command and
control of the UnitedNations (UN) and NATO. Other international organizations
have also undertaken peace support operations or are making preparations
for undertaking them. The Economic Community of West African States
(ECOWAS) for example has carried out peace support operations in Liberia and
Sierra Leone, and in December 2002 decided to deploy an operation in Ivory
Coast.8 The European Union (EU) is likely to play an important role in the
deployment of peace support operations in the future. The 1999 Cologne
European Council decided that the Council should have the ability to take
decisions on the full range of conflict prevention and crisismanagement tasks,
referred to as the ‘Petersberg tasks’, defined in the Maastricht Treaty. To this
end, it decided that the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action,
backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and
a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises. This decision
set in motion a process that has led to the deployment by the European Union
of an international civil police force in Bosnia-Herzegovina in January 2003.
In January 2003 the government of the Former Yugoslav Republic ofMacedonia
formally asked the European Union to take over the small peace support
operation in that country.9 On 27 January 2003 the Council of the European
Union adopted a so-called ‘common position’ in which it decided to establish
such an operation.10 The operation was launched on 31 March 2003.11 The
Union has also indicated that it is willing to take over the much larger opera-
tion in Bosnia-Herzegovina from the NATO Stabilization Force.12
Despite the role of these other organizations, this study is limited to UN
and NATO peace support operations, because these two organizations presently
appear to dominate the scene in respect of peace support operations and it
is likely that they will continue to play an important role in the future. These
two organizations have proven military structures, whereas the EU, for ex-
ample, does not at present. Peace support operations by African organizations
are limited by financial constraints.
More specifically than the conduct of UN and NATO peace support opera-
tions in general, the object of study is conduct of peace support operations
that allegedly involve breaches of international humanitarian law. It may be
8 D. Ba, Region Pledges Ivory Coast Force, Urges UN Action, Reuters, 18 December 2002.
9 D. Simpson,Macedonia: Peace Role for Europeans, New York Times, 21 January 2003, Section
A, Column 5, at 5.
10 Council Joint Action 2003/92/CFSP of 27 January 2003 on the European Union military
operation in the Former Yugoslav republic of Macedonia.
11 EU Force Takes Over Peace Role, The Guardian, 31 March 2003.
12 Presidency Conclusions of the Copenhagen European Council 12 and 13 December 2002,
at 8, para. 29.
6 Introduction
noted that this is not a hypothetical possibility, as illustrated by the following
examples.
The UN Security Council established the United Nations Operation in the
Congo (ONUC) in July 1960 to provide the government of the Republic of the
Congowith such military assistance as might be necessary until, through that
government’s efforts with UN technical assistance, the national security forces
might be able, in the opinion of the government, to fully realize their tasks.
The initial mandate of ONUC was to ensure the withdrawal of Belgian forces
from the Republic of the Congo, to assist the government in maintaining law
and order and to provide technical assistance. The function of ONUC was
subsequently modified to include maintaining the territorial integrity and
political independence of the Congo, preventing the occurrence of civil war
and securing the removal from the Congo of all foreign military, paramilitary
and advisory personnel not under UN command, and all mercenaries. The
operation was mainly involved in preventing the armed secession of the
Katanga province. In the course of carrying out thismandate the force became
involved in hostilities with Katangese forces and foreign mercenaries. These
operations gave rise to accusations by governments and non-governmental
organizations of breaches of international humanitarian law by the UN troops.
In particular, the Belgian government complained to the UN about the death
of several Belgian civilians, killed by UN forces in the course of the operations,
and it urged the UN Secretary-General to:
issue immediate instructions that United Nations troops should scrupulously respect
the obligations of the Geneva Convention and take all necessary measures to
safeguard the lives and property of the civilian population, as unfortunately does
not appear to be the case at present.13
The Belgian government made the following specific charges:
1 On several occasions, civilians could not be removed from areas of military opera-
tions, despite urgent requests; in particular, the urgent representations of the
delegate of the International Red Cross for the evacuation of persons trapped in
the new hospital met with no response.
2 Hospitals have been hit, not by isolated shells, but bymortar fire apparently aimed
at them, resulting in the wounding of hospital staff and in heavy damage and
leading to protests by M. Olivet, delegate of the International Red Cross.
3 Civilians not taking part in any military operation have been wounded or even
killed in their homes by mortar and machine-gun fire.
The United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM I) was established by the
UN Security Council in April 1992 to monitor a cease-fire in Mogadishu, the
13 Quoted in F. Seyersted, supra note 1, at 194.
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capital of Somalia, between parties to the civil war in that country, and to
provide protection and security for UN personnel, equipment and supplies
at the seaports and airports inMogadishu and escort deliveries of humanitarian
supplies from there to distribution centers in the city and its immediate en-
virons. After the situation in the country deteriorated, the Security Council
in December 1992 authorized member states to form a Unified Task Force
(UNITAF) to establish a safe environment for the delivery of humanitarian
assistance. UNITAF, led by the United States, was not under UN command and
control and was much more robust than UNOSOM I. It worked in coordination
with UNOSOM I to secure major population centers and ensure that human-
itarian assistance was delivered and distributed. In March 1993 the Security
Council established UNOSOM II to take over from UNITAF. This operation was
given a strong mandate which allowed it to use force to achieve certain ob-
jectives. UNOSOM II became involved in a number of violent incidents with
local forces, in which forcemembers were killed. In February 1994, after several
violent incidents and attacks on UN soldiers, the Security Council revised
UNOSOM II’s mandate to exclude the use of coercive methods. UNOSOM II was
withdrawn in early March 1995. A number of non-governmental organizations
have accused UNOSOM of breaches of international humanitarian law.
The non-governmental organization African Rights issued a report in 1993
detailing alleged breaches of international humanitarian law.14 The report
includes allegations of an attack on a hospital, the shooting of unarmed persons
taking part in demonstrations, other killings of unarmed persons in un-
warranted circumstances, illegal detentions, demolition of property and forced
relocations of persons. Amnesty International published a report in 1994 on
peacekeeping and human rights in which it expressed its concern about the
conduct of UN troops in Somalia and in which it stated that “some of the
civilians killed by UN or US troops seem to have been victims of the use of
lethal force in breach of human rights and International Humanitarian Law
obligations”.15 Belgian, Italian and Canadian personnel have been prosecuted
in their home countries for abuses of the civilian population during the opera-
tions in Somalia.
The UN Security Council authorized the establishment of the Kosovo Force
(KFOR) led by NATO, after the air campaign against the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia had been suspended on 10 June 1999 and after the conclusion of
a Military Technical Agreement between NATO and the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia on 9 June, which provided for the withdrawal of Yugoslav forces
from Kosovo and the deployment of a peace support operation. The operation’s
mandate includes the tasks of maintaining and where necessary enforcing a
cease-fire, establishing a secure environment in which refugees and displaced
persons can return home in safety and the international civil presence can
14 African Rights, Somalia: Human Rights Abuses by the United Nations Forces (1993).
15 Amnesty International, Peace-keeping and Human Rights 13 (1994).
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operate, a transitional administration can be established, and humanitarian
aid can be delivered. The operationwas alsomandated to ensure public safety
and order until the international civil presence established by the UN could
take responsibility for this task. The force has not become involved in hostilities
like ONUC and UNOSOM, but non-governmental organizations, human rights
monitoring bodies and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in
Europe (OSCE) have criticized conduct by the Kosovo Force, in particular
conduct relating to law enforcement. This conduct includes the shooting of
a man, claimed by KFOR to be a sniper, in Mitrovica in February 2000, and
the subsequent detention of several persons, allegedly under inhumane con-
ditions.16 The Special Rapporteur of the United Nations Commission on
Human Rights on the situation of human rights in the former Yugoslavia has
expressed his concern about military detentions by KFOR on grounds that are
too vague and undefined to provide an adequate and transparent framework
for detention.17 If, as it arguably does, the law of occupation is applicable
in Kosovo,18 international humanitarian law is the relevant law to determine
whether this conduct is legal.
5 OUTLINE OF THE STUDY
This study is divided into three parts. The first part is concerned with the
attribution of conduct of peace support operations. Second, the scope of
applicability of rules of international humanitarian law in peace support
operations is examined. The third and final part contains an analysis of the
existing possibilities for invoking responsibility and accountability of peace
support operations for breaches of international humanitarian law, comple-
mented by proposals for improving themeans for invoking responsibility and
accountability.
Part I starts with a discussion in Chapter 1 of the content of the expression
‘peace support operation’ as it is used in this study. This requires a historical
overview of the creation and the evolution of such operations, from the United
16 Amnesty International, Setting the Standard?UNMIKandKFOR’s Response to theViolence
in Mitrovica (2000).
17 Report of the Special Representative of the Commission on Human Rights on the situation
of human rights in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Jose
Cutileiro of 8 January 2002, UNDoc. E/CN.4/2002/41, at 23-24, para. 86-91. See also OSCE
Department of Human Rights and Rule of Law, Kosovo: A Review of the Criminal Justice
System 1 September 2000 – 28 February 2001 (2001).
18 J. Cerone,Minding the Gap: Outlining KFORAccountability in Post-Conflict Kosovo, 12 European
Journal of International Law 469 (2001), at 484-485; T. Irmscher, The Legal Framework for
the Activities of the UnitedNations InterimAdministrationMission in Kosovo: The Charter, Human
Rights, and the Law of Occupation, 44 German Yearbook of International Law 353 (2001); but
see J. Burger, International Humanitarian Law and the Kosovo Crisis: Lessons Learned or to Be
Learned, 82 International Review of the Red Cross 129 (2000).
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Nations Emergency Force established in 1956 to the variety of operations
presently deployed by the UN and NATO. Such an overview is necessary to
understand the distinctions between the many existing ‘peace’ terms, and to
define the object of study. Special legal and operational characteristics of peace
support operations are identified. These characteristics are essential as the basis
for an examination of the attribution of the conduct of peace support operations
in Chapter 2. A theory on the attribution of conduct of peace support opera-
tions to the international organization establishing the operation, troop con-
tributing states and the member states of the organization is presented, based
on a an analysis of elements of the law of state responsibility and the emerging
law of the responsibility of international organizations as mainly demonstrated
through state and organization practice.
Part II in Chapter 3 deals with the question of the scope of application of
international humanitarian law to peace support operations. This requires a
discussion of the extent to which the UN and NATO are bound by general
international law, and the consequences of the special position of the UN
Security Council in this respect. It also requires an examination of the threshold
of application of international humanitarian law; that is, when a peace support
operation can be considered to be a party to an armed conflict or in occupation
of a territory, triggering the application of international humanitarian law.
Chapter 4 addresses the legal consequences of responsibility and accountability
for violations of international humanitarian law, based on a discussion of the
law of state responsibility and responsibility of international organizations
and the practice in peace support operations.
Part III focuses on the practical implementation of responsibility and ac-
countability, particularly the possibilities for the invocation of these concepts.
Chapter 5 provides an overview of the existing mechanisms for invoking
responsibility and accountability. The chapter focuses in particular on the
mechanisms that are at the disposal of individuals. The idea underlying this
approach is that since international humanitarian law grants rights to indivi-
duals, there should also be a mechanism for individuals to obtain redress when
these rights are violated. The chapter concludes that present mechanisms are
not effective. Consequently, Chapter 6 proposes the modification of existing
mechanisms and the establishment of new mechanisms to improve the legal
position of individuals that are injured by breaches of international human-
itarian law by peace support operations. The chapter includes an exploration
of the ombudsperson concept, which is the basis for a proposal to establish
an international humanitarian law ombudsman in peace support operations.
Part IV recapitulates the main findings of this study and its conclusions.
Finally, the views presented in this study represent the views of the author
and do not necessarily represent the views of the Ministry of Defense of the
Netherlands.

1 Definition and characteristics of peace support
operations
1.1 INTRODUCTION
Since the subject matter of this study is ‘peace support operations’ it seems
necessary to give a definition of this term. Also, because the characteristics
of peace support operations have important consequences for the attribution
of responsibility for their conduct it seems necessary to describe these charac-
teristics in some detail. These, the definition of peace support operations and
a description of their characteristics, are the purposes of this chapter.
Giving a definition of peace operations is however not easy. Different
operations that are all referred to as peace support operations by the UN or
writers can differ widely in the field. The Panel on United Nations Peace
Operations in its 2000 report, often referred to as the ‘Brahimi report’ in
reference to the chairman of the Panel, states that: “United Nations peace
operations entail three principal activities: conflict prevention and peacemaking;
peacekeeping; and peace building.”1 But officials of the UN, doctrinal publica-
tions of different national armed forces andwriters use other terms to describe
the same operations and distinguish between different subcategories. The
Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations established by the General
Assembly in 1965 with a mandate of a comprehensive review of the whole
question of peacekeeping operations in all their aspects has tried to develop
guidelines for further peace operations. The Committee produced ‘Draft
Articles of Guidelines for UnitedNations Peacekeeping Operations under the
Authority of the Security Council and in Accordance with the Charter of the
United Nations’ in 1974. The most recent version of the draft was published
in 1977 but it has not been adopted in final version.2 Schmidl states that:
Despite all attempts so far, we still lack a clear set of definitions and a clear ter-
minology. Since 1995, the US term ‘(Military) Operations other than War’ (MOOTW,
OOTW) has been ‘de-emphasized’ as too unprecise (referring to unilateral as well
as to international actions, and such diverse tasks as peacekeeping, counter-drug
operations, or purely humanitarian relief missions) although it is still occasionally
1 Report of the Panel on UnitedNations Peace Operations of 21 August 2000, UNDoc. A/55/
305, S/2000/809, para. 10.
2 Report of the Special Committee on Peace-Keeping Operations, eleventh report of the
working group of 2 December 1977, UN Doc. A/32/394.Ann.2, Appendix 1.
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used, especially among US Marines. Because the term ‘peace operations’ is rather
vague, too, the British (Interim) Manual 5/2 (‘Operations other than War/Wider
Peacekeeping’) of 1994 introduced the term ‘Peace Support Operations’ (PSO) to
better describe the aim of suchmissions: to support the preservation or restoration
of peace in an international context, usually under a mandate from the UN or
another international body. Since then, the term ‘peace support operations’ is
increasingly used in NATO documents.3
Absence of a clear definition is at least in part a consequence of the way in
which peace support operations have developed. The terms ‘peace operations’,
‘peace support operations’ or ‘peacekeeping’ do not appear in the UNCharter.
The concept was invented as an improvised and practical response to the
failure of theUnitedNations Charter system of collective security. Ryan states
that “peacekeeping began as an unplanned response to a particular set of
problems at a particular time.”4 It has continued to develop since its invention
as the UN has tried to manage conflicts changing in nature. Definitions are
influenced to a large extent by historical events, so that an historical account
is necessary to properly understand the context and connotations of a defini-
tion.
It must be pointed out that the absence of express reference to the concept
of peace support operations from the UN Charter has led to debates on their
constitutional basis in the Charter. Until the 1990s peace operations were
considered to fall between Chapters VI and VII of the UN Charter,5 although
writers tried to find more specific answers.6 Clearly such a conclusion is no
longer appropriate for operations in the 1990s that were established on the
basis of Chapter VII.7 In any case the constitutional basis of peace operations
as such is not directly relevant to the questions that this study is concerned
with and will therefore be left out of the discussion.
3 E. Schmidl, The Evolution of Peace Operations from the Nineteenth Century, in E. Schmidl (Ed.),
Peace Operations between War and Peace 4 (2000), at 18.
4 S. Ryan, United Nations Peace-keeping: A Matter of Principles?, in T. Woodhouse & O. Rams-
botham (Eds.), Peacekeeping and Conflict Resolution 27 (2000).
5 It is difficult to subsume all these various operations under any one clause of the Charter.
It is clear that they fall short of the provisions of Chapter VII described above, which deal
with enforcement. At the same time they go beyond purely diplomatic means or those
described in Chapter VI of the Charter. As former Secretary-General Dag Hammerskjöld
put it, peace-keeping might be put in a new Chapter ‘Six and a Half’. United Nations, The
Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peacekeeping 5 (1990).
6 See e.g. J. Halderman, Legal Basis for United Nations Armed Forces, 56 American Journal of
International Law 971 (1962); D. Ciobanu, The Power of the Security Council to Organize Peace-
Keeping Operations, in A. Cassese (Ed.), United Nations Peace-Keeping: Legal Essays 15
(1978).
7 See N.White, The UN Charter and Peacekeeping Forces: Constitutional Issues, inM. Pugh (Ed.),
The UN, Peace and Force 43 (1997).
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1.2 INITIATION OF PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS
The official view in the UN is that the United Nations Truce Supervision
Organization (UNTSO) was the first UN peace support operation.8 After the
General Assembly had adopted a partition plan for Palestine in 1947, fighting
broke out. It intensified when Jewish leaders proclaimed the state of Israel.
The Security Council called for a cease-fire that was accepted by the parties
in question. Because of the Cold War the United States and the Soviet Union
were not willing to let the other intervene. The United Nations Truce Super-
vision Organizationwas established by the Security Council as a neutral third
party to supervise the observance of the cessation of hostilities.9 It consisted
of unarmed military observers acting with the consent of the parties in ques-
tion.
TheUnitedNations Emergency Forcewas instrumental in the development
of the concept of peace support operations.10 On 26 July 1956 Egyptian Presi-
dent Gamal Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal area. Israel in response
attacked Egypt, followed by a British-French ultimatum to both parties to end
the hostilities within twelve hours or face intervention by them. On 3 Novem-
ber, British and French paratroopers commenced their invasion of Egypt.
Between these dates there was much diplomatic action that focused on the
General Assembly because of the threat of the British or French veto in the
Security Council. In these circumstances a proposal by Canadian Foreign
Minister Lester Pearson for an international force with a mandate to keep the
peace found more and more support. On 3 November the General Assembly
adopted a resolution requesting the Secretary-General to submit a plan for
setting up, with the consent of the nations concerned, an emergency force to
secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities.11 On 4 November Secretary-
General Dag Hammarskjöld presented an interim report and on 6 November
a final report that laid down principles for the force which until now are
quoted as authoritative principles for peace support operations .12 These
principles included that the chief officer of the force should be appointed by
the UnitedNations, and that he should be responsible ultimately to the General
Assembly and the Security Council. His authority should be so defined as to
make him fully independent of any one nation. Another principle was that
since the force resulted fromGeneral Assembly action according to the Uniting
for Peace Resolution, the force could not use powers under Chapter VII of the
8 United Nations, The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peacekeeping 4 (1996).
9 Security Council resolution 50 of 29 May 1948, UN Doc. S/RES/50 (1948).
10 For the account of the establishment of UNEF see M. Fröhlich, Keeping Track of UN Peace-
keeping – Suez, Srebrenica, Rwanda and the Brahimi Report, 5 Max Planck Yearbook of United
Nations Law 185 (2001), at 192-211. See also R. Higgins, United Nations Peacekeeping:
Documents and Commentary: 1, the Middle East (1969).
11 General Assembly Resolution 998 of 4 November 1956, UN Doc. A/RES/998 (ES-I).
12 UN Doc. A/3289 of 4 November 1956 and UN Doc. A/3302 of 6 November 1956
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United Nations Charter, which could only be invoked by the Security Council.
The legal basis of the force’s presence rested on the consent of the parties
concerned. Hammarskjöld stated that the force was limited in its operations
“to the extent that consent of the parties concerned is required under generally
recognized international law.”13 On the basis of these principles General
Assembly Resolution 1001 established the UnitedNations Emergency Force.14
Because it was the first armed peace operation that could use force in self-
defense, the operationwas amajor departure from the past practice of sending
only a few unarmed observers.
UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld insisted on specific principles
for the force because he was convinced that the force should set a precedent
for future operations. He prepared two reports on the experience derived from
the establishment and operation of the force .15 In the second report he stated
that in:
the following paragraphs, certain principles and rules are laid down in the light
of the experience gathered in the past years, which, if they were to meet with the
approval of the General Assembly, would provide a continuing basis on which
useful contacts might be established with interested Governments, with the aim
of being prepared for any requests which might arise from future decisions by the
Assembly on a force or similar arrangement to deal with a specific case.16
The three main principles are consent of the host state to the presence of the
force; impartiality of the force and non-intervention in the state’s domestic
affairs; and the non-use of force except in self-defense. Some writers add the
exclusion of the permanent members of the Security Council from participating,
and UN control over the force, to the list.17
1.3 DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONCEPT OF PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS
The principles established by the United Nations Emergency Force were the
model for peace support operations in the next decades. Until the withdrawal
of the force in 1967 after Egypt withdrew its consent, seven other peace opera-
tions were established in what Wiseman calls the ‘assertive period’ of peace
13 UN Doc. A/3302 of 6 November 1956, para. 9.
14 General Assembly Resolution 1001 of 7 November 1956, UN Doc. A/RES/1001 (ES-I).
15 UN Doc. A/3694 of 9 October 1957 and UN Doc. A/3943 of 9 October 1958.
16 UN Doc. A/3943 of 9 October 1958.
17 M. Goulding, The Evolution of United Nations Peacekeeping, 69 International Affairs 451 (1993);
D. Brown, The Role of the United Nations in Peacekeeping and Truce-monitoring: What are the
Applicable Norms, 27 Revue Belge de Droit International 559 (1994).
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operations.18 The withdrawal of the Emergency Force called into question
the effectiveness of peace operations causing no new operations to be created
until 1973 in a dormant period. After 1973 there was a resurgent period in
which three new operations were established including a second United
Nations Emergency Force in Egypt to supervise the cessation of hostilities
between Israel and Egypt after the Yom Kippur war.19 Between 1978 and
1988 there was again a period in which no new operations were established.
Some of these operations established between 1956 and 1988 consisted of
observers who did not carry arms andwhose task was tomonitor the situation
in a particular area and report to the organization similar to the United Nations
Truce Supervision Organization. Other operations consisted of armedmilitary
forces with a broadermandate similar to the UnitedNations Emergency Force.
Together these two kinds of operations were called ‘peace-keeping operations’
by the United Nations. A 1990 United Nations monograph on peace operations
stated:
United Nations peace-keeping operations can be divided into broad categories:
observer missions, which consist largely of officers who are almost invariably
unarmed; and peace-keeping forces, which consist of lightly armed infantry units,
with the necessary logistic support elements.20
These categories are not watertight. For example, unarmed observers may assist
an armed operation. All the operations established until 1988 to a large extent
were based on the principles developed in the UnitedNations Emergency Force
as reviewed above.
Consent of the host state is a principle that necessarily arises out of the
character of peace operations – at least until 1988 – as operations not estab-
lished under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. They are bound by Article 2,
paragraph 7, of the Charter, which provides that nothing shall authorize the
UN to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic juris-
diction of any state. Except when the Security Council decides to send a force
under Chapter VII, the initial consent of the host state to the entry of the force
is legally required. Consent of the host state has to be continuous. Once it is
withdrawn the operation can no longer stay in the country. This was illustrated
by the withdrawal of the United Nations Emergency Force after the Egyptian
government formally asked for the force to be withdrawn from its territory
on 18 May 1967.21 In a report on the withdrawal of the Emergency Force
18 H. Wiseman, Peacekeeping: Appraisals and Proposals (1983)
19 Security Council Resolution 340 of 25 October 1973, UN Doc. S/RES/340.
20 United Nations, The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peacekeeping 8 (1990).
21 See e.g. N. Elaraby, United Nations Peacekeeping by Consent: A Case Study of the Withdrawal
of the United Nations Emergency Force, in J. Norton Moore (Ed.), The Arab-Israeli Conflict,
Volume II: Readings 620 (1974).
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Secretary-General U Thant stated in relation to the General Assembly resolu-
tions on the force that it:
was thus a basic legal principle arising from the nature of the Force, and clearly
understood by all concerned, that the consent of Egypt was a prerequisite to the
stationing of UNEF on Egyptian territory, and it was a practical necessity as well
in acquiring contingents for the Force.22
Consent is what distinguishes peace support operations from enforcement
action.23 The International Court of Justice confirmed this distinction it its
advisory opinion in theCertain Expenses of the United Nations case. The question
before the Court was whether expenses authorized by the General Assembly
relating to the UnitedNations Emergency Force and theUnitedNations Force
in the Congo (ONUC) were expenses of the organization within the meaning
of Article 17, paragraph 2 of the United Nations Charter. The Court dis-
tinguished between the power to take action under Chapter VII of the United
Nations Charter or “coercive or enforcement action” that is solely within the
province of the Security Council, and the power to take other measures with
respect to the maintenance of international peace and security that the General
Assembly also has. The Court stated that the UnitedNations Emergency Force
and the UnitedNations Operation in the Congowere not enforcement actions
within the compass of Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. It explained
in the case of the Emergency Force, whose mandate was to secure and super-
vise the cessation of hostilities, that the:
verb ‘secure’ as applied to such matters as halting the movement of military forces
and arms into the area and the conclusion of a cease-fire, might suggest measures
of enforcement, were it not that the Force was set up ‘with the consent of the
nations concerned’.24
In interstate conflict it is clear that the consent of the governments concerned
is required. In intra-state conflict, however, the question iswhether the consent
of other, non-state actors, is required. In contrast to host-state consent consent
of non-state actors is not legally necessary. This is illustrated for example by
the establishment of the establishment of the United Nations Interim Force
in Lebanon (UNIFIL). In the relevant resolution the Security Council refers only
to the request from the government of Lebanon to establish such a force even
though the government did not control a large part of its territory.25 Similarly
22 UN Doc. A/6730/Add.3 of 26 June 1967, para. 70.
23 N. Quoc Dinh, P. Daillier & A. Pellet, Droit International Public 966 (1999); E. Suy, Legal
Aspects of UN Peace-keeping Operations, 35 Netherlands International LawReview 318 (1988).
24 Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Article 17, paragraph 2 of the Charter), Advisory
Opinion of 20 July 1962, 1962 ICJ Reports 151, at 170.
25 Security Council Resolution 425 of 19 March 1978, UN Doc. S/RES/425.
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the Security Council has continued to extend the mandate of the United
Nations Force in Cyprus by reference to the consent of the government of
Cyprus even though a large part of the island is controlled by another ad-
ministration supported by Turkey.26 In practice the United Nations has always
tried to also gain the consent of relevant actors other than the host state as
a matter of practical necessity. A peace support operation is not able to func-
tion without the co-operation of the parties on the ground. This practical
necessity in certain cases also results in reference to non-state actors in enabling
resolutions. The preamble to Security Council Resolution 872 establishing the
United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda, for example, stresses the
urgency of the deployment of an international force “as underlined both by
the Government of the Republic of Rwanda and by the Rwandese Patriotic
Front.”27
Impartiality is the requirement that a force is not to advance the interests
of one party against those of another.28 Hammarskjöld, in his final report
on the establishment of the Emergency Force, stated that the UN did not intend
to “influence the military balance in the conflict and, thereby, the political
balance affecting efforts to settle the conflict.”29 The principle of impartiality
is related to the character of peace operations as a holding action, an attempt
to create a peaceful environment in which the parties themselves can resolve
their disputes peacefully.
The requirement of theminimumuse of force is related to the requirement
of consent. In principle a peace support operation has the co-operation of the
host state and does not need to resort to force. The co-operation of the parties
should guarantee that problems are resolved through negotiation. The only
exception is the use of force in self-defense. Such use of force cannot be ex-
cluded because it is an inherent right. According to a memorandum of the
United Nations Office of Legal Affairs “the use of force in self-defense is an
inherent right of United Nations forces exercised to preserve a collective and
individual defense.”30 The concept of self-defense in peace operations evolved
over time.31 Hammarskjöld wrote in his report on the Emergency Force that
the:
rule is applied that men engaged in the operation may never take the initiative
in the use of armed force, but are entitled to respond with force to an attack with
arms, including attempts to use force tomake themwithdraw frompositionswhich
26 See e.g. Security Council Resolution 1416 of 13 June 2002, UN Doc. S/RES/1416.
27 Security Council Resolution 872 of 5 October 1993, UN Doc. S/RES/872.
28 See S. Vohra, Impartiality in United Nations Peace-Keeping, 9 Leiden Journal of International
Law 63 (1996).
29 UN Doc. A/3302 of 6 November 1956, para. 8.
30 UNJY 1993, at 372.
31 K. Cox, Beyond Self-defense: United Nations Peacekeeping Operations & the Use of Force, 27
Denver Journal of International Law & Policy 239 (1999).
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they occupy under orders from the Commander, acting under the authority of the
Assembly and within the scope of its resolutions. The basic element involved is
clearly the prohibition against any initiative in the use of armed force.32
In the case of the UnitedNations Force in Cyprus the definition of self-defense
was expanded. The Secretary-General in an aide-mémoire repeated the rule that
troops were not to take the initiative in the use of armed force but also stated
that they could use force in self-defense where:
specific arrangements accepted by both communities have been or … are about
to be violated, thus risking a recurrence of fighting or endangering law and order
… [or where there were] attempts by force to prevent them from carrying out their
responsibilities as ordered by their commanders.33
In the case of the secondUnitedNations Emergency Force (UNEF II) self-defense
was redefined as including “resistance to attempts by forcefulmeans to prevent
it from discharging its duties under the mandate of the Security Council.”34
This definition may be regarded as covering all subsequent UN peace opera-
tions.
These definitions of self-defense by the Secretary-General are broad guide-
lines that require interpretation, as described for example in a case study of
the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon by Murphy.35 Definitions by
the Secretary-General are political statements that are not appropriate for use
by the members of a peace operation in the field. Rules of Engagement (ROE)
express themilitary consequences of these political guidelines.36 United States
military doctrine states that in:
peace operations, ROE define when and how force may be used. ROE may reflect
the law of armed conflict and operational considerations but are principally con-
cernedwith restraints on the use of force. ROE are also the primarymeans bywhich
commanders convey legal, political, diplomatic, and military guidance to the
military force.37
32 UN Doc. A/3943 of 8 October 1958, para. 179.
33 UN Doc. S/5653 (1964), para 17 (c)-18 (c).
34 UN Doc. S/11052/Rev.1 of 12 October 1973, para. 4 (a).
35 R. Murphy, UN Peacekeeping in Lebanon and the Use of Force, 6 International Peacekeeping
38 (1999).
36 See e.g. A. Paphiti, Rules of Engagement within Multinational Land Operations, 89 Militair
Rechtelijk Tijdschrift 1 (1996).
37 United States Field Manual 100-23, Peace Operations, Chapter 3.
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In United Nations peace operations ROE are developed and issued by the UN
though troop-contributing states may be involved in their development.38
Each operation has rules of engagement that apply to all contingents, but in
translations of these rules for individual contingents by their governments
further restrictions may be imposed. Sometimes commanders interpret rules
in a way that conflicts with the interpretation by other commanders.39
A definition of peacekeeping operations by the United Nations in 1990
reflects these principles that developed in the practice of peace support opera-
tions described above:
As the United Nations practice has evolved over the years, a peacekeeping opera-
tion has come to be defined as an operation involving military personnel, but
without enforcement powers, undertaken by the United Nations to help maintain
or restore international peace and security in areas of conflict. These operations
are voluntary and are based on consent and co-operation. While they involve the
use of military personnel, they achieve their objectives not by force of arms, thus
contrasting them with the ‘enforcement action’ of the United Nations under Ar-
ticle 42.40
1.4 NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS AFTER 1988
In 1990, however, the classical model of peace support operationswas already
changing. The deployment of the United Nations Transition Assistance Group
(UNTAG) in Namibia in 1989 marked the first of a new type of peace opera-
tions.41 These operationswere deployed as part of a negotiated political settle-
ment and the responsibilities of peacekeepers included a range of new tasks
such as disarmament, resettlement of refugees, police training and supervision
and election monitoring. Such operations were referred to as complex, multi-
functional or second-generation operations to distinguish them from first
generation operations whose principal function was limited to separation of
the parties.42 United Nations Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali wrote in a 1993
article that it:
38 As expressed for example by the government of the Netherlands in a letter to parliament
relating to the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea. Bijlagen Handelingen II
2000-01, 22 831, nr. 10, at17.
39 See e.g. B. Janssens, Les Règles d’Engagement pendant les Opérations des Nations Unies en Somalie,
35 Military Law and Law of War Review 209 (1996).
40 United Nations, supra note 20, at 4.
41 See e.g. N.J. Schrijver, Introducing Second Generation Peace-keeping: the case of Namibia, 6 African
Journal of International and Comparative Law 1 (1994).
42 See e.g. R. Lee, United Nations Peacekeeping: Developments and Prospects, 28 Cornell Inter-
national Law Journal 619 (1995);M. Griffin, Retrenchment, Reform and Regionalization: Trends
in UN Peace Support Operations, 6 International Peacekeeping 1 (1999), at 2.
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is now almost always the case that operations undertaken by the United Nations
must include civilian police, electoral personnel, human rights experts, information
specialists, and a significant number of political advisory staff.
U.N. operations may now involve nothing less than the reconstruction of an entire
society and state. This requires a comprehensive approach, over an extended
period.43
In this period East-West relations improved and there was an unprecedented
level of political will on the part of most of its members, most significantly
the P-5, to address a broad range of conflicts leading to the establishment of
five new operations in 1988-1989 alone.44 This optimism was reflected in the
Secretary-General’s 1992 Agenda for Peace, a strategy document for United
Nations action in preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peacekeeping.45
Two proposed departures from previous practice in AnAgenda for Peace were
critical. First, the document defined peacekeeping as the “deployment of a
UnitedNations presence in the field, hitherto with the consent of all the parties
concerned.”46 Here was a clear signal that the UN might, in some instances,
seek to deploy operationswithout consent of the parties to the conflict. Second,
the document proposed the utilization of peace-enforcement units in cases
where the UN is called upon to send forces to restore andmaintain a cease-fire
and this task exceeds the mission of peace-keeping forces and the expectations
of peace-keeping force contributors. Such peace-enforcement units would be
warranted under Article 40 of the UN Charter.
These proposals demonstrated awillingness to depart from the established
principles of peace operations. In the same 1992 article referred to above, the
Secretary-General wrote:
And when the established rules of engagement for peacekeeping operations are
no longer sufficient, U.N. forces may need authorization to demonstrate a resolve
to use force. If this is not effective, the situation may call for wider rules of engage-
ment so that U.N. peacekeepers may react to force and, in some cases, use force
to forestall an escalation in violence.
Between Chapter VI and Chapter VII lie cases which are sui generis and where
earlier certainties about actions with or without the parties’ agreement may need
to be re-examined with each new approach.47
43 B. Boutros-Ghali, Beyond Peacekeeping, 25 New York University Journal of International Law
and Politics 113 (1992), at 115.
44 D. Malone & K. Wermester, The Changing Nature of UN Peacekeeping, 7 International Peace-
keeping 37 (2000), at 39.
45 UN Doc. S/24111 of 17 June 1992, reproduced in 31 ILM 953 (1992). See specifically para-
graph 3 for the optimism in United Nations action.
46 Id., para. 20.
47 B. Boutros-Ghali, supra note 43, at 120.
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These ideas played an important role in the establishment and management
of UN operations in the former Yugoslavia and in Somalia, established in the
wake of An Agenda for Peace. These operations were given the power to use
force under Chapter VII of the UNCharter for specific purposes other than self-
defense, a radical departure from the established principle of the minimal use
of force.48 Somewriters referred to these operations as ‘third-generation peace-
keeping’ because of this departure from established doctrine. The United
Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) was established in February 1992 with
a mandate to demilitarize three ‘United Nations Protected Areas’, monitor
police activities and assist in the return of displaced persons to the protected
areas.49 When the conflict in the former Yugoslavia spread to Bosnia-Herze-
govina, the mandate of the operation came to include a number of activities
in Bosnia-Herzegovina, including ensuring the security of Sarajevo airport
and the protection of the delivery of humanitarian assistance.50 The mandate
was expanded several times, inter alia with the task of deterring attacks against
towns designated as ‘safe areas’ in Resolution 824. Resolution 776 authorized
UNPROFOR to use force to secure the delivery of humanitarian assistance under
Chapter VII. Resolution 836 authorized it to use force to deter attacks against
the ‘safe areas’, to monitor the cease-fire, to promote the withdrawal of military
and paramilitary units other than those of the government of the Republic
of Bosnia-Herzegovina and to occupy some key points on the ground under
Chapter VII. It is well-known that this did not have the desired effect and that
air strikes by NATO, authorized under Security Council Resolutions 770 and
836, forced the parties to accept the Dayton Peace Agreements in 1995.
The Security Council established the second United Nations Operation in
Somalia (UNOSOM II) in March 1993 to take over from the United States-led
Unified Task Force. The Secretary-General recommended a broad mandate
for the force and the endowment of enforcement powers under Chapter VII
of the UN Charter.51 He was especially concerned that the task of disarming
the parties should be enforceable.52 The Security Council adopted the re-
commendations of the Secretary-General in Resolution 814. The resolution gave
the force a broad mandate, including monitoring the cessation of hostilities,
protecting personnel, installations and equipment of the United Nations, its
agencies and non-governmental organizations, assisting in the repatriation
of refugees and disarming factions, and gave the force enforcement powers
under Chapter VII to accomplish its mandate.53 Over time hostility toward
the operation developed among factions in Somalia, and in particular the
48 See e.g. C. Gray, Host-state Consent and United Nations Peacekeeping in Yugoslavia, 7 Duke
Journal of Comparative & International Law 241 (1996).
49 Security Council Resolution 743 of 21 February 1992, UN Doc. S/RES/743.
50 Security Council Resolution 758 of 8 June 1992, UN Doc. S/RES/758.
51 UN Doc. S/25354 of 3 March 1993, para. 56-68.
52 UN Doc. S/25354 of 3 March 1993, para. 63.
53 Security Council Resolution 814 of 26 March 1993, UN Doc. S/RES/814.
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faction led byMohamedAidid. On 5 June 1993 the force was ambushedwhen
it tried to inspect a weapons storage site of Mr. Aidid’s faction and eighteen
Pakistani peacekeeperswere killed. The next day the Security Council adopted
Resolution 837, which reaffirmed that “the Secretary-General is authorized
under Resolution 814 (1993) to take all necessary measures against all those
responsible for the armed attacks.”54 Lalande explains that the:
reaction of the UN to the attack against its forces sparked a guerrilla-type war in
Mogadishu, with UNOSOM II becoming a newwarring party in the civil war, which
was contrary to its mandate to restore law and order in the country.55
On 3 October 1993, United States Rangers deployed to assist the United
Nations force yet remaining under United States command, launched an
operation in south Mogadishu aimed at capturing a number of key aides of
General Aidid who were suspected of complicity in the 5 June attack. During
the course of the operation, two United States helicopters were shot down
by Somali militiamen using automatic weapons and rocket-propelled grenades.
In the fight that followed eighteen Rangers and oneMalaysian member of the
UN operation were killed. Following the events of 3 October 1993, President
Clinton announced the intention of the United States to withdraw its forces
from Somalia by 31 March 1994. This led other governments to do the same
and ultimately led to the withdrawal of the United Nations Operation in the
beginning of 1995.
United Nations operations in the former Yugoslavia and Somalia not only
were authorized to usemore force than previous operations, they also departed
from the principle of consent. Kofi Annan (then Under-Secretary-General for
Peacekeeping Operations) wrote in 1994 that “the need for consent of the
parties was overridden by humanitarian concerns.”56 The weakening of the
principle of consent was related to a change in the type of conflicts confronting
the UN from primarily interstate to much more complex intrastate conflicts
in which only some of the parties may give their consent or in which factions
that give consent may not have full control over their areas.
At the same time the principle of consent was not totally abandoned, as
illustrated by the withdrawal of UNPROFOR from Croatia when that state
withdrew its consent for the operation.57 UNOSOM II also to a certain extent
54 Security Council Resolution 837 of 6 June 1993, Un Doc. S/RES/837, para. 5.
55 S. Lalande, Somalia: Major Issues for Future UN Peacekeeping, in D. Warner (Ed.), New
Dimensions of Peacekeeping 69 (1995), at 92.
56 K. Annan, Peace-keeping in Situations of Civil War, 26 New York University Journal of
International Law & Politics 623 (1994), at 624. See also O. Corten & P. Klein, Action
Humanitaire et Chapitre VII: La Redéfinition du Mandat et des Moyens d’Action des Forces des
Nations Unies, 39 Annuaire Français de Droit International 105 (1993).
57 C. Gray, supra note 48, at 265-269.
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relied on consent. Other factions than the one led by Mr. Aidid continued to
co-operate with the operation.58
The operations in the former Yugoslavia and Somalia were generally
considered unsuccessful.59 The UN was also criticized for standing by while
genocide took place in Rwanda in 1994 while a UN peace support operation
was deployed there.60 This perception of United Nations failure led to a re-
thinking of peace support operations symbolized by a famous 1994 article by
Adam Roberts entitled “The Crisis in UN Peacekeeping.”61 Within the UN this
rethinking led to a retrenchment. The euphoria that accompanied the end of
the Cold War and the accompanying expectation that the Security Council
would finally take center stage in the maintenance of international peace and
security as the drafters of the Charter intended, an expectation that was re-
flected in An Agenda for Peace, did not last. It was felt that the UN should
return to the principles of traditional peacekeeping: consent, impartiality and
the minimum use of force. Departure from these principles was regarded as
the cause of the problems with the operations in the former Yugoslavia and
Somalia.62 Peacekeeping and enforcement should be clearly distinguished.63
In 1995, the Secretary-General presented a supplement to An Agenda for
Peace that reflected these ideas. The Secretary-General stated that UN peace-
keeping operations should respect the principles of consent, impartiality and
the non-use of force except in self-defense.64 According to the Secretary-Gen-
eral this was illustrated by the operations in the former Yugoslavia and Soma-
lia. In both cases, existing peacekeeping operations were given additional
mandates that required the use of force and therefore could not be combined
with existing mandates requiring the consent of the parties, impartiality and
the non-use of force. It was also not possible for them to be executed without
much stronger military capabilities than had been made available. Peace-
keeping and enforcement did not mix well because the:
logic of peace-keeping flows from political and military premises that are quite
distinct from those of enforcement; and the dynamics of the latter are incompatible
with the political process that peace-keeping is intended to facilitate. To blur the
58 See also G. McDonald, Peace Enforcement: Mapping the ’Middle Ground’ in Peace Opera-
tions, dissertation University of Geneva 2001 (unpublished), UNOSOM II, Consent.
59 M. Bothe, United Nations Forces, EPIL 1107 (1992), at 1113; C. Crocker, The Lessons of
Somalia: Not Everything Went Wrong, 74 Foreign Affairs 2 (1995).
60 See e.g. M. Boot, Paving the Road to Hell: The Failure of U.N. Peacekeeping, 79 Foreign Affairs
143 (2000); M. Barnett, Eyewitness to a Genocide: The United Nations and Rwanda (2002).
61 A. Roberts, The Crisis in UN Peacekeeping, 36 Survival 93 (1994).
62 See e.g. S. Tharoor, The Changing Face of Peace-keeping and Peace-enforcement, 19 Fordham
International Law Journal 408 (1995); R. Higgins, Second-Generation Peacekeeping, 89 ASIL
Proc. 275 (1995).
63 M. Berdal, The Security Council, Peacekeeping and Internal Conflcit after the Cold War, 7 Duke
Journal of Comparative & International Law 71 (1996).
64 B. Boutros-Ghali, UN Doc. S/1995/1 of 3 January 1995, para. 33.
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distinction between the two can undermine the viability of the peace-keeping
operation and endanger its personnel.65
The Secretary-General also stated that neither the Security Council nor the
Secretary-General at present had the capacity to deploy, direct, command and
control operations for the purpose of enforcement action, except perhaps on
a very limited scale.66 He instead emphasized increased reliance on states
and regional organizations as a possible approach in enforcement actions, but
also in peacekeeping.
Co-operation between regional organizations and the UN could take a
number of forms including operational support and co-deployment. This new
approach of amore important role for regional organizations has been followed
ever since.67 In 1999 Kofi Annan wrote:
In recent years, the Secretariat has seen a wide-ranging consideration of the ways
in which regional actors can enhance their participation in United Nations work
for peace. In view of certain practical and political limitations, such partnerships
cannot be considered a panacea to the problems facing peacekeeping. However,
they have, in certain situations and under the right conditions, proved crucial to
advancing peace.68
1.5 REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS, IN PARTI-
CULAR THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION
Though there is criticism of the way in which regional organizations carry
out their newfound role and of a perceived lack of United Nations control,69
there is no indication that the role will become less important. There are a
number of examples of regional or subregional organizations that have carried
65 Id., para. 35.
66 Id., para. 77.
67 See e.g. E. Berman, The Security Council’s Increasing Reliance on Burden-Sharing: Collaboration
or Abrogation?, 5 International Peacekeeping 1 (1998); J. Morris & H. McCoubrey, Regional
Peacekeeping in the Post-Cold War Era, 6 International Peacekeeping 129 (1999).
68 Report of the Secretary-General on the Implementation of the Recommendations of the
Special Committee on PeacekeepingOperations of 23 February 1999, UNDoc. A/AC.121/43,
para. 81.
69 See e.g. W. Dorn, Regional Peacekeeping Is Not the Way, 27 Peacekeeping and International
Relations 1 (1998); N. Blokker, Is the Authorization Authorized? Powers and Practice of the UN
Security Council to Authorize the Use of Force by ’Coalitions of the Able and Willing’, 11 European
Journal of International Law 541 (2000); E. de Wet, The Relationship between the Security
Council and Regional Organizations during Enforcement Action under Chapter VII of the United
Nations Charter, 71 Nordic Journal of International Law 1 (2002).
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out peace support operations in the past or that are carrying out such opera-
tions in the present.70
In Latin America, the Organization of American States (OAS) has played
a role in the maintenance of regional security. One example is the case of the
intervention in the Dominican Republic in 1965. In that year the United States
deployed a force to the Dominican Republic which it labeled a ‘peacekeeping
force’. The United States sought retroactive OAS authorization for this force.
In response the OAS adopted a resolution establishing the ‘Inter-American
Armed Force in theDominican Republic’. This interventionwas highly contro-
versial and led to extensive debates in the Security Council.71
In Africa, there are a number of organizations that have deployed peace
support operations. The Organization of African Unity (OAU) established a
peace support operation in Chad in 1979 with a mandate to ensure the defense
and security of the country whilst awaiting the integration of government
forces. The force, which operated from 1980 to 1982, encountered great dif-
ficulties and failed in the realization of its objectives.72 Following this failure,
the OAU in 1995 established a mechanism for conflict prevention, management
and resolution that was a significant improvement on previous practice and
structures. After the establishment of the mechanism the OAU deployed small
missions in Rwanda (1990-1993), Burundi (1993-1996), the Comoros (1997-1999)
and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC, 1999-2000).73 When in 2002 the
OAU was replaced by the African Union (AU), foreign ministers agreed on the
need to set up a robust stand-by peace force.74 In April 2003 the AU deployed
its first peace support operation in Burundi. The operation’s mandate is to
supervise ceasefire accords between the Burundi government and three Hutu
opposition groups.75
The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has fielded
operations in Liberia (1990-1999), Sierra Leone (1997-2000)76 and Guinea-Bissau
(1998-1999). In 2003 ECOWAS established yet another peace support operation
in Liberia in anticipation of a United Nations operation.77
70 See generally H. McCoubrey & J. Morris, Regional Peacekeeping in the Post-ColdWar Era
(2000).
71 See A.F. Lowenthal, The Dominican Intervention (1972), C.G. Fenwick, The Dominican
Republic: Intervention or Collective Self-Defense, 60 American Journal of International Law
64 (1966).
72 See G. Naldi, Peace-keeping Attempts by the Organisation of African Unity, 334 International
& Comparative Law Quarterly 593 (1985).
73 E. Berman & K. Sams, Regional Peacekeeping in Africa, 3 Conflict Trends 50 (2001).
74 See African Ministers Agree on Robust Peacekeeping Force, Agence France Presse, 1 July 2002.
75 African Union ready to deploy Burundi peacekeeping force: South Africa, Agence France Presse,
18 February 2003.
76 See M. Gasiokwu, ECOWAS Intervention in Liberia and Sierra Leone: A New Dimension in
regional Security Systems, 24 Polish Yearbook of International Law 157 (2001).
77 See K. Vick, Troops Land in Liberia: West African Forces Begin International Mission, The
Washington Post, 5 August 2003.
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The Central AfricanMonetary and Economic Community (CEMAC) deployed
a peace support operation in the Central African Republic in 2003. Despite
a coup in March 2003 that toppled President Patassé, the force remained in
the country with a redefined mandate.78
In Europe, the European Union (EU) is quite ambitious in respect of peace
support. The development of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP)
and the role of the so-called ‘Petersberg tasks’ will not be described in detail.
This development could be said to have started at the 1999 Helsinki European
Council where the Heads of State and Government decided to proceed toward
the practical implementation of the security ambitions of the Amsterdam Treaty
and the Cologne European Council Declaration. In particular, the Helsinki
Council agreed that the EU should be able in 2003 to deploy within 60 days
and sustain for at least one year military forces of up to 50,000-60,000 persons
capable of the full range of Petersberg tasks.79 These tasks are humanitarian
and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and combat-force tasks in crisismanage-
ment, including peacemaking. In April 2003 the European Rapid Reaction Force
was declared operational.80
In January 2003 the EU launched a peace support operation, namedOpera-
tion Concordia, in the Former Yugoslav Republic ofMacedonia as a follow-on
to the NATO operation there. On 27 January 2003 the Council adopted a Joint
Action for this purpose.81 This was the first military operation of the EU. In
July 2003, at the request of the Macedonian government, the operation’s
mandate was extended until 15 December 2003. The Macedonian operation
is a relatively modest venture, consisting of a small amount of troops. In June
2003 the EU decided to take on a more challenging task in establishing a peace
support operation in the DRC, namedOperation Artemis and comprising 1400
troops.82 This is the first EU operation outside the European continent. The
operationwas authorized by theUnitedNations Security Council in Resolution
1484, which also set out the force’s mandate. This operation is seen as a test
for the capability of the EU to carry out a larger-scale peace support operation.
This is particularly relevant because the EU has indicated it is interested in
taking over the lead of the Stablization Force in Bosnia from NATO.
78 See Central African leaders seek to keep peacekeeping force in CAR, Agence France Presse, 21
March 2003.
79 Presidency Conclusions of the European Council Meeting InHelsinki, 10 and 11 December
1999, Doc. SN300/1/99, para. 28.
80 Declaration on the Operational Capability of the Common European Security and Defence
Policy, Annex II to the Presidency Conclusions of the European Council Meeting In Laeken,
14 and 15 December 2001, Doc. SN300/1/01REV1.
81 Council Joint Action 2003/92/CFSP of 27 January 2003 on the European Union military
operation in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.
82 See Council Joint Action 2003/423/CFSP of 5 June 2003 on the European Union military
operation in the Democratic Republic of Congo.
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The above demonstrates that there are various regional or sub-regional
organizations with the ambition to play an important role in the peace support
‘business’. At present these organizations have their limitations, however. In
the case of African organizations, for example, these are mostly financial: most
African countries are not capable of undertaking peace support operations
without substantial external assistance. In the case of the EU, its military
structures have not yet been proven, especially in operations where it cannot
make use of NATO assets. For this reason NATO is, at least under the present
circumstances, the most important regional actor in the field of peace support
operations.
While the United Nations was experiencing difficulties with peacekeeping
in the early 1990s, NATO was looking for a new role. It was established in 1949
as a collective defensive organization mainly to defend Western Europe and
the United States against the Eastern Bloc. After the ColdWar it needed a new
role. This new role has been defined more and more as including peace
support operations.83 In 1992, the organization’s foreign ministers declared
that the organization was prepared to support, on a case by case basis, peace-
keeping activities under the responsibility of Conference for Security and Co-
operation in Europe.84 This was followed six months later by a similar declara-
tion concerning UN operations.85 In NATO’s 1999 Strategic Concept, the organiza-
tion states:
In pursuit of its policy of preserving peace, preventing war, and enhancing security
and stability and as set out in the fundamental security tasks, NATO will seek, in
cooperation with other organisations, to prevent conflict, or, should a crisis arise,
to contribute to its effective management, consistent with international law, in-
cluding through the possibility of conducting non-Article 5 crisis response opera-
tions. The Alliance’s preparedness to carry out such operations supports the broader
objective of reinforcing and extending stability and often involves the participation
of NATO’s Partners. NATO recalls its offer, made in Brussels in 1994, to support on
a case-by-case basis in accordancewith its own procedures, peacekeeping and other
operations under the authority of the UN Security Council or the responsibility of
the OSCE, including by making available Alliance resources and expertise.86
In the former Yugoslavia the organization initially used limited coercion in
support of the UN Operation by providing air support. In 1995, greater use
of air power and the emplacement of a Rapid Reaction Force by the organiza-
83 See D. Lightburn, NATO and the Challenge of Multifunctional Peacekeeping, 44 NATO Review
10 (1996); D. Boothby, Background paper, Report of an International PeaceAcademy Seminar
on UN/NATO Relationship, New York, 11 June 1999.
84 Final Communique of the Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, 4 June 1992,
para. 11.
85 Final Communique of the Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, 17 December
1992, para 4.
86 Strategic Concept 1999, para. 31.
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tion, authorized by the Security Council under Chapter VII of the UN Charter,
followed.
The 1995 Dayton Peace Agreements provided for the replacement of the
UN Operation in the former Yugoslavia by a NATO-led Implementation Force
(IFOR) to help ensure compliance with the agreements. The Security Council
authorized the force in Resolution 1031 in which it noted the consent of the
parties to the multinational implementation force.87 Nevertheless, the Council,
acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, authorized the force to take all
necessary measures to effect the implementation and to ensure compliance
with its mandate.88 In 1996 the force was replacedwith the NATO-led Stabiliza-
tion Force (SFOR) with essentially the same mandate.
After Operation Allied Force, the intervention by the organization in
Kosovo in early 1999, the Security Council authorized a NATO-led Kosovo Force
(KFOR). The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia gave its consent for the force in
aMilitary-Technical Agreement between that state and the commander of the
Kosovo force on 9 June 1999.89
Under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the Security Council authorized the
establishment of the force in Resolution 1244with all necessarymeans to fulfil
its responsibilities.90 The mandate of the force is essentially to facilitate the
conditions under which a United Nations-led transitional administration
(UNMIK) can operate.91
It may be pointed out that since the early 1990s, the Security Council has
not only authorized regional organizations, but also individual states or groups
of states to use force.92 The expression ‘coalition of the able and willing’ is
often used to describe such a group of states. In some cases such an operation
falls within the definition of ‘peace support operations’ used in this study.
An example is the Australian-led International Force in East Timor (INTERFET)
from September 1999 until February 2000,93 and another the International
Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. Before NATO took command
87 Security Council Resolution 1031 of 15 December 1995, UN Doc. S/RES/1031, para. 13.
88 Security Council Resolution 1031 of 15 December 1995, UN Doc. S/RES/1031, para. 15.
White states that even while IFOR is performing a basic peacekeeping function, the threat
of enforcement action if the peace is broken, combined with its greater military capacity,
makes it a much more capable military operation than UNPROFOR. N. White, The UN
Charter and Peacekeeping Forces: Constitutional Issues, in M. Pugh (Ed.), The UN, Peace
and Force 43 (1997), at 59.
89 Military Technical Agreement between the International Security Force (KFOR) and the
Governments of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia of 9 June
1999, 38 ILM 1217 (1999).
90 Security Council Resolution 1244 of 10 June 1999, UN Doc. S/RES/1244, para. 7.
91 SeeM. Guillaume, Le Cadre Juridique de l’Action de la KFOR au Kosovo, in C. Tomuschat (Ed.),
Kosovo and the International Community 243 (2002), at 248-252.
92 See e.g. N. Blokker, supra note 69.
93 See e.g. A. Ryan, The Strong Lead-nation Model in an ad hoc Coalition of the Willing: Operation
Stabilise in East Timor, 9 International Peacekeeping 23 (2002).
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of ISAF, it was led by different so-called ‘lead nations’. Since this study focuses
on peace support operations under the command and control of the UN and
NATO, these operations carried out by individual states or ad hoc groups of
states are not discussed, although they do raise interesting questions of ac-
countability.94
1.6 UPSURGE INUNITEDNATIONS PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS AND BRAHIMI
REPORT
During the early days of this development of peace support activities by
regional organizations in general and NATO in particular, there was a decline
in UN peace support operations influenced by budget crises and the sense that
the UN cannot undertake extensive enforcement operations. The new policy
of the United States toward peace operations in the 1995 Presidential Decision
Directive on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations (PDD-25) was also an
important element in this development.95 This document, the Clinton ad-
ministration’s policy on reformingmultilateral peace operations, set strict limits
onUnited States political support for the establishment of, andmilitary partici-
pation in, United Nations-led peace support operations.
Since 1998 however, there has again been an upsurge in UnitedNations-led
operations. These include operations based on the principles of first-generation
peacekeeping. The United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE)
for example is an operation without enforcement powers with the main task
of supervising a cessation of hostilities with the consent of the parties.96 Other
operations, including the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone97 and the
United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo,98 have
multifunctional mandates and limited enforcement powers under Chapter VII
of the United Nations Charter. Finally, the United Nations has established
transitional administrations in Kosovo and East Timor that do not have a
military element but rely for their security on operations led by ad hoc co-
alitions of states or a regional organization. These administrations have taken
94 See e.g. D. Sarooshi, The U.N. and the Development of Collective Security: The Delegation
by the Security Council of its Chapter VII Powers (1999).
95 See D. Scheffer, Problems and Prospects for UN Peacekeeping, 89 ASIL Proc. 285 (1995).
96 Security Council Resolution 1320 of 15 September 2000, UN Doc. S/RES/1320.
97 Security Council Resolution 1270 of 22 October 1999, UN Doc. S/RES/1270. UNAMSIL’s
enforcement powers are limited to action to ensure the security and freedom of movement
of its personnel and, within its capabilities and areas of deployment, to afford protection
to civilians under imminent threat of physical violence, taking into account the responsibil-
ities of the Government of Sierra Leone and ECOMOG.
98 Security Council Resolution 1291 of 24 February 2000, UN Doc. S/RES/1291. MONUC’s
enforcement powers are limited to actions to protect United Nations and co-located JMC
personnel, facilities, installations and equipment, ensure the security and freedom of
movement of its personnel, andprotect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence.
30 Definition and characteristics of peace support operations
over unprecedented responsibility for governance of the territories in ques-
tion.99 Guéhenno, United Nations Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping
Operations, states that there are several reasons for this upsurge:
First, we learned during the 1996-98 period of retrenchment that regional and
subregional initiatives were confronted with the same challenges that had previous-
ly stymied UN peacekeeping operations. It means little which organization is leading
the operation if the parties on the ground simply are not committed to peace.
Second, we learned that, in certain circumstances, regional or subregional organiza-
tions are not appropriate to take on the task, because one ormore of their members
may actually be parties to the conflict. Third, we were reminded of the importance
of the universal legitimacy that only the UN can offer, and which some parties to
a conflict will consider as the only acceptable form of international involvement.
And, fourth, we had to come to termswith the fact that few regional or subregional
arrangements have the necessary capacity to do the job.100
The latest development is the presentation of the Panel on United Nations
Peace Operations in 2000.101 This report was commissioned by the Secretary-
General to evaluate the whole range of UN activities in the area of peace and
security and tomake recommendations for change. In relation to peace support
operations, the panel states that the consent of the local parties, impartiality
and use of force only in self-defense should remain the bedrock principles
of peacekeeping. Yet these criteria are modified or at least restricted in their
practical application.102 In particular the panel recommends giving peace-
keeping operations robust rules of engagement, making forces “able to pose
a credible deterrent threat, in contrast to the symbolic and non-threatening
presence that characterizes traditional peacekeeping.”103 Though the panel
distinguishes peacekeeping from enforcement action, this brings peacekeeping
close to the concept of peace enforcement of the mid-1990s.104 This, a
muscular from of peacekeeping,105 also seems to be a concept presently sup-
99 M. Matheson, United Nations Governance of Postconflict Societies, 95 American Journal of
International Law 76 (2001); C. Stahn, The United Nations Transitional Administrations in Kosovo
and East Timor: A First Analysis, 5 Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law 105 (2001).
100 J.M. Guéhenno, On the Challenges and Achievements of Reforming UN Peace Operations, 9
International Peacekeeping 69 (2002), at 71.
101 Supra note 1.
102 H. Spieker, Changing “Peacekeeping” in the New Millennium? – The Recommendations of the
Panel on United Nations Peace Operations of August 2000, 6 International Peacekeeping 144
(2000), at 147.
103 Supra note 1, para. 51.
104 See also M. Fröhlich, supra note 10, at 227.
105 White states that:
The Brahimi report attempts to tread the tightrope between peacekeeping and enforcement
with a little more care than the Secretary General did in 1992. However, the report still
seems to be based on the untested assumption that peacekeepers can somehow act in a
moremuscular fashionwithout over-stepping the line between peacekeeping and enforce-
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ported by the Secretary-General. In 2000 he was quoted as saying that the
organization should abandon outdated concepts of neutral peacekeeping and
replace them with a more muscular form of peace enforcement.106
1.7 DEFINITION OF PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS
Until 1988 it was relatively clear what the term peace support operation, or
peacekeeping as the preferred term at that time, referred to, as can be readily
understood from the description above. After 1988, a wide variety of terms
emerged to describe and distinguish between new types of operations.Writers
used the terms ‘peace enforcement’, ‘wider peacekeeping’, ‘aggravated peace-
keeping’, ‘robust peacekeeping’, ‘muscular peacekeeping’, ‘peace support
operations’ and others, but they did not agree on their meaning. The UN itself
has changed its use of terms over time. In AnAgenda for Peace, the Secretary-
General distinguished between the concept of peacemaking, that included
peace-enforcement units, and peacekeeping. In the 1995 supplement to An
Agenda for Peace the concept of peace enforcement did not return. Instead
the Secretary-General distinguished between preventive diplomacy and peace-
making (without the enforcement element), peacekeeping, post-conflict peace-
building and enforcement action. The Brahimi report uses the term ‘peace
operations’, divided into conflict prevention and peacemaking, peacekeeping
and peace building.
Armed forces have also tried to develop doctrine for peace support opera-
tions.107 These national doctrines use similar terms to mean very different
things, in particular in relation to new types of operations conceptually distinct
both from traditional peace-keeping and from the kind of large-scale enforce-
ment action mounted in cases of transboundary aggression, as in the Korean
Peninsula (1950-53) and the Persian Gulf (1990-91). For example, United States
doctrine defines ‘peace enforcement’ as:
The application of military force or the threat of its use, normally pursuant to
international authorization, to compel compliance with generally accepted resolu-
tions or sanctions. The purpose of peace enforcement is tomaintain or restore peace
and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement.108
ment. N. White, Commentary on the Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations
(The Brahimi report), 6 Journal of Conflict and Security Law 127 (2001), at 130.
106 C. McGreal, Africans Urge UN to Toughen Mandate, The Guardian, 30 May 2000.
107 See e.g. G. McDonald, supra note 58, Chapter 6 (National Military Doctrine); R. Thonton,
The Role of Peace Support Operations Doctrine in the British Army, 7 International Peacekeeping
41 (2000); C. Dobbie, A Concept for Post-Cold War Peacekeeping, 36 Survival 121 (1994).
108 United States Field Manual 100-23 Peace Operations of 30 December 1994.
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In the United States’ conception of peace enforcement consent is not absolute
and force may be used to compel or coerce. United States doctrine dis-
tinguishes peace enforcement from peacekeeping. The definition of ‘peace-
keeping’ is essentially that of first-generation peacekeeping.
The American definition of ‘peace enforcement’ is not the same as the
corresponding term ‘imposition de la paix’ in French military doctrine. In
‘imposition de la paix’, there is a designated enemy. French peace enforcement
aims, not to destroy that enemy, but rather to force a change of behavior that
disrupts international peace or violates international law.109 There is no con-
sent in ‘imposition de la paix’.110
The present study uses the term ‘peace support operation’ (PSO). This term
adequately describes the category of military operations that are intended to
be the subject of study in subsequent chapters. It is an ‘umbrella’ term, in the
sense that it covers a number of subcategories. At the same time the term
excludes enforcement action or war with a designated enemy. The latter type
of operation takes place in another political and operational context, and to
a certain extent also in a different legal context.111 ‘Peace support operation’
is also an appropriate term because it is used by NATO, one of the two inter-
national organizations this study focuses on. The UN does not publishmilitary
doctrine. As noted above, there is little consistency in the terms used in that
organization.
The definition of ‘peace support operations’ in NATO doctrine is as follows:
PSO are multifunctional operations, conducted impartially, normally in support
of an internationally recognised organisation such as the UN or Organisation for
Security andCooperation in Europe (OSCE), involvingmilitary forces and diplomatic
and humanitarian agencies. PSO are designed to achieve a long-term political
settlement or other specified conditions. They include Peacekeeping and Peace
Enforcement as well as conflict prevention, peacemaking, peacebuilding and
humanitarian relief.112
As this definition indicates, ‘Peace Support Operations’ encompasses a range
of operations, from absolutely non-coercive to overtly coercive. A number of
109 Forces terrestres et maîtrise des crises: conception générale de l’emploi des forces terrestres
dans les opérations extérieures en faveur de la paix, de la sécurité, et de l’application du
droit international (document provisoire), État-Major de l’Armée de Terre, Centre d’Études
et de Prospective, November 1996, at 49.
110 Forces terrestres et maîtrise des crises: conception générale de l’emploi des forces terrestres
dans les opérations extérieures en faveur de la paix, de la sécurité, et de l’application du
droit international (document provisoire), État-Major de l’Armée de Terre, Centre d’Études
et de Prospective, November 1996, at 25.
111 One difference in legal context is that in peace support operations a Status of Forces
Agreement is frequently concluded between the organization that carries out the operation,
whereas this obviously is not the case in enforcement actions.
112 AJP-3.4.1, Peace Support Operations, July 2001, para. 0202.
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subcategories of ‘Peace Support Operations’, in particular conflict prevention,
peace making, peace building, and humanitarian operations, are principally
the preserve of civilian agencies.113 NATO doctrine defines ‘Peacekeeping’
(PK) as follows:
PK operations are generally undertaken in accordance with the principles of Chapter
VI of the UN Charter in order tomonitor and facilitate the implementation of a peace
agreement. A loss of consent and a non-compliant party may limit the freedom
of action of the PK force and even threaten the continuation of the mission. Thus,
the requirement to remain impartial, limit the use of force to self-defence, and
maintain and promote consent would guide the conduct of PK.114
NATO doctrine defines ‘Peace Enforcement’ as follows:
PE operations normally take place under the principles of Chapter VII of the UN
Charter. They are coercive in nature and conducted when the consent of all Parties
to the conflict has not been achieved or might be uncertain. They are designed to
maintain or re-establish peace or enforce the terms specified in the mandate. In
the conduct of PE, the link between military and political objectives must be ex-
tremely close. It is important to emphasise that the aim of the PE operation will
not be the defeat or destruction of an enemy, but rather to compel, coerce and
persuade the parties to comply with a particular course of action. The provision
of adequate military forces to establish a coercive combat capability is critical to
any decision to deploy Alliance forces on a PSO.115
Peace keeping and peace enforcement are principally military operations.
Consequently, these are the most likely to raise the question of application
of international humanitarian law. For this reason this study will focus prin-
cipally on these types of operations. The term ‘peace support operation’ is
nevertheless used instead of, for example, ‘peacekeeping and peace enforce-
ment’. One reason is that the latter term is rather lenghty. The other reason
is that the use of an ‘umbrella’ term decreases the possibility of unintentionally
excluding operations that would not easily fit into one of the subcategories.
For example, it is not immediately clear into which subcategory an operation
initially established under Chapter VI of the UN Charter but subsequently given
certain enforcement powers under Chapter VII of the Charter, would fall.
UNOSOM II was an example of such an operation.
In terms of the UN Charter, ‘peace support operations’ encompasses military
operations under Chapter VI (or VI ½) as well as under Chapter VII. It specific-
ally excludes certain operations under Chapter VII, i.e. enforcement action or
113 As stated in the United Kingdom’s JointWarfare Publication 3-50, Peace Support Operations,
para. 101. This United Kingdom publication is based on NATO doctrine.
114 AJP-3.4.1, supra note 112, para. 0216.
115 AJP-3.4.1, supra note 112, para. 0217.
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war with a designated enemy. This results from the principle of impartiality,
which is central to PSO. NATO doctrine provides that PSO are neither in support
of, nor against a particular party, but rather are conducted in an impartial
and even-handed manner. As the UK manual on Peace Support Operations,
which builds on NATO doctrine, explains, the distinction between coercive PSO
and enforcement action or war will be determined in an examination of the
mandate and desired end-state. A PSO mandate will not designate an enemy,
neitherwill it relate tomilitary victory, whereas amilitary enforcement opera-
tionwill attempt to change the correlation of local forces and impose a solution
by military action.116 It is the principle of impartiality which distinguishes
PSO from action described by the ICJ in theCertain Expenses case as “preventive
or enforcement measures against a state under Chapter VII.”117 Examples
of such action are the military operations in Korea (1950-1953) on the basis
of Security Council Resolutions 83 and 84,118 as well as the NATO air opera-
tions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1999 (Operation Allied
Force).
In the operational sphere, the distinction between enforcement action and
PSO has certain consequences. Because peace support operations are designed
to create a secure environment in which civilian agencies can rebuild the
infrastructure necessary to create a self-sustaining peace, and self-sustaining
peace requires the (active) co-operation and consent of the parties and the local
population, the promotion of consent is fundamental to achieving the political
end-state in all peace support operations.119 In other words, the peace support
operation will attempt to maintain consent if it exists, and will attempt to
promote consent where it does not.
To delineate the subject of study it is necessary to adopt a term. For the
above-mentioned reasons, the term ‘peace support operations’ has been
selected. At the same time it is important not to become fixated on this term.
In practice there are so many different military operations that some of them
defy ready classification. This is precisely why NATO is constantly revising
its doctrine. For example, in 2003 an effort was initiated to update the doctrine
concerning ‘Peace Enforcement’ in Allied Joint Publication 3.4.
This study is limited to peace support operations by the UN and NATO.
First, peace support operations by international and regional organizations
in particular raise questions of the applicability of international humanitarian
law, inter alia because only states are parties to international humanitarian law
treaties. Responsibility for internationally wrongful acts also raises specific
116 Supra note 113, para. 303.
117 Supra note 24, at 177.
118 Security Council Resolution 83 of 27 June 1950, UNDoc. S/1511; Security Council Resolution
84 of 7 July 1950, UN Doc. S/1588.
119 Supra note 112, para. 0310.
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questions in relation to international organizations, while the principles of state
responsibility are relatively clear.
Secondly, the two organizations in questions are presently important
organizations in themaintenance of international peace and security. A central
role for the UN is guaranteed by the UN Charter, in particular Chapter VII that
gives the Security Council a monopoly on the authorization of the use of force
except in case of self-defense. NATO’s military capability, unmatched by any
other regional organization, guarantees its important role in peace support
operations. Indeed, in 1993 Kofi Annan stated that with “its existing military
structure, resources and political weight, NATO has a lot to contribute to the
concept of peacekeeping, particularly in its more muscular form.”120
1.8 LEGAL STATUS OF PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS
1.8.1 The importance of legal status for this study
Peace support operations involve several international actors, in particular
the international organization that establishes the operation, the states that
contribute troops to the operation and the host state. The UN does not have
armed forces of its own and relies on member states to contribute troops to
a specific operation. NATO peace support operations also consist of national
contingents contributed bymember and non-member states. The relationship
between the different international actors – in other words, the legal status
of peace support operations – is an important element to determine the re-
sponsible entity for conduct of an operation and possible breaches of inter-
national humanitarian law. Command and control relationships in particular
are important. Attribution of conduct in international law is based to a large
extent on the concept of control or authority.121 In military terms, the posses-
sion of control or authority is expressed in the term ‘command and control’.
Command in NATO terms for example means the “authority vested in an
individual of the armed forces for the direction, coordination, and control of
military forces.”122 For this reason the regulation of command is of crucial
importance.123 The UN Secretary-General reaffirmed the relationship between
command and control and responsibility in 1996:
120 K. Annan,UN Peacekeeping Operations and Cooperation with NATO, 41 NATOReview 3 (1993).
121 See e.g. P. Klein, La Responsabilité des Organisations Internationales dans les Ordres
Juridiques Internes et en Droit des Gens 378 (1998); M. Perez Gonzalez, Les Organisations
Internationales et le Droit de la Responsabilité, 92 RevueGénérale deDroit International Public
63 (1988), at 83.
122 NATO Glossary of terms and Definitions, AAP-6 (V), 2003, at 2-C-8.
123 See e.g. K. Wellens, Remedies against International Organisations 100 (2002).
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The international responsibility of the UnitedNations for combat-related activities
of United Nations forces is premised on the assumption that the operation in
question is under the exclusive command and control of the United Nations.124
1.8.2 Legal status of United Nations peace support operations
In the absence of a pre-determined legal framework for UN peace support
operations, setting up a new operation requires ad hoc measures. A number
of instruments are adopted or concluded to regulate the legal status of each
specific operation.125 Over time the content of these instruments has devel-
oped into a more or less uniform pattern. A peace support operation is estab-
lished by a Security Council or General Assembly resolution that defines the
mandate of the operation, the so-called ‘enabling resolution’. The resolution
usually makes reference to a more detailed plan prepared by the Secretary-
General. Peace support operations are composed of national contingents
contributed bymember states. The Secretary-General is responsible for finding
the necessary participants through informal consultations. He consults primar-
ily with the Security Council about offers he receives. If the Council gives its
consent, the agreement on the supply of troops is recorded in an exchange
of letters between the Secretary-General and the government in question.
The composition of a peace support operation of military personnel be-
longing to states requires detailed regulation of their legal status.126 In this
regard the Secretary-General stated in his second report on the UnitedNations
Emergency Force that a “problem of first instance, therefore, was that of
harmonizing the international character of the Force with the fact of its being
composed of national contingents.”127
Conditions under which a contingent will be contributed are agreed on
between the UN and each participating state. In some cases these are informal
written or even oral agreements but in other cases they are formalized.128
The Secretary-General has developed a draft model agreement based on
established practice and drawing extensively on previous participating state
124 UN Doc. A/51/389 of 20 September 1996, para. 17.
125 EPIL 1110 (1992).
126 P. Dewast, Quelques Aspects du Statut des “Casques Bleus”, 81 Revue Générale de Droit
International Public 1007 (1977), at 1030.
127 UN Doc. A/3943 of 9 October 1958, para. 127.
128 See e.g. agreement between the United Nations and India concerning the service with the
United Nations Emergency Force of 14 August 1957, UNTS 3968 (1957); agreement between
the UnitedNations andDenmark concerning servicewith the UnitedNations Peace-Keeping
force in Cyprus of 21 February 1966, UNTS 8108 (1966).
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agreements. The model is intended to serve as a basis for drafting individual
agreements.129
A participating state agreement refers to the Status of Forces Agreement
(SOFA) concluded between the UN and the host state, which defines the relation
between the force and the host state.130 In principle such an agreement is
concluded for every peace support operation. In practice a SOFA is not always
concluded or is concluded after a certain period.131 An agreement was not
concluded in the case of the United Nations Operation in Somalia, for example,
because there was no government with which to negotiate an agreement. In
the United Nations Mission inWestern Sahara (MINURSO) there was no agree-
ment with Morocco until a year after the force deployed. Until 1990 the legal
situation was very unclear in the absence of an agreement. Suy states that in
this case it is generally accepted that principles laid down in previous agree-
ments constitute general principles of law that are applicable.132 In 1990 the
Secretary-General prepared a model SOFA based on established practice.133
In 1992 the General Assembly recommended that pending the conclusion of
a SOFA, the model would apply provisionally.134 This arrangement was ap-
plied for example in the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea until
the UN and Ethiopia signed an agreement on 23 March 2001.135
Forces contributed to a UN operation are incorporated into the organiza-
tion.136 The participating state agreement, together with the ‘Transfer of Author-
ity’ (TOA), integrates the contingent into the organizational apparatus of the
UN. The troop contributing state gives its contingent instructions to serve the
UN.137 The operations are subsidiary organs of the main organ by which they
have been established. Operations established by the General Assembly are
subsidiary organs under Article 22 of the UN Charter and operations estab-
lished by the Security Council are subsidiary organs under Article 29. Their
legal personality is identified with that of the United Nations. The personnel
of the force remain in their national service but are for the period of their
129 Model Agreement between theUnitedNations andMember States Contributing Personnel
and Equipment to United Nations Peace-keeping Operations of 23 May 1991, UN Doc. A/
46/185.
130 UN Doc. A/46/185, para. 4.
131 J-M. Thouvenin, Le Statut des Forces de Maintien de la Paix des Nations Unies, 3 International
Law Forum 105 (2001), at 106.
132 E. Suy, Legal Aspects of UN Peace-keeping Operations, 35 Netherlands International LawReview
318 (1988), at 320. See also EPIL 1115 (1992).
133 Model Status-of-Forces-Agreement for Peace-keeping Operations of 9 October 1990, UN
Doc. A/45/594.
134 General Assembly Resolution 52/12 B of 9 January 1998, UN Doc. A/RES/52/12 B, para.
7.
135 Bijlage Handelingen TK, 2000-01, 22831, 15.
136 N. Quoc Dinh, P. Daillier & A. Pellet, supra note 23, at 969.
137 M. Bothe, Streitkräfte Internationaler Organisationen: Zugleich ein Beitrag zu völkerrecht-
lichen Grundfragen der Anwesenheit fremder Truppen 44 (1968).
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assignment international personnel. This is the model that was used for the
Emergency Force and has been used ever since.138 The Secretary-General
in his report on the Emergency Force called this arrangement an “effective
marriage of national military service with international function.”139 The
International Court of Justice in the Certain Expenses case affirmed that the
United Nations Operation in the Congowas a subsidiary organ of the Security
Council. It stated in relation to ONUC that:
The Charter does not forbid the Security Council to act through instruments of
its choice: under Article 29 it ‘may establish such organs as it deems necessary for
the performance of its functions’.140
The Model Participating State Agreement refers to the status agreement to
affirm the international nature of the operation as a subsidiary organ of the
UN.141 It also states that the functions of the operation are exclusively inter-
national in character and that the personnel made available by the participating
state shall regulate their conduct with the interests of the UN only in view.142
This is the same language as used in previous agreements with individual
participating states.143
While assigned to a peace support operation, military personnel of national
contingents comprise an integral part thereof.144 The UN has the power to
take decisions concerning operational activities and activities concerning third
parties. The Secretary-General has full authority over the deployment, organiza-
tion, conduct and direction of the operation, including the personnel made
available by the participating states, in close coordination with the Security
Council. Seyersted states that the “substantive (legislative and administrative)
138 For a description of the status under international law of the Emergency Force see G. Rosner,
The United Nations Emergency Force 142-157 (1963).
139 UN Doc. A/3943 of 9 October 1958, para. 128.
140 Supra note 24, at 176.
141 UN Doc. A/46/185 of 23 May 1991, para 4.
142 Id. para. 9.
143 See e.g. Agreement between the United Nations and Denmark concerning service with the
United Nations Emergency Force of 16 July 1957, UNTS 3959 (1957); Agreement between
the UnitedNations andCanada concerning service with theUnitedNations Peace-keeping
Force in Cyprus of 21 February 1966, UNTS 8107 (1966).
144 See Legal Status ofMembers of theNationalMilitary Contingents Serving inUnitedNations
Peacekeeping Operations, 1996 UNJY 450. The status of military personnel in the United
Nations Operation in the former Yugoslavia has also been analysed by the International
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia in the context of the question who has to give
permission for them to testify. The Appeals Chamber has held in this regard that an officer
“is present in the former Yugoslavia as a member of an international armed force re-
sponsible for maintaining or enforcing peace and not qua member of the national military
structure.” Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blaskicˇ, Judgement on the Request of the Republic of Croatia
for Review of the Decision of Trial Chamber II of 18 July 1997, Case No. IT-95-14-AR108
bis, A. Ch., 2 October 1997.
Chapter 1 39
jurisdiction in operational matters – and this is the most important – is vested
in the Organization.”145 The participating states however retain a limited
number of powers over the troops they contribute. These powers are limited
to administrative authority, including promotion and pay. Participating states
also retain criminal jurisdiction over the troops they contribute. This is legally
necessary to the extent that the United Nations has no law enforcement and
judicial organs of its own. It is also politically necessary because participating
states require it as a condition for contributing troops. The Secretary-General
affirmed in his 1958 report on the Emergency Force that the policy of exclusive
jurisdiction of the participating state “obviously, makes easier the decision
of States to contribute troops from their armed forces.”146
The peace support operation’s status as a subsidiary organ of the Security
Council or General Assembly gives it privileges and immunities related to
those of the UN.147 It also results in exclusive UN authority to protect the
rights of the operation and its personnel.148
1.8.3 Military command and control over United Nations peace support
operations
In the field, military command over a peace support operation is exercised
on behalf of the Secretary-General by the Force Commander (FC) who is usually
appointed by the Secretary-General.149 He is responsible only to the Secretary-
General and, through the chain of command, exercises command over con-
tingents. Since the inclusion in peace support operations of large civilian
elements, the practice has been to appoint a Special Representative of the
Secretary-General (SRSG) who has authority over the civilian as well asmilitary
elements. The Special Representative, or in his absence the Force Commander,
is the Head ofMission. According to the model participating state agreement,
the authority of the Secretary-General in the field “shall be exercised by the
Head of Mission, who shall be responsible to the Secretary-General.”150 In
practice, the division of responsibilities between the SRSG and the FC is arranged
in an internal document.151
The level of command and control conferred on the UN is not easy to
express in definite terms. The UN does not have agreed terms to designate
145 F. Seyersted, United Nations Forces in the Law of Peace and War 97 (1966).
146 UN Doc. A/3943 of 9 October 1958, para. 136.
147 UN Doc. A/45/594 of 9 October 1990, para. 15.
148 F. Seyersted, supra note 145, at 112-117.
149 H.McCoubrey&N.White, The BlueHelmets: Legal Regulation of UnitedNationsMilitary
Operations 142 (1996).
150 UN Doc. A/46/185, para. 7.
151 See e.g. in relation to the United NationsMission in Ethiopia and Eritrea Bijlage Handelingen
II, 2000-01, 22831, 10, para. 12.
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levels of command and control such as for example NATO.152 In principle
the level of command conferred on the UN FC is set out in the participating
state agreement and/or transfer of authority (the national order conferring
command on the UN), and may vary. The use of terms in the TOA is connected
to, and varies with, national use of terms.
The German government for example referred to UN command over Ger-
man troops in the United Nations Operation in the former Yugoslavia as
‘operational control’,153 a term with a distinct meaning in NATO terminology.
The Dutch government referred to UN command over Dutch troops in the same
operation as ‘operational command’,154 though there is no clear indication
that the Dutch government granted different powers over its contingent than
the German government over its contingent. It is certain that participating
states always retain full command, in other words the authority to withdraw
the troops.
The Secretary-General presented a report in 1994 in relation to command
and control over UN peace support operations. This report states that:
In general, UnitedNations command is not full command and is closer inmeaning
to the generally recognizedmilitary concept of “operational command”. It involves
the full authority to issue operational directives within the limits of (1) a specific
mandate of the Security Council; (2) an agreed period of time, with the stipulation
152 The North Atlantic Treaty Organization distinguishes the following levels of command
and control in the NATOGlossary of Terms and Definitions, AAP-6 (V), modified version,
7 August 2000:
Full command
Themilitary authority and responsibility of a superior officer to issue orders to subordinates.
It covers every aspect of military operations and exists only within national services.
Operational Command (OPCOM)
The authority granted to a commander to assign missions or tasks to subordinate com-
manders, to deploy units, to reassign forces, and to retain or delegate operational and/or
tactical control as may be deemed necessary. It does not of itself include responsibility for
administration or logistics.May also be used to denote the forces assigned to a commander.
Operational control (OPCON)
The authority delegated to a commander to direct forces assigned so that the commander
may accomplish specific missions or tasks which are usually limited by function, time, or
location; to deploy units concerned, and to retain or assign tactical control of those units.
It does not include authority to assign separate employment of components of the units
concerned. Neither does it, of itself, include administrative or logistic control.
Tactical command (TACOM)
The authority delegated to a commander to assign tasks to forces under his command for
the accomplishment of the mission assigned by higher authority.
Tactical control (TACON)
The detailed and, usually, local direction and control of movements or manoeuvres neces-
sary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned.
153 Bulletin 32 of 23 April 1993, cited in BverGE 90, 286, at 311.
154 Handelingen II 1994-95, p. 5987.
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that an earlier withdrawal requires adequate prior notification; and (3) a specific
geographical range (the mission area as a whole).155
According to the Secretary-General, it is clearly impermissible for contingent
commanders to be instructed by national authorities to depart fromUNpolicies,
or to refuse to carry out orders.156
Illustrative of the confusion in this area is that only a year after the pre-
sentation of the Secretary-General’s report, the Special Committee on Peace-
keeping Operations stated that “the authority of the UN Force Commander
is based on the concept of operational control.”157
In practice, the actual level of UN command, whatever the term used,
depends to a certain extent on political factors. It is a compromise between
the desire for unity of command and legitimate interests of the participating
states.158 This compromise can for example be institutionalized by appointing
officers from participating states to the staff of an operation.159
Of much greater concern is that in certain cases participating states do not
respectmore or less formal agreements relating to command and control. There
are reports of cases in which commanders of national contingents counter-
manded orders of a UN commander or where national authorities bypassed
the chain of command. The Secretary-General for example states that during
the United Nations Operation in Somalia, while some contingents were os-
tensibly part of the operation, they were in fact consulting first with their
national capitals.160 Similar problems occurred in the United Nations Opera-
tion in the former Yugoslavia. There are reports that then President Chirac
of France bypassed UN commanders on several occasions. United Nations
commander Rose gives a number of other examples in his account of the
operation.161 A continuing question is whether or not the Dutch government
directly gave orders to the Dutch contingent in Srebrenica in 1995, which the
government denies.162 Therewere reports in September 2000 that theNigerian
contingent in the UnitedNationsMission in Sierra Leone ignored orders from
155 UN Doc. A/49/681 of 21 November 1994, para. 6.
156 Id. para. 7.
157 Report of the Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations of 22 June 1995, UN Doc.
A/.50/230, para. 53. The Committee also states that “it would be useful for theDepartment
of Peacekeeping Operations, in co-operation with member States, to reach an agreed
definition of the different kinds of command relationships applicable to peacekeeping
operations.”, para. 54.
158 Interview with a senior official in the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Opera-
tions of 18 September 2002.
159 See e.g. S. Gordon, Icarus Rising and Falling: The Evolution of UN Command and Control
Structures, in D. Gordon & F. Toase (Eds.), Aspects of Peacekeeping 19 (2001).
160 United Nations, The United Nations and Somalia 1992-1996 86 (1996). See also L. Ahlquist
(Ed.), Co-operation, Command and Control in UN Peace-keeping Operations (1996).
161 M. Rose, Fighting for Peace 85, 116 (1998).
162 Bijlage Handelingen II 1996-97, 22181, 181.
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the Indian Force Commander.163 In general, as these examples illustrate, inter-
vention by national authorities is more frequent in a volatile environment.
1.8.4 Legal status of North Atlantic Treaty Organization peace support
operations
In the case of NATO peace support operations the legal status of each individual
operation is specified in several instruments. These operations have differed
in legal basis, scale and other respects, but proven structures, procedures and
command and control arrangements in the organization have been discussed.
Operations by the organization have included two smaller-scale operations
in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) at the request of the
government. The first, Operation Essential Harvest, had a mandate to collect
arms and ammunition voluntarily turned over by ethnic Albanian insurgents,
and thereby help to build confidence in the broader peace process. The second,
Operation Amber Fox, had the mandate to contribute to the protection of
international monitors from the EU and the OSCE overseeing the implementation
of a peace plan.164
The organization also deployed an operation in Albania (April-September
1999), Operation Allied Harbour later renamed Operation Joint Guardian, at
the request of the Albanian government to assist the government in resolving
a refugee crisis. Two other NATO-led operations were deployed in the context
of the Kosovo crisis. Operation Eagle Eye (30 October 1998 – 24 March 1999)
consisted of verification flights over Kosovo in support of the Kosovo Verifica-
tion Mission conducted by the OSCE. The legal basis for the operation was the
Kosovo Verification Mission Agreement signed by the government of the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and Security Council Resolution 1199.165
In the same context the organization deployed a contingency force (Operation
Determined Guarantor) in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, with
the consent of the government, with a mandate to assist in the extraction of
the Kosovo Verification Mission if necessary.
By far themost important NATO peace support operations in terms of scale,
mandate, powers and potential for internationally wrongful acts, however,
are the Implementation Force (IFOR, later Stabilization Force (SFOR)) in Bosnia-
Herzegovina and Croatia, and the Kosovo Force (KFOR) in Kosovo.
163 C. McGreal, Nigerian Peace Force Accused of Sabotage, the Guardian 14 September 2000.
164 See for a detailed discussion of the legal status of these operations P. Dreist, Die Task Force
Harvest und die Task Force Fox – Beiträge zur Stabilisierung Makedoniens, 8 Humanitäres
Völkerrecht – Informationsschriften 4 (2002).
165 Letter dated 22 October 1998 from the Chargé d’Affaires a.i. of the Mission of the United
States of America to the United Nations of 23 October 1998, UNDoc. S/1998/991; Security
Council Resolution 1199 of 23 September 1998, UN Doc. S/RES/1199.
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1.8.5 Legal status of the Implementation Force and Stabilization Force
IFOR had its origin in Annex 1A (Agreement on the Military Aspects of the
Peace Settlement) to the Dayton Peace Agreements. Article 1, paragraph 1,
subparagraph a of the agreement states that:
The United Nations Security Council is invited to adopt a resolution by which it
will authorize Member States or regional organizations and arrangements to
establish a multinational military Implementation Force (hereinafter “IFOR”). The
Parties understand and agree that this Implementation Force may be composed
of ground, air and maritime units from NATO and non-NATO nations.
Subparagraph b of paragraph 1 describes that:
It is understood and agreed that NATO may establish such a force, which will
operate under the authority and subject to the direction and political control of
the North Atlantic Council (‘NAC’) through the NATO chain of command.
Status of Forces Agreements concerning the force were signed between NATO
on the one hand, and Bosnia Herzegovina, Croatia and the Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia on the other hand, and attached to Annex 1A as appendices.
The Status of ForcesAgreementswere complementedwith Technical Arrange-
ments. A Technical Arrangement was concluded between Croatia and the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization on behalf of IFOR. Another Technical
Arrangement was concluded between Bosnia Herzegovina and IFOR itself.
The Security Council resolution referred to in the agreement was adopted
as Resolution 1031. It authorized member states acting through or in coopera-
tion with the organization referred to in Annex 1A of the Peace Agreement
to establish amultinational implementation force under unified command and
control in order to fulfil the role specified in Annex 1A and Annex 2 of the
peace agreement.166
Participating state agreements between NATO and itsmembers concerning
servicewith the forcewere not concluded. Conditions of service for contingents
from non-member states were agreed in correspondence between the govern-
ments in question and the organization.167
Some writers state that IFOR was not a subsidiary organ of NATO.168 Others
even state that the organization was “merely providing Command, Control,
Communication and Intelligence (C3I) infrastructure and co-ordination between
166 Security Council Resolution 1031 of 15 December 1995, UN Doc. S/RES/1031, para. 14.
167 UN Doc. S/1996/49 of 23 January 1996, para. 4.
168 M. Donner, Völkerrechtliche und Verfassungsrechtliche Aspekte der Militärischen Absicherung
der Friedensvereinbarung von Dayton, 10 Humanitäres Völkerrecht 63 (1997), at 67; M. Bothe,
Peacekeeping and International Humanitarian Law: Friends or Foes?, 3 International Peacekeeping
91 (1996), at 93.
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United Nations Member States contributing to IFOR without thereby affecting
the legal status of their contribution.”.169 According to this view, though
Annex 1A of the peace agreement provides that IFOR will be established by
NATO, Security Council Resolution 1031 only authorizes member states to estab-
lish a force, albeit “through or in cooperation with the organization referred
to in Annex 1A of the Peace Agreement.” Therefore the organization itself
would not be entitled to establish a force under the resolution. Figà-Talamanca
states that:
Aside from political considerations, however, NATO involvement is restricted to
the co-ordination of United Nations Member States for the establishment of IFOR
under unified command and control. The fact that members of NATO are choosing
to provide their troops and equipment under the NATO insigniae should not be
confused with an intervention of NATO as an Alliance.170
This description does not seem a reflection of the organization’s actual role
in IFOR. Operational planning was done by the organization’s organs leading
to Operational Plan (OPLAN) 10405. The North Atlantic Council (NAC), an
organization organ, adopted the operational plan and authorized a NATO
commander to command the operation. This commander used an organization
procedure called an activation order (ACTORD) to authorize troops under his
control to move into active duty. Reports on Implementation and Stabilization
Force operations to the Security Council have been submitted by the Secretary-
General of NATO and not by member states.171 This does not point to the
establishment of the operation bymember states using the organizationmerely
as a facilitating instrument. Lüder argues that SFOR is not a subsidiary organ
of NATO because participating states have merely conferred operational con-
trol.172 On this basis, it is argued, the commander could not enforce his orders
against the national contingent. Lüder does not make clear how the situation
is different from UN peace support operations, in which the German govern-
ment has also conferred operational control173 but that are nevertheless sub-
ordinate organs of the Security Council or the General Assembly.174 Regular
169 N. Figà-Talamanca, The Role of NATO in the Peace Agreement for Bosnia and Herzegovina, 7
European Journal of International Law 164 (1996).
170 Id.
171 See e.g. UN Doc. S/1996/49 of 23 January 1996; UN Doc. S/1996/1066 of 24 December
1996, and UN Doc.S/1997/81 of 27 January 1997.
172 S. Lüder, Die Völkerrechtliche Verantwortlichkeit der Nordatlantikvertrags-Organisation bei
Militärische Absicherung der Friedensvereinbarung van Dayton, 43 Neue Zeitschrift für Wehrrecht
107 (2001), at 116.
173 See § 1.8.3.
174 See also the statement by the Netherlands government that:
In de praktijk draagt Nederland aan deze “Major NATO Commanders” en aan lagere
commandanten zoals commandant SFOR, evenals aan VN-commandanten zoals de Force
Commander van UNMEE, Operational Control over.
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political consultation with non-NATO member contributors takes place at the
level of the (NAC) and at the deputy level, but there are also regular political
meetings with troop contributing states in UN operations. In 1996, the Security
Council adopted procedures for consultations that are to be held as a matter
of course between members of the Council, troop-contributing countries and
the Secretariat.175 In 2001, the Security Council adopted detailed provisions
on format, procedures and documentation of meetings with troop-contributing
countries.176 An important role of NATO in IFOR does not necessarily mean
that the operation is a subsidiary organ of the organization. The 1949Washing-
ton Treaty provides that the North Atlantic Council “shall set up such sub-
sidiary bodies as may be necessary”, but there is no definition of the term
‘subsidiary body’ or ‘subsidiary organ’ in the organization or in international
law. The term subsidiary organ is also used in the United Nations, inter alia
for peace support operations. A UN document defines a subsidiary organ as:
one which is established by or under the authority of a principal organ of the
United Nations, in accordance with Article 7, paragraph 2, of the Charter, by
resolution of the appropriate body…. Most subsidiary organs have in common
their establishment by parent bodies which presumably may change their terms
of reference and composition, issue policy directives to them, receive their reports
and accept or reject their recommendations. Generally speaking, a subsidiary organ
may be abolished or modified by action of the parent body.177
According to this definition, mutatis mutandis, IFOR meets the requirements
for a subsidiary organ of NATO. It is established by the NAC, a principal organ
of the organization, and it is under the authority and control of that principal
organ.
1.8.6 Military command over the Implementation Force and Stabilization
Force
The SupremeCommander Allied Forces Europe (SACEUR), one of the twomajor
NATO commanders, was directed by the NAC to assume operational command
and control over the operation. He delegated his command to a subordinate
(In practice the Netherlands transfers Operational Control to these “Major NATO Com-
manders” and to subordinate commanders such as Commander SFOR, as well as to UN
Commanders such as the UNMEE Commander) Translation by the author.
Bijlagen Handelingen II 2000-01, 26454, 18.
175 UN Doc. S/PRST/1996/13 of 28 March 1996.
176 Security Council Resolution 1353 of 13 June 2001, UN Doc. S/RES/1353.
177 Summary of internal Secretariat studies of constitutional questions relating to agencies
within the framework of the United Nations: this document was subsequently proposed
to the General Assembly, UN Doc. A/C1/758, paras 1-2, cited in D. Sarooshi, supra note
94.
46 Definition and characteristics of peace support operations
NATO commander, the Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces Southern Europe
(CINCSOUTH), as the commander of IFOR.178 Participating states conferred opera-
tion control, as defined in NATO terminology, to the IFOR commander. A
separate command and control arrangement was concluded in relation to the
Russian contingent. Command relationships in SFOR are essentially the same
as in IFOR. A NATO commander exercises operational control over national
contingents.179
1.8.7 Legal status of the Kosovo Force
The first reference to an international security presence in Kosovo is in a
statement adopted by G-8 Foreign Ministers on 6 May 1999. This statement
was adopted during the NATO air campaign in the Federal Republic of Yugo-
slavia and concerned general principles on the political solution to the Kosovo
crisis agreed on by the G-8. The peace plan presented to the leadership of the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia by the President of Finland, Martti Ahtisaari,
representing the European Union, and Viktor Chernomyrdin, Special Re-
presentative of the President of the Russian Federation, and adopted by the
Parliaments of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Serbia on 3 June 1999,
provided for an international security presence under UN auspices with sub-
stantial NATO participation under unified command and control.180
On 9 June a Military Technical Agreement was signed between the Inter-
national Security Force and the governments of the Federal Republic of Yugo-
slavia and the Republic of Serbia. Article 1 of the Agreement states:
The Parties to this Agreement reaffirm the document presented by President
Ahtisaari to President Miloševic´ and approved by the Serb Parliament and the
Federal Government on June 3, 1999, to include deployment in Kosovo under UN
auspices of effective international civil and security presences. The Parties further
note that the UN Security Council is prepared to adopt a resolution, which has been
introduced, regarding these presences.
The State Governmental authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the
Republic of Serbia understand and agree that the international security force
(“KFOR”) will deploy following the adoption of the UNSCR referred to in paragraph
1 and operate without hindrance within Kosovo and with the authority to take
all necessary action to establish and maintain a secure environment for all citizens
178 Bijlage Handelingen II 1995-96, 22181, 137.
179 Bijlage Handelingen II 1996-97, 22181, 174.
180 Letter Dated 7 June 1999 From the Permanent Representative of Germany to the United
Nations Addressed to the President of the Security Council, UN Doc. S/1999/649 (1999)
(Agreement on the principles (peace plan) to move towards a resolution of the Kosovo
crisis presented to the leadership of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia by the President
of Finland, Martti Ahtisaari, representing the European Union, and Viktor Chernomyrdin,
Special Representative of the President of the Russian Federation, 3 June 1999), para. 3-4.
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of Kosovo and otherwise carry out its mission. They further agree to comply with
all of the obligations of this Agreement and to facilitate the deployment and
operation of this force.181
The resolution referred to in the Agreement was adopted the next day as
Security Council Resolution 1244. The Security Council, acting under Chapter
VII of the UN Charter, authorized member states and relevant international
organizations to establish the international security presence in Kosovo.182
The Military Technical Agreement provides that the parties will agree on
a Status of Forces Agreement as soon as possible.183 Such an agreement for
the Kosovo Force was drafted by NATO.184 Negotiations were not started with
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, however, because the international com-
munity andmember states wanted to politically isolate the regime in Belgrade
and therefore did not want to conclude international agreements with it.
Concluding an agreement would also have impinged on the competence of
the UN-led civilian mission.185
Instead of in a bilateral agreement, the legal status of the force, or at least
those aspects thereof commonly governed by a SOFA, were regulated unilateral-
ly. The commander of KFOR promulgated an ‘Interim Status of Forces policy’
in 1999. The document stated that the legal basis for such a policy was the
provision in theMilitary Technical Agreement that authorizes the commander
to do all that he judges necessary and proper to protect the international
security force.186 This policy was replaced by a common declaration by the
Kosovo Force and the UnitedNationsMission in Kosovo signed on 17 August
2000 and issued the next day as Regulation 2000/47 by the SRSG as the legis-
lating power in Kosovo. The regulation provides inter alia for privileges and
immunities of the civil and security presences. In contrast to UN peace support
operations, requests for waiver of jurisdiction are referred to the respective
commander of the national element. The regulation also provides that Kosovo
Force personnel shall be subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of their respective
sending states.
181 Military Technical Agreement Between the International Security Force (“KFOR”) and the
Governments of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia, 38 ILM
1217, Article 1, paras. 1-2.
182 Security Council Resolution 1244 of 10 June 1999, UN Doc. S/RES/1999, para. 7.
183 Supra note 181, Annex 2, para. 3.
184 P. Dreist, Rechtliche Aspekte des KFOR-Einsatzes, 43 Neue Zeitschrift für Wehrrecht 1 (2001),
at 4.
185 M. Guillaume, supra note 91, at 253.
186 KFOR Interim Status of Forces Policy, copy on file with the author.
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Operational planning for the Kosovo Force was done within NATO. The
NAC approved the Operational Plan (OPLAN) on 9 June 1999 after consultations
with non-member participating states.187
The considerations relating to IFOR as possibly a subsidiary organ of the
NAC (see § 1.8.5) also apply to the Kosovo Force. The force was established
by the NAC, a principal organ of the organization, and it is under the authority
and control of that principal organ. In addition and in contrast to IFOR, Security
Council Resolution 1244 authorizedmember states and relevant international
organizations, instead of member states acting through an organization, to
establish the international security presence in Kosovo.188
1.8.8 Military command and control over the Kosovo Force
As in the case of IFOR and SFOR, military command of KFOR was initially
conferred on the SupremeAllied Commander Europe (SACEUR), who delegated
his command to another NATO command, Commander in Chief Allied Forces,
Southern Europe (CINCSOUTH). SACEUR was responsible to the NAC.189 The
KFOR Commander was appointed by NATO and responsible to CINCSOUTH.
Participating states conferred operational control over national contingents
to the KFOR Commander.190
A special agreement concerning command and control was concluded
concerning command and control over Russian troops, similar to the agreement
concerning command and control over Russian troops in IFOR.191 Multi-
national command did not extend to administrative control over national
contingents or to personnel management.
Some writers refer to the existence of a so-called ‘red card procedure’,
which would give each contingent the right to not take orders if they contradict
their national policy.192 It is not clear whether such a procedure is official
policy and to what extent it is institutionalized. It seems that in most cases
such a refusal to take orders from a multinational commander would be in
187 Bijlage Handelingen II 1998-99, 22181, 284.
188 Security Council Resolution 1244 of 10 June 1999, UN Doc. S/RES/1244, para. 7.
189 InMarch 2001 theMinister for Foreign and CommonwealthAffairs of the United Kingdom
stated that the “commander of KFOR is appointed byNATO and is accountable toNATO”,
Hansard HC, 27 March 2001, col. 824.
190 See e.g. Bijlage Handelingen II, 2000-01, 22181, 331; Hansard HC, 7 February 2002, col.
1084W.
191 Agreement onRussian Participation inKFOR,NewsReleaseNo. 301-99, Office of Assistant
Secretary of Defense, 18 June 1999.
192 See e.g. J. Cerone, Minding the Gap: Outlining KFOR Accountability in Post-Conflict Kosovo,
12 European Journal of International Law 469 (2001), at 486.
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breach of formal agreements relating to command and control in the same
way this sometimes happens in UN peace support operation.193
1.9 CONCLUSION
It may seem unnecessary to give an account of the evolution of peace support
operations to arrive at a definition of the term peace support operation.
§ 1.2-1.6 howevermake clear that the operations that are referred to in common
usage as peace support operations varywidely. The UN initiated the first peace
support operation as a pragmatic response to a problem that could not be
addressed through the procedures envisaged by the drafters of the UNCharter.
The ad hoc way in which the first operation was established became character-
istic of all subsequent peace support operations.White states that in this respect
the concept “reflects the crisis management approach of the Organisation’s
work concerning international peace and security.”194
Peace support operations have evolved in response to new political environ-
ments and they will continue to evolve as illustrated by the novelty of transi-
tional administrations by the United Nations in Kosovo and East Timor.195
The proposals in the Brahimi Report will probably to a certain extent plot the
course for further evolution.
A definition of peace support operations can only be properly understood
taking account of this continuing development, which makes it very difficult
to strictly separate different kinds of operations.
The definition of ‘peace support operations’ used in this study is taken
from NATO doctrine. It encompasses certain non-coercive as well as certain
coercive operations. Importantly, the element of impartiality distinguishes
peace support operations from enforcement action.
This study is limited to peace support operations led by the UN and by
NATO for two main reasons: first, because these organizations are presently
important actors in the maintenance of international peace and security, and
second, because peace support operations led by international organizations
raise particular questions of applicable law and accountability.
These questions arise from the involvement of international organizations
on the one hand, and the relationship between these organizations and states
on the other hand. Neither the UN nor NATO has a standing army for peace
193 See § 1.8.3. White uses the term red card to describe the case in which a UN contingent
commander ignores the orders of the UN commander on instruction from his national
capital. N. White, Commentary on the Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations
(The Brahimi Report), 6 Journal of Conflict and Security Law 127 (2001), at 136.
194 N. White, Keeping the Peace: The United Nations and the Maintenance of International
Peace and Security 184 (1993).
195 M. Ruffert, The Administration of Kosovo and East-Timor by the International Community, 50
International & Comparative Law Quarterly 613 (2001).
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support operations. The UN depends on voluntary contributions of troops by
member states to deploy an operation because the agreements provided for
in Article 43 of the Charter, that would have made troops available to the
organization on its call, were never concluded. NATO also depends on voluntary
contributions in the case of peace support or non-Article 5 operations. This
requires regulation of the competences of the international organization in
question and the troop contributing states.
The relationship between the international organization in question and
the troop contributing states requires regulation for each individual peace
support operation because of the ad hoc character of such operations. The result
of this regulationmay vary because it depends to a large extent on the specific
situation in which an operation is established, but certain procedural as well
as substantive patterns may be discerned. Procedurally the legal status of
national contingents in peace support operations is generally regulated in
participating states agreements and in a Status of Forces Agreement, though
in certain cases it may not be necessary or possible to conclude one or more
of these agreements. In NATO operations, a distinction is made betweenmember
states, whose relationship with the organization is already defined to a large
extent, and non-member states.
Substantively, the troop contributing states confer certain decision-making
powers over their contingent to the international organization in question while
retaining certain others, in particular criminal jurisdiction. A certain level of
military command is conferred from the states to amultinational commander,
though in practice the formal agreement concerning transfer of authority is
not respected in all cases. The result of these arrangements is that the national
contingents are to a certain extent integrated into the organization in question
while retaining their national identity. This is generally accepted in respect
of national contingents in UN peace support operations that are recognized
as part of a subsidiary organ of the UN principal organ that established the
operation, but it also seems to be the case for national contingents in NATO
peace support operations whose legal status seems to resemble that of UN
operations in a manner which is not generally recognized.
The legal status of peace support operations, in other words the relationship
between the international persons involved, is the key to determine the applic-
able law and questions of accountability in the following chapters. These
chapters will make clear that the complex character of the legal status and
its ad hoc development are reflected in questions of applicable law, and in
particular, questions of accountability. The bricolage institutionnel in the estab-
lishment of peace support operations must have its repercussions on the legal
issues involved.196
196 See J.M. Sorel, La Responsabilité des Nations Unies dans les Opérations de Maintien de la Paix,
3 International Law Forum 127 (2001), at 138.
2 Attribution of conduct of peace support
operations
2.1 INTRODUCTION
International responsibility requires the breach of an obligation under inter-
national law that is attributable to a legal person. This chapter discusses the
element of attribution, to which entity the conduct of peace support operations
is attributable. The second element, the breach of an international obligation,
is discussed in the next chapter.
As noted above, this study focuses on peace support operations under the
command and control of the UN and those under the command and control
of NATO. As a consequence, this chapter is principally concerned with those
two types of peace support operations. Nevertheless, it is inevitable that certain
general assertions are made, in particular in connection with the responsibility
of international organizations.
Different actors are involved in the establishment, deployment and func-
tioning of a peace support operation. In particular, these are the international
organization concerned, its member states, troop contributing states as well
as the host state. It is largely this multiplicity of actors and the intricate
relationship between them that makes the question of attribution of conduct
of a peace support operation so complex.
Another reason for the complexity of attribution of conduct of peace
support operations is that it is connected with questions of state responsibility
as well as the responsibility of international organizations. State responsibility
on the one hand is governed by a relatively developed set of principles. The
ILC adopted a set of draft articles on state responsibility in 2001 after many
years of work on the topic. Many of these articles are considered by states
to be a codification of customary international law. Principles of the respons-
ibility of international organizations on the other hand are very much under-
developed. Until quite recently it was unclear whether an international organ-
ization can incur responsibility and if so, on what basis.
2.2 THE BASIS OF INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
In doctrine and practice, state responsibility is regarded as a consequence of
the breach or non-performance of an international obligation by the state.
International responsibility is the term that describes the new legal relations
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to which the non-performance of an international obligation gives rise. Such
non-performance automatically leads to a new legal relationship, or as Special
Rapporteur García Amador wrote in his first report on the topic for the ILC
“international responsibility, of whatever specific type, is invariably the con-
sequence of the breach or non-performance of an international obligation.”1
A classical statement of the principle is by Judge Huber in the British Claims
in the Spanish Zone of Morocco case that responsibility is “the necessary corollary
of rights. All international rights entail international responsibility.”2
More recently the International Court of Justice stated in the Gabcˇikoco-
Nagymaros case that:
It is moreover well established that, when a State has committed an internationally
wrongful act, its international responsibility is likely to be involved whatever the
nature of the obligation it has failed to respect.3
Article 1 of the ILC draft articles on state responsibility restates this basic
principle, and draft article 2 specifies the conditions required to establish the
existence of an internationally wrongful act of the state:
Article 1
Responsibility of a State for its internationally wrongful acts
Every internationally wrongful act of a State entails the international responsibility
of that State.
Article 2
Elements of an internationally wrongful act of a State
There is an internationally wrongful act of a State when conduct consisting of an
action or omission:
a. Is attributable to the State under international law; and
b. Constitutes a breach of an international obligation of the State.
Among other things, the above demonstrates that state responsibility is closely
connected with the concept of international legal personality. The existence
of an international obligation of the state is a requirement for state responsibil-
1 F.V. García Amador, First Report on State Responsibility, YBILC 1956, Vol. II (Part I) 173,
at 184, para. 58.
2 UNRIAA vol. II, 615 (1925), at 641.
3 Gabcˇikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia), 1997 ICJ Reports 7, at 38, para. 47. For
other judicial statements of the principle see Report of the International Law Commission
on the work of its fifty-third session, 23 April – 1 June and 2 July – 10 August 2001 (A/56/
10), at 63-65, paras. 2-3.
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ity. A state is capable of having international obligations under international
law because it has international legal personality.4
The connection between the possession of international rights and obliga-
tions and international responsibility is also the basis for the recognition in
theory of the responsibility of international organizations. This basis is widely
accepted by writers.
For example, Eagleton asserts: “A state, or other international legal person,
may be held responsible only to the extent that it has rights and duties which
it is free to exercise”,5 and Sands and Klein contend that from:
a theoretical point of view, the fact that international organisations may be held
accountable for the consequences of their illegal or wrongful acts is widely accepted.
Liability is thus generally presented as the logical corollary of the powers and rights
conferred upon international organisations.6
In the specific case of the UN, the International Court of Justice’s advisory
opinion in the Reparations for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations
case is considered to confirm the link between international legal personality
and international responsibility. In this advisory opinion the Court established
a connection between the international legal personality of the organization
and the capacity to maintain its rights by bringing international claims or, in
other words, its ‘passive’ international responsibility.7 Although the Court
4 See F.V. García Amador, supra note 1, at 185, para. 64: “Responsibility is a consequence
of the breach or non-observance of an international obligation. Its imputability therefore
necessarily depends upon who is or are the subject or subjects of that obligation. Inter-
national doctrine and practice have developed in accordance with a conception of inter-
national law in which the State is the only subject capable of possessing or assuming
international obligations.”
5 C. Eagleton, International Organization and the Law of Responsibility, 76 Hague Recueil
(1950-I), 386.
6 P. Sands & P. Klein, Bowett’s Law of International Institutions 513 (2001), para. 15-087;
see also P. Reuter, Sur Quelques Limites du Droit des Organisations Internationales, in E. Diez,
J. Monnier, J. Müller, H. Reimann and L. Wildhaber (Eds.), Festschrift für Rudolf Bind-
schedler, Botschafter, Professor Dr. Iur. Zum 65. Geburtstag 8. Juli 1980, 491 (1980), at 505;
M.H. Arsanjani, Claims against International Organizations: Quis custodiet ipsos custodes, 7 The
Yale Journal of World Public Order 131 (1981), at 132; M. Perez-Gonzalez, Les Organisations
Internationales et le Droit de la Responsabilité, 92Revue Générale de Droit International Public
63 (1988), at 64; P. de Visscher, Rapport définitif, Les Conditions d’application des Lois
de la Guerre aux Opérations Militaires des Nations Unies, Annuaire IDI 54-I (1971) 116.
7 “the Court has come to the conclusion that the Organization is an international person. That is
not the same as saying that it is a State, which it certainly is not, or that its legal personality
and rights and duties are the same as those of a State. Still less it is the same thing as saying
that it is ‘a super-State’, whatever that expression may mean. It does not even imply that
all its rights and duties must be upon the international plane, any more than all the rights
and duties of a State must be upon that plane. What it does mean is that it is a subject of
international law and capable of possessing international rights and duties, and that it has capacity
to maintain its rights by bringing international claims.” Reparations for Injuries Suffered in
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did not discuss the question of the ‘active’ international responsibility of the
United Nations, i.e. its capacity for being responsible, recognition of such
responsibility is implicit because the passive and active sides of responsibility
are inseparable.8
The capacity of international organizations for international responsibility
is also recognized in the work of the ILC. The first report on the topic of state
responsibility submitted to the ILC by Special Rapporteur García Amador in
1956 covered international responsibility in general. The report recognized
that the appearance of new subjects on the international stage, including
international organizations, could not remain without consequences for inter-
national responsibility.9 One of these consequences was that international
organizations could be held responsible. One of the ‘bases of discussion’ at
the end of the report, in which the Special Rapporteur presented a summary
of his research and some of his conclusions, stated that:
Basis of discussion No. II
The active subjects of international responsibility
1. International responsibility being the consequence of the breach or non-ob-
servance an international obligation, its imputability depends on who is the
direct subject of the obligation.
2. Accordingly, the following may be active subjects of international responsibility:
…
(c) International organizations, in respect of acts or omissions of their organs
so far as the duty to make reparation for the injury caused is concerned.10
the Service of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion of 11 April 1949, 1949 ICJ Reports
174, at 179 (emphasis added).
8 See B. Amrallah, The International Responsibility of the U.N. for the Activities Carried out by
U.N. Peacekeeping Forces, 32 Revue Egyptienne de Droit International 57 (1976), at 60-61:
“Although the Court did not give an answer to the question of the capacity of the U.N.
to bear the responsibility for its unlawful acts or omissions, the recognition of such capacity
– according to the dominant doctrine – is educed from the internal logic of the Court’s
advisory opinion. The rights and duties of a legal person are indissociable. Where there
are rights, there are also duties; and we must assume that the U.N., as a legal person, has
duties as well as rights, and for failure to perform these duties it may be possible to claim
reparation from the U.N.”.
9 “In contemporary international law, in which full recognition had been given to the exist-
ence of other subjects of international responsibility, traditional theory and practice must
be reconsidered in order to adapt them to the new state of affairs.” García Amador, 370th
meeting, YBILC 1956 , 229, para. 26.
10 See F.V. García Amador, supra note 1, at 219-220. Also: “A brief reference will be made
to the cases in which responsibility is imputable to international organizations; in a sense,
these cases do not present complications and difficulties as to other subjects of international
law. In the first place, the international personality of these organizations, particularly of
some of them, is no longer in doubt, especially so far as their rights and their capacity to
exercise them are concerned, as will be seen in the next chapter. Nor can there be any doubt
concerning their duties, for some of these are explicitly prescribed in their constitutions
or rules and regulations. Accordingly, it cannot be denied that the non-performance of those
obligations, like the breach or non-observance of any other international obligation, neces-
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This basis of discussion was not taken up for discussion by the Commission,
however. The Commission adopted the recommendation made by the Special
Rapporteur that at that stage codification should be confined to the law on
the responsibility of states for damage caused to the person or property of
aliens. In 1963, the Commission reconsidered its approach to the topic of state
responsibility and decided to focus on “the definition of the general rules
governing the international responsibility of the State.” International responsib-
ility of international organizations was still not covered. In its work on state
responsibility the Commission consciously tried to avoid the topic of the
responsibility of international organizations. An example of such efforts is the
statement in the commentary to draft article 13 adopted on first reading that:
In studying the questions which arise in the context of this article, care must be
taken not to go beyond the scope of the draft under consideration which, as already
stated, is limited in respect of international responsibility to the responsibility of
States, and does not deal with questions relating to the responsibility of subjects
of international law other than States.11
In 1998, Special Rapporteur Crawford stated that some of the draft articles
adopted on first reading by the Commission raised awkward issues with
regard to the responsibility of international organizations. He proposed the
adoption of a savings clause in the draft articles reserving any question of the
responsibility under international law of an international organization or of
any state for the acts of an international organization.12 Acting on this re-
commendation the Commission adopted draft article 57, which states:
Article 57
Responsibility of an international organization
These articles are without prejudice to any question of the responsibility under
international law of an international organization, or of any State for the conduct
of an international organization.
Despite all these efforts by the Commission to avoid discussion of the topic
of the responsibility of international organizations, discussions on state re-
sponsibility sometimes led to statements concerning the responsibility of
international organizations. Such statements were made in connection with
a draft article concerning the attribution to the state of the conduct of organs
placed at its disposal by another state or by an international organization (draft
article 9), and in connection with a draft article concerning the attribution to
sarily involves them in responsibility. In some respects, it is even possible to establish a
definite analogy with the responsibility imputable to the State.”, id., at 189, para. 83.
11 YBILC 1975, Vol II, at 89-90.
12 J. Crawford, First Report on State Responsibility, Addendum of 22 July 1998, UN Doc. A/
CN.4/490/Add.5, at 29, para. 234 and at 37, para. 262.
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the state of conduct of organs of an international organization (draft article
13). These statements recognized the possibility of an international organization
being responsible under international law,13 although many of them also
reaffirmed that the Commission did not have to define the rules on the possible
responsibility of international organizations in the context of the draft articles
on state responsibility.14
The commentary to draft article 57 of the draft articles on state responsibil-
ity also recognizes that international organizations can be responsible. The
commentary states that:
Such an organization possesses separate legal personality under international law,
and is responsible for its own acts, i.e. for acts which are carried out by the organ-
ization through its own organs or officials.15
The clearest recognition by the ILC that international organizations can be
responsible is that in 2002, pursuant to a request by the General Assembly,16
the Commission included the topic of the responsibility of international organ-
izations in its program of work. The ILC decided to establish a working group
on responsibility of international organizations to be chaired by Mr. Giorgio
Gaja. The commission also appointed Mr. Gaja as Special Rapporteur for the
topic of responsibility of international organizations.
In 2003 the Special Rapporteur submitted his first report on responsibility
of international organizations to the ILC. The report starts with an overview
of earlier work of the ILC on the topic. This work consists of the remarks made
by the ILC in the process of compiling the draft articles on state responsibility
as reviewed above. In this respect the report concludes as follows:
While the draft articles adopted on second reading have left all the specific ques-
tions open, the Commission’s work on State responsibility cannot fail to affect the
new study. It would be unreasonable for the Commission to take a different
approach on issues relating to international organizations that are parallel to those
concerning States, unless there are specific reasons for doing so. This is not meant
to state a presumption that the issues are to be regarded as similar and would lead
to analogous solutions. The intention only is to suggest that, should the study
concerning particular issues relating to international organizations produce results
that do not differ from those reached by the Commission in its analysis of State
13 See, e.g. YBILC 1974, Vol I, at 47, para. 39; YBILC 1975, Vol. I, at 45, para. 29, at 46, para.
35, at 47, paras. 5-6, at 60, para. 42.
14 See, e.g. YBILC 1975, Vol. I, at 57, para 17, Bilge: “he considered that article 12 should not
attempt to define the responsibility of international organizations.”
15 Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its fifty-third session, 23 April
– 1 June and 2 July – 10 August 2001 (A/56/10), at 361, para. 2.
16 General Assembly Resolution 56/82 of 18 January 2002, UN Doc. A/RES/56/82, para. 8.
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responsibility, the model of the draft articles on State responsibility should be
followed both in the general outline and in the wording of the text.17
This paragraph suggests that the effect of the draft articles on state responsibil-
ity on the drafting of the law of responsibility of international organizations
is limited to the placement of particular articles. The suggestion appears to
fail to recognize the fundamental correspondence between the two topics that
is the result of the connection between legal personality and international
responsibility. The latter connection is dscussed in more detail below.
The report continues with a discussion of the scope of the study. This
concerns the definition of ‘international organization’ for the purposes of the
draft articles on responsibility of international organizations. The point of
departure for this definition is that responsibility under international law may
arise only for a subject of international law.18 The report espouses the so-called
‘objective theory’ of international legal personality. According to this theory,
the characterization of an organization as a subject of international law appears
as a question of fact.19 The report proposes a number of elements for a defini-
tion of ‘international organization’. These are the intergovernmental character
of the organization, the exercise of normative, executive or judicial functions
by the organization, and that the organization may be considered as a separate
entity from its members. The report states that the question of the responsibility
of a state either because it has contributed to the organization’s unlawful act
or else because it is a member of the organization should be included in the
scope of the study, but:
without prejuduce to the way in which these questions should be answered. Even
if the present study were to conclude that States are never responsible for the
conduct of the organizations of which they are members, the scope of the present
draft articles would not be accurately stated unless it was made clear that it includes
those questions that were left out of the draft articles on State responsibility because
of their relation to issues concerning responsibility of international organizations.20
The report states that the general principles of state responsibility also apply
to international organizations, without giving substantive supporting argu-
ments for this proposition.21 This lack of argument is striking in view of the
suggestion in another part of the report that principles from the draft articles
on state responsibility can only be transposed to the draft articles on the
17 G. Gaja, First Report on Responsibility of International Organizations of 26 March 2003,
UN Doc. A/CN.4/532, para. 11.
18 Id., para. 15.
19 See § 2.4.
20 Supra note 17, para. 33.
21 Supra note 17, paras. 35-37.
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responsibility of international organizations after careful study.22 The report
concludes with text proposals for three draft articles.
The Special Rapporteur’s report was discussed by the ILC during its 2003
session. The most passionately debated issue was the definition of ‘international
organization’ for the purposes of the draft articles. Specifically, there was much
criticism of the Special Rapporteur’s proposal to include the exercise of certain
governmental functions as an element of the definition. Several members of
the Commission either maintained that the expression ‘certain governmental
functions’ was inaccurate because it equated international organizations to
states,23 or that the expression was too vague,24 or that it unjustifiably ex-
cluded certain organizations, for example those devoted to scientific re-
search.25 On the other hand, several members of the Commission stressed
that the possession of international legal personality should be an element
of the definition.26 It was pointed out that international legal personality is
a prerequisite of international responsibility. One member of the Commission
for example stated that:
As a first step, it was important to establish that the organization possesses inter-
national personality, because that was what invested it with duties or obligations
a breach of which might entail international responsibility.27
Another member of the Commission suggested that the Special Rapporteur
might consider the viability of linking the issue of definition to the notion of
legal personality by indicating the most relevant criteria pertaining to such
personality.28 This illustrates that members of the Commission felt that inter-
national legal personality is central to the notion of international responsibil-
ity.29
Draft article 1 on the scope of the draft articles, which the Special Rappor-
teur proposed in his first report, stated that the draft articles: “also apply to
the question of the international responsibility of a State for the conduct of
an international organization.”30 In the passage relating to this proposal in
the Special Rapporteur’s first report, specific mention is made of “conduct
22 See this para. above.
23 See e.g. Chee, UN Doc. A/CN.4/SR.2754, at 17; Galicki, UN Doc. A/CN.4/SR.2755, at 9;
Escarameia, UN Doc. A/CN.4/SR.2755, at 10.
24 See e.g. Momtaz, UN Doc. A/CN.4/SR.2754, at 17; Candioti, UN Doc. A/CN.4/SR.2755,
at 25.
25 See e.g. Koskeniemmi, UN Doc. A/CN.4/SR.2754, at 4.
26 See Pellet, UN Doc. A/CN.4/SR.2753, at 13; Sepúlveda, UN Doc. A/CN.4/SR.2754, at 14;
Momtaz, UN Doc. A/CN.4/SR.2754, at 17; Galicki, UN Doc. A/CN.4/SR.2755, at 9; Candioti,
UN Doc. A/CN.4/SR.2755, at 25.
27 Addo, A/CN.4/SR.2755, at 11.
28 Comissario Afonso, A/CN.4/SR.2755, at 21.
29 See also § 2.5.1.
30 G. Gaja, supra note 17, para. 34.
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which, unlike that of international organizations acting as State organs, is to
be attributed to an organization.”31 This leaves open both the possibility that
a state is responsible for conduct attributable to an international organization
that is in breach of an obligation of the organization itself, as well as the
possibility that the state is responsible for conduct attributable to the organiza-
tion that is in breach of an international obligation of that state.
The report continues to state that the responsibility of a state may arise
“either because it has contributed to the organization’s unlawful act or else
because it is a member of the organization.”32 This appears to discard the
possibility that the draft articles deal with the possibility that a state is re-
sponsible for an act that is attributable to an international organization that
breaches an obligation of that state. The text of the report does not indicate
whether this was the intention of the Special Rapporteur. During the ILC’s 2003
deliberations on the responsibility of international organizations, none of the
members referred to the possibility of state responsibility for conduct that is
attributable to an international organization and that breaches an obligation
of the state. Several members held that the draft articles on state responsibility
already covered the question of the responsibility of a state for the conduct
of an international organization. In so far as they were referring to Part One,
Chapter II, of the draft articles on state responsibility, it is strictly speaking
not correct to say that this is a question of state responsibility for conduct of
an international organization. Rather, this Chapter covers state responsibility
for conduct of a state in the context of an international organization. The
example given by one member of the commission,33 where an international
organization enters into an agreement on privileges and immunities with a
state and responsibility is thereby incurred by that state, is a case in point.
In that case the state is responsible for having entered into the agreement,
instead of for the conduct of the organization.34
A small number of members of the Commission questioned the inclusion
of a reference to state responsibility for the conduct of an international organ-
ization in the first draft article.35 They considered that to include a reference
to such responsibility essentially required that its existence be demonstrated.
Neither the Special Rapporteur nor the rest of the Commission appear to have
shared this point of view. They appear to want not to exclude this question
31 G. Gaja, supra note 17, para. 33.
32 G. Gaja, supra note 17, para. 33.
33 Sreenivasa Rao, A/CN.4/SR.2755, p. 24. See also Kamto, A/CN.4/SR.2755, at 6; Yamada,
A/CN.4/SR.2754, at 10.
34 The example bears a striking resemblance to the facts in the Waite & Kennedy v. Germany
and Beer & Regan v. Germany cases before the European Court of Human Rights. In these
cases the granting of immunity by Germany to the European Space Agency was at issue.
Waite & Kennedy v. Germany, (1999) 30 EHHR 261; Beer & Regan v. Germany (1999) 33 EHHR
54.
35 Pellet, UN Doc. A/CN.4/SR.2753, at 8; Candioti, UN Doc. A/CN.4/SR.2755, at 25.
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from the scope of the draft articles at this point, while reserving an analysis
of whether and to what extent such responsibility actually exists for a later
stage in the Commission’s study.36
A noteworthy feature of the deliberations was the statement by one member
of the Commission that although state responsibility might be incurred through
the conduct of an international organization, this would come within the scope
of the draft articles on the responsibility of states, and it was odd to refer to
such problems in the first article on the responsility of international organiza-
tions.37 As the Special Rapporteur pointed out, however, the question of the
international responsibility of states for the conduct of international organiza-
tions had been left out of the draft articles on state responsibility.38 It would
be odd if the question was not addressed in the draft articles on state respons-
ibility because of its link to international organizations, and not addressed
in the draft articles on the responsibility of international organizations because
of its link to states.
At the ILC session in 2003 the draft articles proposed by the Special Rappor-
teur were referred to the ILC Drafting Committee. The Drafting Committee
adopted the draft articles with certain amendments as follows:
Article 1
Scope of the present draft articles
1 The present draft articles apply to the international responsibility of an inter-
national organization for an act that is wrongful under international law.
2 The present draft articles also apply to the international responsibility of a State
for the international wrongful act of an international organization.
Article 2
Use of terms
For the purposes of the present draft articles, the term “international organization”
refers to an organization established by a treaty or other instrument governed by
international law and possessing its own international legal personality. Inter-
national organizations may include as members, in addition to States, other entities.
Article 3
General principles
1 Every internationally wrongful act of an international organization entails the
international responsibility of the international organization.
2 There is an internationally wrongful act of an international organization when
conduct consisting of an action or ommission:
a. Is attributable to the international organization under international law; and
36 See e.g. Gaja, UN Doc. A/CN.4/SR.2756, at 6.
37 Koskeniemmi, UN Doc. A/CN.4/SR.2754, at 3.
38 Gaja, UN Doc. A/CN.4/2755, at 27.
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b. Constitutes a breach of an international obligation of that international organiza-
tion.39
2.3 ACCOUNTABILITY AND INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
Attention for the responsibility of international organizations is also fueled
by an increasing concern for accountability of international organizations.
Similar to certain other popular expressions such as ‘global governance’40
the vagueness of accountability is part of its attractiveness. Reinisch states that
accountability can mean many different things to different people.41
Black’s law dictionary definition of accountability is “state of being re-
sponsible or answerable.” A slightly more specific description used by
Slaughter is that “those who exercise power on behalf of others can be held
accountable if that power is misused or abused.”42 This description however
is still very general, and Slaughter notes that: “Accountability itself is such
a complex concept, with many different definitions in different contexts and
according to different political theories, that it makes little sense to address
it apart from specific factual situations.”43
Concern for the accountability of international organizations developed
as a consequence of the proliferation of international organizations and the
expanding scope of the activities of international organizations.44 The con-
temporary practice of many international organizations reflects an important
role being played in many fields of activity, including the maintenance of
international peace and security. To enable organizations to play this role,
states have increasingly conferred powers upon them. In the field of inter-
national peace and security for example, member states of the UN have given
the organization the power to decide whether there is a threat to the peace,
breach of the peace or act of aggression and more importantly, the power to
decide on the use of force. More generally, the increasing powers of inter-
national organizations have led to calls for increased accountability, because
39 Responsibility of international organizations, Titles and texts of the draft articles 1,2 and
3 adopted by the Drafting Committee, Un Doc. A/CN.4/L.632 of 4 June 2003.
40 See e.g. A. Franceschet, Justice and International Organization: TwoModels of Global Governance,
8 Global Governance 19 (2002); L. Finkelstein, What is Global Governance?, 1 Global Govern-
ance 367 (1995); M. Hewson & T. Sinclair (Eds.), Approaches to Global Governance Theory
(1999); Commission on Global Governance, Our Global Neighbourhood: Report of the
Commission on Global Governance (1995).
41 A. Reinisch, Governance Without Accountability?, 44 German Yearbook of International Law
270 (2002), at 273.
42 A.M. Slaughter, The Accountability of Government Networks, 8 Indiana Journal of Global Legal
Studies 347 (2001), at 349.
43 Id., at 360.
44 See e.g. The Accountability of International Organizations to Non-State Actors, 92 ASIL Proc.
359 (1998).
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accountability is considered a desirable, if not necessary, corollary of power.
In a more specific sense a consequence of the increase in activities and powers
of international organizations is that international organizations have come
to operate much closer to, and have a direct impact on the lives of, individuals.
Peace support operations are a good example because these operations by
definition are in the field and in direct contact with the population of the host
state. The decisions of international organizations used to affect individuals
almost exclusively through the intermediation of their sovereign.45 This sover-
eign was in most cases accountable to the individuals under its sovereignty
through the democratic political process or through other means. Hey states
that international law, however, does not reflect the notion that if international
organizations, in fact, exercise public policy competences, the exercise of those
competences should be subject to the controls and rules applicable to the
exercise of governmental powers in national societies and that states, by
attributing public policy competences to international organizations, thus
arguably may circumvent the procedures which, at the national level, otherwise
may be available for controlling the exercise of such competences.46 This
development has led to an increasing call for accountability of international
organizations.47 It also helps to explain why the call for accountability is
strongest in cases where international organizations take on complex peace-
making operations.48 In these cases, and in particular in the case of transitional
administration, an international operation acts as a state. Grossman and
Bradlow state that those:
Cases in which the international community has been willing to undertake complex
peacemaking operations, involving the assumption of certain governmental func-
tions, raise important considerations of responsibility and accountability. The
peacekeepers relate to the general population within the country in much the same
way that governmental actors relate to the population within a country. This
suggests that the international community, in defining the mandate and in the
execution of these operations, needs to ensure that the international peacekeepers
perform their responsibilities to these private actors to the same extent and in a
comparable manner to what would be expected of a national government.49
45 See P. Stephan, Legitimacy, Accountability, Authority, and Freedom in the New Global Order,
70 University of Colorado Law Review 1555 (1999).
46 E. Hey, The World Bank Inspection Panel: Towards the Recognition of a New Legally Relevent
Relationship in International Law, 2 Hofstra Law & Policy Symposium 61 (1997), at 64-65.
47 See e.g. A. Reinisch, Securing the Accountability of International Organizations, 7 Global
Governance 131 (2001).
48 See e.g. R. Wilde, Accountability and International Actors in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo
and East Timor, 7 ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law 455 (2001).
49 C. Grossman & D. Bradlow, Are We Being Propelled Towards a People-Centered Transnational
Legal Order?, 9 American University Journal of International Law & Policy 1 (1993), at 21.
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The increasing attention that the issue of the accountability of international
organizations has received from the international legal community is demon-
strated by the establishment by the ILA of a committee to study the topic. The
point of departure of the committee is the one discussed above, i.e. that ac-
countability is linked to the authority and power of an international organiza-
tion and that “power entails accountability, that is the duty to account for its
exercise.”50 The committee has developed a set of recommended rules and
practices aimed at making accountability operational by inter alia fostering
the effectiveness and appropriateness of the use of power and sanctioning the
abuse or derailment of power.51 It has not given a definition of accountability,
other than a description of the components of accountability. Nevertheless,
the description of components gives a reasonably clear idea of the concept.
Accountability of and towards international organizations is described as
comprising three interrelated and mutually supportive components:
1. the extent to which international organizations, in the fulfillment of their
responsibilities as established in their constituent instruments, are and should
be subject to or exercising forms of internal and external scrutiny and monitor-
ing, irrespective of potential and subsequent liability and/or responsibility;
2. tortious liability for injurious consequences arising out of acts or omissions
not involving a breach of any rule or norm of international and/or institutional
law; (e.g. environmental damage as a result of lawful nuclear or space activities);
3. responsibility arising out of acts or omissions which do constitute a breach
of a rule or norm of international and/or institutional law (e.g. violations of
human rights or humanitarian law, breach of contract, gross negligence, or
as far as institutional law is concerned acts of organs ultra vires or violating
the law of employment relations).52
The broadest contours of accountability in this description, i.e. monitoring and
scrutiny, imply certain elements that make such monitoring and scrutiny
possible, such as transparency including access to information, responsiveness
and reporting. These and other implications have been elaborated by the
committee in draft ‘recommended rules and practices’.53 Unlike international
responsibility, which is by definition legal, accountability of international
50 Committee on Accountability of International Organisations, Third Report 2 (2002).
51 See Committee on Accountability of International Organizations, Third Report (2002).
52 Committee on Accountability of International Organisations, First Report 17 (1998).
53 Supra note 51. Implications of accountability of international organizations are also being
developed in the context of the “Global Accountability Project” by One World Trust, a non-
governmental organization, assisted by a panel of academics, activists and former inter-
national officials. Research by the project has inter alia identified an effective complaints
mechanism, regular assessment of the impact of policies and access to information as
dimensions of accountability of international organizations. See The Global Accountability
Project 1: Power Without Accountability? (2003)
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organizations can present itself in different forms: legal, political, administrative
or financial.54 This is an important point because it makes clear that account-
ability is broader than international responsibility, in the sense of responsibility
for internationally wrongful acts in the ILC’s project on the responsibility of
international organizations. Accountability encompasses political, administra-
tive, and various informal, non-legal mechanisms by which an entity or an
individual may be answerable for something. This also means that the yard-
stick of accountability of international organizations is not limited to inter-
national obligations binding on those organizations.
The concept of accountability may apply differently to different entities.
In every case, however, the main questions to make the concept operational
are what the yardstick of accountability should be, who can raise accountability
and how accountability can be implemented. In the context of peace support
operations these questions can be answered as follows. First, this study is
concerned with the application of international humanitarian law and as a
consequence the relevant yardstick is international humanitarian law. Secondly,
traditionally the only relevant relationship in international organizations is
the one between the organization and its member states. There is sometimes
a tendency to think of accountability of international organizations principally
in relation to member states. This focus leads to concern for, inter alia, voting
rights of member states and the possibilities of judicial review of organs of
international organizations.55 Accountability is increasingly considered from
the perspective of individuals instead of states, however. The activities of
international organizations have a direct impact on the lives of individuals.
If all affected parties should be able to hold those who make and implement
policies that affect them accountable for their actions, and if the scope of those
who can raise accountability is determined by “who is actually affected by
the decisions that have been taken and the consequences thereof”,56 than this
must include individuals. The claim by individuals to accountability is re-
inforced by the increasing recognition that they have a legal personality of
their own, and that as a consequence there is a legally relevant direct relation-
ship between them and international organizations. The United Nations
Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) also takes this people-
centered perspective in its evaluation of the United Nations Operation in
Somalia where it writes under the heading ‘accountability’ that:
For the United Nations to successfully promote respect for human rights and good
governance in collapsed states, as well as gain some measure of credibility, it must
54 Supra note 52, at 16.
55 For an article discussing accountability from this perspective see N. White, Accountability
and Democracy Within the United Nations: A Legal Perspective, 13 International Relations 1
(1997).
56 C. Grossman & D. Bradlow, supra note 49, at 24.
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demonstrate a commitment to the principles of accountability and transparency
in its own work. In UNOSOM, no independent oversight existed which could serve
as an ombudsman to consider grievances registered by the local population against
the United Nations.57
Finally, there are many instruments to implement accountability. Responsibility
is usually implemented by adjudicative means. Accountability in a broader
sense can also be achieved through various quasi-judicial or even political or
administrative means.
2.4 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PERSONALITY OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE NORTH
ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION
As noted above, the capacity to have rights and obligations under international
law is critical to the possibility of being held responsible for an internationally
wrongful act.58 The status of being capable of bearing legal rights and duties
under international law is defined as having international legal personality.59
States by definition have international legal personality. The possession
of legal personality, in other words the capacity to enter into relations at the
international level, is necessary evidence of statehood.60 This is expressed
in article 1 of the 1933 Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of
States that refers to “the state as a person of international law.”61
57 The Comprehensive Report on Lessons Learned from United Nations Operation in Somalia
(UNOSOM), para. 57.
58 See also International Law Association, supra note 52, at 21; C.F. Amerasinghe, Principles
of the Institutional Law of International Organizations 239 (1996): “Once the existence of
international personality for international organizations is conceded, it is not difficult to
infer that, just as organizations can demand responsibility of other international persons
because they have rights at international law, so they can also be held responsible to other
international persons because they have obligations at international law.”
59 “the Court has come to the conclusion that the Organization is an international person. That is
not the same as saying that it is a State, which it certainly is not, or that its legal personality
and rights and duties are the same as those of a State. Still less it is the same thing as saying
that it is ‘a super-State’, whatever that expression may mean. It does not even imply that
all its rights and duties must be upon the international plane, any more than all the rights
and duties of a State must be upon that plane. What it does mean is that it is a subject of
international law and capable of possessing international rights and duties, and that it has capacity
to maintain its rights by bringing international claims.” Reparations for Injuries Suffered in
the Service of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion of 11 April 1949, 1949 I.C.J. Reports
174, at 179 (emphasis added); see also B. Cheng, Introduction to Subjects of International Law,
in M. Bedjaoui (Ed.), International Law: Achievements and Prospects 23 (1991), at 25.
60 See D. Raicˇ, Statehood and the Law of Self-Determination 23 (2002).
61 Convention on the Rights and Duties of States (Montevideo Convention), 26 December
1933, 165 L.N.T.S. 19, 28 American Journal of International Law (Supplement) 75 (1934).
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International organizations on the other hand do not by definition have
international legal personality. It is therefore necessary to determine whether
the international organizations that this study focuses on, the United Nations
and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, are international legal persons.
Doctrine has developed two main theories on the bestowal of international
legal personality on international organizations. The first is the theory of
objective international personality. According to this theory international law
bestows legal personality when an organization meets certain criteria, ir-
respective of the will of the member states. It is not the provisions of the
constitution or the intention of its framers which establish the international
personality of an international organization, but the objective fact of its exist-
ence.62 This theory appears to be making a comeback in the literature,63
though it is not unproblematic. It does not seem to be supported by the Repara-
tions for Injuries case in which the ICJ in several passages refers to the intention
of the member states. It is also at pains to explain the ability of non-member
states to withhold recognition of the personality of the organization.
The second, subjective, theory maintains that organizations have inter-
national legal personality because this status is given to them by member
states. Member states can do so expressly or implicitly. In the latter case
personality can be derived from the functions and rights and duties of the
organization. If the member states would not have wished the organization
to have international legal personality, they would not have given it these
attributes. This theory is supported by the Reparations for Injuries case.64 It
may be noted that the practical effects of the objective theory of international
personality and of the subjective theory, i.e. that the intention of the member
state can be derived from functions, rights and obligations, are very similar.
The International Court of Justice determined in its advisory opinion in the
Reparations for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations case that the
UN has international legal personality. It stated that:
In the opinion of the Court, the Organization was intended to exercise and enjoy,
and is in fact exercising and enjoying, functions and rights which can only be
explained on the basis of the possession of a large measure of international per-
sonality and capacity to operate upon an international plane. It is at present the
supreme type of international organization, and it could not carry out the intentions
of its founders if it was devoid of international personality. It must be acknow-
62 F. Seyersted, Objective International Personality of Intergovernmental Organizations, 34 Nordisk
Tidsskrift for International Ret 1 (1964), at 39-40.
63 See e.g. N.D. White, The Law of International Organisations 29 (1996); I. Brownlie, Principles
of Public International Law 679-680 (1998); C. Brölmann,AFlat Earth? International Organiza-
tions in the System of International Law, 70 Nordic Journal of International Law 319 (2001),
at 325.
64 H. Schermers & N. Blokker, International Institutional Law 579 (1995); P. Sands & P. Klein,
Bowett’s Law of International Institutions 472 (2001).
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ledged that its Members, by entrusting certain functions to it, with the attendant
duties and responsibilities, have clothed it with the competence required to enable
those functions to be effectively discharged. Accordingly, the Court has come to
the conclusion that the Organization is an international person.65
The international legal personality of the UN has subsequently been confirmed
on numerous occassions in law and practice.
There is no similar international judicial authority with regard to the
international legal personality of NATO. The constitutive instrument of the
organization does not expressly provide that it has legal personality in inter-
national law. Explicit recognition is not the only way in which international
legal personality is conferred on international organizations.
Application of the objective as well as application of the subjective theory
of international legal personality leads to the conclusion that NATO is an
international legal person.66 The organization is a permanent association of
states established by the 1949 North Atlantic Treaty with the lawful object of
collective self-defense. It is equipped with organs, the most important of which
is the North Atlantic Council. The functions of the organization are distinct
from those of the member states. The most recent statement of these functions
is in section 10 of the 1999 Strategic Concept of the organization.67 The organ-
ization exercises powers on the international plane, notably treaty-making
power. Article 25 of the 1951 Ottawa treaty on the status of the organization
for example provides that the North Atlantic Council acting on behalf of the
organization may conclude supplementary agreements with member states.
The organization also concludes international agreements on other issues with
member states68 and with non-member states.69 There is also state practice
supporting legal personality of the organization. In the Bankovic´ case before
the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) the French government argued
that a bombardment during Operation Allied Force was not imputable to its
member states but to NATO as an organization with an international legal
65 Supra note 59, at 178-179.
66 See also A. Pellet, L’Imputabilité d’Éventuels Actes Illicites Responsabilité de l’OTAN ou des États
Membres, in C. Tomuschat (Ed.), Kosovo and the International Community 193 (2002), at
198, for the conclusion that NATO has international legal personality.
67 The Alliance’s Strategic Concept approved by the Heads of State and Government partici-
pating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Washington D.C. on 23-24 April
1999, para. 10.
68 E.g. Briefwisseling tussen de Regering van het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden en de Noord-
Atlantische Verdragsorganisatie houdende een overeenkomst inzake the functioneren in
Nederland van het NATO Airborne Early Warning and Control Programme Management
Agency (NAPMA), ’s Gravenhage/Brussel, 31 augustus en 11 september 1979, Trb. 1979
159.
69 E.g. Agreement Between the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization Concerning the Status of NATO and its Personnel, Appendix B to
Annex 1A to the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina,
35 ILM 75 (1996).
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personality separate from that of the respondent states. The challenge of the
admissibility of the case by all the respondent states on the ground that the
ECHR would be determining the rights and obligations of NATO itself also points
in this direction.70 This challenge assumes that NATO itself has rights and
obligations under international law, which can only be the case if the organiza-
tion has international legal personality. Trial Chambers of the International
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) have also treated NATO
as an international legal person separate from its member states. Trial Chamber
I in the Todorovic´ case ordered the NAC to disclose to the defense copies of
documents and the identity of certain individuals in connection with the arrest
of the accused.71 The order was based on article 29 of the ICTY Statute that
provides that states shall cooperate with the Tribunal. The Trial Chamber stated
that:
A purposive construction of the Statute yields the conclusion that such an order
should be as applicable to collective enterprises of States as it is to individual States;
Article 29 should, therefore, be read as conferring on the International Tribunal
a power to require an international organization or its competent organ such as
SFOR to cooperate with it in the achievement of its fundamental objective of
prosecution persons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian
law, by providing the several modes of assistance set out therein.72
2.5 STATE RESPONSIBILITY AND ATTRIBUTION
A state is only responsible for conduct that is attributable to the state. A state
as an abstract legal entity cannot in reality act. Imputability is the legal fiction
that assimilates the actions or omissions of persons to the state itself. The
attribution of conduct to the state as a subject of international law is based
on criteria determined by international law and not on the mere recognition
of a link of factual causality.73
70 Vlastimir and Borka Bankovic´, Živana Stojanovic´, Mirjana Stoimenovski, Dragana Joksimovic´ and
Dragan Sukovic´ v. Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary,
Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Turkey and the
United Kingdom, Decision of 12 December 2001 (Appl. No. 52207/99), at 9, para. 31. See
§ 5.6.4.
71 Prosecutor v. Blagoje Simic´, Milan Simic´, Miroslav Tadic´, Stevan Todorovic´ and Simo Zaric´,
Decision on Motion for Judicial Assistance to be Provided by SFOR and Others, Case No.
IT-95-9-PT, Tr. Ch. I, 18 October 2000. This statement was espoused by Trial Chamber II
in Prosecutor v. Dragan Nikolic´, Decision on Defence Motion Challenging the Exercise of
Jurisdiction by the Tribunal, Case No. IT-94-2-PT, Tr. Ch. II, 9 October 2002, para. 49.
72 Id., para. 48.
73 Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its fifty-third session, supra
note 15, at 81, para. 4
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The ILC specified conditions under which conduct is attributed to the state
in Chapter II of Part One of the draft articles on state responsibility. Some of
these appear more relevant with regard to the attribution of the conduct of
peace support operations than other conditions. In particular, these are the
following:
Article 4
Conduct of organs of a State
1 The conduct of any State organ shall be considered an act of that State under
international law, whether the organ exercises legislative, executive, judicial
or any other functions, whatever position it holds in the organization of the
State, and whatever its character as an organ of the central government or of
a territorial unit of the State.
2 An organ includes any person or entity which has that status in accordance
with the internal law of the State.
Article 6
Conduct of organs placed at the disposal of a State by another State
The conduct of an organ placed at the disposal of a State by another State shall
be considered an act of the former under international law if the organ is acting
in the exercise of elements of the governmental authority of the State at whose
disposal it is placed.
Article 7
Excess of authority or contravention of instructions
The conduct of an organ of a State or of a person or entity empowered to exercise
elements of the governmental authority shall be considered an act of the State under
international law if the organ, person or entity acts in that capacity, even if it
exceeds its authority or contravenes instructions.
Article 8
Conduct directed or controlled by a State
The conduct of a person or group of persons shall be considered an act of a State
under international law if the person or group of persons is in fact acting on the
instructions of, or under the direction or control of, that State in carrying out the
conduct.
2.6 RESPONSIBILITY OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND ATTRIBUTION
2.6.1 Attribution to the organization
An international organization is an abstract person and rules are necessary
to impute the conduct of individuals to it. These rules have not yet been
codified. As mentioned in § 2.2 the ILC has just started its study of the respons-
ibility of international organizations.
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In the absence of codification, the principles of attribution to international
organizations are determined by customary international law. The identification
of customary rules requires state practice, however, and in connection with
the responsibility of international organizations state practice is limited. Ques-
tions of the responsibility of international organizations are often resolved
without explicit reference to legal grounds.74 The body of international case
law on the topic is also very limited. The International Court of Justice has
addressed the attribution of conduct to an international organization in one
case, and that was in an obiter dictum. In its advisory opinion on the Difference
relating to immunity from legal process of a Special Rapporteur of the Commission
on Human Rights the Court stated that:
the question of immunity from legal process is distinct from the issue of compensa-
tion for any damages incurred as a result of acts performed by the United Nations
or by its agents acting in their official capacity.
The United Nations may be required to bear responsibility for the damage arising
from such acts.75
In the absence of any considerable practice in respect of the responsibility of
international organizations it is generally recognized in doctrine that the
principles of the law of state responsibility apply by analogy to international
organizations.76
This is logical in view of the connection between legal personality and
international responsibility. The legal personality of states and international
organizations, in the sense of the capacity to possess rights and obligations
under international law, is the same. Only the scope of the legal personality,
the actual rights and obligations that the legal person possesses, is different
because of the functional character of international organizations. One of the
main functions of the institution of international responsibility is the defense
of the legal order against breaches by a subject of that legal order. This legal
order is affected in the same way by the breach of an obligation by an inter-
74 P. Reuter, Sur Quelques Limites du Droit des Organisations Internationales, in E. Diez, J.
Monnier, J. Müller, H. Reimann and L. Wildhaber (Eds.), Festschrift für Rudolf Bindschedler,
Botschafter, Professor Dr. Iur. Zum 65. Geburtstag 8. Juli 1980, 491 (1980), at 497.
75 Difference Relating to Immunity from Legal Process of a Special Rapporteur of the Commis-
sion on Human Rights, 1999 ICJ Reports 62, para. 66.
76 See e.g. P. Klein, La Responsabilité des Organisations Internationales dans les Ordres
Juridiques Internes et en Droit des Gens 376 (1998); I. Scobbie, International Responsibility,
in R.J. Dupuy (Ed.), Manuel sur les Organisations Internationales 886 (1998), at 887; Jimenez
de Aréchaga, International Responsibility, in M. Sørensen (Ed.), Manual of Public International
Law 532 (1968), at 595, M. Perez Gonzalez, Les Organisations Internationales et le Droit de
la Responsabilité, 92 Revue Générale de Droit International Public 63 (1988), at 81, M. Hirsch,
The Responsibility of International Organizations Toward Third Parties: Some Basic Prin-
ciples (1995).
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national organization as by a breach by a state. This is summed up well by
one author:
The steadily growing participation of international organizations in international
relations calls for a closer scrutiny of the question of legality of the acts of inter-
national organizations, understood as the proper fulfillment of their statutory
functions with due respect to the rights of other subjects of international intercourse.
The institution which serves to evaluate, under universal international law, the
actions of a given subject and the possible consequences of a violation of an obliga-
tion is international responsibility, whose source constitutes the internationally
wrongful act. The fundamental role of international responsibility ensuring the
proper functioning of the international legal order can be played effectively only
when the rules governing responsibility in that order apply to all subjects.77
International organizations could develop separate principles applying to their
responsibility and different from the principles of state responsibility. The
development of such a separate regime has taken place in respect of the
privileges and immunities of international organizations, for instance. The
practice of international organizations does not demonstrate that a separate
regime has developed in respect of international responsibility.78 This circum-
stance is in itself an argument for applying the principles of state responsibility.
It is necessary that there are principles applicable to the responsibility of
international organizations.79 Without the application of the principles of state
responsibility a legal vacuum would open up, because there no other respons-
ibility regime has been developed.
The legal basis for this application is the customary international law status
of the core of the legal regime of state responsibility. Customary international
law applies in principle to international organizations.80 When an international
organization arrives on the international scene it is bound by the general
international law that is applicable on that scene. It is in a similar position
as a newly independent state, which is in principle bound by customary
international law. In the case of the latter however it has been argued that
it should be able to choose whether to be bound by a customary international
rule because it has not been able to object to that rule during the period it was
created. This argument is not applicable to international organizations, because
77 E. Butkiewicz, The Premisses of International Responsibility of Inter-Governmental Organizations,
11 Polish Yearbook of International Law 117 (1981-82).
78 C. Pitschas, Die Völkerrechtliche Verantwortlichkeit der Europäischen Gemeinschaft und
ihrer Mitgliedstaaten: Zugleich ein beitrag zu den völkerrechtlichen Kompetenzen der
Europäischen Gemeinschaft 43 (2001).
79 P. Reuter, supra note 74, at 491.
80 H. Schermers & N. Blokker, supra note 64, at 988. See also § 3.5
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these are established by states that have been able to object and that would
otherwise be able to indirectly free themselves from the rule.81
Taking the principles of attribution in state responsibility as a starting point
is attractive because the principles of state responsibility offer a relatively
developed system.82 The creation of a new legal system would in many ways
duplicate work that has already been done. In a pre-study for the ILC, Pellet
also recommends taking the law of state responsibility as a point of departure
for the ILC project on the responsibility of international organizations. Pellet
states that:
The Commission’s draft articles on State responsibility are thus a legitimate starting
point for the discussion, which will also have to deal with the adaptations that
those draft articles will require.83
It must be noted that not all the customary rules of state responsibility can
be applied to international organizations. The differences between states and
international organizations require that where necessary the rules must be
adapted. In other words, they must be applied mutatis mutandis.84 For ex-
ample, draft article 44 refers to the so-called ‘local remedies rule’. The applica-
tion of this rule is premised on the existence of national judges, which is not
a common characteristic of international organizations.
Other paragraphs in this chapter examine the application of the principles
of international responsibility to the UN and NATO in practice.85
2.6.2 Grounds for attribution to member states of conduct of the organization
Some writers state that the responsibility of an international organization for
conduct of the organization does not exclude the responsibility of member
states for that same conduct. A common concern for the writers in question
is that states cannot absolve themselves of their responsibility by establishing
or joining an international organization. The treaty establishing an international
organization does not bind third parties and consequently it cannot as such
limit the responsibility of member states towards third parties, they argue.
81 C. Pitschas, supra note 78, at 44.
82 Commissie van Advies inzake Volkenrechtelijke Vraagstukken, Aansprakelijkheid voor
Onrechtmatige Daden tijdens VN Vredesoperaties, Advies No. 13, 14 February 2002, at
22.
83 Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its fifty-second session, 1 May
– 9 June and 10 July – 18 August (A/55/10), annex, syllabi on topics recommended for
inclusion in the long-term programme of work of the Commission, 299, at 301.
84 M. Perez Gonzalez, supra note 6, at 67.
85 See § 2.9 and § 2.10.
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For some of these writers member state responsibility takes the form of
responsibility for conduct of the organization that breaches an international
obligation of the member state. Lawson states that if the conduct of an inter-
national organization is a prima facie breach of obligations of the member states,
the conduct must be attributed to the member states so that it can be estab-
lished whether there has been an actual breach. If the conduct breaches an
obligation that binds the member states as well as the international organiza-
tion, the conduct must be attributed to the organization. In this situation the
member states may be co-responsible for the internationally wrongful act of
the organization, based on the constituent document, the obligation breached
or legitimate expectations of third parties.86
For other writers member state responsibility takes the form of responsibil-
ity for conduct of the organization that breaches an international obligation
of the organization.87 In other words, not only the conduct, but the entire
internationally wrongful act of the international organization, is attributed
to the member states. These writers disagree on the principles to determine
whether member states are responsible in a specific situation for the inter-
nationally wrongful act of the organization. Herdegen for example suggests
principles on elements of attribution and responsibility that will directly serve
as a basis for the liability of the member states only if the primary obligation
incurred by the international organization itself flows from international law.
The principles he suggests are “based on the founding act as well as on the
remaining influence and control of the founders – without entailing a strictly
accessory and full liability of all members for obligations incurred by the
organization.”88 Pescatore states that the member states of the European
Communities are subsidiarily responsible for the conduct of the Communities
because of their influence on the Communities and because the member states
can modify the treaties establishing the Communities.89
86 R. Lawson, Het EVRM en de Europese Gemeenschappen: Bouwstenen voor een Aansprake-
lijkheidsregime van Internationale Organisaties 281-283 (1999).
87 See e.g.W. Meng, Internationale Organisationen im völkerrechtlichenDeliktsrecht, 45 Zeitschrift
für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht 324 (1985); R. Sadurska & C. Chinkin,
The Collapse of the International Tin Council: A Case of State Responsibility? 30 Virginia Journal
of International Law 845 (1989); H. Schermers, Liability of International Organizations, 1 Leiden
Journal of International Organizations 3 (1988), I. Seidl-Hohenveldern, Piercing the Corporate
Veil of International Organizations: The International Tin Council Case in the English Court of
Appeals, 32 German Yearbook of International Law 43 (1980). Note that the latter author
has adjusted his point of view to defend a much more limited theory of member state
responsibility, I. Seidl-Hohenveldern, Liability of Member States for Acts or Ommissions of
an International Organization, in S. Schlemmer-Schulte & K-Y. Tung (Eds.), Liber Amicorum
Ibrahim F.I. Shihata: International Finance and Development Law 727 (2001).
88 M. Herdegen, The Insolvency of International Organizations and the Legal Position of Creditors:
Some Observations in the Light of the International Tin Council Crisis, 35 Netherlands Inter-
national Law Review 135 (1988).
89 P. Pescatore, Les Relations Extérieures des Communautés Européennes, 103 Recueil des Cours
(1966-II), at 224.
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The common concern of most of these writers is that unsuspecting third
parties should not be victimized by states that transfer their activities to
international organizations. Consequently, these writers state that member
states are not responsible if third parties have been put on notice that the
member states have limited their responsibility for the conduct of the organiza-
tion. Most of them agree that this is the case if there is an express clause in
the constituent instrument of the organization limiting member states’ respons-
ibility. They disagree, however, on whether it is possible for member states
to limit their responsibility for conduct of the organization without an express
clause to that effect.
Judicial decisions concerning member state responsibility were made in
cases concerning the International Tin Council and in cases concerning the
Arab Organization for Industrialization (the Westland case).
2.6.3 The Westland case
The Westland case originated in the winding up of the Arab Organization for
Industrialization.90 The organization was established in 1975 by the United
Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the Arab Republic of Egypt with the
object of developing an arms industry for the benefit of the four states. The
constituent instrument set up a higher committee composed of ministers
delegated by the four states. In 1978 the organization concluded an agreement
with Westland helicopters called the ‘Shareholders’ Agreement’ to create a
joint stock company named the Arab British Helicopter company. After the
Arab Republic of Egypt recognized Israel in 1979, the other three member states
of the organization announced that they were putting an end to the existence
of the organization and set up a liquidation committee. Westland then filed
a request for arbitration claiming damages against the organization, the four
member states and the Arab British Helicopter company.
Egypt expressed reservations about the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal
over the four states because the arbitration was based on an arbitration clause
in the shareholders agreement to which the four states were not parties. The
Tribunal decided to restrict the initial proceedings to the question of juris-
diction. It held that the question whether the four states were bound by the
arbitration clause was exactly the same as the substantive law question whether
the four states were bound in general by the obligation contracted by the
organization.
90 International Chamber of Commerce, Court of Arbitration, 5 March 1984, Westland Heli-
copters Ltd. and Arab Industrialization Organization, United Arab Emirates, Kindom of
Saudi Arabia, State of Quatar, Arab Republic of Egypt and Arab British Helicopters Com-
pany, 80 ILR 610 (1989).
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The Tribunal found that the organization was an international legal person.
However, the attribution of legal personality to the organization did not
exclude the possible liability of the member states. The Tribunal based this
conclusion on general principles of law and on good faith. It explained that
the notion that excludes cumulative liability of a legal person and of the
individuals which constitute it is nowhere accepted or given effect without
limitation and gave several examples from domestic company law in Switzer-
land, Germanic law and France. The Tribunal stated that:
These observations show that the designation of an organization as “legal person”
and the attribution of an independent existence do not provide any basis for a
conclusion as to whether or not those who compose it are bound by obligations
undertaken by it. One must therefore disregard any question relating to the per-
sonality of the AOI. The possible liability of the four States must be determined
by directly examining the founding documents of the AOI in relation to this prob-
lem.91
The founding documents of the organization did not stipulate anything on
the question of the responsibility of the member states. The Tribunal stated
that:
In the absence of any provision expressly or impliedly excluding the liability of
the four States, this liability subsists since, as a general rule, those who engage in
transactions of an economic nature are deemed liable for the obligations which
flow therefrom. In default by the four States of formal exclusion of their liability,
third parties which have contracted with the AOI could legitimately count on their
liability. This rule flows from general principles of law and from good faith.92
The Tribunal considered that its foregoing arguments were all the more true
because the member states of the Arab Organization for Industrialization
effectively controlled the actions of the organization, so that “in reality, in the
circumstances of this case, the AOI is one with the States”.93
The Tribunal concluded that the four states were bound by the arbitration
clause because the obligations under substantive law cannot be dissociated
from those that exist on the procedural level.
2.6.4 The International Tin Council cases
Other judicial decisions in connection with the question of the responsibility
of member states for the debts of an international organization resulted from
91 Id., at 612.
92 Id., at 613.
93 Id., at 614.
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the collapse of the International Tin Council in 1985. The International Tin
Council was an international organization established to prevent excessive
fluctuations in the price of tin and to secure an adequate supply of tin at fair
prices to the consumers and remunerative to the producers. The organization
was founded by the Sixth International Tin Agreement (ITA 6). Twenty-three
states and the European Economic Community (EEC) were parties to the
agreement. A headquarters agreement between the organization and the United
Kingdom gave the organization legal personality under United Kingdom law.
The headquarters agreement was implemented in the United Kingdom by an
Order in Council that provided that the organization had “the legal capacities
of a body corporate”. Neither the International Tin Agreement nor the head-
quarters agreement contained an express clause limiting the responsibility of
the member states.
When the organization announced that it could not pay its debts, creditors
started legal proceedings in United Kingdom courts against the members of
the organization to recover the organization’s debts. The creditors claimed,
inter alia, that if the organization had legal personality or a degree of legal
personality, then this was analogous to that of bodies in the nature of quasi-
partnerships well known in civil law systems, where both the entity and the
members are liable to creditors, or the members are in any event liable for
the debts of the entity. The proceedings were unsuccessful for the creditors.
The High Court decided that the International Tin Council was a legal person
under domestic law. Under the applicable domestic law its members were
not liable to third parties on the basis of their membership. The Court of
Appeal and the House of Lords dismissed appeals against the High Court
judgments.
Most of the judges decided the claim primarily in accordance with domestic
law instead of international law. Some of the judges also discussed whether
there is a rule of member states responsibility under international law, but
only when they were of the opinion that domestic law did not include suffi-
cient rules to adjudicate the case. Judge Staughton in a High Court judgment
stated that “it is open to question whether in international law a legal personal-
ity necessarily excludes direct liability of the members of association to its
creditors.”94
Judge Kerr in the Court of Appeal judgment was prepared to accept that
under international law, member states can be liable secondarily for the obliga-
tions of an international organization, stating that “on the available material
the better view may well be that the characteristics of an international organiza-
94 J.H. Rayner (Mincing Lane) Ltd. v. Department of Trade and Industry, High Court, Queen’s
Bench Division, 24 June 1987, 77 ILR 55 (1985), at 77.
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tion are those of a ‘mixed’ entity rather than that of a body corporate.”95 Such
member state responsibility could however not be enforced under domestic
law.
Judge Nourse also decided that there was a rule of secondary responsibility
of member states under international law that could not be enforced under
United Kingdom law. He based the existence of a rule in international law
on the intention of the members of the organization to be held responsible
that he deduced from the provisions of the International Tin Agreement and
on the ‘extensive participation and control’ in the affairs of the organization
by the members. Judge Nourse also referred to the certain circumstances of
this particular case.96
Judge Gibson, however, stated that in the absence of any express or implied
term or rule of law imposing liability on the member states such responsibility
could not be assumed, but that members did have an obligation to indemnify
the organization. Lord Templeman in the House of Lords stated that if there
had existed a rule of international law that imposed on members the obligation
to discharge the debts of the organization, such obligation could not be en-
forced by the domestic courts.97 Lord Oliver of the House of Lords stated
that the authorities to which the House of Lords was referred “totally failed
to establish any generally accepted rule of the nature contended for.”98 In
his view, a rule of member state responsibility was not certain and accepted
generally by the body of civilized nations.
2.6.5 Arguments de lege ferenda and the Institut de Droit International
The practice in the Westland and International Tin Council cases is not conclusive
on the question of the existence of a customary rule of member state responsib-
95 Court of Appeal, 27 April 1989, Maclaine Watson v. Department of Trade and Industry and
J.H. Rayner (Mincing Lane) Ltd. v. Department of Trade and Industry and others, 80 ILR 49 (1989),
at 108.
96 (1) the obligations arise out of an activity as mundane as that of buying and selling tin
on the London Metal Exchange; (2) it must have been apparent to the members that in
periods of world over production it might prove impossible to finance the necessary
purchases wholly out of funds in the hands of the ITC; (3) anyone who sold tin under such
conditions would be entitled to assume that if the manager did not have funds at his
disposal the members had instructed him to buy without them; and (4) the members did
not, as they easily could have done, expressly exclude or limit their liability for the obliga-
tions of the ITC.
97 House of Lords, 26 October 1989, Maclaine Watson v. Department of Trade and Industry and
J.H Rayner (Mincing Lane) Ltd. v. Department of Trade and Industry and others [1989] 3 All
ER 523.
98 Id.
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ility because of the widely divergent reasoning of the judges in question and
because the cases were decided primarily in accordance with domestic law.99
In the absence of a rule of customary international law they examine
whether there is a general principle of law that emerges from domestic cor-
porate laws. The question is whether domestic systems generally exclude or
limit the responsibility of the constituent parts of corporations with a separate
legal personality. Many writers conclude that a single principle does not exist
in domestic laws.100 Most domestic systems include limited liability com-
panies as well as mixed entities that do not exclude the liability of the mem-
bers.
Another problem is that the parallel between international organizations
and domestic corporations is tenuous. Important differences exist between
domestic corporations and international corporations such as the Arab British
Helicopter company and the differences are even greater between domestic
corporations and organizations such as the UN and NATO.
Many writers invoke policy arguments in the absence of a clear rule of
customary international law or general principle of law. At this point a dis-
cussion of member state responsibility becomes de lege ferenda rather than de
lege lata. For example, Amerasinghe discusses “conceptual considerations”.101
Expressly or implicitly, the policy factors that carry the most weight for these
authors include the following. One is the value of protecting unsuspecting
third parties in their relations with an international organization. Hirsch
explains that exemption of member states from responsibility:
would lead in many cases to situations in which the injured party would have no
remedy for the harm inflicted upon it. Such might be the case when the organiza-
tion does not agree to provide a remedy (as in the Westland Case) or when the
99 C. Amerasinghe, Liability to Third Parties of Member States of International Organizations:
Practice, Principle and Judicial Precedent, 85 American Journal of International Law 259 (1991),
at 273; W. Meng, supra note 87, at 332; M. Hirsch, The Responsibility of International
Organizations to Third Parties: Some Basic Principles 127-128 (1995). But see P. Sands &
P. Klein, supra note 64, at 524: It is clear from these judicial precedents – the conclusions
of which were confirmed by the Institute of International Law in its 1995 resolution – that
the organisations themselves are the only subjects that may be held liable for the conse-
quences of their wrongful acts, to the exclusion of their members.
100 H. Schermers, supra note 87, at 9; I. Seidl-Hohenveldern, supra note 87, at 46-47; R. Lawson,
supra note 86, at 27. Hirsch identifies a general principle of member states responsibility
that is incompatible with his own statement that a “general principle of law cannot be
deduced from such a fundamental divergence of principles as those applying in domestic
legal systems”, M. Hirsch, supra note 99, at 129-136.
101 C. Amerasinghe, supra note 99, at 259. Another example is Meng, who states that for the
solution of future cases of damage that are not governed by treaty only commonplaces
of argumentation (“argumentationstopoi”) can be found. W. Meng, supra note 87, at 332.
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organization does not have sufficient resources to meet its obligations (as happened
in the International Tin Council Case). Justice and efficiency militate against a
principle according to which those who benefit from the operations of the organiza-
tion do not provide any remedy for the loss caused by the organization, when the
latter is unable or unwilling to provide adequate remedy.102
The other policy factor in question is the possibility that member states will
interfere unduly in the affairs of the independent organization. If member
states are responsible for the conduct of an international organization they
may attempt to control the daily life of the organization in such a way as to
make it impossible for the organization to operate as an independent entity.
Many of the considerations discussed above were expressed by members
of the Institut de Droit International (IDI) when the institute considered the
question of the legal consequences for member states of the non-fulfilment
by international organizations of their obligations toward third parties. Rappor-
teur Higgins prepared a preliminary, provisional and final report.103 In 1995
the IDI discussed the final report and adopted a resolution on the topic.104
The focus was the legal consequences for states, in international law, for
the non-fulfillment by international organizations of the obligations of those
organizations toward third parties. The IDI did not discuss the responsibility
of member states for violation of obligations of the member states by the
conduct of an international organization. The majority of the members of the
IDI took for granted that an international organization with legal personality
is responsible for its obligations because “liability follows personality” in
conformity with § 2.2.105 It did not follow, however, that separate personality
is necessarily determinative of whether member states have a concurrent or
residual liability.
The IDI decided to divide its work and its resolution on the topic in a
section on the contemporary state of the law and a section on recommendations
for future practice. In other words it distinguished between lex lata and lex
ferenda. The IDI accepted that the contemporary state of the law allows member
states to exclude or limit their responsibility expressly or implicitly in the rules
of the international organization. Rapporteur Higgins examined inter alia case
law, writings and state practice in connection with cases where the rules of
the organization did not provide a solution. She concluded that “by reference
to the accepted sources of international law, there is no norm which stipulates
102 M. Hirsch, supra note 99, at 150.
103 Preliminary exposé and draft questionnaire, Annuaire IDI 66-I (1995) 249, Provisional report
Annuaire IDI 66-I (1995) 373, Final report Annuaire IDI 66-I (1995) 461.
104 Annuaire IDI 66-II (1995) 233.
105 Id., at 244.
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that member states bear a legal liability to third parties for the non-fulfillment
by international organizations of their obligations to third parties”.106 This
conclusion raised a series of further questions. Does the absence of a specific
norm determining state liability mean that there is no liability? Or is the correct
position that, unless states can be shown to have excluded or limited their
liability, the liability must be presumed to exist? The members of the IDI
disagreed on the correct answer. Rapporteur Higgins and the majority held
that member state liability was not to be presumed. A minority held the
contrary view that in principle there is member state liability.
In her final report, the rapporteur stated that all agreed that in determining
the metaphysical question of presumption of liability one key issue was the
analysis of relevant policy considerations:
Confrères Schermers, Vukas, Salmon and Waelbroeck thought that protection of
innocent third parties, and other factors, pointed in the direction of liability. Mr
Seidl-Hohenveldern came to accept the argument, expressed by the Rapporteur
in her Initial Report, that state liability would inevitably lead to encroachments
upon the independence of international organizations.107
This statement implies that policy considerations that properly belong to the
lex ferenda seem to also have played a role in the institute’s assessment of the
lex lata.
The IDI adopted a resolution on the topic in 1995. Article 6 of the resolution
states:
Article 6
Save as specified in article 5, there is no general rule of international law whereby
States members are, due solely to their membership, liable concurrently or sub-
sidiarily, for the obligations of an international organization of which they are
members.
The article seems to provide that there is a presumption that member states
are not liable, but that impression was disputed by several members of the
IDI. Waelbroeck for example stated that:
It had been agreed that the Resolution would say that international law was unclear
or that there was no general rule of international law saying that member States
were liable. He acknowledged that he now realized that Members were interpreting
the Resolution in the sense that, since there was no general rule stating that member
106 Annuaire IDI 66-I (1995) 415, para. 113.
107 Id., at 462.
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States were liable, it meant that they would not be liable. He stressed that this was
a fundamental ambiguity in the present situation.108
Article 5 of the resolution also qualifies any presumption that member states
are not liable.
Article 5
The question of liability of the members of an international organization for its
obligations is determined by reference to the Rules of the organization.
In particular circumstances, members of an international organization may be liable
for its obligations in accordance with a relevant general principle of international
law, such as acquiescence or the abuse of rights.
In conclusion, the case law, writings and state practice do not conclusively
demonstrate either the existence or the absence of a rule of international law
that member states are responsible for the conduct of an international organiza-
tion. State practice in respect of peace support operations examined below
may help to clarify the issue.
2.7 LEX SPECIALIS IN INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW
2.7.1 Absolute responsibility
Article 55 of the ILC draft articles on state responsibility states that the draft
articles do not apply where and to the extent that the conditions for the exist-
ence of an internationally wrongful act or the content or implementation of
the international responsibility of a state are governed by special rules of
international law.109 Draft article 55 reflects the maxim lex specialis derogat
legi generali.110
A number of treaty provisions in international humanitarian law are lex
specialis in connection with attribution of internationally wrongful acts.
Article 3 of the 1907 Hague Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and
Customs of War on Land,111 to which the Hague Regulations concerning
the Laws and Customs of War on Land are annexed, states:
108 Annuaire IDI 66-II (1996), at 277. See also the statement by Henkin at 274: “Mr Henkin
suggested that the Rapporteur’s point that there was no rule either way be made clearer
in the draft”.
109 See Commissie van Advies inzake Volkenrechtelijke Vraagstukken, supra note 82, at 17.
110 Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its fifty-third session, supra
note 15, at 356, para. 2.
111 Hague Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its annex:
Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, 18 October 1907, 3 Martens
Nouveau Recueil (ser. 3) 504.
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Article 3
A belligerent party which violates the provisions of the said Regulations shall, if
the case demands, be liable to pay compensation. It shall be responsible for all acts
committed by persons forming part of its armed forces.
Conduct by the armed forces is attributable to the state on the basis of article 4
and article 7 of the draft articles on state responsibility because armed forces
are an organ of the state. For an act of a state organ to be considered as an
act of that state under international law, the draft articles require that the organ
was acting in that capacity. Cases where officials acted in their capacity as
such, albeit unlawfully or contrary to instructions, must be distinguished from
cases where the conduct is so removed from the scope of official functions
that it should be assimilated to that of private individuals, not attributable
to the state. The draft articles do not attribute the private conduct of indivi-
duals to the state, even if the individual happens to be an organ or agent of
the state.
Article 3 of Hague Convention (IV) is broader than these principles because
it provides that even private acts of members of the armed forces are attribut-
able to the state if those acts violate the Hague Regulations.112 The principle
expressed in the article is a principle of absolute responsibility, in the sense
that all the conduct by armed forces that violates the provisions of the Hague
Regulations is attributable to the state.113 The German delegate who intro-
duced the proposal for the article explained:
Nous pensons donc que la responsabilité pour tout acte illicite, commis en contra-
vention du Règlement par les personnes faisant parties de la force armée, doit
incomber aux Gouvernements dont elles relèvent.114
The 1949 Geneva Conventions do not contain an article on attribution of
conduct. A common article on liability of the contracting states with regard
to grave breaches states:
No High Contracting Party shall be allowed to absolve itself or any other High
Contracting Party of any liability incurred by itself or by another High Contracting
Party in respect of breaches referred to in the preceding Article.
112 F. Kalshoven, State Responsibility for Warlike Acts of the Armed Forces: From Article 3 of the
Hague Convention IV of 1907 to Article 91 of Additional Protocol I of 1977 and Beyond, 40
International & Comparative Law Quarterly 827 (1991), at 837 and M. Sassòli , State Respons-
ibility for Violations of International Humanitarian Law, 84 International Review of the Red
Cross 401 (2002), at 406.
113 See R. Bierzanek, The Responsibility of States in Armed Conflicts, 11 Polish Yearbook of
International Law 93 (1981-1982), at 97; L. Condorelli, Imputation à l’Etat d’un Fait Inter-
nationalement Illicite, 189 Hague Recueil (1984-VI), at 145-149.
114 Deuxième Conférence internationale de la Paix, La Haye 15 juin – 18 octobre 1907, Actes
et Documents (Actes), Vol. III, at 145.
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The article does not explain when a contracting party incurs liability. In other
words, it does not specify the applicable principles of attribution. Some writers
state that the principle in Article 3 of Hague Convention (IV), that all conduct
by members of the armed forces of a state is attributable to that state, applies
to all violations of international humanitarian law including violations of the
1949 Geneva Conventions.115 The Red Cross commentary to Article 131 of
the third Geneva Convention that that article “should be compared with Article
3 of the Fourth Hague Convention of 1907, which states the same principle.”
Military manuals also apply the principle of Article 3 to all violations of
international humanitarian law.116
Article 91 of Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions explicit-
ly applies the principle in article 3 of Hague Convention (IV) to the Geneva
Conventions and the Protocol. The article states:
Article 91
Responsibility
A Party to the conflict which violates the provisions of the Conventions or of this
Protocol shall, if the case demands, be liable to pay compensation. It shall be
responsible for all acts committed by persons forming part of its armed forces.
The article is the result of a proposal by Vietnam at the 1977 diplomatic
conference. The proposal was designed to restate the principle in Article 3
of Hague Convention IV and the principle of non-exoneration of responsibility
in the 1949 Geneva Conventions.117 The original text of the proposal was
changed in a working group, which deleted a paragraph reproducing article
148 of Geneva Convention IV and also deleted a reference to grave
breaches.118 The first Committee of the Conference adopted the article without
further discussion.119 Statements in this committee demonstrate that article
91 was intended to have the same meaning as Article 3 of Hague Convention
(IV).120
115 L. Condorelli, supra note 113, at 146; E. Castren, The Present Law of War and Neutrality
490 (1954).
116 See e.g. the German Manual Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflicts, 1992, para. 1214.
117 Official Records of the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of
International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts, Geneva (1974-1977) (Official
Records), Vol. 9, at 355 (CDDH/I/SR.67, paras. 67, Mr. Van Luu).
118 Official Records of the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of
International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts, Geneva (1974-1977) (Official
Records),Vol. 10, at 215 (CDDH/I/338/Rev.1/Add.1).
119 Official Records of the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of
International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts, Geneva (1974-1977) (Official
Records),Vol. 9, at 397 (CDDH/I/SR.70).
120 Id., at 415 (CDDH/I/SR.71, para 5) and 416 (CDDH/I/SR.71, para. 9).
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2.7.2 Responsibility toward individuals
Article 3 of Hague Convention (IV) was discussed above as a provision con-
cerning state-to-state responsibility. Some writers argue that the article is not
only lex specialis because it provides for absolute state responsibility, but also
because it established state responsibility toward individuals. Kalshoven states
that:
the records of the conference that adopted the text, i.e. the Second Hague Peace
Conference 1907, provide convincing evidence that the delegates sought not so
much to lay down a rule relating to the international responsibility of one State
vis-à-vis another, as one relating to a State’s liability to compensate the losses of
individual persons incurred as a consequence of their direct (and harmful) contact
with its armed forces.121
On the one hand the article was drafted at a time when states were generally
regarded as the only subjects of international law, and consequently as the
only entities capable of having rights under international law. This establishes
a presumption against the idea that the drafters of Article 3 wished to create
responsibility toward individuals. Writers have generally interpreted Article
3 as creating responsibility toward other states. Freeman for instance states
that the responsibility is not one which flows directly to any injured individual,
but, consistently with orthodox concepts, it runs directly to the state of the
person injured.122 The ILC also considered Article 3 in the context of respons-
ibility between states in the commentary to article 10 of the 1996 draft articles
on state responsibility.123 .
On the other hand the travaux préparatoires of Article 3 contain a number
of statements that seem to refer to the rights of individual persons. In his
introduction of the proposal that ended up as Article 3 the German delegate,
Major-General von Gündell, stated that in the absence of this provision in the
proposal’s importance lay in cases where the Hague Regulations were breached
without the fault of the government. If in such a case:
les personnes lésées par suite d’une contravention au Règlement, ne pouvaient
demander réparation au Gouvernement, et qu’elles fussent obligées à se retourner
contre l’officier ou le soldat coupable, elles seraient, dans la majorité des cas,
destituées de la faculté d’obtenir l’indemnisation qui leur est due.124
121 F. Kalshoven, supra note 112.
122 A. Freeman, Responsibility of States for Unlawful Acts of their Armed Forces, 88 Recueil des
Cours (1955-II), at 333. See also A. Waltzog, Recht der Landkriegführung 11 (1942).
123 YB ILC 1975, vol. II, at 69, para. 26.
124 Deuxième Conférence Internationale de la Paix, Actes et Documents, Vol III, at 145 (1907).
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The initial proposal distinguished between nationals of the enemy and
nationals of neutral states. One part of the proposal required a belligerent party
to compensate neutral persons as soon as possible for all acts committed by
members of its armed forces. The other part provided that if the victims of
the violation were persons belonging to the adverse party, the compensation
would be settled at the conclusion of peace. The end result of Article 3 is based
on the first part of the proposal, as a consequence of strong objections by
several delegations to the distinction between neutral and enemy nationals.
This distinction led the President of the sub-commission drafting the Article
to state that “il y a là droit et obligation, mais aucun droit n’est stipulé pour
le préjudice causé ‘à des personnes de la Partie adverse’.”125 In his report
to the Second Commission of the Conference the President was clearer. He
stated in respect of enemy nationals that “on ne leur reconnaît donc aucun
droit.”126 It could be argued that this leads to the conclusion that a right was
granted to neutral nationals. However, other statements from the travaux
préparatoires suggest that this was not the case. A statement by one delegation
for example suggests that this delegation considered Article 3 as relating to
inter-state responsibility, by referring to the settlement of cases by the states
concerned.127 The German delegate responded to this statement that he could
not have defended the proposition better himself, suggesting that this was
also what the sponsor of the proposal had in mind.128 Indeed, the conferral
of rights on individuals must be distinguished from the conferral of a right
to invoke a breach of those rights in their own name. As the Permanent Court
of International Justice (PCIJ) pointed out “it is scarcely necessary to point out
that the capacity to possess civil rights does not necessarily imply the capacity
to exercise those rights oneself.”129
In conformity with this interpretation, in a great majority of cases in which
individual claimants have based their claim on Article 3, courts have held that
125 Id., at 144.
126 Id., at 28.
127 “Le règlement des indemnités dues à des neutres pourra, le plus souvent, avoir lieu sans
retard, par la simple raison que l’Etat belligérant responsible est en paix avec leur pays
et continue avec ce dernier des relations pacifiques qui permettront aux deux Etats de liquider
aisément et sans délai tous les cas venant à se présenter. La même facilité ou possibilité
n’existe pas entre les belligérants, par le fait même de la guerre, et, bien que le droit à une
indemnité naisse en faveur de leurs ressortisants respectifs aussi bien qu’en faveur de
neutres, le règlement des indemnités, entre belligérants, ne pourra guère être arrêté et effectué
qu’à la conclusion de la Paix.” (emphasis added); Deuxième Conférence internationale de
la Paix, La Haye 15 juin – 18 octobre 1907, Actes et Documents (Actes), Vol. III, at 147
(emphasis added).
128 Id.
129 Appeal from a Judgment of the Hungaro-Czechoslovak Mixed Arbitral Tribunal (the Peter
Pazmany case), PCIJ Series A/B, No. 61, at 231.
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this article did not create an individual right of action, i.e. a secondary right,
without stating that it did not create a primary right.130
2.8 STATE PRACTICE OF ATTRIBUTION OF CONDUCT OF UNITED NATIONS PEACE
SUPPORT OPERATIONS
2.8.1 Lump sums in the Congo
During the United Nations Operation in the Congo a number of Belgian, Greek,
Italian, Luxemburg and Swiss nationals lodged claims for damage to persons
and property with the United Nations. The governments of these individuals
then exercised diplomatic protection by espousing the claims. The UN negoti-
ated agreements with the governments on compensation in the form of lump
sums. The governments distributed the lump sums between the individual
claimants. The Secretary-General stated in the agreements with the govern-
ments that the organization:
would not evade responsibility where it was established that United Nations agents
had in fact caused unjustifiable damage to innocent parties. It is pointed out that,
under these principles, the United Nations does not assume liability for damage
to persons or property which resulted solely from military operations or which,
although caused by third parties, has given rise to claims against the United
Nations.131
The Soviet Union protested against the compensation provided by the organ-
ization. The Soviet Union was of the opinion that Belgium had forfeited its
moral or legal basis for making claims against the organization either on its
own behalf or on behalf of its citizens, because it had committed aggression
against the Republic of the Congo.132 The Secretary-General replied to the
Soviet note that:
130 See e.g. Goldstar (Panama) S.A. v. United States, 967 F.2d 965 (4th Cir. 1992). See also §
5.5.2.
131 Agreement between the United Nations and Belgium relating to the settlement of claims
filed against the United Nations in The Congo by Belgian nationals of 20 February 1965,
535 UNTS 199 (Spaak-U Thant Agreement). See also Exchange of letters constituting an
agreement relating to the settlement of claims filed against the United Nations in the Congo
by Swiss nationals of 3 January 1966, 564 UNTS 193; Exchange of letters constituting an
agreement relating to the settlement of claims filed against the United Nations in the Congo
by Greek nationals of 20 January 1966, 565 UNTS 3; Exchange of letters constituting an
agreement relating to the settlement of claims filed against the United Nations in the Congo
by Luxembourg nationals of 28 December 1966, 585 UNTS 147; Exchange of letters constitu-
ting an agreement relating to the settlement of claims filed against the United Nations in
the Congo by Italian nationals of 18 January 1967, 588 UNTS 197.
132 Letter of 2 August 1965 from the Acting Permanent Representative of the USSR addressed
to the Secretary-General, UN Doc. S/6589.
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It has always been the policy of the United Nations, acting through the Secretary-
General, to compensate individuals who have suffered damages for which the
Organization was legally liable. This policy is in keeping with generally recognized
legal principles and with the Convention on Privileges and Immunities of the
United Nations. In addition, in regard to the United Nations activities in the Congo,
it is reinforced by the principles set forth in the international conventions concerning
the protection of the life and property of civilian population during hostilities as
well as by considerations of equity and humanity which the United Nations cannot
ignore. Accordingly, the claims submitted were investigated by the competent
services of ONUC and at United Nations Headquarters in order to collect all the
data relevant to determining the responsibility of the Organization. Claims of
damage which were found to be solely due to military operations or military
necessity were excluded. Also expressly excluded were claims for damage found
to have been caused by persons other than United Nations personnel.133
2.8.2 Claims settlement procedures
The UN has established procedures for handling third-party claims for claims
of a private law character against peace support operations. These procedures
concern claims by the government of the host state as well as nationals of the
host state. SOFAs provide that claims of a private law character shall be settled
by a standing claims commission established for that purpose. The provision
used in earlier agreements was reproduced in Article 51 of the Model SOFA:
Any dispute or claim of a private law character to which the United Nations
peacekeeping operation or any member thereof is a party and over which the courts
of [host country/territory] do not have jurisdiction because of any provision of
the present Agreement, shall be settled by a standing claims commission to be
established for that purpose. One member of the commission shall be appointed
by the Secretary-General of the United Nations, one member by the Government
and a chairman jointly by the Secretary-General and the Government.134
The model SOFA provides that any appeal that the UN or the host state agree
to allow from the award of the claims commission shall unless otherwise
133 Id.
134 See also Report of the Secretary-General on arrangements concerning the status of the United
Nations Emergency Force in Egypt of 8 February 1957, UN Doc. A/3526; Exchange of Letters
Constituting an Agreement between the United Nations and the Government of the Republic
of Cyprus concerning the Status of the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force in Cyprus,
492 UNTS 58, article 38; Agreement between the United Nations and the Republic of South
Africa concerning the Status of the United Nations Transition Assistance Group in Namibia
(South West Africa), UN Doc. S/20412/Add.1 of 16 March 1989, article 57; Agreement
between the United Nations and the Government of the Republic of Rwanda on the Status
of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda, 5 November 1993, United Nations
Juridical Yearbook 1993, at 102, article 50.
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agreed by the parties, be submitted to an arbitral tribunal. The decisions of
the claims commission and the arbitral tribunal shall be binding on both
parties.
However, to date, third-party claims of a private law nature have been
settled without resort to the establishment of standing claims commissions.
Instead, it has been the practice, with respect to most past and present UN
operations, for a local claims review board established in the mission on the
basis of authority delegated by the Controller to examine, approve or recom-
mend settlement of third-party claims for personal injury or death and for
property loss or damage that are attributable to acts performed in connection
with official duties by civilian or military members of the mission. When the
claims review board approves a settlement amount within its delegated finan-
cial authority, the relevant administrative office of the peacekeeping mission,
normally the claims unit, proceeds to offer such a settlement amount to the
claimant. In the vast majority of cases, the offer is accepted by the claimant
and payment is made.
UN claims review boards do not accept claims in connection with acts of
members of peace support operations committed while off duty. In a 1986
memorandum the UN Office of Legal Affairs stated that UN policy in regard
to off-duty acts of the members of peacekeeping forces is that the organization
has no legal or financial liability for death, injury or damage resulting from
such acts. The memorandum states that:
A soldier may be considered ‘off duty’ not only when he is ‘on leave’ but also when
he is not acting in an official or operational capacity while either inside or outside
the area of operations. In this regard, we wish to point out that there have been
such off-duty determinations made with respect to previous incidents involving
soldiers acting in a non-official capacity in the area of operations. We consider the
primary factor in determining an ‘off-duty’ situation to be whether the member
of a peace-keeping mission was acting in a non-official/non-operational capacity
when the incident occurred and not whether he/she was in military or civilian
attire at the time of the incident or whether the incident occurred inside or outside
the area of operations.135
The Secretary-General submitted a report in 1995 that discussed the scope of
UN liability for activities of UN forces.136 The report was written pursuant
to a request by the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary
135 UNJY 1986, 300.
136 Report of the Secretary-General on the the Financing of the United Nations Protection Force,
the United Nations Confidence Restoration Operation in Croatia, the United Nations
Preventive Deployment Force and the the United Nations Peace Forces headquarters;
Administrative and budgetary aspects of the financing of the United Nations peacekeeping
operations: financing of the United Nations peacekeeping operations of 20 September 1996,
UN Doc. A/51/389.
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Questions (ACABQ) to study the procedures for settling third-party claims.137
The report states that:
The international liability of the United Nations for the activities of United Nations
forces is an attribute of its international legal personality and its capacity to bear
international rights and obligations. It is also a reflection of the principle of State
responsibility – widely accepted to be applicable to international organizations –
that damage caused in breach of an international obligation and which is attribut-
able to the State (or to the Organization), entails the international responsibility
of the State (or of the Organization) and its liability in compensation.
In recognition of its international responsibility for the activities of its forces, the
United Nations has, since the inception of peacekeeping operations, assumed its
liability for damage caused by members of its forces in the performance of their
duties. In conformity with section 29 of the Convention on the Privileges and
Immunities of the United Nations, it has undertaken in paragraph 51 of the model
status-of-forces agreement (see A/45/594) to settle by means of a standing claims
commission claims resulting from damage caused by members of the force in the
performance of their official duties and which for reasons of immunity of the
Organization and its Members could not have been submitted to local courts.
The undertaking to settle disputes of a private law nature submitted against it and
the practice of actual settlement of such third-party claims – although not neces-
sarily according to the procedure provided for under the status-of-forces agree-
ment – evidence the recognition on the part of the United Nations that liability
for damage caused by members of United Nations forces is attributable to the
Organization.138
The report distinguished between the responsibility of the organization for
the ordinary operation of a force and for combat-related activities. The respons-
ibility of the UN for combat-related activities is determined by the principles
and rules of international humanitarian law. The report discusses the principles
of attribution of conduct by peace support operations that violates international
humanitarian law on the basis of command and control:
The international responsibility of the United Nations for combat-related activities
of United Nations forces is premised on the assumption that the operation in
question is under the exclusive command and control of the United Nations. Where
a Chapter VII-authorized operation is conducted under national command and
137 Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions, Report on the Financing
of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR), the United Nations Confidence
Restoration Operation in Croatia (UNCRO), the United Nations Preventive Deployment
Force (UNPREDEP), the United Nations Peace Forces headquarters (UNPF), the United
Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH) and the United Nations Transitional
Administration in Eastern Slavonia, Branja and Western Sirmium (UNTAES), UN Doc. A/
50/903/Add.1.
138 Supra note 136, paras. 6-8.
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control, international responsibility for the activities of the force is vested in the
State or States conducting the operation. The determination of responsibility be-
comes particularly difficult, however, in cases where a State or States provide the
United Nations with forces in support of a United Nations operation but not
necessarily as an integral part thereof, and where operational command and control
is unified or coordinated. This was the case in Somalia where the Quick Reaction
Force and the US Rangers were provided in support of the United Nations Opera-
tion in Somalia (UNOSOM II), and this was also the case in the former Yugoslavia
where the Rapid Reaction Force was provided in support of the United Nations
Protection Force (UNPROFOR).
In joint operations, international responsibility for the conduct of the troops lies
where operational command and control is vested according to the arrangements
establishing the modalities of cooperation between the State or States providing
the troops and the United Nations. In the absence of formal arrangements between
the United Nations and the State or States providing troops, responsibility would
be determined in each and every case according to the degree of effective control
exercised by either party in the conduct of the operation.
The principle that in coordinated operations liability for combat-related damage
in violation of international humanitarian law is vested in the entity in effective
command and control of the operation or the specific action reflects a well-estab-
lished principle of international responsibility While it would be desirable to make
provisions for the attributability of responsibility in the arrangements with the State
or States providing troops, absent such arrangements, claims for damage caused
by auxiliary troops should be submitted to their Governments for processing and
settlement. This, in fact, was the procedure followed in the case of UNOSOM II and
the forces made available in support of the United Nations operation.139
The Secretary-General also suggested that the General Assembly consider the
concurrent responsibility of the state of nationality of the member of a peace
support operation that violates international humanitarian law:
Given the exclusive criminal jurisdiction of the State of nationality and its obligation
to ensure respect for international humanitarian law by members of its force, the
General Assembly may wish to consider recognizing the concurrent responsibility
of the State of nationality for violations of international humanitarian law by
members of its national contingent and its responsibility in compensation.140
When the Fifth Committee of the General Assembly discussed the Secretary-
General’s report it did not consider this suggestion,141 nor does it seem to
have been taken up in other organs.
139 Id., paras. 17-19.
140 Id., para. 44.
141 See UN Doc. A/C.5/51/SR.14 of 25 October 1996.
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2.8.3 National case law
In N.K. v. Austria the superior provincial court of Vienna decided that Austria
was not responsible for damage to the property of a member of the Austrian
contingent in the peace support operation in the Golan Heights.142 The plain-
tiff sought compensation from the state alleging that Austria was liable for
the negligent act of another Austrian soldier in the same contingent that caused
the damage. The Court of first instance dismissed the action on the ground
that, at the time in question, the negligent soldier had been acting as an organ
of the UN and not of Austria. The superior provincial Court dismissed the
appeal on the basis of Austrian law, which accepts the so-called ‘organ theory’.
According to this theory, in determining which legal entity is liable under the
Austrian state liability law, what is decisive is not whose organ (from the
organizational standpoint) the person alleged to have caused the damage
actually was, but rather in whose name and for whom (from the functional
standpoint) that person was acting at the moment when the act occurred. The
court, taking this theory as the starting point, decided that the negligent soldier
was not acting as an organ of the state. It discussed the agreement between
the UN and Austria concerning the contribution of troops and the annexed
regulations, which stated that members of the force, whilst remaining in the
service of their national state, become, during the period of their assignment
to the force, international personnel under the authority of the UN and that
through the chain of command, they are subject to the instructions of the
commander appointed The court concluded that:
Starting from the premise that the order at issue in this case was given by the
“Commander”, albeit indirectly through a “senior authority”, to a “member of the
United Nations Forces in Cyprus” under his command (cf. Point 5c of the Regula-
tions), this Court concurs with the view of the court of first instance that the Lance-
Corporal, according to the organtheorie explained above, was acting as an organ
of the United Nations and not of the Republic of Austria when he caused the
damage at issue. The defendant is therefore not capable of being sued.143
In Nissan v. Attorney-General the tenant of a hotel in Nicosia, Cyprus, claimed
compensation from the United Kingdom for damage resulting from the occupa-
tion and possession of the hotel by inter alia British members of the United
Nations Force in Cyprus operation after 27 March 1964. The defendant claimed
that the members of the force were temporarily servants of the commander
and that his master was in turn the United Nations, who were to be treated
as equivalent to an independent sovereign state.
142 Austria, Superior Provincial Court (Oberlandesgericht) of Vienna, N.K. v. Austria, 26
February 1979, 77 ILR 470.
143 Id., 474.
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The case concerned a number of preliminary questions, including whether
the defense by the government that the acts of the soldiers were acts of the
UN and not of the government disclosed a ‘good defense’ in law to the claim
of compensation. According to the government:
The British forces operating in the Republic of Cyprus from and after Mar. 17, 1964,
were contingents of the United Nations force aforesaid. In the premises no action
lies against the Crown in respect of any of the actions of the said forces.144
It was made clear by the government that the last sentence of this paragraph
covered three separate contentions, one of which was that the force and its
British soldiers were agents of the UN. Judge Stephenson relied on the agree-
ments between the UN and Cyprus, and the organization and the United
Kingdom, to decide whether the force occupied the hotel as agents of the state
or of the UN. He stated that:
The British troops derived their authority to occupy the hotel no longer from her
Majesty but from the United Nations, and occupied it as agents of the United
Nations exclusively. From that date, until they were withdrawn from service with
the United Nations force, it no longer rested with the British government to say
whether they stayed in the hotel or left, and the only authority which their own
commander had so long as they remained members of the force to order them in
or out of the hotel or any other premises required for their accommodation or the
fulfillment of their functions was derived from the commander of the force and
through him from the United Nations.145
The Court of Appeal dismissed Nissan’s appeal concerning the decision of
Judge Stephenson that the government was not responsible for the British
members of the UN force. The Court decided that once the British forces became
part of the United Nations force, the responsibility for their acts fell on the
UN. Lord Denning stated that:
They were under the command of the United Nations commander. They flew the
United Nations flag. They wore the berets and arm-flashes to denote that they were
no longer the soldiers of the Queen, but the soldiers of the United Nations. They
were acting as agents for the United Nations, which is a sovereign body cor-
porate.146
144 Nissan v. Attorney-General, Queen’s Bench Division, 17 February 1967, [1967] 2 All ER 200,
at 208.
145 Id., at 220.
146 Nissan v. Attorney-General, Court of Appeal, Civil Division, 29 June 1967, [1967] All ER 1238,
at 1244.
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The government appealed the order of the Court of Appeal. The House of
Lords decided that Nissan did have an action against the government. Lord
Pearce stated that:
All the judgments, however, took the view that during the second period the British
troops no longer occupied the hotel in the Queen’s name but in the name of the
United Nations. I do not think so. The United Nations is not a superstate nor even
a sovereign state. It is a unique legal person or corporation. It is based on the
sovereignty of its respective members. But it is not a principal carrying out its policy
through state acting as its agents. It is an instrument of collective policy which
it enforces by using the sovereignty of its members. In carrying out the policies
each member still retains its own sovereignty, just as any sovereign state, acting
under its treaty obligations to another state, would normally still retain its sover-
eignty.
This view of the matter is strongly reinforced by the relevant letters and regulations.
They show that the commander of the United Nations force is head in the chain
of command and is answerable to the United Nations. The functions of the force
as a whole are international. But its individual component forces have their own
national duty and discipline and remain in their national service.147
In Manderlier v. Belgium the plaintiff claimed compensation from the UN and
the Belgian government for damage suffered from acts of the Ethiopian con-
tingent in ONUC. The Court of first instance148 and the Court of Appeals149
declared the claims against the UN inadmissible because the organization
enjoyed immunity from jurisdiction. The judgment of the Court of first instance
does not make clear the precise basis for the plaintiff’s claim against the
Belgian government. The plaintiff seems to have based his claim against the
state on the alleged failure of the state to exercise effective diplomatic pro-
tection.150 It is not clear whether the plaintiff also considered that the conduct
of the members of the peace support operation could be attributed to Belgium.
In any event the Court of first instance did discuss this possibility:
Whereas the facts of which the plaintiff complains have taken place abroad and
they have been committed by foreigners; and that the second defendant, the Belgian
147 Attorney-General v. Nissan, House of Lords, 11 February 1969, [1969] All ER 629, at 647.
148 Manderlier v United Nations and Belgium, Court of first instance of Brussels, 11 May 1966,
81 Journal des Tribunaux No. 4553 (1966), 721, 45 ILR 446.
149 Manderlier v United Nations and Belgium, Court of appeals of Brussels, 15 September 1969,
69 ILR 139.
150 The Court of appeal stated that:
The appellant alleges that the respondent failed to fulfil its obligation of protection in a
satisfactory manner. He accuses the respondent, in particular, of not having applied to the
International Court of Justice. He alleges that this failure constitutes fault engaging its
responsibility. In his submissions he also accuses the respondent of not honouring its formal
undertaking to defend individually the rights of each victim and in particular the appellant.
Manderlier v United Nations and Belgium, supra note 149, at 144.
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state, is a third party in relation to these facts, and its organs have not committed
them; that it could not have prevented them by itself;151
2.8.4 International Law Commission
It was noted above that despite the efforts by the ILC not to discuss the topic
of the responsibility of international organizations, discussions on state re-
sponsibility sometimes did in fact lead to statements concerning the responsibil-
ity of international organizations. Some of these statements concerned attri-
bution of conduct to international organizations, and attribution of conduct
of peace support operations in particular.
In his third report on state responsibility Special Rapporteur Ago pointed
out that the principle that the conduct of an organ of one state placed at the
disposal of another state must be attributed to the second state (draft article
6 of the 2001 draft articles on state responsibility), was confirmed by the
practice concerning acts or omissions of organs placed at the disposal of
international organizations by states.152 He discussed the practice during
the operations undertaken in Korea in 1950 on behalf of the UN by armed
forces of the United States and other countries, as well as the payment of lump
sums by the UN in connection with ONUC. He stated that:
Here, too, the decisive criterion for determining responsibility in such cases is the
actual circumstances in which the acts or omissions concerned have been committed.
In cases where State organs have been placed at the disposal of an organization
on a purely formal basis and they have continued in fact to act under the sole
control and in accordance with the instructions of the State to which they belong,
it is that State and not the organization which has been held responsible for their
acts. On the other hand, in cases where the organs have really been placed under
the sole authority of an organization by the State to which they belong and have
acted in accordance with instructions genuinely emanating from the organization,
the organization itself has accepted its responsibility and borne the financial con-
sequences; and – this is an interesting point – none of the member States has ever
raised any objections.153
Members of the ILC also discussed the attribution of conduct to an international
organization in connection with a draft article that excluded the attribution
151 Manderlier v United Nations and Belgium, supra note 148, at 723. Translation by the author.
The original states:
Attendu que les faits dont le demandeur se plaint se sont passés à l’étranger où ils ont
été commis par des étrangers; que le second défendeur, l’Etat belge, est à leur égard un
tiers, dont les organes ne les ont point commis; qu’il n’aurait pu de sa seule initiative les
empêcher.
152 YBILC 1971 Vol. II (Part One), at 272.
153 YBILC 1971 Vol. II (Part One), at 272.
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of conduct of an organ of an international organization by reason only of the
fact that such conduct has taken place in the territory of that state. Several
members indicated that the conduct of an organ of an international organiza-
tion acting in that capacity should be attributed to the organization. El-Erian
stated:
In practice, the conduct of an organ of an international organization performing
a function of a State should not raise legal difficulties, since the organ would have
been accepted by the State. An international organization which had the capacity
to enter into a contract or treaty with a State in which its organ was to operate,
would clearly be responsible for the acts of that organ.154
Ushakov also accepted that the conduct of an organ of an international organ-
ization should be attributed to the organization, but he left the door open for
attribution to a state as well:
With regard to the conduct of an organ of an international organization, when the
armed forces of an international organization acted in that capacity in the territory
of a State, it was open to question whether it was only the international organization
that acted, or whether the act should not also be attributed to the States whose
contingents composed the armed forces of the organization. In that case, too, there
might perhaps be a joint act by the international organization and the States which
had provided contingents.155
2.9 STATE PRACTICE OF ATTRIBUTION OF CONDUCT OF NORTH ATLANTIC
TREATY ORGANIZATION PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS
2.9.1 Claims settlement procedures
NATO has developed procedures for the settlement of claims in the territory
of host states of peace support operations. There is no standard procedure
that applies to all peace support operations. The organization has yet to create
a permanent claims structure to handle deployment claims.156 Such pro-
cedures are negotiated for each individual peace support operation.
Settlement of claims against the Stabilization Force is governed by Annex
1A of the Dayton Peace Agreement157 and the Status of Forces Agreements
154 YBILC 1975 Vol. I, at 46, para. 35. See also Reuter, at 45, para. 29.
155 YBILC 1975 Vol. I, at 47, para. 5.
156 J. Prescott, Claims, in D. Fleck (Ed.), The Handbook of the Law of Visiting Forces 159, at
165 (2001).
157 Agreement on Military Aspects of the Peace Settlement, Annex 1A of the the General
Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, reproduced in 35 ILM 75
(1996).
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between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Bosnia and Croatia in
appendixes to Annex 1A.158
Article VI.9 of Annex 1A states that “the IFOR and its personnel shall not
be liable for any damages to civilian or government property caused by combat
or combat related activities.” The SOFAs state that claims for damage or injury
to government personnel or property, or to private personnel or property of
the receiving state shall be submitted through governmental authorities of
the receiving state to the designated North Atlantic Treaty Organization
representatives.
The actual process to be followed in settling claims in Bosnia was addressed
by Mr. Sergio Balanzino, acting Secretary-General of NATO, in a letter to the
minister of foreign affairs of Bosnia Herzegovina. In this letter Mr. Balanzino
noted that if civil suits were brought against NATO personnel for actions
performed in their official capacity, the NATO commander could issue a scope
certificate to that effect and remove the case to the standing claims commission
to be established for that purpose.
Subsequent agreements spelled the claims commission process out in
greater detail. These agreements included the claims annexes to the Technical
Arrangements entered into between representatives of the peace support
operation and Bosnia Herzegovina and Croatia. The claims annexes stated
that payment orders were to be paid with either NATO or national contingent
funds.
In practice, claims are the responsibility of the troop contributing states,
in the sense that claims by third parties are submitted to the contingent that
caused the damage and payment for these claims is made by the contingent
in question. Claims caused by the acts or omissions of force headquarters
personnel are investigated and adjudicated by the force claims office and
payment for these claims is made by the force.
2.9.2 The Legality of the Use of Force cases
In April 1999, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia instituted proceedings before
the International Court of Justice against ten NATO member states. On the same
day Yugoslavia filed a request for provisional measures.
158 Agreement between the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the North Atlantic Treaty
Organisation Concerning the Status of NATO and its Personnel, Appendix B to Annex
1A of the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, reproduced
in Office of the High Representative, Essential Texts 31 (2000), article 15 and Agreement
between the Republic of Croatia and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation Concerning
the Status of NATO and its Personnel, Appendix C to Annex 1A of the the General Frame-
work Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, reproduced in Office of the High
Representative, Essential Texts 32 (2000), Article 15.
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The application claimed inter alia that by taking part in the bombing of
the territory of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia by NATO in Operation Allied
Force, these states violated several of their international obligations, including
obligations under international humanitarian law. The application did not
specify the precise acts or omissions that were considered attributable to the
member states.
Strictly speaking this case did not concern a peace support operation. The
case is nevertheless instructive because command and control relationships
over military forces in Operation Allied Force were very similar to those in
peace support operations.159 In Operation Allied Force national forces were
placed under the operational control of NATO. The overall NATO commander
of the operation was the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR). He
delegated operational control to the Commander in Chief Allied Forces South
(CINCSOUTH). SACEUR reported to the North Atlantic Council. It may be noted
that this chain of command closely resembles the chain of command in NATO
peace support operations.160 Special arrangements were made in respect of
United States forces however, for which a parallel national chain of command
was established.161
The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia developed the question of attribution
orally in the hearings concerning the request for provisional measures:
Mr. President and Members of the Court, the acts of force are imputable to the Re-
spondents.
5.1. The Respondents have used their military forces for bombing. The military
forces are organs of a State and their acts are imputable to a State.
5.2. I refer to Article 5 of the 1949 North Atlantic Treaty, which reads as follows:
“The parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe
or North America shall be considered an attack against them all, and consequently
they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the
right of individual or collective self-defense recognised by Article 51 of the Charter
of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forth-
with, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems
necessary, including the use of force, to restore and maintain the security of the
North Atlantic area.”
According to quoted basic rule, the Respondents are acting individually and in
concert.
5.3. I believe that information offered by the NATO Handbook published in 1998,
dealing with the functioning of that Organization, could be relevant for the matter.
159 See US Department of Defense, Kosovo/Operation Allied Force After-Action Report 16-20
(2000); UK Ministry of Defense, Kosovo: Lessons from the Crisis, para. 7.23 (2000); UK
Parliament Select Committee on Defence Minutes of Evidence, 22 March 2000, para. 108.
160 See § 1.8.6 and § 1.8.8.
161 US Department of Defense, supra note 159, at 16-20.
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Describing “the principal policy and decision-making forum of NATO, the North
Atlantic Council”, the Handbook says:
“When decisions have to be made, action is agreed upon on the basis of unanimity
and common accord. There is no voting or decision by majority. Each nation
represented at the Council table or any of its subordinate committees retains
complete sovereignty and responsibility for its own decision” (NATO Handbook,
Brussels, 1998. p. 37).
5.4. And about the role of integrated military forces, the Handbook informs:
“In accordance with the fundamental principles which govern the relationship
between political and military institutions within democratic states, the integrated
military structure remains under political control and guidance at the highest level
at all times.” (Ibid., p. 245.)
5.5. So, even as a part of the integrated military force of NATO, military forces of
the Respondents are under their control and guidance.
In this statement the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia seems to base attribution
on the alleged status of the military forces taking part in the bombing as organs
of the member states, in accordance with draft article 4 of the draft articles
on state responsibility or Article 91 of the first Additional Protocol for those
respondent states that are parties to the Protocol.
In the same proceedings at a later point the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
developed another ground for attribution to the member states:
Mr. President, I shall now move on to my last topic. Several of the respondent States
have contended that the actions of the NATO command structure are not imputable
to individual member States of NATO. Three references will be in the transcript
by way of examples (CR 99/17, p. 13, para. 6 (France), CR 99/16, p. 15, para. 34
(Canada), CR 99/22, p. 10 (Spain)).
The general implications of such contentions call for some consideration. The North
Atlantic Council directs the war against Yugoslavia as a joint enterprise. It constant-
ly says so. It would be a legal and political anomaly of the first order if the actions
of the command structure were not attributable jointly and severally to the member
States. This joint and several responsibility is justified both in legal principle and
by the conduct of the member States. Thus, after the destruction of the Chinese
Embassy in Belgrade, the British Prime Minister apologized to the Chinese Govern-
ment, although there had been no suggestion that a British plane had fired the
missiles. More recently the German Chancellor has also apologized.
In the case concerning Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru (Nauru v. Australia), this
Court held that the possibility of a joint and several liability of the three States
responsible for the administration of a Trust Territory at the material time did not
render inadmissible in limine litis a claim brought against only one of them (I.C.J.
Reports 1992, pp. 258-259, para. 48; see also President Jennings, p. 301).
In closing on this issue of joint responsibility, I would point out that it is quite
remarkable that States who have publicly associated themselves with a multilateral
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NATO campaign of coercion should now seek to avoid the legal responsibility
involved.
This argument seems to refer to the possibility of ‘piercing the veil’ of the
organization and theories of member state responsibility for the conduct of
an international organization discussed above.162
The respondent states approached the question of attribution in various
ways. Some of the respondents seemed to accept that military actions were
attributable to them. For example, the United Kingdom stated that it had acted
in accordance with international law in its resort to force and the methods
and means that it had adopted.163 The United States also seems to have
accepted that military actions were attributable to it.164 Other respondents
stated that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia had not specifically imputed
acts to that particular respondent state. For example, Portugal stated that the
request for provisional measures was based on a list of apparently violated
conventions and alleged damages attributed indistinctly to the Portuguese
Republic without definition of its share of responsibility on the actions and
alleged damages.165 Belgium166 and Canada167 also made this argument.
Only two of the respondent states discussed the theory of joint and several
responsibility in their pleadings. Canada stated that:
No specific conduct – we said it two days ago – is alleged against Canada itself,
as an independent sovereign State, or for that matter against any of the other
Respondents. As a very poor substitute for the imputation of specific acts to any
of the Respondents, the Applicant asserts broadly that joint and several liability
can be imputed to each one of the Respondents for acts it may not have committed
because of the integrated command structure of NATO.
Mr. President, it was for the Respondent to demonstrate a basis in international
law for that proposition, and it has not done so. Joint and several liability for acts
of an international organization, or for the acts of other States acting within such
an organization, cannot be established unless the relevant treaty provides for such
liability. Article 5 of the 1949 NATO Convention, cited in the first round, provides
no such indication of an assumption of joint and several liability, and neither do
the provisions of the Handbook respecting the integrated military structure of the
organization. The separate liability of Australia in Nauru was of course based on
the specific terms of the trust instruments in issue in that case, not on general
162 See § 2.5.2.
163 CR 99/23 of 11 May 1999, para. 7.
164 CR 99/24 of 11 May 1999 (“the fact is that the Applicant has made no credible allegation
that United States or other NATO forces have committed acts of genocide or are at all likely
to do so”, para 3.9; “the actions of the Members of the NATO Alliance find their justification
in a number of factors”, para. 1.7).
165 CR 99/21 of 11 May 1999, para. 3.1.2.
166 CR 99/15 of 10 May 1999 (“nowhere have we seen evidence establishing prima facie that
such facts are imputable to the military forces of the Kingdom of Belgium”)
167 CR 99/16 of 10 May 1999, para. 34 (“there are no facts specifically imputed to Canada”).
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principles on international organizations. The work of the International Law Com-
mission on State Responsibility provides no more support for the joint and several
concept. I note as well that these concepts were canvassed in the Tin Council
litigation in the United Kingdom, and the outcome would not support the Applicant
in the present case.168
The Netherlands also rejected the theory of joint and several responsibility
of the member states:
3. On the question of joint and several responsibility, brought up by the FRY in
its observations this morning, the Netherlands would like to observe, that this
aspect is new and deviates from the Application submitted to the 10 countries
individually on 29 April of this year. The Netherlands strongly rejects such a
responsibility on the side of the Netherlands and observes that in the relevant
instruments, invoked by the FRY, there is no legal basis for such a form of responsib-
ility.169
On 2 June 1999 the Court decided that in two of the ten cases (Yugoslavia v.
Spain and Yugoslavia v. United States of America) it manifestly lacked jurisdiction
and ordered that these cases be removed from its list. In the other eight cases
the Court found that it lacked prima facie jurisdiction, which is a prerequisite
for the issue of provisional measures, and that it therefore could not indicate
such measures. The Court did remain seized of those cases and a fuller con-
sideration of the question of jurisdiction will take place later. After that the
Court may consider the question of attribution of the acts of NATO. There is
however a possibility that Serbia and Montenegro, as the Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia is now officially named,170 will withdraw the applications.
Reportedly NATO has made this a condition for considering Serbia and Monte-
negro’s candidacy for the so-called ‘Partnership for Peace’ program.171
2.9.3 The Bankovic´ case
On 20 October 1999 six citizens of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia lodged
an application with the European Court of Human Rights against Belgium,
the Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland,
Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Turkey
and the United Kingdom in connection with Operation Allied Force. The
168 CR 99/27 of 12 May 1999.
169 CR 99/31 of 12 May 1999, para. 3.
170 See D. Williams, Yugoslavs Shrug off their Country’s End, The Washington Post, 5 February
2003.
171 See J. Chalmers, Belgrade Offers to Aid NATO in Hunt for War Crime Suspect, The Boston
Globe, 33 July 2003.
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applicants alleged that the strike on a radio and television station in Belgrade
on 23 April 1999 by a missile from a NATO forces’ aircraft that killed sixteen
persons and seriously injured another sixteen was a violation by the re-
spondents of Article 2 (the right to life), Article 10 (freedom of expression)
and Article 13 (the right to an effective remedy) of the European Convention
on Human Rights.
The plaintiffs claimed that the actions by NATO forces in Operation Allied
Force were imputable, jointly and severally, to the governments of the re-
spondent states. The application stated:
The acts complained of in the present Application were not taken on the initiative
of a single pilot or missile battery commander. They were approved and directed
by the highest political authority of NATO, the North Atlantic Council, and the
nationality of those who actually carried out a specific attack is irrelevant, in the
context of the larger NATO command and control structure.
Approval of the ‘target list,’ pursuant to which the attack on the RTS station was
conducted, is the direct responsibility of the NAC and its member States. Within
the NATO command structure, the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR)
delegated authority for the implementation of Operation Allied Force to the Com-
mander in Chief of Allied Forces Southern Europe (CINCSOUTH), whose headquarters
is in Naples, Italy. CINCSOUTH delegated control of the operation to the Commander,
Allied Air Forces Southern Europe (COMAIRSOUTH), also based in Naples. Opera-
tional conduct of day to day missions during “Operation Allied Force” was del-
egated to the Commander 5th Allied Tactical Air Force, at Vicenza, Italy.172 To
the best of the applicants’ knowledge, target lists were initially prepared within
this structure and, on a daily basis, forwarded through the NATO chain of command
through the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) to the Military Commit-
tee and to the NAC. Every one of the 19 member States of NATO received the target
lists on a daily basis, and each State had the legal authority to approve or object
to any target on that list. To the best of the applicants’ knowledge, either all of
the Respondent States approved the target list on which the RTS station appeared
or none of the Respondent States objected to listing the RTS station on the target
list.
The applicants refer to the Statement of Facts above. The RTS station could not and
would not have been bombed without the prior approval of the NAC and, by
extension, each of the Respondent States. Under the NATO Treaty, this is the case
whether or not there was initial disagreement or dispute over the targeting of RTS.
All of the information available to the Applicants confirms that the decision to bomb
RTS was reached by unanimous consensus among NATO member States.
The application also referred to the case of M and Co v. Federal Republic of
Germany in which the European Commission on Human Rights considered
that a transfer of powers does not necessarily exclude a state’s responsibility
172 This information is drawn from the NATO web site (http//www.afsouth.nato.int/opera-
tions/detforce/force.htm)
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under the Convention with regard to the exercise of the transferred powers.173
The transfer of powers to an international organization is not incompatible
with the Convention, provided that within that organization fundamental rights
will receive an equivalent protection, the Commission stated. In the M & Co
case the Commission held that such protection was afforded under European
law. The plaintiffs in the Bankovic´ case considered that the NATO structure offers
neither substantive nor procedural protection for the fundamental rights
guaranteed under the Convention. Thus, the respondent states could not argue
that delegation of decision-making authority to NATO over as fundamental
a right as the right to life in any way diminishes their individual obligation
to protect that right under the Convention.
The application seems to distinguish two bases of attribution. One is the
decision by the representatives in the North Atlantic Council that is attributed
to the member states. This argument raises the question whether national
representatives to the North Atlantic Council act as agents of the member states
or as members of the relevant decision-making organ of the organization. In
the first case the vote of a national representative is attributable to the state
on the basis of draft article 4 of the ILC draft articles on state responsibility.
The latter case is referred to as dédoublement fonctionnel. It refers to the theory
developed by Scelle according to which state officials act as state organs
whenever they operate within the national legal system, and as international
agents whenever they operate in the international legal system.174 The
position of national representatives in decision-making organs of international
organizations was addressed during the work of the Institut de Droit Inter-
national on the legal consequences for member states of the non-fulfilment
by international organizations of their obligations toward third parties.175
Rapporteur Higgins maintained that member state representatives should be
considered as members of the relevant decision-making organ. As a con-
sequence, the continuing role of states members qua organs should be regarded
as neutral as regards the issue of members’ responsibility for the acts of the
international organization.176 Several members of the Institut supported the
position of the Rapporteur.177 A number of other members considered that
a state can be responsible for its vote in an international organization.178
173 See § 2.9.3.
174 See G. Scelle, Théorie et Pratique de la Fonction Exécutive en Droit International, 55 Recueil des
Cours (1936), at 91-106; G. Scelle, Le Phénomène Juridique du Dédoublement Fonctionnel, in
W. Schätzel & H.J. Slochauer (Eds.), Rechtsfragen der Internationalen Organisation: Fest-
schrrift für Hans Wehberg zu seinem 70. Geburtstag 324 (1956); A. Cassese, Remarks on
Scelle’s Theory of “Role Splitting”(Dédoublement Fonctionnel) in International Law, 1 European
Journal of International Law 210 (1990).
175 See § 2.5.5.
176 Provisional report Annuaire IDI 66-I (1995) 388.
177 Id., at 305 (Vignes); id. 323 (Waelbroeck); id. 331 (Seyersted).
178 Id. at 291 (Shihata); id. 327 (Zemanek).
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Salmon referred in this context to article 27 of the ILC draft articles on state
responsibility. This article, which in 2001 ILC draft articles is draft article 16,
provides that a state is responsible for aid or assistance in the commission
of an internationally wrongful act by another state. There are two prerequisites
for responsibility, namely that the state aiding or assisting does so with know-
ledge of the circumstances of the internationally wrongful act, and that the
act would be internationally wrongful if committed by that state.
Writers point out that the theory of dédoublement fonctionnel is difficult to
apply consistently.179 If the conduct of member states of an international
organization in the decision-making organs of that organization is not con-
sidered as state practice, for example, it cannot be maintained that UN General
Assembly resolutions are a form of state practice, as Higgins does.180
There seems to be no other particular characteristic of international organ-
izations that stands in the way of applying the principle in Article 16 of the
ILC draft articles to this case. In particular, it is possible to distinguish between
the will of the member state as expressed through its vote, and the will of the
decision-making organ of the organization as expressed in the result of the
organ’s voting procedure.
It seems that the application of the principle in draft article 16 of the ILC
draft articles would only rarely lead to member state responsibility, however.
Not only would the aiding or assisting state have to be aware of the circum-
stances making the conduct of the assisted organization internationally wrong-
ful, the aid or assistance must also be given with a view to facilitating the
commission of the wrongful act, and must actually do so. The latter require-
ment, that the state organ intended to facilitate the occurrence of wrongful
conduct, will be difficult to establish.181 It may also be pointed out that there
is no state practice to support this theory. The courts in the International Tin
Council and Westland cases did not find member states responsible for their
votes. The Landgericht Bonn, in a 1992 judgment, also rejected an argument
that Germany was responsible for its vote in favor of an EEC economic embargo
that caused damages to a German company.182 On the other hand, national
law played an important role in all these judgments so that they are incon-
clusive as regards a rule of international law.
The other basis for attribution is the transfer of powers by the member
states to the international organization that is attributed to those states. The
application does not specify the precise transfer of powers in question. In the
M & Co case the Commission had in mind the transfer of powers by the
member states in the constituent instrument of the European Community. The
application in the Bankovic´ case suggests that the applicants had in mind the
179 R. Lawson, supra note 86, at 466-467.
180 R. Higgins, Problems & Process: International Law and How We Use It 23 (1994).
181 But see P. Klein, supra note 76, at 470.
182 Landgericht Bonn, Judgment of 26 February 1992 (1 O 446/90).
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delegation of certain decision-making powers to military organs of NATO
specifically in connection with Operation Allied Force, rather than the transfer
of powers effected in the constituent instrument of the organization.
The respondent governments disputed the admissibility of the case. They
mainly contended that the court did not have personal jurisdiction because
the applicants did not fall within the jurisdiction of the respondent states
within the meaning of article 1 of the Convention. They also maintained that
the court could not decide the merits of the case as it would be determining
the rights and obligations of the United States, of Canada and of the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization itself, none of whom were contracting parties
to the Convention. The French government further argued that the bombing
concerned was not imputable to the respondent states but to NATO, an organ-
ization with an international legal personality separate from the respondent
states.
On 12 December 2001 the Court declared the application inadmissible
because it considered that it did not have personal jurisdiction.183 The Court
considered that it was not necessary to examine the remaining submissions
of the parties on the admissibility of the application, including the alleged
several liability of the respondent states for an act carried out by an inter-
national organization of which they are members.
It may be concluded that the Court’s decision in the Bankovic´ case does
not provide any guidance on the question of state responsibility arising out
of conduct of an international organization. The Court simply avoided this
issue by declaring the application inadmissible ratione personae. In this regard,
the decision is actually a ‘non-decision’.184 It has been suggested that the
Court’s restrictive stance on the question of jurisdiction in the sense of Article
1 of the European Convention was inspired by the desire to avoid the need
to address states’ responsibility for actions carried out within the framework
of NATO.185 If the Court would have considered this issue, it would have been
justified to hold member states responsible on the basis of the two theories
of attribution put forward by the applicants discussed above, provided that
the facts as stated by the applicants had been established. In particular, it
would have been difficult for the Court not to find that member states were
responsible on the basis of the delegation of powers over parts of their armed
forces to certain organs of the Organization. This would be in accordance with
the former Commission and the Court’s previous case law,186 and in par-
ticular with the Court’s holding in Matthews v. United Kingdom that the Euro-
183 Supra note 70.
184 G. Cohen-Jonathan, Observations: La Territorialisation de la Jurisdiction de la Cour Européenne
des Droits de l’ Homme, 12 Revue Trimestrielle des Droits de l’Homme 1069 (2002), at 1073.
185 A. Rüth & M. Trilsch, Case Report: Bankovic´ v. Belgium, 97 American Journal of International
Law 168 (2003), at 172.
186 See § 2.9.3.
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pean Convention does not exclude the transfer of competences to international
organizations provided that Convention rights continue to be secured.187
As the applicants pointed out, unlike the European Community, NATO does
not have any system for the protection of human rights that can provide
protection equivalent to that of the European Convention.
The Court’s decision concerning admissibility is open to criticism. The
Court maintains that the applicant’s submission, that the positive obligation
under Article 1 of the Convention extends to securing the Convention rights
in a manner proportionate to the level of control exercized in any given extra-
territorial situation, is tantamount to arguing that anyone adversely affected
by an act imputable to a Contracting State, wherever in the world that act may
have been committed or its consequences felt, is thereby brought within the
jurisdiction of that State for the purpose of Article 1.188 It agrees with the
respondents that the wording of Article 1 does not provide any support for
the applicant’s suggestion that the positive obligation in Article 1 can be
divided and tailored in accordance with the particular circumstances of the
extra-territorial act in question. Here, the Court correctly makes a distinction
between the scope of application of the Convention on the one hand, and the
question whether an act that allegedly violates the Convention is attributable
to a contracting state. In terms of state responsibility, Article 1 of the Conven-
tion sets out the obligations of the contracting parties and is not concerned
with attribution. This distinction however in itself does not justify the Court’s
conception of jurisdiction, based principally on scholarly definitions of ‘juris-
diction’. ‘Jurisdiction’ in these definitions is not necessarily identical with
jurisdiction in Article 1. Under international law and as conceived in the
publications the Court refers to, state jurisdiction concerns essentially the extent
of a state’s right to regulate, enforce or adjudicate. Article 1 of the Convention,
however, is not concerned with the question of whether a state, when acting
territorially, is lawfully entitled to do so with respect to another state, but with
the question whether a state, when so acting, is bound to respect its obligations
under the Convention.189 A broader conception of jurisdiction, as proposed
by the applicants, would be fully in line with a dynamic interpretation of the
Convention. In constant case law, the Court has reiterated that the Convention
is a living instrument to be interpreted in light of present-day condictions,
as it recognizes in the Bankovic´ decision.190 The Court however seems to sug-
gest that, for some unspecified reason, this approach is not applicable to Article
1. It is telling that the Court refers to the ‘ordinary’ notion of jurisdiction.191
187 Matthews v. United Kingdom, Judgement of 18 February 1999 (Application No. 24833/94),
para. 32.
188 Supra note 70, para. 75.
189 A. Rüth & M. Trilsch, supra note 185, at 172.
190 Supra note 70, para. 64.
191 Supra note 70, para. 61.
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It is argued with some justification that this is a misunderstanding of the
particular nature of the Convention.192 It is arguable whether a broader con-
ception of ‘jurisdiction’ would divide the obligation under Article 1, as the
Court agrees with the respondents. Rather, it appears that the fact that a state
would not in all cases be obliged to respect all the rights under the Convention,
would be an application of the principle that no-one is held to perform the
impossible (‘impossibilium nulla obligatio est’).
Under the approach advocated by the applicants, the extra-territorial actions
of a contracting state would be subject to the Convention’s standards under
the same conditions that apply to attribution under the law of state responsibil-
ity. While the same standards would apply, however, this would not be a
question of attribution itself. As explained above, Article 1 is concerned with
the scope of a state’s obligations, not with attribution. This doctrine may not
have been in the minds of the drafters of Article 1, but it is certainly in accord-
ance with a dynamic interpretation of the Convention. The Court states that
in previous case law it has recognized the exercise of extra-territorial juris-
diction:
when the respondent State, through the effective control of the relevant territory
and its inhabitants abroad as a consequence of military occupation or through the
consent, invitation, or acquiescence of the Government of that territory, exercises
all or some of the public powers normally to be exercised by that Government.193
This is a recognition by the Court that it has departed from the purely
territorial notion of jurisdiction that it attributes to the drafters of the Conven-
tion. The Court does not make clear why departures in other cases than the
two it mentions would not be appropriate.
The Court arguably restricted the interpretation of jurisdiction under Article
1 even further. It distinguished its judgement in Cyprus v. Turkey, in which
it held that persons in northern Cyprus fell within the jurisdiction of Turkey
on the basis of the Turkish occupation, from the facts in Bankovic´. According
to the Court, the inhabitants of northern Cyprus would have found themselves
excluded from the benefits of the Convention safeguards and system which
they previously enjoyed, by Turkey’s ‘effective control’ of the territory and
by the accompanying inability of the Cypriot government, as a contracting
state, to fulfil its obligations under the Convention.194 The Court does not
state whether this means that it regards persons affected by extraterritorial
military operations to fall within the jurisdiction of contracting states only if
they enjoyed the protection of the Convention prior to the operation. Certain
192 G. Cohen-Jonathan, Observations: La Territorialisation de la Jurisdiction de la Cour Européenne
des Droits de l’ Homme, 12 Revue Trimestrielle des Droits de l’Homme 1069 (2002), at 1080.
193 Supra note 70, para. 71.
194 Id., para. 80
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authors interpret the Court’s statement in this sense.195 It is just as likely,
however, that the Court merely distinguished the applicants in Bankovic´ from
those in Cyprus v. Turkey for the specific purpose of refuting the applicant’s
claim that any failure to accept that the applicants fell within the jurisdiction
of the respondent states would defeat the ordre public mission of the Conven-
tion, without establishing an additional condition. The Court’s judgement in
the Öcalan case seems to confirm that the latter is the correct interpretation.196
In that case, the Court accepted that the applicant fell within Turkey’s juris-
diction when it abducted him from Kenya, a country that is not a contracting
state to the Convention.The Court stated that:
the circumstances of the present case are distinguishable from those in the afore-
mentioned Bankovic´ and Others case, notably in that the applicant was physically
forced to return to Turkey by Turkish officials and was subject to their authority
and control following his arrest and return to Turkey.197
2.10 STATE PRACTICE IN CONNECTION WITH UNITED NATIONS PEACE SUPPORT
OPERATIONS: OBSERVATIONS
2.10.1 Application of draft article 6 of the draft articles on state responsibility
State practice in connection with UN peace support operations in § 2.8 demon-
strates that the UN and states accept that in certain circumstances conduct of
the operations that violates international humanitarian law is attributable to
the international organization.
The clearest example is the payment of lump sums by the UN in connection
with violations of international humanitarian law by the United Nations
operation in the Congo. In these cases the organization acknowledged that
it was responsible where it was established that UN agents had in fact caused
unjustifiable damage to innocent parties.
Some writers discuss the procedures for the settlement of third-party claims
developed by the UN to demonstrate that the conduct of peace support opera-
tions is attributed to the UN. Scobbie for example refers to paragraph 51 of
the model status of forces agreement, which provides that claims of a private
law character arising from a peacekeeping operation shall be settled by a claims
commission, as proof of international responsibility of the UN.198
195 A. Rüth & M. Trilsch, supra note 185, at 171; H. Krieger, Die Verantwortlichkeit Deutschlands
nach der EMRK für seine Streitkräfte im Auslandeinsatz, 62 Zeitschrift für ausländisches
öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht 669 (2002), at 683.
196 Öcalan v. Turkey, Judgement of 12 March 2003, (Appl. No. 46221/99).
197 Id., para. 93.
198 I. Scobbie, International Responsibility, in R.J. Dupuy (Ed.), Manual on International Organiza-
tions 886 (1998), at 889.
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Cases decided by claims commissions and local claims review boards
however are not examples of attribution of conduct to the UN on the basis of
international law because these bodies do not apply international law but the
private law of torts. The procedures established by the UN in this regard should
be considered as local remedies that must be exhausted before a claim can
be made under international law. Simmonds states that:
When the injuries are to persons and their property, a rule akin to the rule of
exhaustion of local remedies would apply so that the Government would take up
the claim against the UN only when there had been, via the UN’s own procedures
for settlement of claims, a ‘denial of justice’.199
The proper role of claims settlement procedures is put into perspective by the
statement of the UN Secretary-General that these procedures are in conformity
with section 29 of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the
United Nations. In other words, these procedures were established because
the immunity of the UN prevents claims from being adjudicated by local courts.
Claims settlement procedures were established to prevent such an a priori
denial of justice.
The principles of attribution used by claims review boards do indirectly
demonstrate the applicable principles under international law because claims
settlement procedures were established by the UN “in recognition of its inter-
national responsibility for the activities of its forces.”200 The claims review
boards provide a remedy in private law in cases where the UN could be held
responsible under international law. The 1995 report of the Secretary-General
was an express acceptance of the international responsibility of the UN for
violations of international humanitarian law by peace support operations under
the exclusive command and control of the UN. The Secretary-General’s report
states that the attribution to the UN of combat-related activities is premised
on the assumption that the operation in question is under the exclusive com-
mand and control of the organization. In joint operations command and control
can be vested according to the arrangements between the state or states provid-
199 R. Simmonds, Legal Problems Arising from the United Nations Military Operations in the
Congo 238 (1968). See also B. Amrallah, The International Responsibility of the U.N. for the
Activities Carried out by U.N. Peacekeeping Forces, 32 Revue Egyptienne de Droit International
57 (1976), at 76.
200 Report of the Secretary-General on the the Financing of the United Nations Protection Force,
the United Nations Confidence Restoration Operation in Croatia, the United Nations
Preventive Deployment Force and the the United Nations Peace Forces headquarters;
Administrative and budgetary aspects of the financing of the United Nations peacekeeping
operations: financing of the United Nations peacekeeping operations of 20 September 1996,
UN Doc. A/51/389, para. 7. This is illustrated by Secretary-General’s discussion of the
principles of attribution of conduct of peace support operations that violates international
humanitarian law without distinguishing between settlement of claims by claims review
boards or through lump sum settlement under international law in paras. 17-19.
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ing the troops and the UN. In the absence of formal arrangements responsibility
would be determined in each and every case according to the degree of ef-
fective control exercised by either party in the conduct of the operation.
The same principle of attribution was used by the Vienna superior provin-
cial court in the NK v. Austria case as well as by the United Kingdom high
court and court of appeal in the Nissan case. The Vienna court for example
primarily inquired “whose instructions the commander of a unit sent abroad
is subject to.” The relevant arrangements between Austria and the UN demon-
strated that the commander was subject to the instructions of the UN. Therefore
the conduct of a member of the unit was not attributable to Austria.
However, international law was not deemed to be the applicable law in
these domestic cases. The Vienna superior provincial court for example decided
the case on the basis of the ‘Organtheory’ developed in Austrian administrative
law. Consequently, domestic case law can not be used to prove the existence
of a principle of attribution under international law, as some writers
suggest.201
State practice as placed in context in the Secretary-General’s report demon-
strates the application of the principle in draft article 6 of the draft articles
on state responsibility to the UN. Draft article 6 is concerned with the conduct
of organs placed at the disposal of a state by another state. The situation of
contingents in peace support operations is that of organs placed at the disposal
of the UN by troop contributing states. The ILC’s commentary to draft article 6
states that the:
notion of an organ placed at the disposal of the receiving State is a specialized one,
implying that the organ is acting with the consent, under the authority of and for
the purposes of the receiving State. Not only must the organ be appointed to
perform functions entrusted to it by the beneficiary State, the organ must also act
in conjunction with the machinery of that State and under its exclusive direction
and control, rather than on instructions from the sending State.202
The parallel with the principle of attribution applied to the conduct of peace
support operations is obvious, inter alia because the principle in draft article
6 is based in part on state practice in connection with peace support operations.
When Special Rapporteur Ago proposed the principle in draft article 6 to the
ILC in 1971, he stated that the validity of the principle was undoubtedly pro-
vided by the practice concerning acts or omissions of organs placed at the
disposal of international organization by states, in particular the practice in
connection with the United Nations operation in the Congo.203
201 For example M. Bothe, Streitkräfte Internationaler Organisationen: Zugleich ein beitrag
zu völkerrechtlichen Grundfragen der Anwesendheit fremder Truppen 54 (1968); M. Hirsch,
supra note 99, at 73-76.
202 Supra note 15, at 95, para. 2.
203 YBILC 1971, Vol. II (Part One), at 272, para. 210.
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For the application of draft article 6, a provision on direction and control
in an agreement between the sending state and the receiving state can play
a role in the attribution of conduct of the organ in question. If the agreement
provides that the organ is under the orders of the receiving state, there is a
presumption that conduct of the organ is attributable to that state. The Secret-
ary-General’s report demonstrates that the same presumption is applied to
contingents placed at the disposal of the UN because the responsibility of the
UN for combat-related activities is premised on the assumption that the opera-
tion in question is under the exclusive command and control of the UN. The
assumption can be based on the clauses in agreements between troop con-
tributing states and the UN concerning command and authority over peace
support operations. Command and control relate to the nature of the authority
exercised by military commanders over the forces assigned to them and as
such it is an indication of who gives instructions in the sense of draft article
6. Troop contributing states transfer a level of command and control to the
UN that involves the full authority to issue operational directives within the
limits of a specific mandate, an agreed period of time and a specific geograph-
ical range. Giving such military command and control over an organ is the
equivalent of placing the organ at the disposal of an international organization
in the sense of draft article 6.
For the contingent to be placed at the disposal of the organization it must
be established that the organ was not acting on the instructions or under the
direction and control of the sending state. It is not necessary that the sending
state gave express instructions. Hirsch states:
Each individual case must be examined as to whether the specific legal act was
performed under the control of the organization or the sending state. If a member
of such a force performs an act under the direction of its national government, that
government will be the proper addressee of any claim arising from that act; this
conclusion will not be altered even in cases where the contingent to which that
member belongs is generally under the operational control of the organization.204
Support for such an interpretation can be found in the drafting history of draft
article 6 of the draft articles. The ILC’s commentary on draft article 9 of the
draft articles adopted on first reading, and containing the principle now in
draft article 6, states that the article excludes:
those situations in which the organs of a State or of an international organization
perform functions appertaining to another State in the territory of that other State
and with its consent, but nevertheless act under the authority, direction and control
of the sending State or organization.
204 M. Hirsch, supra note 99, at 64-65. See also B. Amrallah, supra note 199, at 65.
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One of the cases mentioned in the commentary adopted on second reading
to draft article 6 is Drozd and Janousek v. France and Spain, in which the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights held that French and Spanish judges were placed
at the disposal of Andorra because “their judgments are not subject to super-
vision by the authorities of France and Spain.”205
Writers that apply draft article 6 of the draft articles to peace support
operations also do not require express instructions.206
An example in which conduct would be attributable to the troop con-
tributing state is the hypothetical situation that the Dutch contingent in Srebre-
nica received instructions from its government concerning the attitude it must
take toward the transfer of the local population by Bosnian Serb forces. If such
were the case, the conduct of the contingent would be attributable to the
government, even though the agreement between the Netherlands and the
UN concerning the participation of Dutch troops in the operation specified that
the UN was in command.207 In the case in question the Dutch government
has denied that it gave instructions to the contingent.208
State practice does not provide examples of the attribution of the conduct
of peace support operations to states because they are member states of the
UN. On the other hand state practice does not provide evidence of a conviction
that member state responsibility is excluded. At the most it justifies the con-
clusion that member state responsibility is secondary: in other words, that a
claim must be addressed to the UN before it is addressed to member states.
The governments that exercised diplomatic protection of their nationals in
connection with ONUC first directed their claims at the UN, and because negoti-
ations with the organization were successful, the question of secondary re-
sponsibility did not arise.209 In this sense state practice is disappointing be-
cause it does not give guidance to the practical existence or lack thereof of
the theories of member state responsibility. The application of draft article 6
of the draft articles to peace support operations does not a priori exclude a
secondary responsibility of member states in cases in which it leads to attribu-
tion of conduct to the UN.
205 Drozd and Janousek v. France and Spain, E.C.H.R. Series A, No. 240 (1992), para. 96.
206 P. Klein, supra note 76, at 380-381; M. Hirsch, supra note 99, at 64; B. Amrallah, supra note
199, at 66 (stating that “the amount of operational control or authority which is exercised
over the U.N. force can be a useful criterion to determine the responsibility of the various
parties”).
207 See R. Siekmann, The Fall of Srebrenica and the Attitude of Dutchbat from an International Legal
Perspective, 1 Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law 301 (1998). For the Dutch
government to be internationally responsible, the conduct of the troops would also have
to be a breach of an international obliagtion of the Netherlands.
208 Aanhangsel Handelingen II 1996/97, nr. 181.
209 State practice supports only half of Brownlie’s statement that there is no “presumption
in law that the United Nations bears either an exclusive or a primary responsibility for
the tortious acts of such forces”, I. Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law 686
(1998).
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State practice does not provide examples of the attribution of the conduct
of peace support operations to troop contributing states. Here too, there is
on the other hand no evidence of a conviction that troop contributing state
responsibility is excluded. In certain circumstances the attribution of conduct
of members of a peace support operation to a troop contributing state would
be entirely consistent with principles of state responsibility developed by the
ILC and international courts.
Condorelli states that the application of the principle in draft article 6 of
the draft articles on state responsibility to peace support operations is ap-
propriate.210 Application of the principle, he argues, leads to the conclusion
that conduct of a national contingent is attributable to the UN as well as to
the state contributing the contingent in question. Condorelli bases attribution
of the conduct of a national contingent to the troop contributing state in
question on the state’s supposed authority, direction and control (soumis à
l’autorité, à la direction et au contrôle) over the contingent and on his submission
that the contingent is acting in the exercise of elements of the governmental
authority of the state.
As a general proposition Condorelli’s argument is correct, but his applica-
tion of the principle to UN peace support operations is not. Draft article 6 of
the ILC draft articles accepts that there is a presumption of attribution to the
receiving state (or international organization) if the organ in question is placed
under its orders in an agreement. This presumption is established in agree-
ments between troop contributing states and the UN, that provide that during
the period of their assignment the personnel made available by the troop
contributing state shall be under the command of the UN and that accordingly,
the Secretary-General shall have full authority over the deployment, organiza-
tion, conduct and direction of the operation, including the personnel. The
presumption can be rebutted if it is established that the organ acted under
the direction and control of the sending state, the clearest example of which
would be specific instructions. The mere provision in agreements between
the UN and troop contributing states, that national administrative matters
remain the responsibility of the government of the troop contributing state,
or that the orders of the international commander are received by the con-
tingent through the national operational commander of the contingent, do not
establish such a situation.211 Condorelli mainly bases his argument on the
appointment of so-called ‘contingent commanders’(contco, contico) by troop
contributing states. It seems, however, that he misconstrues the role of such
commanders in according them much more authority than they actually have.
This is illustrated by the Directive of the Chief of Defense Staff of the Nether-
lands Armed Forces concerning the distribution of control in the case of peace
210 L. Condorelli, Le Statut des Forces de l’ONU et le Droit International Humanitaire, 78 Rivista
di Diritto Internazionale 881 (1995).
211 Cf. mutatis mutandis in national law the court in NK v Austria.
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support operations.212 This Directive states that when the Netherlands con-
tributes troops to a peace support operation, command is in principle trans-
ferred to the international organization concerned. Nevertheless, the Chief of
Defense Staff shall appoint a Senior National Representative (SNR), or Con-
tingent Commander (Contco) in a larger operation. This person is not the
operational commander of the contingent as his title suggests. His main tasks
are the provision of information to the Chief of Defense Staff, monitoring
whether the international commander exercises command over the contingent
in accordance with the agreements between the troop contributing state and
the international organization, and coordinating the information to the national
authorities concerning the personnel and material sustainability of the national
units. This is a more limited function than the one that Condorelli seems to
have in mind. It may be recalled that attribution of conduct of contingent is
not excluded but can only be based on a strict application of the criterion of
control exercised over the contingent in the circumstances in which the conduct
was committed.213
Another case is that in which a state or states provide the UN with forces
in support of a UN operation but not as an integral part thereof, such as in
the case of the Quick Reaction Force in Somalia. The Terms of Reference
Agreement between the United States and the UN provided that the Quick
Reaction Force was under the operational control of United States Central
Command (USCINCCENT).214 Tactical control could be delegated from
USCINCCENT to the commander of US forces in Somalia, who was also deputy
commander of the UN operation. In a case in which tactical control had been
delegated there would not be a clear presumption of attribution because the
Commander of US forces in Somalia was by agreement under the command
of USCINCCENT as well as the UNOSOM force commander. To establish respons-
ibility it would have to be established whether conduct of the Quick Reaction
Force was on the instructions or under the direction and control of the sending
state or the United Nations. Situations could also arise where the Quick Re-
action Force acted on the joint instructions of the UN and the United States.
In this case the conduct in question would be attributable to both.
The presumption, that the conduct of troops that are an integral part of
a peace support operation is attributable to the UN, is rebutted if it is estab-
lished that the troops were acting in fact on behalf of a troop contributing state.
As the Secretary-General states, the responsibility of the UN for combat-related
activities of UN forces is premised on the assumption that the operation in
212 Aanwijzing CDS Nr A-1, Verantwoordelijkheidsverdeling tussen CDS en Bevelhebbers bij
de Aansturing van Vredesoperaties (2002).
213 P. Klein, supra note 76, at 380.
214 Terms of Reference for US Forces Somalia, United Nations Operation Somalia, Annex A
to United States Army Field Manual 100-23, Peace Operations, <www.adtdl.army.mil/cgi-
bin/adtdl.dll/fm/100-23/fm100_7.htm> .
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question is under the exclusive command and control of the UN, implying that
such an assumption can be rebutted. The IDI discussed the situations in which
this is the case when it studied the conditions of application of humanitarian
rules of armed conflict to hostilities in which United Nations forces may be
engaged in 1971. Rapporteur Paul de Visscher submitted both a preliminary
and a final report and the IDI adopted a resolution after discussion of final
report.215
De Visscher stated in his reports that responsibility is based on control:
in case men or objects the conduct or presence of which is at the origin of an
internationally wrongful act are prima facie susceptible of attachment to two distinct
legal persons, responsibility must in principle be imputed to the person who
exercised preponderant or exclusive control over the conduct in question.216
De Visscher stated that state practice in connection with peace support opera-
tions demonstrated that in the opinion of the UN, troop contributing states
and host states, effective but not exclusive control by the organization over
the activities of national contingents could and should justify exclusive respons-
ibility of the organization.217 De Visscher also stated that the principle of
exclusive responsibility of the United Nations for activities of contingents under
its control was supported by a logical interpretation of the legal personality
and objectives of the organization.
In the discussions following the presentation of de Visscher’s final report,
a majority of the members of the IDI supported the principle that the conduct
of armed units under the control of the UN is attributable exclusively to the
organization, but it was difficult to agree on the words to describe the control
in question.218 De Visscher proposed the words ‘haute direction’. He explained
that this expressed that tactical control of operations was not enough control
to base attribution on. ‘Haute direction’ was based on a bundle of elements,
including the status of personnel and the way the commander was appointed.
Ago objected that this term suggested that there existed two kinds of control:
formal control and effective control, and proposed to replace ‘haute’ with
‘effective’. He explained that conduct is not attributable to the UN in case a
state controls the operation; the applicable criterion is real control and the
215 Preliminary Report Annuaire IDI 54-I (1971) 45, Final Report Annuaire IDI 54-I (1971) 116,
Resolution Annuaire IDI 54-II (1971) 449.
216 Preliminary Report, Annuaire IDI 54-I (1971) 45, at 48-49. Translation by the author. Original
text:
Dans ces conditions, lorsque les hommes ou les choses dont l’activité ou la présence sont
à l’origine d’un dommage internationalement illicite sont, prima facie, susceptibles de
rattachement à deux personnes juridiques distinctes, la responsabilité devra, en principe,
être imputée à celle d’entre elles qui, quant à l’acte dommageable consideré, exerçait à leur
égard le contrôle prépondérant ou exclusif.
217 Preliminary Report, Annuaire IDI 54-I (1971) 45, at 50.
218 See Annuaire IDI 54-II (1971), 183-192 and 209-216.
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source of instructions given to the UN force. Ago’s less abstract criterion based
on real control instead of agreements that may or may not be respected in
practice seems to adequately reflect state practice and the application of draft
article 6 of the draft articles on state responsibility to international organiza-
tions.
Although the resolution adopted by the IDI uses the words ‘haute direction’,
it is not clear whether the institut also adopted de Visscher’s interpretation
of the expression. Rolin for example stated that the words ‘haute direction’ were
intended to express that real control was decisive for the purpose of attributing
conduct.219
Only two members of the IDI stated that the conduct of a peace support
operation was attributable to troop contributing states even in case the UN
exercized control over the operation in question. Koretsky stated that the troops
remained those of the troop contributing states, so that the conception of the
rapporteur concerning the problem of responsibility of the UN had to be
revised. Wengler referred to the judgment of the House of Lords in Nissan
v. United Kingdom. In his view, it would be regrettable to exclude or limit the
responsibility of states towards victims. Such a limitation could lead officers
of national contingents to no longer check the legality of orders from the UN,
which would be nefarious.220
2.10.2 Ultra vires acts
Draft article 7 of the ILC draft articles on state responsibility is concerned with
responsibility of states for conduct of an organ of a state or of a person em-
powered to exercise elements of the governmental authority in excess of
authority or contravention of instructions, also referred to as ultra vires acts
of state organs or entities. The draft article essentially precludes a state from
invoking the internal distribution of competences between state organs. The
ILC commentary notes that the state cannot take refuge behind the notion that,
according to the provisions of its internal law or to instructions which may
have been given to its organs or agents, their conduct ought not to have
occurred or ought to have taken a different form. This is so even where the
organ or entity in question has overtly committed unlawful acts under the
cover of its official status. Though the state is responsible for conduct of organs
purportedly or apparently carrying out their official functions, it is not respons-
ible for private acts or omissions of individuals who happen to be organs or
agents of the state. In practice, it can be difficult to distinguish between official
conduct and private conduct. The same difficulty obtains in the field of state
219 “En utilisant le mot ‘haute’, on a voulu montrer que c’était la direction réelle qui importait”,
Annuaire IDI 54-II (1971), at 188.
220 Id., at 214.
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immunity, because a state can only have immunity for conduct that can be
attributed to it.221
It may be noted that the ILC commentary refers to Article 91 of Additional
Protocol I as confirming the principle in draft article 7. Article 91, however,
is much broader than draft article 7, because it not only makes the state re-
sponsible for acts of its armed forces acting with apparent authority but also
for acts of member its armed forces committed in a private capacity.222
Because draft article 7 is concerned with the internal distribution of com-
petences, the kind of conduct it governs could be referred to as ‘internal’ ultra
vires conduct. In international organizations, there is also the possibility of
conduct that could be referred to as ‘external’ ultra vires conduct. This is
conduct that is in excess of the competences of the international organization
itself. In contrast to the competences of states, those of international organiza-
tions are limited to the competences explicitly or implicitly conferred on the
organization by its member states. This is the kind of ultra vires conduct that
is directly relevant to the conduct of peace support operations. Though draft
article 7 of the ILC draft articles cannot be applied directly, the UN employs
a test that is based on the same distinction made in that draft article in the
case of peace support operations.
The UN Office of Legal Affairs in a 1986 memorandum explains that the
UN does not consider itself responsible for ‘off-duty acts’ of the members of
peace-keeping forces. The primary factor in determining that there is an ‘off-
duty’ situation is:
whether the member of a peace-keeping mission was acting in a non-official/non-
operational capacity when the incident occurred and not whether he/she was in
military or civilian attire at the time of the incident or whether the incident occurred
inside or outside the area of operations.223
Moreover, the Office states that a member of the operation on a state of alert
may none the less assume an off-duty status “if he/she acts in an individual
capacity, not attributable to the performance of official duties, during that
designated ‘state-of-alert’ period.”224 These passages make a similar dis-
tinction between acts committed in an individual capacity and acts committed
in an official capacity, the latter including not only acts committed under real
authority but also under apparent authority.225
This interpretation is supported by state practice. On the one hand, the
responsibility of the UN does not seem to have been invoked in the case of
221 See J. Salmon, Immunités et Actes de la Fonction, 38 Annuaire Français de Droit International
314 (1992).
222 See § 2.6.1.
223 UNJY 1986, at 300.
224 Id.
225 But see P. Klein, supra note 76, at 390.
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an off-duty member of UNIFIL who was accused of smuggling explosives into
Israel for use by the PLO.226 On the other hand, the UN does seem to have
accepted its responsibility in cases where civilians were killed by members
of UNEF and ONUC and where no official function or superior order required
the member to fire and where he was therefore prosecuted in his home country
for his conduct.227 The UN also accepted responsibility for conduct committed
under apparent authority of the organization by Belgian members of
UNOSOM.228
This practice demonstrates that the principle in Article 3 of the Hague
Convention IV of 1907 and Article 91 of the first Additional Protocol, that a
state is responsible for all the conduct of its armed forces on or off duty, is
not applied to peace support operations.
This approach would seem to be the most accurate, because the principle
is based on the structure of the armed forces, including the chain of command
and the disciplinary power of the commander. The structure of armed forces
provides better opportunities to prevent violations of international law than
the structure of other state organs.229 In peace support operations these op-
portunities are not reproduced because the UN commander is in command
but does not have disciplinary powers in the same sense as national com-
manders. The head of mission of a peace support operation has general re-
sponsibility for the good order and discipline of the operation, but responsibil-
ity for disciplinary action with respect to military personnel made available
by a troop contributing state rests with an officer designated by the govern-
ment of the state for that purpose.
2.10.3 Common Article 1 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and Additional
Protocol I: A due diligence obligation of the state in respect of conduct
of an organization
In case a troop contributing state does not effectively control members of a
peace support operation it is still the case that the state has transferred powers
over part of its armed forces to an international organization. The transfer itself
is attributable to the state and can possibly breach an obligation of the state
under international law. One such obligation could possibly be based on the
duty in common Article 1 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions to “ensure respect
for the present Convention in all circumstances.”
In 1961, in connection with ONUC, the International Committee of the Red
Cross addressed a memorandum to states parties to the 1949 Geneva Conven-
226 UNJY 1979, at 233.
227 R. Simmonds, supra note 199, at 233.
228 See § 4.5.4.
229 See for example L. Condorelli, supra note 113, at 148.
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tions concerning the application of the conventions by military contingents
placed at the disposal of the UN. The Red Cross implied in the memorandum
that common Article 1 requires troop contributing states to ensure that the
peace support operation respect humanitarian law:
the International Committee would like to remind governments that could provide
contingents for a United Nations emergency force that in common article 1 of the
four Geneva Conventions, the High Contracting Parties have undertaken not only
to respect, but also to ensure respect for the provisions of those conventions. The
Committee therefore expresses the hope that they will if necessary use their in-
fluence to ensure that the provisions of humanitarian law are applied by all con-
tingents as well as by the unified command.230
The reasoning in the memorandum is based on an interpretation by the Inter-
national Committee of the Red Cross of common Article 1 in which the duty
to ‘ensure respect’ obliges states parties to the Geneva Conventions to ensure
that other states, and international organizations, respect humanitarian law.
For the International Committee of the Red Cross ‘to ensure respect’ means
that states, whether engaged in conflict or not, must take steps to ensure that
the rules are respected by all. Arguably, a state’s transfer of powers over part
of its armed forces to an international organization without adequate guar-
antees that the organization will respect humanitarian law breaches such an
obligation.
Despite convincing arguments that such an interpretation of common
Article 1 was not the one originally envisaged by the drafters,231 recent state
practice supports the position that states currently interpret common Article
1 as imposing obligations with respect to violations of the Geneva Conventions
by other states. The International Court of Justice decided on the basis of the
obligation to ensure respect for humanitarian law that the United States was
under “an obligation not to encourage persons or groups engaged in the
conflict in Nicaragua to act in violation of the provisions of common Article 3
to the four 1949 Geneva Conventions.”232 Common Article 1 was the legal
basis for convening a conference of states parties to the fourth Geneva Conven-
230 Translation by the author. Original text: “le Comité international se permet de rappeler
aux Etats qui pourraient fournir des contingents à une Force d’urgence des Nations Unies
qu’aux termes de l’article Ier commun aux quatre Conventions de Genève, les Hautes Parties
contactantes se sont engagées non seulement à respecter, mais encore à ‘faire respecter’
les dispositions de ces Conventions. Il exprime donc l’espoir qu’ile voudront bien, chacun,
en cas de besoin, user de leur influence pour que les dispositions du droit humanitaire
soient appliquées par l’ensemble des contingents engagés, comme par le commandement
unifié.”, reproduced in 43 International Review of the Red Cross 592 (1961).
231 F. Kalshoven, The Undertaking to Respect and Ensure Respect in all Circumsatnces: From Tiny
Seed to Ripening Fruit, 2 Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law 3 (1999).
232 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States
of America), Judgment, 1986 ICJ Reports 14, para. 220.
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tion on measures to enforce the Convention in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory in 1999 and the resumption of the conference in December 2001.
General Assembly resolution ES-10/6 states that the General Assembly:
Reiterates its recommendation that the High Contracting Parties to the Fourth
Geneva Convention convene a conference on measures to enforce the Convention
in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including Jerusalem, and to ensure respect
thereof in accordance with common article 1, and further recommends that the
High Contracting Parties convene the said conference on 15 July 1999 at the United
Nations Office at Geneva.233
The Conference took place on 15 July 1999, but was adjourned taking into
consideration the prospect of a resumption of the peace process. On 5 Decem-
ber 2001 the Conference was reconvened and issued a Declaration reflecting
the common understanding of the participants. The Declaration states inter
alia that:
The participating High Contracting Parties welcome and encourage the initiatives
by States Parties, both individually and collectively, according to Art. 1 of the
Covention and aimed at ensuring the respect of the Convention, and they underline
the need for the Parties, to follow up on the implementation of the present Declara-
tion.234
There are also other indications that the obligation in common Article 1 is now
interpreted as referring to third states.235 For example, the General Assembly,
in its Resolution 57/125 of 24 February 2003, called upon all High Contracting
Parties to Geneva Convention (IV) “in accordance with article 1 common to
the four Geneva Conventions, to continue to exert all efforts to ensure respect
for its provisions by Israel” in the Occupied Territories.236 This interpretation
of common Article 1 was also reaffirmed by participants, including state
representatives, at regional seminars on ‘Improving Compliance with Inter-
national Humanitarian Law’ organized by the ICRC in 2003. The report of these
233 General Assembly Resolution ES-10/6 of 9 February 1999, UN Doc. A/RES/ES-10/6, para.
6. See also the statement by the permanent representative of Pakistan in the resumed tenth
emergency session of the General Assembly:
In Article 1 of the Convention, “The High Contracting Parties undertake to respect and
to ensure respect for the present Convention in all circumstances”. Therefore, it is our
collective responsibility to ensure compliance by Israel to the provisions of the Geneva
Convention of 1949.
<http://www.un.int/pakistan/12990205.htm>.
234 Declaration of the Conference of High Contracting Parties to the Fourth Geneva Convention,
5 December 2001, para. 17.
235 See also U. Palwankar, Measures Available to States for Fulfilling their Obligation to Ensure
Respect for International Humanitarian Law, 76 International Review of the Red Cross 9 (1994).
236 General Assembly Resolution 57/125 of 24 February 2003, UN Doc. A/RES/57/125, para.
3. Adopted with 155 in favor, 6 opposed and 3 abstentions.
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seminars states that by virtue of common Article 1, third states are bound by
a legal obligation to neither encourage a party to an armed conflict to violate
international humanitarian law nor take action that would assist in such
violations.237 In other words, this is a negative obligation, i.e. an obligation
to refrain from doing something. The report goes on to state that:
Seminar participants also acknowledged a positive obligation on States not involved
in an armed conflict to take action – unilaterally or collectively – against States
who are violating international humanitarian law, in particular to intervene with
States over which they might have some influence to stop the violations. All
participants affirmed that this entails at minimum a moral responsibility and that
States have the right to take such action, with the majority of participants agreeing
that this constitutes a legal obligation under common Article 1. This is not to be
construed as an obligation to reach a specific result, but rather an ‘obligation of
means’on States to take all appropriate measures possible, in an attempt to end
international humanitarian law violations.238
The Secretary-General’s proposal to the General Assembly to consider recogniz-
ing the concurrent responsibility of the state of nationality for violations of
international humanitarian law by members of its national contingent in a
peace support operation given “the exclusive criminal jurisdiction of the State
of nationality and its obligation to ensure respect for international humanitarian
law of its force” also seems to be based on such an interpretation of common
Article 1. It must be pointed out, however, that the IDI has not been willing
to affirm the existence of a positive obligation, rather than a right, under
common Article 1. In its resolution on ‘The Application of International
Humanitarian Law and Fundamental Human Rights, in Armed Conflicts in
which Non-State Entities are Parties’, the IDI merely states that:
Without prejudice to the functions and powers which the Charter attributes to
organs of the United Nations, in case of systematic and massive violations of
humanitarian law or fundamental human rights, States, acting individually or
collectively, are entitled to take diplomatic, economic and other measures towards
any party to the armed conflict which has violated its obligations, provided such
measures are permitted under international law.239
237 International Committee of the Red Cross, International Humanitarian Law and the
Challenges of Contemporary Armed Conflicts, Background document for the 28th Inter-
national Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent, 03/IC/09 (2003), at 48.
238 Id., at 49.
239 Institut de Droit International, The Application of International Humanitarian Law and
Fundamental Human Rights, in Armed Conflicts in which Non-State Entities are Parties,
Ann. IDI 65-II (1999), at 387, para. VII.
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On the other hand, the travaux préparatoires of the resolution reveal that several
members held that common Article 1 imposes a positive obligation.240
Arguably, the duty to ensure respect for the 1949 Geneva Conventions
obliges troop contributing states that are states parties to the conventions to
take steps to ensure that the peace support operation respect the provisions
of these conventions. This obligation would go beyond the mere avoidance
of aiding and assisting the operation in the violation of international human-
itarian law. It is not clear which efforts such a ‘due diligence’ obligation
requires a state to make to avoid responsibility. State practice241 and the Inter-
national Court of Justice’s judgment in the Nicaragua case, in which the Court
only required that the United States did not actively encourage others to act
in violation of common Article 3, suggest a limited reach of the duty to ensure
respect.
Such a limited reach implies that a state would not be responsible in every
case it places troops at the disposal of the UN because that in itself does not
lead the organization to act in violation of the Geneva Conventions. Another
case would be placing untrained or undisciplined troops at the disposal of
the organization. Arguably the troop contributing state in question is respons-
ible for violations of the Geneva Conventions by such troops.
State practice does not provide an example of responsibility of a troop
contributing state for placing troops at the disposal of the UN, but it appears
the possibility is in total conformity with the principles of state responsibility
and the current interpretation of common Article 1 of the Geneva Conventions.
The Advisory Committee on Issues of Public International Law (CAVV) to the
government of the Netherlands, in a report of February 2002 states that de lege
ferenda troop contributing states should be held responsible for violations of
international humanitarian law in case they have transferred competences
without guarantees that the Geneva Conventions will be respected.242
240 See e.g. Carillo Salcedo, Ann. IDI 68-I (1999), at 281
241 See for example the statement by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Norway who stated
in connection with common article 1:
The question has therefore been asked whether those who supply small arms to the violators
of the provisions of international humanitarian law should share some responsibility with
these violators. It has been argued that since availability of small arms may increase the
risk of unlawful acts, supplier-states should take measures to reduce this and thereby
strenghten respect for international humanitarian law. Although it may be difficult to argue
that states have a legal obligation to do this, those who argue that they have a moral
responsibility may, in my view, have a good case.
Minister of Foreign Affairs Knut Vollebaek, The Fridtjof Nansen Memorial Lecture, the
Hague, 12 October 1998, <http//odin.dep.no/odinarkiv/norsk/dep/ud/1998/taler/032005-
090222/index-dok000-b-n-a-html> .
242 Commissie van Advies inzake Volkenrechtelijke Vraagstukken, Aansprakelijkheid voor
Onrechtmatige Daden tijdens VN Vredesoperaties, Advies No. 13, 14 February 2002, at
22, para 4.3.
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Case law of the European Commission of Human Rights and the European
Court of Human Rights demonstrates that already de lege lata the transfer of
powers by a state to an international organization does not necessarily exclude
that state’s responsibility.
The applicants in case 235/56 had unsuccessfully instituted proceedings
in Germany to recover possessions lost during World War II before the German
courts and on appeal before the Supreme Restitution Court. The Supreme
Restitution Court was composed of two judges nominated by Germany, two
judges nominated by the Allies and one judge nominated by both and was
established on the basis of the 1952 Convention on the Settlement of Matters
arising out of the War and Occupation between the Allies and Germany. Before
the Commission the applicants claimed inter alia that Germany had violated
the European Convention because if the state failed to reserve for itself in the
Paris Agreements sufficient powers to control the procedure of the Supreme
Restitution Court, that failure amounted to a lack of due diligence in the
performance of its obligations under the European Convention. The Commis-
sion stated that:
Whereas it is clear that, if a State contracts treaty obligations and subsequently
concludes another international agreement which disables it from performing its
obligations under the first treaty, it will be answerable for any resultant breach
of its obligations under the earlier treaty.243
In the case in question, however, the Commission held that Germany had not
freely concluded the Settlement convention because at that time “it did not
possess the authority of a sovereign state in matters of restitution which were
then subject to the legislation and control of the Occupying Powers.” The
Commission declared the complaint inadmissible.
In Tête v. France the Commission declared the principle developed in the
235/56 case applicable to international agreements in which states transfer
powers to an international organization. The complaint concerned the applica-
tion of Article 3 of the first Protocol to the European Convention (right to free
elections) to the voting procedure for the European Parliament in France. The
Commission declared the complaint inadmissible because the French electoral
law in question was in any case in conformity with Article 3, but it also stated:
that ‘if a State contracts treaty obligations and subsequently concludes another
international agreement which disables it from performing its obligations under
the first treaty, it will be answerable for any resultant breach of its obligations under
the earlier treaty’(No. 235/56, Dec. 10.6.58, Yearbook 2, p. 256 and 300). This is
particularly so when, as in the present case, the obligations in question have been
243 X&X v. Federal Republic of Germany, Decision of 10 June 1958, 2 Yearbook ECHR (1958-59),
at 300.
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assumed in a treaty, the Convention, whose guarantees affect the ‘public order
of Europe’(No. 788/60, Austria v. Italy, Dec. 11.1.61, Yearbook 4, p. 116 and 140).
It cannot therefore be accepted that by means of transfers of competence the High
Contracting Parties may at the same time exclude matters normally covered by
the Convention from the guarantees enshrined therein. What is at stake is respect
for fundamental rights, such as those set forth in Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 which,
in the Convention system, is of vital importance.244
In M. & Co. v. Federal Republic of Germany, the applicant complained that the
German authorities issued a writ for the execution of a judgment of the Euro-
pean Court of Justice according to which it had to pay a heavy fine for having
violated Article 85 of the EC Treaty. The applicant submitted that in its case
the Court of Justice violated Article 6 of the European Convention. According
to the applicant the German authorities, before issuing a writ of execution,
should examine whether or not the judgment of the European Court of Justice
had been given in proceedings respecting the guarantees set out in Article
6 of the Convention. As this was not the case the granting of the writ of
execution, so the applicant company argued, gave effect to the violations
complained of and therefore violated the provisions invoked. The respondent
state argued inter alia that its responsibility could not be derived from the fact
that it transferred part of its powers to the European Communities. Otherwise
all Community acts would indirectly be subject to control by the Convention
organs. It also pointed out that in any event, observance of fundamental rights
is secured by the European Court of Justice. The Commission phrased the
question before it as concerning more the transfer of powers by Germany to
the European Communities rather than the granting of the writ for execution:
Whether by giving effect to a judgment reached in proceedings that allegedly
violated Article 6 (Art. 6) the Federal Republic of Germany incurred responsibility
under the Convention on account of the fact that these proceedings against a
German company were possible only because the Federal Republic has transferred
its powers in this sphere to the European Communities.245
The Commission next reaffirmed the principle developed in 235/56 and Tête
v. France:
It has next to be observed that the Convention does not prohibit a Member State
from transferring powers to international organisations. Nonetheless, The Commis-
sion recalls that “if a State contracts treaty obligations and subsequently concludes
another international agreement which disables it from performing its obligations
under the first treaty it will be answerable for any resulting breach of its obligations
244 Tête v. France, Decision of 9 December 1987, D.R. 54, at 67.
245 M. & Co. v. Federal Republic of Germany, Decision of 9 February 1990, D.R. 64, 33 Yearbook
ECHR , at 46.
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under the earlier treaty” (cf. N° 235/56, Dec. 10.6.58, Yearbook 2 p. 256 (300)). The
Commission considers that a transfer of powers does not necessarily exclude a
State’s responsibility under the Convention with regard to the exercise of the
transferred powers. Otherwise the guarantees of the Convention could wantonly
be limited or excluded and thus be deprived of their peremptory character. The
object and purpose of the Convention as an instrument for the protection of indiv-
idual human beings requires that its provisions be interpreted and applied so as
to make its safeguards practical and effective (cf. Eur. Court H.R., Soering judgment
of 7 July 1989, Series A no. 161, para. 87).246
The Commission added a new element to the principle in the next paragraph
of the decision:
Therefore the transfer of powers to an international organisation is not incompatible
with the Convention provided that within that organisation fundamental rights
will receive an equivalent protection.247
The application of the ‘equivalent protection’ test by the Commission to the
facts of the case in question demonstrates that the test is an abstract one. The
Commission concluded on the basis of a joint declaration of the Parliament,
the Council and the Commission of the European Communities that they attach
prime importance to the protection of fundamental rights, and on the basis
of case law of Court of Justice of the European Communities according to
which it is called upon to control Community acts on the basis of fundamental
rights, that “the legal system of the European Communities not only secures
fundamental rights but also provides for control of their observance.” Such
an application has received much criticism because it makes it unnecessary
to examine whether there has been equivalent protection in individual cases.
Matthews v. United Kingdom248 like Tête concerned elections for the Euro-
pean Parliament. The applicant complained that she was not entitled to vote
in the 1994 elections to the European Parliament. She invoked Article 3 of
Protocol No. 1 to the Convention. Under European Community law, elections
to European Parliament were governed by the EC Act on Direct Elections of
1976 annexed to Council Decision 76/787/ECSC, EEC, Euratom. The Council
Decision itself was signed by the President of the Council and by the ministers
representing the member states as members of the Council. Annex II, which
is stated in the Act to be an integral part thereof, declares “The United King-
dom will apply the provisions of the Act only in respect of the United King-
dom” thereby excluding Gibraltar.
The applicant argued inter alia that the EC Act on Direct Elections with
Annex II was a treaty like any other treaty and that by freely choosing to
246 Id., at 52.
247 Id.
248 Matthews v. United Kingdom, Decision of 29 October 1997.
Chapter 2 125
conclude the treaty which disabled it from performing its obligations under
the Convention, the United Kingdom was answerable for any resulting breach
of its obligations under the Convention. She referred to the 235/56 and Tête
v. France decisions to this effect. As to Annex II to the Act, the applicant
underlined that the Annex was included in the Act as a result of the unilateral
wish of the United Kingdom, that the United Kingdom was under no obliga-
tion to add Annex II, that the real aim of Annex II was to exclude the Channel
Isles and the Isle of Man from the scope of EC elections (because the Channel
Isles do not form part of the EU, unlike Gibraltar) and moreover, that nothing
required the United Kingdom to interpret, or continue to interpret, Annex II
in such a way as to exclude Gibraltar from the application of the Act on Direct
Elections. The applicant recalled that Gibraltar is the United Kingdom’s re-
sponsibility in the European Community, and in signing the treaty of direct
elections, the United Kingdom had the power, and the obligation, to provide
for the enfranchisement of citizens of the Union who live in Gibraltar.
A majority of the Commission did not consider these submissions but
focused instead on the content of Article which led to the conclusion that the
European Parliament was not part of the legislature of Gibraltar, so that Article
3 was inapplicable in this case.
In a dissenting opinion five members of the Commission seemed prepared
to address the question of the United Kingdom’s responsibility on the basis
of its entering into treaty obligations, but found it unnecessary in the end
because responsibility of United Kingdom could also be based on other conduct
of the state. Schermers in his dissenting opinion did apply the equivalent
protection test developed in M. & Co. to the European Communities, stating
that the test was not met in the present case. Schermers added that:
At the present stage of European and international development, where increasingly
governmental powers are transferred to European or international organs, I consider
it essential to underline that the Contracting States remain responsible for infringe-
ments of human rights if they do not provide for adequate protection of these rights
by the institutions to which powers are transferred.
In January 1998, the Commission referred the case to the European Court of
Human Rights. After the entry into force of Protocol No. 11 the case was
referred to the Grand Chamber of the Court, which issued its judgment on
18 February 1999.249 In contrast to the Commission, the Court discussed in
detail the question of state responsibility by deciding that it must consider
whether, notwithstanding the nature of the elections to the European Parlia-
ment as an organ of the EC, the United Kingdom can be held responsible under
Article 1 of the Convention for the absence of elections to the European Parlia-
ment in Gibraltar, that is, whether the United Kingdom is required to ‘secure’
249 Matthews v. United Kingdom, Judgment of 18 February 1999 (Application No. 24833/94).
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elections to the European Parliament notwithstanding the Community character
of those elections. The Court stated that:
The Convention does not exclude the transfer of competences to international
organisations provided that Convention rights continue to be “secured”. Member
States’ responsibility therefore continues even after such a transfer.
33. In the present case, the alleged violation of the Convention flows from an annex
to the 1976 Act, entered into by the United Kingdom, together with the extension
to the European Parliament’s competences brought about by the Maastricht Treaty.
The Council Decision and the 1976 Act (see paragraph 18 above), and the Maastricht
Treaty, with its changes to the EEC Treaty, all constituted international instruments
which were freely entered into by the United Kingdom. Indeed, the 1976 Act cannot
be challenged before the European Court of Justice for the very reason that it is
not a ‘normal’ act of the Community, but is a treaty within the Community legal
order. The Maastricht Treaty, too, is not an act of the Community, but a treaty by
which a revision of the EEC Treaty was brought about. The United Kingdom,
together with all the other parties to the Maastricht Treaty, is responsible ratione
materiae under Article 1 of the Convention and, in particular, under Article 3 of
Protocol No. 1, for the consequences of that Treaty.
34. In determining to what extent the United Kingdom is responsible for ‘securing’
the rights in Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 in respect of elections to the European
Parliament in Gibraltar, the Court recalls that the Convention is intended to guar-
antee rights that are not theoretical or illusory, but practical and effective (see, for
example, the above-mentioned United Communist Party of Turkey and Others
judgment, pp. 18-19, § 33). It is uncontested that legislation emanating from the
legislative process of the European Community affects the population of Gibraltar
in the same way as legislation which enters the domestic legal order exclusively
via the House of Assembly. To this extent, there is no difference between European
and domestic legislation, and no reason why the United Kingdom should not be
required to “secure” the rights in Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 in respect of European
legislation, in the same way as those rights are required to be ‘secured’ in respect
of purely domestic legislation. In particular, the suggestion that the United Kingdom
may not have effective control over the state of affairs complained of cannot affect
the position, as the United Kingdom’s responsibility derives from its having entered
into treaty commitments subsequent to the applicability of Article 3 of Protocol
No. 1 to Gibraltar, namely the Maastricht Treaty taken together with its obligations
under the Council Decision and the 1976 Act. Further, the Court notes that on
acceding to the EC Treaty, the United Kingdom chose, by virtue of Article 227(4)
of the Treaty, to have substantial areas of EC legislation applied to Gibraltar (see
paragraphs 11 to 14 above).
35. It follows that the United Kingdom is responsible under Article 1 of the Conven-
tion for securing the rights guaranteed by Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 in Gibraltar
regardless of whether the elections were purely domestic or European.
Matthews concerned the transfer of powers to the European Communities, but
the principle that member states’ responsibility continues even after the transfer
of competences to an international organization can also be applied to the
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transfer of powers to other international organizations.250 Paragraph 32 of
the judgment refers to the transfer of competences to international organiza-
tions, not to the European Communities. An example of the application of
the principle to another international organization is Waite & Kennedy v.
Germany,251 in which the Court applied the principle to the transfer of im-
munities to the European Space Agency by Germany. In Bankovic´ the applicants
invoked the principle in connection with the transfer of competences to NATO.
In M. & Co. the writ of execution given by the German authorities in
accordance with Community law was attributable to the state, even though
it was in application of Community law. Matthews v. United Kingdom demon-
strates that a state party to the European Convention can be responsible not
only for an act but also for failure to ensure that the powers it has transferred
to an international organization are exercised in conformity with its own
international obligations.
As noted above, the applicants in the Bankovic´ based a part of their argu-
mentation on the case law examined above.252 The ECHR did not reach the
stage where it could consider this argumentation because it decided that the
application was inadmissible.
Finally, the DSR Senator Lines case that is pending before the ECHR should
be mentioned. The case concerns a German corporation on which the European
Commission by way of Decision imposed a fine. The applicant challenged the
fine before the Court of First Instance (CFI) of the European Communities. The
Commission communicated that it would not take any steps to recover the
fine pending the proceedings before the CFI if the applicant provided a bank
guarantee. The applicant was unable to provide such a guarantee, and re-
quested a suspension of the obligation to provide the guarantee from the CFI
as interim relief. The CFI rejected this request, as did the European Court of
Justice (ECJ) on appeal. The applicant then initiated proceedings before the
ECHR against the fifteen member states of the European Communities. It alleged
that the respondents infringed both individually and collectively the right to
a fair trial in so far as the European Communities failed – in the circumstances
of the case – to give suspensory effect to the applicant’s appeal before the CFI.
Relying on the above-mentioned case law, the applicants allege that member
states of the European Union remain (collectively) responsible for acts of the
Community institutions. The member states signed the treaties establishing
the European Communities and thereby agreed to the creation of such institu-
tions to which powers were transferred. This application could lead the ECHR
to develop its case law concerning the responsibility of member states for
conduct in the context of an international organization. It seems unlikely that
250 See also G. Cohen-Jonathan & JF Flauss, A Propos de l’Arrêt Matthews c/ Royaume-Uni (18
février 1999), 35 Revue Trimestrielle de Droit Européen 637 (1999), at 643.
251 Waite & Kennedy v. Germany, supra note 34.
252 See § 2.8.4.
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this will happen, however, because on 30 September 2003 the CFI delivered
its judgment in this case setting aside the fine. The hearing scheduled before
the ECHR was subsequently cancelled.253
In summary, case law of the ECHR demonstrates that states can be held
responsible for the consequences of the transfer of powers to international
organizations. The ECRM does not contain a provision obliging states to ensure
respect for the rights guaranteed by the Convention. A fortiori, because common
Article 1 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol I does
contain such a provision, the High Contracting Parties should be responsible
for the transfer of powers to an international organization.
2.11 STATE PRACTICE IN CONNECTION WITH NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGAN-
IZATION PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS: OBSERVATIONS
State practice so far in connection with NATO peace support operations is rare.
Simply put, the international responsibility of the organization or states does
not seem to have been invoked in connection with conduct by peace support
operations.
Claims settlement procedures in connection with NATO peace support
operations were established by international agreement and do not necessarily
reflect principles of state responsibility. In the case of the UN, the Secretary-
General has expressly stated that claims settlement procedures were established
in recognition of international responsibility of the organization for the activ-
ities of its forces. Troop contributing states to NATO peace support operations
have not made such statements in connection with claims settlement proced-
ures. Claims settlement procedures for SFOR expressly exclude combat-related
damage. Troop contributing states that are parties to the Geneva Conventions
could not rely on these agreements to absolve themselves from liability in-
curred in respect of grave breaches of the conventions.
Proceedings instituted by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia before the
International Court of Justice and by Bankovic´ and others before the European
Court of Human Rights do not concern a peace support operation. Arguments
by the applicants in these cases concerning attribution of conduct are neverthe-
less instructive because control over forces in Operation Allied Force was
governed by an arrangement quite similar to that in peace support operations,
except for United States and Russian forces.
In its initial oral arguments in proceedings before the International Court
of Justice the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia seems to have denied a separate
international legal personality of NATO, so that military forces remained organs
of a state. Despite the integrated military force of the organization the applicant
253 Registrar of the ECHR, Press release 508a of 16 October 2003.
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maintained that member states in the organization act individually and in
concert. On the other hand the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia seems to have
accepted an international legal personality of the organization at least starting
15 October 1998 when it signed the Kosovo Verification Mission Agreement
with the organization. Possibly the argument must be read as meaning that
in principle draft article 6 of the ILC draft articles on state responsibility could
apply, but that it does not in this particular case because the troop contributing
states have retained direction and control over the troops. Insofar as the
application in principle of draft article 6 is concerned, this argument is correct.
If NATO is an international legal person, this draft article can apply as much
to NATO operations as it does to UN operations. Application of the principle
also acknowledges better than any other principle from the law of state re-
sponsibility that conduct by a peace support operation is prima facie susceptible
of attachment to two distinct legal persons.
At a later moment in the proceedings the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
argued that actions of the command structure are attributable jointly and
severally to the member states, an argument that seems similar to the argument
by the applicants in the International Tin Council direct action cases that
member states remain liable for the conduct of an international organization
even if it has separate legal personality. At least one of the respondent states
also understood the argument in this sense. If the Court comes to consider
this argument at the merits stage, which is unlikely, it may take into account
the arguments de lege ferenda examined above.254
Interestingly, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has not claimed that
responsibility of member states flows from the transfer of competences to the
organization, even though it claims inter alia violations of the 1949 Geneva
Conventions by the respondents. It could have argued that member states had
violated their obligation in common Article 1 to ensure respect for the conven-
tions. This obligation is as much applicable to troop contributing states in NATO
operations as it is to troop contributing states in UN operations.255
2.12 CONCLUSION
Some writers make bold statements concerning responsibility of international
organizations and their member states under international law. Some even
describe a more or less detailed system that they state governs such responsib-
ility. This study is primarily concerned with only part of the larger question
254 See § 2.5.5.
255 But see A. Pellet, supra note 66, at 200.
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of responsibility, responsibility for violations of international humanitarian
law by peace support operations.
This part of the larger question is sometimes presented as providing a clear
picture, at least concerning UN peace support operations.256 As this chapter
demonstrated, state practice in connection with UN peace support operations
is relatively lacking, inter alia because the domestic case law that some writers
treat as evidence of state practice does not meet the standard necessary to be
seen as valid evidence. Consequently, caution is required when drawing
conclusions with regard to responsibility for peace support operations, and
a fortiori with regard to responsibility of international organizations and their
member states in general, as demonstrated by the divergent conclusions by
writers based on the same state practice.
At the same time, the need is felt to develop principles of responsibility
of international organizations in general, and of responsibility for peace sup-
port operations in particular, as recognized by the ILC placing the topic of
responsibility of international organizations on its program of work. Such a
feeling is connected to an increase in operational activities of international
organizations. Peace support operations are no longer deployed only by the
UN. NATO is also deploying peace support operations, as well as the EU.
It became clear in § 2.2 that international responsibility is premised on the
capacity to possess rights and obligations under international law, in other
words on international legal personality. Since the Reparations for Injuries case
there is no doubt that the UN has international legal personality. § 2.3 demon-
strated that NATO does as well.
State practice in connection with UN peace support operations demonstrates
that the conduct of national contingents in these operations is attributed to
the UN because the contingents have been placed at the disposal of the organ-
ization. The principle in draft article 6 of the draft articles on state responsibil-
ity is applied mutatis mutandis. Indeed, the ILC developed draft article 6 as
corresponding to state practice in connection with UN peace support operations.
Transfer of command and control by a troop contributing state to the UN
establishes a presumption that the contingent in question is placed at the
disposal of and that its conduct is attributable to the organization. Paradoxical-
ly, the lower the level of command and control (full command being the
highest) transferred, the stronger the presumption, because the lower the level
of command and control the more detailed direction and control actually is,
explaining why conduct of contingents is not a priori attributed to troop
contributing states though they the highest level of command, full command.
The presumption that a contingent is placed at the disposal of the organization
is rebutted if it is established that the troops in question were acting in fact
on behalf of a troop contributing state. It is not necessary that the sending state
256 5 EPIL ( 1983) 162-163.
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gave express instructions in this regard, because it is sufficient that troops in
question acted under the direction and control of the state. It is difficult to
semantically further explicate direction and control, as demonstrated by the
discussions in the IDI, and it may be necessary to take diverse elements into
account.
State practice in connection with UN peace support operations also demon-
strates that the principle in draft article 7 of the ILC draft articles on state
responsibility is applied. Off-duty conduct of members of peace support
operations, that is, conduct in an individual capacity and not attributable to
the performance of official duties, is not attributed to the UN. The organization
can be responsible for conduct of troops even if the conduct was in excess
of authority or contravention of instructions. In that case attribution is justified
by the apparent authority of the troops, in other words by the link between
the individual or individuals in question and the organization that has con-
ferred authority or power that they have abused.
The application of these principles to the UN demonstrates that in state
practice the ILC draft articles on state responsibility are applied mutatis mutandis
to the organization. Such an application is accepted by writers. More im-
portantly, it is in conformity with the common basis for responsibility of states
and international organizations: the capacity to possess rights and obligations
under international law. In the specific case of peace support operations
application of draft article 6 is appropriate because it reflects the plurality of
legal persons involved. In contrast to officials of the UN Secretariat, for ex-
ample, contingents in peace support operations continue to have a functional
connection with their state of nationality.
Lex specialis in Article 3 of Hague Convention IV and Article 91 of Ad-
ditional Protocol I is not applied to peace support operations, which demon-
strates that the law of state responsibility is applied mutatis mutandis to inter-
national organizations. The premises on which Articles 3 and 91 rest is not
present in the case of peace support operations.
Responsibility of the international organization does not preclude the
possibility of piercing the veil of the organization in certain circumstances so
that member states are responsible for conduct of the organization. State
practice in connection with peace support operations does not contribute to
establishing a clear rule of customary international law or general principle
of law on this question, which cannot be deduced from practice outside the
specific context of peace support operations either. In connection with UN
operations a concurrent responsibility of member states has never been claimed,
while the presence of claims settlement procedures may have prevented claims
of secondary responsibility being raised. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
has invoked responsibility of NATO member states in its application to the
International Court of Justice, and a judgment of the Court on the merits in
these cases is at least as potentially groundbreaking on the question of member
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states responsibility as on the question of the legality of humanitarian inter-
vention that pre-occupies most of the commentators to the case.
In the absence of a clear rule of lex lata on member state responsibility,
it is important to consider the lex ferenda on the topic. Arguments de lege ferenda
will probably be important for the ILC when it progressively develops the law
of responsibility of international organizations. Writers and courts have formu-
lated such arguments primarily in connection with international corporations
instead of international organizations that exercise public functions. The
argument that those who engage in transactions of an economic nature are
deemed liable for the obligations which flow therefrom, for example, does
not apply to peace support operations unless such operations are seen as
undertaken for economic profit.
On the other hand, the argument that member states will interfere unduly
in the affairs of the organization if they are potentially responsible, applies
to peace support operations. On one level member state responsibility could
collapse the system of peace support operations, because member states could
refuse to provide contingents. On another level, member state responsibility
could lead national authorities to interfere in command and control in the field.
Experience has demonstrated that when command in the field is divided, and
military units receive guidance from national as well as UN headquarters, the
difficulties inherent in an international operation are maximized and the risk
of casualties arises. One example is the UNOSOM II. The Lessons Learned Unit
in the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations concludes in its report
concerning this operation that:
Unity of command and purpose is a critical element if coalition operations such
as UNOSOM are to succeed. With regard to the military component, there were at
least two types of difficulties related to unity of command. First off, not all the
national contingents operating in the area were placed under UNOSOM command,
and this led to tragic consequences. Secondly, some contingents that were ostensibly
part of UNOSOM were in fact following orders from their respective capitals; this
made them unreliable in the mission area and reduced the mission’s effective-
ness.257
A policy argument used to support member state responsibility is the value
of the protection of innocent third parties, and this argument also seems
applicable to UN and NATO peace support operations. The third parties in
question are states and not individuals. International law does not yet give
individuals the right to invoke responsibility for a breach of international
humanitarian law.
257 Experience with the United Nations operation in Somalia does not support the argument
that more control by officers of national contingents leads to more compliance with the
law (see Wengler in § 2.9.1), because the most serious reports of unlawful conduct relate
to this operation.
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Whether or not member states are responsible for the conduct of an inter-
national organization, they remain responsible for their own conduct in con-
nection with an international organization.
If a national contingent has nominally been placed at the disposal of an
international organization but acts in fact on behalf of the troop contributing
state, its conduct is attributable to the state. In that case the contingent remains
an organ of the troop contributing state and its conduct is attributable to the
state. In this case Article 3 of Hague Convention (IV) and Article 91 of Addi-
tional Protocol I apply for those states that are parties to the treaties in ques-
tion. The conduct is attributed to states that are not parties to these treaties
on the basis of draft article 4 of the draft articles on state responsibility.
State responsibility can also derive from the transfer of command and
control over a national contingent to the UN or NATO. Such a transfer could
be a violation of the duty to ensure respect for the provisions of the 1949
Geneva Conventions in common Article 1 of the conventions. The limited reach
of the duty to ensure respect suggests that a state is not automatically re-
sponsible if a contingent that has been placed at the disposal of an organization
breaches a provision of the conventions, but only if the state has not taken
certain steps such as adequately training the contingent in question.
In the Bankovic´ case, applicants based their claim of state responsibility
inter alia on the voting by states in the North Atlantic Council. Such a claim
of responsibility is based on the attribution of conduct of the state’s represent-
atives in a decisionmaking organ of an organization and not on the attribution
of conduct of the organization itself to the state.258 It is an application of draft
article 16 of the ILC draft articles, which states that a state which aids or assists
another state in the commission of an internationally wrongful act by the latter,
is internationally responsible.259 In this case the state is responsible on the
basis of the assistance given by its vote permitting an international organization
to commit an internationally wrongful act.260 In contrast to the theory dis-
cussed in § 2.9.3, conduct by a state’s representatives within an international
organization instead of conduct by state officials outside the organization is
attributed to the state. Other differences are that based on application of draft
article 16 the conduct of the organization that receives the aid or assistance
258 See also T. Stein, Kosovo and the International Community. The Attribution of Possible Inter-
nationalWrongful Acts: Responsibility of NATO or of itsMember States?, in C. Tomuschat (Ed.),
Kosovo and the International Community 181 (2002), at 191.
259 Article 16
Aid or assistance in the commission of an internationally wrongful act
A state which aids or assists another State in the commission of an internationally wrongful
act by the latter is internationally responsible for doing so if:
That State does so with the knowledge of the circumsatnces of the internationally wrongful
act; and
The act would be internationally wrongful if committed by that State.
260 See P. Klein, supra note 76, at 469.
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must be an internationally wrongful act itself, in other words the obligation
breached must be in force for the state and for the organization, that the state
votes with knowledge of the circumstances of the internationally wrongful
act and that the aid or assistance is given with a view to facilitating the com-
mission of the wrongful act, and must actually do so. Such a basis for respons-
ibility was invoked by Miloševic´ in interlocutory injunction proceedings against
the Netherlands before the president of the District Court of the Hague.261
Miloševic´ claimed inter alia that the Netherlands acted unlawfully towards
him by cooperating in the Security Council’s decision to establish the ICTY.
Because, according to Miloševic´, the Tribunal cannot be regarded as an in-
dependent and impartial tribunal, the Netherlands may therefore be regarded,
in a sense, as a co-perpetrator of human rights violations. The President of
the District Court held that he did not have jurisdiction, since the subject
matter of the complaint fell within the exclusive competence of the ICTY which
was entitled to immunity from jurisdiction in the Netherlands.
It is clear that the attribution of conduct in connection with a UN or NATO
peace support operation is not an a priori exercise, but depends very much
on the specific circumstances of the case. Depending on the circumstances,
possible breaches of international humanitarian law by a peace support opera-
tion can be a basis of responsibility for troop contributing states, the inter-
national organization in question and/or member states.
261 Judgment in the interlocutory injunction proceedings Slobodan Miloševic´ v. the Netherlands,
reproduced in 48 Netherlands International Law Review 357 (2001). In fact Miloševic´’s claim
went even further by claiming that the Netherlands was responsible for cooperating in
decisionmaking rather than voting. The Netherlands could not have voted for the establish-
ment of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia because it was not
a member of the Security Council in 1993.
3 Scope of application of international
humanitarian law to peace support operations
3.1 Introduction
One element of international responsibility is that the conduct in question
constitutes a breach of an international obligation of the entity to which the
conduct is attributed. In other words, a state or an international organization
can only be internationally responsible for a breach of international human-
itarian law norms that bind it.
The obligations of states under international humanitarian law are relatively
easy to determine. On the basis of the principle pacta sunt servanda, states are
bound by the treaties to which they have consented to be bound.
States are also bound by customary international humanitarian law, unless
they have persistently objected to be bound.1 There is no question that at least
certain parts of international humanitarian law constitute customary inter-
national law, though there is some controversy concerning which rules precise-
ly.
The international obligations of international organizations are more
difficult to determine than those of states, in particular because these organiza-
tions are generally not parties to multilateral rulemaking treaties. Another
problem is that, while there is general agreement that in principle international
organizations with an international legal personality are bound by customary
international law, the precise consequences of this general assertion are contro-
versial. In the case of the UN, finally, there is the question whether the Security
Council is also bound by customary international law. The question in respect
of the Security Council is whether its special position in the UN collective
security system, and the fact that its decisions are binding on member states,
are compatible with the Council being bound by customary international law.
This chapter focuses in particular on the international humanitarian law
obligations of the UN and NATO. The main reason is that, as stated, the obliga-
tions of states are relatively clear, though there is some controversy concerning
the rules that are international customary law. The expected publication of
a study by the International Committee of the Red Cross on the customary
status of the provisions of Additional Protocol I will certainly contribute to
1 J. Charney, The Persistent Objector Rule and the Development of International Law, 56 British
Yearbook of. International Law 1 (1985).
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more certainty in this regard. The obligation on states parties under common
Article 1 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions to respect and ensure respect for
the Conventions, that is of particular significance in the case of peace support
operations, was discussed above.
3.2 INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW NORMS2
International humanitarian law is the branch of international law that is also
referred to as the law of armed conflict (LOAC), ius in bello or the law of war.
The latter expression is not widely used anymore, mainly because recent
treaties refer to ‘armed conflict’ instead of ‘war’ and because the term sits
uncomfortably with the international prohibition of the use of force. Inter-
national humanitarian law is defined by the International Committee of the
Red Cross as “a set of rules which seek, for humanitarian reasons, to limit
the effects of armed conflict.”3
Ius in bello must be distinguished from the ius ad bellum. The latter
regulates the legitimate use of force, i.e. when force may be used. The former
lays down rules that apply during the use of force, irrespective of the reasons
for the conflict and whether or not the cause upheld by either party is just.
International humanitarian law is only applicable during an armed conflict.
This is the principal difference between international humanitarian law and
human rights law. The latter also strives to protect human beings, but is
applicable in peacetime only, or at all times in the case of a number of ‘non-
derogable’ rights.
The origin of customary rules of international humanitarian law reaches
far back in time. Already in ancient times limits were placed on what was
legitimate in war and these limits evolved into customary rules.4 Customary
rules still play a role in present international humanitarian law.
The codification of international humanitarian law began in the nineteenth
century. The first treaty in this field was the 1864 Geneva Convention for the
Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded in Armies in the Field, followed
by the 1868 St. Petersburg Declaration. In 1899 and in 1907 major codification
efforts were undertaken at peace conferences in the Hague, leading inter alia
to the adoption of the 1907 Convention (IV) on the Laws and Customs of War
on Land and the Regulations annexed thereto. The above-mentioned treaties
are considered the core of the so-called ‘law of the Hague’. This is the part
2 See generally F. Kalshoven & L. Zegveld, Constraints on the Waging of War: An Intro-
duction to International Humanitarian Law (2001); J. Pictet, Le Droit Humanitaire et la
Protection des Victimes de la Guerre (1973)
3 ICRC Advisory Service on International Humanitarian Law, What is International Human-
itarian Law? 1 (2002).
4 See G. Best, Humanity in Warfare: The Modern History of the International Law of Armed
Conflicts (1980).
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of international humanitarian law that relates to the conduct of war and
permissible means and methods of war. Another part of the the law is con-
cerned with the protection of those who are not, or no longer, taking part in
fighting, including civilians. This part of the law is referred to as the ‘law of
Geneva’. The principal elements of this part are the four Geneva Conventions
of 1949. Each of these four Conventions deals with the protection of a different
vulnerable group: the wounded and sick in armed forces on land; the
wounded, sick and shipwrecked members of armed forces at sea; prisoners
of war; and civilians. The Geneva Conventions have been almost universally
ratified. In 1977 two Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions were
adopted. The Protocols are a confluence of the Hague and Geneva law. They
contain rules on methods and means of war as well as rules on the protection
of civilians and other groups. The Protocols have not been as widely ratified
as the 1949 Geneva Conventions, because they contain a number of contro-
versial elements. Of particular importance is that the United States is not a
party to Additional Protocols I and II.5
Originally, international humanitarian law only applied to international
conflicts, i.e. conflicts between two or more states. The law was only applicable
between a state’s armed forces and an armed opposition group if the latter’s
members were recognized as ‘belligerents’ by the state. The relationship
between a state and its population, including armed opposition groups, was
considered an internal affair and interference by other states was deemed to
be a breach of that state’s sovereignty. The adoption of Article 3 common to
the 1949 Geneva Conventions was a departure from this situation. This article
is applicable “in case of armed conflict not of an international character
occuring in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties.” Although
the article only contains a very limited number of rules that apply in non-
international armed conflicts, the fact that it was the first regulation of these
conflicts gave it major significance. Additional Protocol II of 1977 developed
common Article 3, though its scope of application is formulated more restric-
tively.6 The protection afforded by the Protocol is still much more limited
5 See G. Aldrich, Prospects for United States Ratification of Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva
Conventions, 85 American Journal of International Law 1 (1991).
6 Article 1 of the Protocol provides:
1. This Protocol, which develops and supplements Article 3 common to the Geneva Conven-
tions of 12 August 1949 without modifying its existing conditions or application, shall apply
to all armed conflicts which are not covered by Article 1 of the Protocol Additional to the
Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Inter-
national Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) and which take place in the territory of a High
Contracting Party between its armed forces and dissident armed forces or other organized
armed groups which, under responsible command, exercise such control over a part of
its territory as to enable them to carry out sustained and concerted military operations and
to implement this Protocol.
2. This Protocol shall not apply to situations of internal disturbances and tensions, such
as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence and other acts of a similar nature, as not
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than that provided by the regime that applies to international armed conflicts.
At present there is a tendency to de-emphasize the distinction between the
regimes for international armed conflicts on the one hand, and for non-inter-
national armed conflicts on the other hand. However, there is no reason to
assume that the two will merge anytime soon.
In addition to the above-mentioned treaties, international humanitarian
law comprises a number of other agreements that prohibit the use of certain
weapons and military tactics or that protect certain categories of people and
goods. These include the 1954 Convention for the Protection of Cultural
Property in the Event of Armed Conflict and the two Protocols Additional
to the Convention, the 1980 Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the
Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively
Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects and its five Protocols, as well as
the 1997 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production
and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction.
3.3 SOURCES OF OBLIGATIONS FOR THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE NORTH
ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION
The debate whether the UN in general, and the Security Council in particular,
is or should be bound by international law is not new. The debate started
during the drafting of the UN Charter. In the subsequent decades the debate
continued mainly outside the organization itself. In particular this debate
focused on the application of international humanitarian law to operations
authorized or established by the organization for the maintenance of inter-
national peace and security. In the 1990s, two developments in particular
renewed the debate and shifted its focus slightly. The first was the application
by Libya to the International Court of Justice in two parallel cases against the
United States and the United Kingdom relating to the demands for surrender
by that state of two of its nationals. The United States and the United Kingdom
suspected the two of being responsible for the bombing of Pan Am flight 103
over Lockerbie, Scotland, and demanded that Libya surrender them for trial.
When Libya refused, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 731, urging
Libya to immediately provide a full and effective response to the United States’
and United Kingdom’s requests. Libya then filed an application requesting
the International Court of Justice to find that it had complied with all of its
obligations under the Montreal Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful
Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation,7 that the United Kingdom and the
United States were in violation of their obligations under that convention, and
being armed conflicts.
7 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation,
Montreal, 23 September 1971, reproduced in 1971 ILM 1151.
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that they were obliged to desist from the use of any force or threats against
Libya. Libya also requested the indication of certain provisional measures.
Shortly after the filing of the applications, the Security Council adopted Resolu-
tion 748 under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The Council decided that Libya
must comply with the request for surrender and that states should adopt
certain sanctions against Libya if it had not complied by 15 April 1992. The
central problem of the Lockerbie cases was whether the Court can review the
legality of a Security Council Resolution and which standards of review it
should apply. The Court itself, in its orders of 14 April 19928 dismissing the
request for provisional measures and judgments of 27 February 19989 rejecting
preliminary objections and finding jurisdiction, circumvented these questions
to a large extent, leaving them for the merits stage.10 The surrender by Libya
of its two nationals for trial by a Scottish court in the Netherlands on 5 April
1999 has made it uncertain whether there will ever be a judgment on the
merits.11 However this may be, the Lockerbie cases have given rise to an ex-
tensive literature on the legal limitations on the Security Council.12
The second development is related to the use of economic sanctions. The
Security Council made extensive use of this instrument in the 1990s. The
sanctions instrument was however criticized both inside and outside the UN
for leading to humanitarian disasters, in particular in the case of Iraq.13 This
8 Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention arising from
the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libya v. United Kingdom; Libya v. United States of America),
Provisional Measures, Order, 1992 ICJ Reports 4.
9 Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention arising from
the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libya v. United Kingdom; Libya v. United States of America),
Preliminary Objections, Judgment, reproduced in 37 ILM 586 (1998).
10 B. Martenczuk, The Security Council, the International Court and Judicial Review: What Lessons
from Lockerbie?, 10 European Journal of International Law 517 (1999), at 525.
11 In August 2003 the Washington Post reported that the government of Lybia accepted
responsibility for the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103. See P. Slevin, Lybia Accepts Blame in
Lockerbie Bombing: Letter on Flight 103 Is Bid to Ease Sanctions, The Washington Post, 17
August 2003.
12 See e.g. V. Gowlland-Debbas, The Relationship between the International Court of Justice and
the Security Council in the Light of the Lockerbie Case, 88 American Journal of International
Law 643 (1994); D. Akande, The International Court of Justice and the Security Council: Is there
Room for Judicial Control of Decisions of the Political Organs of the United Nations?, 46 Inter-
national & Comparative Law Quarterly 309 (1997); T. Gill, Legal and Some Political Limitations
on the Power of the UN Security Council to Exercise its Enforcement Powers under Chapter VII
of the Charter, 26 Netherlands Yearbook of International Law 33 (1995); D. Schweigman,
The Authority of the Security Council under Chapter VII of the UN Charter: Legal Limits
and the Role of the International Court of Justice (2001).
13 Former UN Official Decries Sanctions on Iraq, The Guardian, 27 January 1999; B. Crossette,
UN Council to Review its Policy on Sanctions, New York Times, 18 April 2000.
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has led to a debate on the limits international law places on the use of eco-
nomic sanctions14 and a call for targeted or smart sanctions.15
The debate on legal limits to action by NATO is of much more recent origin.
Generally, there was very little discussion of the application of international
law to NATO action before 1999. This situation changed radically with the air
campaign conducted by the organization against the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia in 1999. As a result the Federal Republic filed applications against
ten members of the organization asking the International Court of Justice inter
alia to declare that rules of international humanitarian law had been violated.
Operation Allied Force also gave rise to a report by the prosecutor of the
ICTY16 and to body of literature that has started to address the legal contours
of NATO.17
An aspect of commonality between these debates is that they look to the
same sources for limitations under international law on action by the UN or
NATO. These sources are mainly international humanitarian law treaties, the
constituent instruments of the organizations and international customary law.
3.4 INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW TREATIES
The UN and NATO have both concluded treaties under international law. Such
treaties are binding on them on the basis of the principle pacta sunt servanda
as codified in Article 26 of the 1986 Convention on the Law of Treaties between
States and International Organizations or between International Organiza-
tions.18 Neither organization however is party to any treaty on international
humanitarian law.
The question is whether the treaties themselves even provide for the
possibility of accession by an international organization. Accession clauses
of earlier international humanitarian law treaties provide only for accession
14 See e.g. A. Reinisch, Developing Human Rights and Humanitarian Law Accountability of the
Security Council for the Imposition of Economic Sanctions, 95 American Journal of International
Law 851 (2001); E. de Wet, Human Rights Limitations to Economic Enforcement Measures under
Article 41 of the United Nations Charter and the Iraqi Sanctions Regime, 14 Leiden Journal of
International Law 277 (2001).
15 E. MacAskill, UN Agrees Long-Awaited Smart Sanctions for Iraq, The Guardian, 15 May 2002.
16 Final Report to the Prosecutor by the Committee Established to Review the NATO Bombing
Campaign Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, reproduced in 39 ILM 1257 (2000).
17 See e.g. P. Kovács, Intervention Armée des Forces de l’OTAN au Kosovo: Fondement de l’Obligation
de Respecter le Droit International Humanitaire, 82 International Review of the Red Cross 103
(2000).
18 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and International Organizations
or between International Organizations, 21 March 1986, reproduced in 25 ILM 543 (1986).
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by ‘states’19 or ‘countries’,20 clearly excluding international organizations.21
The 1907 Hague Conventions and the 1949 Geneva Conventions, and the 1977
Additional Protocols by reference to the Geneva Conventions, provide for
accession by ‘Powers’. Yet more recent treaties revert solely to the possibility
of accession by ‘states’.
Unlike the term ‘state’, the term ‘Power’ does not a priori exclude an
international organization, and it has been suggested that the term should not
be read restrictively and that consequently international organizations can
accede to the 1907 Hague Conventions and the 1949 Geneva Conventions.22
This possibility would then also extend to the 1977 Additional Protocols
because these refer to the 1949 Geneva Conventions. The possible question
of accession by international organizations was simply not raised during the
drafting of the 1907 Hague Conventions and the 1949 Geneva Conventions
so that the travaux préparatoires are not conclusive. In practice, however, the
UN has interpreted the term ‘Power’ as excluding international organizations,
and this interpretation also finds extensive support in literature.23
The travaux préparatoires of Additional Protocol I reaffirm this interpretation.
The ratification and accession clauses of the Protocol state that it is open to
ratification or accession by any Party to the 1949 Geneva Conventions and
thus by reference includes the concept of Power. During the 1971 Conference
of Government Experts the ICRC mentioned the matter of the application of
the Geneva Conventions to UN peacekeeping forces. Several statements were
made on the subject and it was suggested that it be included in the agenda
19 See Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases,
and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, entered into force 8 February 1928, 94 LNTS
65 which states: “The High Contracting Parties will exert every effort to induce other States
to accede to the present Protocol.”
20 See Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, entered into force 19 June
1931, 118 LNTS 343, Article 93: “As from the date of its entry into force, the present Conven-
tion shall be open to accession notified in respect of any country on whose behalf this
Convention has not been signed.”
21 Cf. Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion
of 11 April 1949, 1949 ICJ. reports 174, at 179:
The Court has come to the conclusion that the Organization is an international person.
That is not the same as saying that it is a State, which it certainly is not, or that its legal
personality and rights and duties are the same as those of a State.
22 F. Seyersted, United Nations Forces in the Laws of Peace and War 350 (1966).
23 See e.g. 88 ASIL Proc. 349 (1994); B. Tittemore, Belligerents in Blue Helmets: Applying Inter-
national Humanitarian Law to United Nations Peace Operations, 33 Stanford Journal of Inter-
national Law 61 (1997), at 95; R. Simmonds, Legal problems Arising from the United Nations
Military Operations in the Congo 182-183 (1968); C. Greenwood, International Humanitarian
Law and United Nations Military Operations, 1 Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law
3 (1998), at 16. But see D. Schindler, United Nations Forces and International Humanitarian
Law, in C. Swinarski (Ed.), Etudes et Essais sur le Droit International Humanitaire et sur
les Principes de la Croix-Rouge en l’Honneur de Jean Pictet 521 (1984), at 529.
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of the IVth Commission of the Conference.24 At the second session of the
Conference in 1972 the ICRC brought up the subject again. The representative
of the UN Secretary-General then argued against the possibility of accession
to the Conventions and Protocol by the UN. He stated that:
Such accession would obviously pose problems as to the competence in general
of the Organization to become a Party to a multilateral treaty, as well as with
respect to the ratification procedure. But the main obstacle was the impossibility
for the Organization to fulfil many of the obligations laid down in the Conventions
of Geneva. … The accession which had been suggested would therefore only raise
false hopes, and in consequence, give rise to unjustified criticism of the United
Nations.25
At the conference a proposal was introduced by Egypt to adopt the following
provision:
The United Nations Organization, the international specialized agencies and regional
intergovernmental organizations may accede to the Conventions and the present
Protocol.26
Most experts declared themselves against such a proposal. They stressed that
the UN was not a party to any multilateral treaty and the capacity to become
a party to such treaties raised difficult legal problems. It would be impossible
for the UN to fulfil a great many of the obligations spelt out in the Conventions
and the organization was not in a position to assume responsibility for the
behavior of the contingents placed at its disposal.27 The Egyptian proposal
was not adopted. In other words, the delegates consciously excluded the
possibility of accession by international organizations and gave a restrictive
interpretation of the term ‘Power’.28
Previously, the question of the accession of the United Nations had also
arisen during negotiations on the 1954 Cultural Property Convention. At the
diplomatic Conference, the legal advisor of UNESCO stated that the Convention
24 International Committee of the Red Cross, Report on the Work of the Conference of
Government Experts on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian
Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts, Geneva (1971), at 52, paras. 309-310 (Government
Experts Conference Report, first session).
25 International Committee of the Red Cross, Report on the Work of the Conference of
Government Experts on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian
Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts, Second Session, Geneva (1972), at 193-194, paras. 4.165-
4.166 (Government Experts Conference Report, second session).
26 Id., Vol. II (Annexes), at 108.
27 Id., at 194, para. 4.168.
28 See also United Nations Juridical Yearbook 1972, at 153: “Finally, the Commission IV of
the Conference decided not to include in the draft Protocol any clause providing for
accession of intergovernmental organizations. The position taken by the Secretariat on this
matter has been nearly unanimously supported by all the delegations.”
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would apply in the event of UN collective action, but only if the Security
Council and the General Assembly adopted a resolution deciding to apply
the Convention. The secretariat of the Conference envisaged the drafting of
a text by which the UN itself would accept some of the provisions of the
Convention.29 The proposal was ruled out of order because it had not been
introduced in writing. The French delegation proposed instead to adopt a
resolution at the Conference recommending that the UN ensure application
of the principles of the Conventions by the armed forces taking part in a
military action in implementation of the Charter.30 This resolution was
adopted and reads:
The Conference expresses the hope that the competent organs of the United Nations
should decide, in the event of military action being taken in implementation of
the Charter, to ensure application of the provisions of the Convention by the armed
forces taking part in such action.31
Though the drafters expressed their concern that the UN ensure respect for
the provisions of the convention, it is clear that they excluded the possibility
of ratification or accession.
3.5 CONSTITUENT INSTRUMENTS
In general, the constituent instrument of an international organization is a
treaty and as such the organization and its organs must respect the division
of competences and limitations on power in the treaty.32 In this sense the
constituent instrument of the organization performs a role similar to a constitu-
tion in domestic law. Though extreme care is required when comparing
international organizations to states, the constitutional character of the United
29 Where an international authority – by the terms of the Article (Final Provisions) -- would
state its acceptance of all or some of the provisions of the present Convention, which it
would be capable of applying, the High Contracting Parties shall be bound, in relation
to the said international authority, by the provisions of the Convention accepted in the
terms of the aforementioned statement, English translation, Actes de la Conférence Con-
voquée par l’Organisation des Nations Unies pour l’Education, la Science et la Culture tenue
à la Haye du 21 Avril au 14 Mai 1954, at 187 (1954).
30 Actes de la Conférence Convoquée par l’Organisation des Nations Unies pour l’Education,
la Science et la Culture tenue à la Haye du 21 Avril au 14 Mai 1954, at 274-275 (1954).
31 United Nations Economic Social and Cultural Organization, Final Act of the Intergovern-
mental Conference on the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict
80 (1954).
32 I. Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law 697 (1998).
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Nations Charter has recently been asserted in literature and in practice.33 The
Appeals Chamber of the ICTY affirmed that:
The Security Council is an organ of an international organization, established by
a treaty which serves as a constitutional framework for that organization. The
Security Council is thus subjected to certain constitutional limitations, however
broad its powers may be, those powers cannot, in any case, go beyond the limits
of the jurisdiction of the Organization at large, not to mention other specific limita-
tions or those which may derive from the internal division of power within the
Organization. In any case, neither the text nor the spirit of the Charter conceives
of the Security Council as legibus solutus (unbound by law).34
The assumption that an international organization is limited by its constituent
instrument, is in itself generally accepted. Problems arise, however, in defining
the content of those limitations. This is primarily a matter of treaty interpreta-
tion, because the constituent instrument is generally a treaty.
The UN Charter contains a number of provisions which some writers have
interpreted as imposing an obligation on the organization, and the Security
Council in particular, to respect international humanitarian law. Legal limita-
tions on the Security Council are of principal concern because in practice UN
peace support operations are subsidiary organs of the Council.35
Article 24, paragraphs 1 and 2 of the UN Charter provide that:
In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United Nations, its Members
confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of
international peace and security, and agree that in carrying out its duties under
this responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf.
In discharging these duties the Security Council shall act in accordance with the
Purposes and Principles of the United Nations.
The purposes and principles of the UN are set out in Article 1 and 2 of the
Charter. Article 1, paragraph 1, provides that one of the purposes of the
organization is:
To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective
collective measures for the prevention of threats to the peace, and for the suppres-
sion of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by
peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international
33 See e.g. B. Fassbender, The United Nations Charter as Constitution of the International Com-
munity, 36 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 529 (1998); P.M. Dupuy, The Constitutional
Dimension of the Charter of the United Nations Revisited, 1 Max Planck Yearbook of United
Nations Law 33 (1997).
34 Prosecutor v. Duško Tadic´, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on
Jurisdiction, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, A. Ch., 2 October 1995, para. 28.
35 See § 1.8.2.
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law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes which might lead to a breach
of the peace.
The ordinary meaning given to the terms of this article makes clear that the
Security Council is only bound by the obligation to act in conformity with
the principles of justice and international law in the adjustment or settlement
of international disputes, and not when it takes collective measures for the
prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of
acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace.36 The latter is clearly a
reference to action under Chapter VII of the Charter.
The travaux préparatoires confirm this interpretation. The Dumbarton Oaks
Proposals that laid the groundwork for the UN Charter did not include a
reference to international law in its provisions on Purposes and Principles.
A proposal was made at the United Nations Conference on International
Organization by China, supported by the United Kingdom, the United States
and the Soviet Union, to add that peaceful settlement of disputes must be
brought about “with due regard for principles of justice and international
law”.37 Other delegations thought that this phrase was inadequate, and that
“a more explicit requirement for strict observance of the principles of justice,
international law, and morality should be written into the Declaration of
Purposes in the Charter.”38 In the subcommittee that was drafting the Pur-
poses, it was proposed that the words “in conformity with the principles of
justice and international law” be placed in the first line after the words “peace
and security.” This amendment received 19 votes in favor and 15 against, not
enough for the two-thirds majority required.39 The same amendment was
later again introduced by the Egyptian delegation in Commission I. The
Egyptian delegate said in support of the amendment that the “last argument
with which we were today confronted was that if we asked the Security
Council to respect justice and international law it might make the burden of
the Organization heavier.”40 The delegate of the United Kingdom who
opposed the amendment used:
the illustration of the policeman or the gendarme who is concerned with dealing
with a wrong that he sees arising. He does not stop at the outset of what he does
36 See R. Wolfrum, Article 1, in B. Simma (Ed.), The Charter of the United Nations: A Com-
mentary 49 (1995), at 52, M. Bedjaoui, Article 1, in J.P. Cot & A. Pellet (Eds.), La Charte
des Nations Unies 23 (1985), at 25.
37 UNCIO III, at 622, Doc. 2 G/29.
38 Summary Report of Third Meeting of Committee I/1, doc. 197, 10 May 1945, UNCIO
Documents vol. 6, at 281, at 282.
39 Summary Report of the Ninth Meeting of Committee I/1, Doc. 742, I/1/23/ 1 June 1945,
UNCIO vol. 6 at 317, at 318.
40 Verbatim Minutes of First Meeting of Commission I, 14 June 1945, Doc. 1006, UNCIO.
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to inquire where exactly lies the precise balance of justice in their quarrel. He stops
it, and then, in order to make adjustment and settlement, justice comes into town.41
The United States delegation shared this opinion.42 This opposition was an
important element leading to the defeat of the Egyptian amendment by a vote
of 21 for and 21 against.43
That Article 1, paragraph 1, may be interpreted to mean that the Security
Council may derogate from the principles of international law when it acts
under Chapter VII of the UN Charter was also understood by the Dutch govern-
ment. It reported to parliament on the drafting of the article that:
In the meanwhile the Delegations of Egypt, Panama and Uruguay had … intro-
duced two amendments, to the effect of naming the principles of justice and
international law in the first part of paragraph 1, so that they could be considered
to regard all the functions of the Organization, which, it seemed, could be doubted
in the case of the proposed text. For the Dutch Delegation, which had been content
with the amendment to paragraph 1 proposed by the Sponsoring Governments,
there was initially no reason to support these amendments. When, however, the
British Delegate challenged these amendments with the argument that in main-
taining international peace and security one could not always respect these prin-
ciples because the maintenance of international peace and security had a political
dimension, the Dutch Delegation considered this so dangerous that it lent its
support to the amendments. These were however unable to carry the required two-
thirds majority in Committee 1.44
41 Id.
42 Id:
It is our view that this Security Council … will have two very important functions … Those
might be characterized somewhat as being the functions of a policeman and the functions
of a jury. … When you begin to function as a jury you must do so in conformity with justice
and international law.
43 Id.
44 “Intussen waren door de Delegaties van Egypte, Panama en Uruguay … twee amendemen-
ten ingediend, welke de strekking hadden om de grondslagen van rechtvaardigheid en
van internationaal recht in lid 1 direct in de aanvang te noemen, zodat zij geacht konden
worden op alle functies van de Organisatie betrekking te hebben, hetgeen, naar het scheen,
van de voorgestelde bepalingen kon worden betwijfeld. Voor de Nederlandse Delegatie,
die zich bevredigd had geacht door het door de Delegaties der Uitvoerende Mogenheden
vastgestelde amendement op lid 1, bestond aanvankelijk geen aanleiding om deze amende-
menten te steunen. Toen echter bij het debat de Britse vertegenwoordiger die amendementen
bestreed met het argument, dat men bij het handhaven van de internationale vrede niet
altijd van deze grondslagen zou kunnen uitgaan, omdat het handhaven van de international
vrede en veiligheid een politieke kant had, achtte de Nederlandse Delegatie dit betoog zo
gevaarlijk, dat zij haar steun aan de amendementen gaf. Deze vermochten evenwel niet
de vereiste tweederde meerderheid der stemmen in Comité 1 te behalen.” Ministerie van
Buitenlandse Zaken, Het Ontstaan der Verenigde Naties: San Francisco, 25 April – 25 Juni
1945, at 20-21 (1950) (English translation by the author).
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In short, the Security Council, when acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter
can derogate from certain principles of international law.45 Article 1, para-
graph 1, simply does not require, as a report submitted to the UN Sub-commis-
sion for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights by Bossuyt states,
that sanctions or other measures undertaken to maintain international peace
and security must be in conformity with the principles of justice and inter-
national law and that sanctions must be evaluated to ensure that they are not
unjust or that they do not in any way violate principles of international law
stemming from sources outside the Charter.46 On the contrary, as Judge
Schwebel stated in his dissenting opinion in the 1998 judgment in the Lockerbie
case, the omission of principles and justice of international law “was deliberate-
ly so provided to ensure that the vital duty of preventing and removing threats
to and breaches of the peace would not be limited by existing law.”47 Judge
Oda stated in the same vein that under the positive law of the United Nations
Charter “a resolution of the Security Council may have binding force, irres-
pective of the question whether it is consonant with international law derived
from other sources.”48
The principle that the UN Security Council can derogate from international
law that would otherwise be applicable, is supported by Article 103 of the
Charter. This Article provides that in case of conflicting obligations of member
states under the UN Charter and under another international agreement, the
obligations under the Charter prevail.49 Obligations ‘under the Charter’ are
understood to be not only obligations arising directly from provisions of the
Charter, but also obligations arising from binding decisions of the UN Security
Council.50 This was confirmed by the ICJ in its order on provisional measures
in the Lockerbie case.51 The question arises whether in the latter case the
45 G. Oosthuizen, Playing the Devil’s Advocate: the United Nations Security Council is Unbound
by Law, 12 Leiden Journal of International Law 549 (1999), at 552-553; H. Kelsen, The Law
of the United Nations 294-295 (1951); B. Martenczuk, The Security Council, the International
Court and Judicial Review: What Lessons from Lockerbie?, 10 European Journal of International
Law 517 (1999), at 545.
46 UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2000/33, para. 24.
47 Supra note 9, at 627.
48 Supra note 8. But see the dissenting opinion of Judge Bedjaoui, Id, para. 26. See also the
dissenting opinion by Judge Fitzmaurice in the South West Africa case, in which he stated
that even when acting under Chapter VII of the Charter the Security Council is bound by
principles of international law including the prohibition of abrogating or altering territorial
rights, Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia
(South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory
Opinion, 1971 ICJ Reports 6, at 294, para. 115.
49 Article 103 reads:
In the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members of the United Nations
under the present Charter and their obligations under any other international agreement,
their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail.
50 R. Bernhardt, Article 103, in B. Simma (Ed.), supra note 36, at 1120.
51 Supra note 8, at 16, para. 39.
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Security Council must actually use the verb ‘to decide’ in the relevant para-
graph of a resolution under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. This does not seem
to be the case. Here it is important to recall that Article 25 concerns binding
decisions of the Security Council. Speaking to that Article, the ICJ stated in
its advisory opinion in the Namibia case:
The language of a resolution of the Security Council should be carefully analysed
before a conclusion can be made as to its binding effect. In view of the nature of
the powers under Article 25, the question whether they have been in fact exercised
is to be determined in each case, having regard to the terms of the resolution to
be interpreted, the discussions leading to it, the Charter provisions invoked and,
in general, all circumstances that might assist in determining the legal consequences
of the resolution of the Security Council.52
Consequently, although the Security Council need not use the verb ‘to decide’,
there needs to be a clear indication that it intended to bind member states.
Reisman has advocated that not only decisions, but also recommendations
by the Security Council should prevail over treaty obligations.53 This seems
a dangerous road to take. First, it overlooks the natural and close relationship
between Article 103 and Article 25. Second, it gives much leeway to states
to argue that their actions have the Council’s blessing under Chapter VII of
the Charter, at a a time when there have been questionable invocations of
Council Resolutions to justify the use of force. Finally, it is not in conformity
with the principle that exceptions should be interpreted narrowly.
It is striking that the wording of Article 103 only refers to treaty obligations
and not to customary international law. At the San Francisco conference, a
proposal to formulate the article in a such a way that all other commitments,
including those arising under customary law, were to be superseded by the
Charter, was ultimately not included.54 Judge Bedjaoui concluded in his dis-
senting opinion in the ICJ’s order on provisional measures in the Lockerbie case,
that Article 103 “does not cover such rights as may have other than conven-
tional sources and be derived from general international law.”55 Combacau
on the other hands offers another, and more probable, interpretation of the
article, according to which its specific purpose is to set aside the rule that a
later treaty prevails over an earlier treaty (lex posterior derogat legi priori).56
If this is the specific purpose of the article, there is no need for it to refer to
customary international law.
52 Supra note 48 at 53, para. 114.
53 M. Reisman, The Constitutional Crisis in the United Nations, 87 American Journal of Inter-
national Law 83 (1993), at 89.
54 R. Bernhardt, supra note 50.
55 Supra note 8, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Bedjaoui, para. 29.
56 J. Combacau, Le Pouvoir de Sanction de l’O.N.U.: Étude Théorique de la Coercition non
Militaire 282 (1974).
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In any event, Article 103 must be seen in the broader system of the Charter.
Article 1 (1), Article 25 and Article 103 together make clear that the UN Security
Council can derogate from customary international law. As Reisman states,
“[t]he synergy of Articles 25 and 103 ... trumps all contrary non-Charter legal
obligations.”57 This is confirmed by Judge Oda in his declaration in the Locker-
bie case, in which he states that “under the positive law of the United Nations
Charter a resolution of the Security Council may have binding force, irres-
pective of the question whether it is consonant with international law derived
from other sources.”58
Certain writers argue that the Security Council is bound by peremptory
norms of international law, also referred to as ius cogens. The concept of
peromptory norms was first codified in the Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties. Article 53 of that convention provides:
A treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory norm
of general international law. For the purposes of the present Convention, a peremp-
tory norm of general international law is a norm accepted and recognized by the
international community of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation
is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general
international law having the same character.
It is argued that the non-derogatory character of peremptory norms means
that all subjects of international law, including the Security Council, have to
abide by them.59
Judge Lauterpacht declared in his separate in the Genocide case that:
The concept of jus cogens operates as a concept superior to both customary inter-
national law and treaty. The relief which Article 103 of the Charter may give the
Security Council in case of conflict between one of its decisions and an operative
treaty obligation cannot – as a matter of simple hierarchy of norms – extend to
a conflict between a Security Council resolution and jus cogens.60
It has been argued that the concept of ius cogens partly explains the lack of
reference to customary international law in Article 103 of the UN Charter.61
However, at the time of drafting of the Charter this concept was not widely
recognized, and it is therefore unlikely that the drafters took it into account.
57 M. Reisman, supra note 53, at 93.
58 Supra note 8, Declaration of Acting President Oda, under I.
59 See e.g. D. Schweigman, supra note 12, at 197.
60 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
(Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), Separate Opinion of Judge
Lauterpacht, 1993 ICJ Reports 4, at 440.
61 M. Shaw, The Security Council and the International Court of Justice: Judicial Drift and Judicial
Function, in A. Muller, D. Raicˇ & J. Thuránsky (Eds.), The International Court of Justice:
Its Future after Fifty Years 219 (1997), at 229.
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If they did, it is difficult to explain why Article 1, paragraph 1, does not
mention peremptory norms. If the concept of peremptory norms gained
currency only after the adoption of the UN Charter, it is not necessarily the
case that the Security Council cannot derogate from such norms. At a mini-
mum, there has been no attempt to amend the UN Charter to state that the
Security Council is bound by peremptory norms when its acts under Chapter
VII.
In addition, there is the question of the legal consequences of establishing
that a particular norm is a perempory norm. As noted, the concept of ius cogens
was first anchored in conventional law in the Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties, which sets out certain consequences in the field of treaty law. There
is no consensus on other legal consequences of the determination that a par-
ticular norm is a peremptory norm. These consequences extend beyond the
field of treaty law, as illustrated by Chapter III of Part Two of ILC draft articles
on state responsibility. However, this does not mean that these consequences
are unlimited. For example, the International Court of Justice in the Arrest
Warrant case declined to hold that head of state immunity is set aside in case
of a prosecution for genocide, even though the prohibition of genocide is
widely regarded as one of the clearest examples of a peremptory norm.62
In other words, the mere determination that a norm is a peremptory norm
does not automatically set aside all other international law.
Finally, it is uncertain which norms of international humanitarian law are
peremptory norms. The ILC commentary to draft article 40 states that it would
seem justified to treat as peremptory those basic rules of international human-
itarian law referred to as ‘intransgressible’ in character by the International
Court of Justice.63 It may be recalled, however, that the Court refused to
pronounce itself on the ius cogens nature of rules of international humanitarian
law in the Nuclear Weapons case.64
In short, the proposition that the Security Council cannot derogate from
peremptory norms is open to criticism. It may also be noted that in the context
of the application of international humanitarian law to UN peace support
operations, a conflict between basic, rather than more technical, norms of
international humanitarian law and a Security Council decision is unlikely
to arise.
It is not the case that the mere adoption of a resolution under Chapter VII
renders international humanitarian law inapplicable. The Council should
explicitly and specifically state which legal regime applies if international
62 Arrest Warrant of April 11th 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium), Judgment,
Merits, reproduced in 41 ILM 536 (2002).
63 Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its fifty-third session, 23 April
– 1 June and 2 July – 10 August 2001 (A/56/10), at 284, para. 5.
64 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion of 8 July 1996, 1996
ICJ Reports 226, para. 83.
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humanitarian law does not apply. It cannot be assumed that it was the in-
tention of the drafters of the UN Charter to create a legal vacuum every time
the Council adopted a resolution under Chapter VII. This would also not be
consistent with the functional nature of the rights and obligations of the UN.
It may be argued that the Security Council’s function of maintaining and
restoring international peace and security can require setting aside specific
rules of general international law in specific situations, but not the wholesale
abrogation of general international law.
Arguably, the Security Council has derogated from international human-
itarian law in Resolution 1483.65 This resolution was adopted after the United
States and the United Kingdom invaded Iraq in early 2003. The resolution,
which was adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, included a number
of paragraphs that were important to a legal characterization of post-confict
Iraq. In its preamble, it notes the letter of 8 May 2003 from the Permanent
Representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom to the President
of the Security Council and recognizes “the specific authorities, responsibilities,
and obligations under applicable international law of these states as occupying
powers under unified command (the ‘Authority’).” The Council hereby ob-
served that the US and the UK were occupying powers under international
humanitarian law, and that consequently the provisions of the Hague Regula-
tions 1907 and Geneva Convention (IV) of 1949 were applicable to them. Under
international humanitarian law, an occupation is conceived of as a temporary
administration of territory. For this reason the law, to a large extent, restricts
the occupying power from interfering in state structures of the occupied
territory. For example, Article 43 of the 1907 Hague Regulations provides that
the occupying power shall respect, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in
force in the country. Article 53 of the the same regulations provides that an
army of occupation can only take possession of cash, funds, and realizable
securities which are strictly the property of the state, depots of arms, means
of transport, stores and supplies, and, generally, all movable property be-
longing to the state which may be used for military operations. In other words,
the law of occupation does not envisage changing the state structures of the
occupied territory. Resolution 1483, however, calls upon the Authority to:
promote the welfare of the Iraqi people through the effective administration of
the territory, including in particular working towards the restoration of conditions
of security and stability and the creation of conditions in which the Iraqi people
can freely determine their own political future.66
In pursuance of this objective, the Authority has made important changes to
Iraqi structures, such as by establishing a ‘Governing Council’ and reforming
65 Security Council Resolution 1483 of 22 May 2003, UN Doc. S/RES/1483 (2003).
66 Id., para. 4.
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the laws of the country. On the basis of these facts Grant maintains that
Resolution 1483:
has created a ‘carve out’ from the Hague Regulations and Fourth Geneva Conven-
tion, leaving other provisions of the treaties in force, but suspending with respect
to the Authority those provisions that otherwise would curb its license to change
the laws, institutions, and personnel of the occupied state.67
When the Security Council is not acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, as
well as when it is acting under Chapter VII and has not derogated from the
principles of international law, it is bound by those principles. What are the
‘principles of international law’? At first sight the term ‘principles’ seems to
refer to general principles of law recognized by civilized nations, which is
only one subset of general international law. It seems that this is not what
the drafters meant, however. The travaux préparatoires of the Charter make
clear that the function of the principles in question is mainly to preserve the
rights of states in the settlement of disputes.68 This is illustrated inter alia by
the debate in Commission III of the San Francisco Conference. The Norwegian
delegate in this Commission stated that:
The Security Council was vested with enormous powers and little restraint was
placed upon their exercise by the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals. … He felt that a
basic rule of conduct must be formulated as a restraint on the Security Council
and as a guarantee that it would not resort to a ’politique de compensation’.
Whatever sacrifices the Security Council might require of a nation should not be
of such a nature as to impair the confidence of that nation in its future.69
For this reason the Norwegian delegation proposed an amendment to Article
1 of the United Nations Charter that would have required that no solution
should be imposed upon a state of a nature to impair its confidence in its
future security or welfare.70
The representative of the United Kingdom opposed the amendment and
stated that:
its purpose was already served by the amended principles in Chapter I, where it
was stipulated that the Organization was to ’bring about by peaceful means, and
with due regard for principles of justice and international law, adjustment or
settlement…’ etc.71
67 T. Grant, Asil Insight: Iraq: How to reconcile Conflicting Obligations of Occupation and Reform,
June 2003.
68 L. Goodrich, E. Hambro & A.P. Simons (Eds.), The United Nations Charter: A Commentary
28 (1969).
69 UNCIO Documents, 1945, Vol. XI, at 378.
70 UNCIO Documents 1945, Vol. XI, at 378.
71 Id.
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Clearly, the rights of states that must be preserved are not only found in
general principles of law, but also in other sources of international law, in
particular customary international law. In other words, the term principles
of international law in Article 1 paragraph 1 refers to all sources of inter-
national law. This is also the interpretation by Wolfrum in Simma’s com-
mentary on the UN Charter,72 and this interpretation was reaffirmed by Judge
Weeramantry in his dissenting opinion the Lockerbie case. He stated that
whatever Security Council Resolution 731, adopted under Chapter VI of the
United Nations Charter, purported to do “was required by Article 24 (2) of
the Charter to be in accordance with international law.”73 The obligations
of international humanitarian law binding the UN and its organs under general
international law, that is under customary international law and general
principles of law, are discussed below.
The obligation for the Security Council to act in accordance with the
principles and purposes of the Charter also extends to Article 1, paragraph
3 of the Charter. Unlike Article 1, paragraph 1, this paragraph does not exempt
the Security Council when it is acting under Chapter VII of the Charter. Article
1, paragraph 3, states that one purpose of the organization is:
To achieve international co-operation in solving international problems of an
economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and en-
couraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without
distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion;
Closely connected to this paragraph is Article 55 of the Charter which states
that the UN shall promote inter alia universal respect for, and observance of,
human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race,
sex, language, or religion. Writers frequently base an obligation for the UN
and the Security Council to respect human rights on these articles.74 It is also
argued that the term ‘human rights’ should be read extensively to include
international humanitarian law. It is argued that the purposes and principles
of the UN are evolutionary and should be read in the light of changes in
international law since 1945, including the development of UN concern for
international humanitarian law.75 Gardam suggests that:
the reference to human rights in the purposes of the Charter not only must be broad
enough to include within its compass principles that have the potential to provide
72 R. Wolfrum, supra note 36, at 52. Wolfrum states that the words ‘justice and international
law’ not only refer to treaties, customary law, and general principles of law, but also
establish a connection to natural law.
73 Supra note 8.
74 See e.g. T. Gill, supra note 12, at 77; UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2000/33, para. 26;
75 V. Gowlland-Debbas, Security Council Enforcement Action and Issues of State Responsibility,
43 International & Comparative Law Quarterly 55 (1994), at 91.
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very real protection to individuals in that most destructive of activities – armed
conflict – but should have a meaning outside the narrow context of how a State
treats its own subjects.76
The question remains, however, whether the articles in question can be the
basis for any obligation at all. A textual interpretation of the articles on the
one hand seems to lead to the conclusion that the UN must promote human
rights, not that it must respect them.77 The travaux préparatoires on the other
hand suggest that Article 1, paragraph 3, does impose an obligation on the
organization. At the San Francisco Conference Uruguay proposed an amend-
ment to the purposes and principles of the organization that would oblige
it “to promote the recognition of and guarantee respect for the essential human
liberties and rights without distinction as to race, sex, belief, or social status.”78
The report of the debate concerning this amendment in the official records
of the conference states:
There was considerable discussion by other delegates of this point, with emphasis
on the idea that respect for human rights should also be mentioned in Chapter
II as a principle to be observed by all members. It was felt that if this statement
were included only in Chapter I, it would bind only the Organization and would
relieve member governments from the obligation to respect the fundamental
freedoms of individuals within their own countries.79
The committee in question did not adopt the amendment. The report suggests
that as a result only the organization is bound to respect human rights. In view
of the debates and text of article 1, paragraph 1, however, presumably this
does not include the Security Council when it is acting under Chapter VII of
the Charter. If the Security Council is not bound by international law in that
capacity, it is also not bound by human rights as a subset of that law.80 This
is also demonstrated by the travaux préparatoires of Article 1, paragraph 3. In
respect of that article, Panama proposed an amendment at the San Francisco
conference that would have obliged the Security Council:
To maintain international peace and security in conformity with the fundamental
principles of international law and to maintain and observe the standards set forth
in the ‘Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Nations’, and the ‘Declaration of
76 J. Gardam, Legal Restraints on Security Council Military Enforcement Action, 17 Michigan
Journal of International Law 285 (1996), at 301-302.
77 L. Goodrich, The United Nations 246 (1960).
78 UNCIO Documents Vol. VI, at 552.
79 Commission I, Committee 1, Doc. 308, I/1/14, May 15, 1945, UNCIO Documents Vol. VI,
at 291.
80 A. Vradenburgh, The Chapter VII Powers of the United Nations Charter: Do They “Trump”
Human Rights Law?, 14 Loyola of Los Angeles International and Comparative Law Journal
175 (1991), at 184.
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Essential Human Rights’ which are appended to the present Charter, and which
are made an integral part thereof.
The amendment, which would have imposed an obligation on the Security
Council to respect human rights even in the exercise of Chapter VII powers,
was rejected.
In short, Article 1, paragraph 3 of the Charter only imposes an obligation
on the Security Council to respect human rights, and possibly international
humanitarian law, when it is not acting under Chapter VII of the Charter.81
This conclusion however can also be reached, and arguably more strongly,
on the basis of the applicability of general international law to the UN.
The constitutional documents of NATO are the 1949 Washington Treaty in
which the member states establish the North Atlantic Council, and the 1951
Ottawa Treaty on the status of the organization, national representatives and
international staff. There is no indication in either of these treaties that the
member states intended that the organization would not be bound by inter-
national law. On the contrary, in the preamble to the Washington Treaty, the
parties reaffirm their faith in the purposes and principles of the United Nations.
The drafters of the treaty took much care to ensure that the treaty would be
in conformity with the United Nations Charter, as is made clear in Article 5
by express reference to Article 51 of the UN Charter and the obligation to
terminate action in self-defense when the Security Council has taken the
measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.
The NATO Handbook, an official publication of the Organization, emphatically
stresses the relationship between the UN Charter and the North Atlantic Treaty
of 1949 (the Washington Treaty). The handbook states that the relevance of
the UN Charter to the North Atlantic Alliance is twofold: “First, it provides
the juridical basis for the creation of the Alliance, and second, it establishes
the overall responsibility of the UN Security Council for international peace
and security.”82 It also states that the UN Charter is the framework within
which the Alliance operates.83 In particular, Article 7 of the Washington Treaty
reminds member states of their rights and obligations under the UN Charter
and reaffirms the primary responsibility of the UN Security Council for the
maintenance of international peace and security. Even if it is the case, as a
number of authors assert, that the reference to the UN Charter was not a real
81 But see Judge ad hoc Lauterpacht in the Genocide case, supra note 48, at 440, para 101:
Nor should one overlook the significance of the provision in Article 24 (2) of the Charter
that, in discharging its duties to maintain international peace and security, the Security
Council shall act in accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations.
Amongst the Purposes set out in Article 1 (3) of the Charter is that of achieving international
co-operation “in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental
freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion.
82 NATO, NATO Handbook, Chapter 15, at www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/hb1501.htm.
83 Id.
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commitment to the United Nations but only a formality,84 this is not an in-
dication that the Organization does not consider itself bound by international
law including the United Nations Charter.
In particular, the organization has not claimed that its members should
not respect international humanitarian law during NATO operations. This is
illustrated by events during and after Operation Allied Force, the NATO air
campaign in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1999. During this operation
NATO was accused of having violated a number of international humanitarian
law norms. These accusations led to the establishment by the Prosecutor of
the ICTY of a committee to assess the allegations and material accompanying
them, and advise the Prosecutor and Deputy Prosecutor whether or not there
was a sufficient basis to proceed with an investigation into some or all the
allegations or into other incidents related to the NATO bombing.85 In response
to the allegations, the organization never claimed that international human-
itarian law did not apply. Rather, it argued that the operation was conducted
in accordance with the law.86
3.6 GENERAL INTERNATIONAL LAW
In principle, an organization with international legal personality is bound by
general international law, that is customary international law and general
principles of law.87 The reason is that international organizations as subjects
of international law are subject to general international law precisely because
they partake of personality under this legal system. In the case of the United
Nations, the International Court of Justice determined in the Reparations case
that states, “by entrusting certain functions to it, with the attendant duties
and responsibilities, have clothed it with the competence to enable those
functions to be effectively discharged.”88 The functions of the UN are those
that are “specified or implied in its constituent documents and developed in
84 See e.g. J. Granatstein, The United Nations and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, in G.
Schmidt (Ed.), A History of NATO – The First Fifty Years, Vol I, 29 (2001), at 32.
85 Supra note 16. See for commentary P. Benvenuti, The ICTY´s Prosecutor and the Review of
the NATO Bombing Campaign against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 12 European Journal
of International Law 503 (2001).
86 See e.g. NATO press releases of 2 May 1999, 8 May 1999 and 15 May 1999.
87 See e.g. I. Brownlie, supra note 32, at 690, H. Schermers & N. Blokker, International Instit-
utional law: Unity within Diversity 982-990 (1995); E. Butkiewicz, The Premisses of Inter-
national Responsibility of Inter-Governmental Organizations, 11 Polish Yearbook of International
Law 117 (1981-82), at 118-122; A. Bleckmann, Zur Verbindlichkeit des Algemeinen Völkerrechts
für Internationale Organisationen, 37 Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und
Völkerrecht 107 (1977).
88 Reparations for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion
of 11 April 1949, 1949 ICJ Reports 174, at 180.
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practice.”89 In this sense the deployment of peace support operations is a
function of the UN though it is not expressly provided for in the UN Charter.
In the same sense the deployment of peace support operations is a function
of NATO though the organization was established for other purposes. In the
case of the function of deploying peace support operations the ‘attendant
duties’ to, or in other words law regulating, the conduct of hostilities,
applies.90 The law in question is international humanitarian law. Shraga states
that the:
principle of functionality which circumscribes the international personality of the
organization and its legal capacity, also determines the scope of the applicable law
to activities carried out by the United Nations in the performance of its functions.
Indeed, the legal capacity of the United Nations to conclude international agree-
ments, to bring international claims on behalf of its agents, to enjoy privileges and
immunities and to incur international responsibility is thus governed, respectively,
by the laws of treaties, diplomatic protection, privileges and immunities and state
responsibility, as they were transposed and made applicable to it by analogy and
mutatis-mutandis. In a similar vein, the ever-growing involvement of UN forces
in situations of armed conflict, warrants that International Humanitarian Law be
made applicable to them by analogy and as appropriate, when they, like states,
are engaged in military operations as combatants.91
It can be said that international humanitarian law is a custom of the trade of
being engaged in hostilities. Since the factual character of hostilities carried
out on both sides during a peace support operation that is engaged in hostil-
ities is hardly distinguishable from armed conflict between states, the situation
calls for the application of the law of armed conflict.92 In this sense the applica-
tion of general international law rules of international humanitarian law to
the UN is also consistent with, and could be said to depend on, the purposes
of the organization.93 The main purpose of the organization is the maintenance
of international peace and security or, as expressed in the preamble of the
Charter, saving succeeding generations from the scourge of war. In speaking
of the need to prevent war the drafters of the Charter naturally had in mind
the suffering inflicted during World War II that was aggravated to a large
extent by many breaches of international humanitarian law. According to the
rapporteur of the Committee which drafted the purposes “when we speak
89 Id., at 179.
90 See e.g. J. Stone, Legal Controls of International Conflict: A Treatise on the Dynamics of
Disputes and War Law 315 (1954).
91 D. Shraga, The United Nations as an Actor Bound by International Humanitarian Law, 5 Inter-
national Peacekeeping 64 (1998), at 65.
92 D. Bowett, United Nations Forces: A Legal Study of United Nations Practice 498 (1964);
F. Seyersted, United Nations Forces in the Law of Peace and War 209 (1966).
93 But see G. Draper, The Legal Limitations upon the Employment of Weapons by the United Nations
Force in the Congo, 12 International & Comparative Law Quarterly 387 (1963), at 409.
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of the prevention of war we have, of course, in mind only what sufferings
war is causing to humanity.”94 Respect for international humanitarian law
would also be consistent with the organization’s purpose of promoting respect
for human rights and achieving international cooperation in resolving inter-
national problems of a humanitarian character, in particular if these purposes
are considered as evolutionary.95
These arguments apply to NATO as well as to the UN. The preamble to the
1949 Washington Treaty makes clear that the organization was intended to
be consistent with the purposes and principles of the UN Charter and founded
to preserve, inter alia, the rule of law. Violating international humanitarian
law would hardly be consistent with these principles.
The International Court of Justice has reaffirmed the application of general
international law to the United Nations on different occasions. In the Interpreta-
tion of the Agreement of 25 March 1951 between the WHO and Egypt case,96 the
Court was concerned with an envisaged transfer of a regional office of the
WHO from Egypt to elsewhere. The Court rephrased the question before it as
what “are the legal principles and rules applicable to the questions under what
conditions and in accordance with what modalities a transfer of the Regional
Office from Egypt may be effected?”97 It considered that:
International organizations are subjects of international law and, as such, are bound
by any obligations incumbent upon them under general rules of international law,
under their constitutions or under international agreements to which they are
parties.98
The Court in this specific case held that mutual agreements between the WHO
and Egypt constituted a contractual regime between the parties. Moreover,
the legal relationship between the parties was that of a host state and an
international organization, the very essence of which is a body of mutual
obligations of co-operation and good faith. The Court then specified what these
mutual obligations were. For this purpose it looked for guidance first in
different host agreements, which it found to provide certain general indications
of what the mutual obligations of organizations and host states to co-operate
in good faith involve. Another source of guidance for the Court was the second
paragraph of Article 56 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and
the corresponding provision in the ILC’s draft articles on treaties between states
and international organizations or between international organizations. The
94 Verbatim Minutes of First Meeting of Commission I, June 14, UNCIO, Doc. 1006, June 15.
95 B. Tittemore, Belligerent in Blue Helmets: Applying International Humanitarian Law to United
Nations Peace Operations, 33 Stanford Journal of International Law 61 (1997), at 102-103.
96 Interpretation of the Agreement of 25 March 1951 between the WHO and Egypt, Advisory
Opinion of 20 December 1980, 1980 ICJ Reports 4.
97 Id., at 19.
98 Id., at 20-21.
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Court found that “these provisions are based on an obligation to act in good
faith and have reasonable regard to the interests of the other party to the
treaty.”
The Court followed the written arguments presented to it by the United
States in as far as it considered that obligations on the parties arose from
general international law. The United States submitted that:
The principle of pacta sunt servanda naturally governs the conduct of the parties
as long as the Agreement remains in force. This principle is reflected in Article
26 of the Vienna Convention, which reads: ‘Every treaty in force is binding upon
the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith.’ The principle has
also been repeatedly reaffirmed by the decisions of this Court and its prede-
cessor.…The responsibilities discussed … arise of general international law and
came into being at the beginning of the relationship between the parties.99
In its Advisory Opinion of 21 June 1971 in the Namibia (South West Africa) case
of 1971,100 the International Court of Justice applied general international
law to the UN. In this case the Court dealt with, among other things, the legal
consequences of General Assembly Resolution 2145,101 which was concerned
with the administration of the Mandated Territory of Namibia by South Africa.
The Resolution declared that South Africa had failed to fulfil its obligations
under the mandate and that the mandate was therefore terminated. The Court
held that the mandate over Namibia that had been conferred by the League
of Nations on South Africa was an international agreement having the charac-
ter of a treaty or convention. In examining this treaty relationship the Court
stated that “it is appropriate to have regard to the general principles of inter-
national law regulating termination of a treaty relationship on account of
breach.”102 In particular, the Court applied:
the general principle of law that a right of termination on account of breach must
be presumed to exist in respect of all treaties, except as regards provisions relating
to the protection of the human person contained in treaties of a humanitarian
character (as indicated in Art. 60, para. 5 of the Vienna Convention). The silence
of a treaty as to the existence of such a right cannot be interpreted as implying
the exclusion of a right which has its source outside of the treaty, in general inter-
99 Interpretation of the Agreement of 25 March 1951 between the WHO and Egypt (Pleadings,
Oral Arguments, Documents), Written Statement of the United States of America, 182 (1951),
at 205.
100 Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South
West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion
of 21 June 1971, ICJ Rep. 1971, at 16.
101 General Assembly Resolution 2145 of 27 October 1966, UN Doc. A/RES/2145 (1966).
102 Supra note 100, at 46.
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national law, and is dependent on the occurrence of circumstances which are not
normally envisaged when a treaty is concluded.103
The mandate was originally an agreement between the League of Nations and
South Africa. The Court considered, however, that the relationship between
the League and South Africa had been replaced on the basis of the UN Charter
by a relationship between the UN and South Africa. Because the mandate was
now an agreement to which the UN was party,104 the general principle of
law that a right of termination on account of breach must be presumed to exist
in respect of all treaties applied to the UN.
There are several examples of general international law being applied
mutatis mutandis to international organizations.105 The law of treaties is one
of these examples. From 1950 to 1960 the ILC prepared draft articles on the
law of treaties. The question was frequently raised in the Commission whether
the draft articles should apply not only to treaties between states but also to
treaties concluded by international organizations. The Commission decided
to exclude treaties concluded by international organizations from the draft
articles. This course was also followed by the drafters of the 1969 Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties.
In 1970 the ILC separately took up the question of treaties concluded
between states and international organizations or between two or more inter-
national organizations. Paul Reuter was appointed Special Rapporteur for this
topic and submitted eleven reports between 1971 and 1982. The approach taken
by the Special Rapporteur was to take the 1969 Vienna Convention as a starting
point. The general rules that applied to treaties concluded between states
should in principle also apply to treaties to which international organizations
were parties. He stated that “if international organizations were to be able
to conclude treaties, general rules must be applied to them which, a priori,
should be the same as those applicable to States.”106 For this reason the Com-
mission followed as far as possible the articles of the 1969 Vienna Convention
referring to treaties between states, for treaties between states and international
103 Id., at 47 (emphasis added).
104 Id., at 37, 46.
105 See also Paul de Visscher, 54 (I) Annuaire IDI 43 (1971):
L’extension analogique du droit interétatique aux activités des organisations internationales
est un phénomène bien connu dont il existe de nombreux examples en matière de traités,
de protection diplomatique et de responsabilité. Que cette extension doive se faire mutatis
mutandis, en tenant compte de la condition spéciale des organisations interantionales et
de la compabilité de la norme en cause avec les finalités de ces organisations, est chose
évidente.
106 YB ILC 1979, Vol. I, at 66.
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organizations and between international organizations.107 The Commission
recognized that there are differences between international organizations and
states that require modification of the rules for states to international organiza-
tions. It stated in its 1978 report that it should consider “what departures have
to be made from the text of the Vienna Convention to take account of the
inherent characteristics of international organizations, whose entire operation
is based on functions and capacities less extensive than those of States.”108
The Commission adopted the draft articles on treaties between states and
international organizations or between international organizations in 1982.
These formed the basis for discussion in the Conference that negotiated the
1986 Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and International
Organizations or between International Organizations.109 The conference took
the same approach as the ILC in agreeing that the new instrument should make
the general law of treaties applicable to international organizations, except
in so far as there was a demonstrated need to adapt that law to the particular-
ities of international organizations.110 The Conference was even more limited
in departing from the rules applicable between states than the ILC had been
in its draft articles. This led one commentator to conclude that while “there
had always been a certain assumption that agreements concluded by inter-
national organizations could and should be governed by the general inter-
national law of treaties, the Convention both confirms the assumption and
circumscribed the questions with respect to which variations of the general
rules are unavoidable.”111
The application of rules of general international law to NATO can be based
on the same considerations as apply to the World Health Organization and
the UN. The organization is an international legal person and in principle the
relations of the organization with other persons of international law will be
governed by international law.112
107 In his first report the Special Rapporteur stated as the first part of the work to be undertaken
by the Commission: “all the provisions of the 1969 Convention must be examined article
by article, in order to determine which of them would require drafting changes to adapt
them to the agreements of international organizations.”; YB ILC 1972, Vol. II (Part One),
at 78.
108 YB ILC 1978, Vol. II (Part Two), at 130.
109 Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and International Organizations or
between International Organizations of 21 March 1986, 25 ILM 543 (1986).
110 G. Gaja, A ’New’ Vienna Convention on Treaties between States and International Organizations
or between International Organizations: A Critical Commentary, 63 British Yearbook of Inter-
national Law 253 (1987), at 258.
111 F. Morgenstern, The Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and International Organiza-
tions or between International Organizations, in Y. Dinstein (Ed.), International Law at a Time
of Perplexity: Essays in Honour of Shabtai Rosenne 435 (1988), at 446.
112 See also L-A. Sicilianos, L’Autorisation par le Conseil de Securité de Recourir à la Force: Une
Tentative d’Evaluation, 106 Revue Générale de Droit International Public 5 (2002), at 36.
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In this regard writers affirm that if the organization is an international legal
person then it is subject to general international law rules of international
humanitarian law.113 These writers generally question whether NATO is an
international legal person. Their arguments are however not convincing.
Johnson for example states that the organization “is not a supranational organ-
ization and, as an entity or legal person, cannot be a belligerent.”114 A supra-
national organization is an international organization with specific character-
istics, including in particular the power to bind individuals by means of
decisions having direct effect. The European Community is an example of such
an organization. An organization however does not need to have these charac-
teristics to have international legal personality. The UN does not have the
power to take decisions that bind individuals by decisions having direct effect
but it certainly does have international legal personality.
The same writer stated that IFOR, a multinational force under the opera-
tional command and control of NATO, “should not be equated to a State in
terms of international obligations.”115 Again, it is one thing to possess inter-
national legal personality and another to be equated to a state. The Inter-
national Court of Justice stated expressly in the Reparations case that the UN
is an international legal person but that that is not the same thing as saying
that “it is a State, which it certainly is not, or that its legal personality and
rights and duties are the same as those of a State.”116
The application of general international law to the UN is subject to the
reservation that the Security Council may derogate from international law
when it is acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter when necessary to
uphold or restore international peace and security. This was the specific
intention of the drafters of the UN Charter as noted above.
It may be noted the application specifically of international humanitarian
law to international organizations is less revolutionary than the application
of many other international rules, because international humanitarian law
already provides for its direct application to non-state actors in the form of
armed opposition groups.117 Traditionally, the application of international
humanitarian law to armed opposition groups remained very much within
a state-centered system. It was dependent on formal recognition by states of
113 See e.g. G. Moritz, The Common Application of the Laws of War within the NATO-Forces, 13
Military Law Review 1 (1961), at 5.
114 M. Johnson, The Function of Legal Advisors in NATO with Regard to International Humanitarian
Law, 35 Revue de Droit Militaire et de Droit de la Guerre 167 (1996), at 170.
115 Letter from Max S. Johnson, Jr, Legal Adviser to the Supreme Allied Command in Europe
(SACEUR), cited in Amnesty International, Amnesty International Renews Calls for IFOR
to Comply with International Law, April 1996.
116 Supra note 21, at 179.
117 See generally L. Zegveld, The Accountability of Armed Opposition Groups in International
Law (2002).
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the non-state group as belligerents.118 Recognizing the status of belligerency
placed the group on the same playing field as states. This state-centered system
was abandoned with the adoption of common Article 3 to the 1949 Geneva
Conventions, which states that certain rules apply in an armed conflict not
of an international character. Common Article 3 notoriously does not define
the term armed conflict, but it is clear that its field of application is determined
by objective standards. It is generally recognized that the level of organization
of the armed group or groups in question is an important aspect of the ob-
jective standard.119 This aspect has been confirmed in the case law of the
international criminal tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. Trial
Chamber I of the Rwanda Tribunal for example stated in its judgment in the
Akayesu case in relation to common Article 3 that “an armed conflict is dis-
tinguished from internal disturbances by the level of intensity of the conflict
and the degree of organization of the parties to the conflict.”120 Additional
Protocol II to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, which develops and supplements
common Article 3, sets out more clearly certain objective criteria for deter-
mining the field of application of the Protocol. The drafters of the Protocol
considered it necessary to set out clear criteria because of the perceived am-
biguity of the field of application of common Article 3, without modifying
the existing conditions of application of that Article. Article 1 of the Protocol
states that the Protocol shall apply:
to all armed conflicts which are not covered by Article 1 of the Protocol Additional
to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of
Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) and which take place in the
territory of a High Contracting Party between its armed forces and dissident armed
forces or other organized armed groups which, under responsible command,
exercise such control over a part of its territory as to enable them to carry out
sustained and concerted military operations and to implement this Protocol.
This Protocol shall not apply to situations of internal disturbances and tensions,
such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence and other acts of a similar
nature, as not being armed conflicts.
Most of the criteria in the article refer directly or indirectly to the level of
organization of the armed group involved in the conflict. This is obvious from
the placement of the word ‘organized’ in front of the expression ‘armed
groups’. The existence of a responsible command and the exercise of control
over part of a territory are also characteristics pointing to a certain level of
organization. The article also makes clear that the requirement of a certain
level of organization is not included for its own sake but because it makes
118 H. Lauterpacht, Oppenheim’s International Law: A Treatise, Vol. 2 (1952), at 249.
119 See § 3.11.
120 Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, Judgment, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Tr. Ch. I, 2 September
1998, para. 625.
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it possible for the group in question to implement the substantive rules of the
Protocol. The Red Cross commentary to Article 1 states that the ability to
implement the Protocol is “the fundamental criterion which justifies the other
elements of the definition.”121 In other words, rules of international human-
itarian law can be declared binding on non-state actors because they are in
a position to implement these rules. This view is also apparent from the
explanation of vote by Canada after the adoption of Article 1 by the plenary
session of the 1977 Conference. Canada stated that “these qualifications are
a reflection of the factual and practical circumstances that would in fact have
to exist if a Party to the conflict could be expected to implement the provisions
of the Protocol.” This argument can be applied to common Article 3 as well
as to Additional Protocol II. The elements of a number of amendments that
were proposed at the 1949 diplomatic conference in the course of drafting
common Article 3, including for example that the armed forces act under the
direction of an organized authority and are prepared to observe the ordinary
laws of war, support the conclusion that the ability of an armed group to
implement the substantive obligations was considered important also for the
application of common Article 3.122 The requirement of a certain level of
organization that is derived from common Article 3 serves to establish that
the armed group involved in the conflict is able to implement the substantive
obligations of that Article. In this context it is submitted that of the criteria
mentioned in Article 1 of the second Additional Protocol, the existence of a
responsible command is relatively more important than control over part of
the territory. It can be argued that humanitarian law is more easily applied
by those who have a territorial base but that this does not mean that it cannot
be implemented by a force which does not control a clearly defined area of
territory.123 A system of responsible command on the other hand seems indis-
pensable.
Being under a responsible command is precisely a characteristic of peace
support operations. UN peace support operations are under the exclusive
operational command and control of the organization. On this basis Glick
argues that:
Only an entity that exercises command and control over military forces can order
or fail to order compliance with humanitarian law, for example, what weapons
121 C. Pilloud et al, Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva
Conventions of 12 August 1949, at 1353 (1987). See also A. Castillo-Suárez, Hors de Logique:
Contemporary Issues in International Humanitarian Law as Applied to Internal Armed Conflict,
15 American University International Law Review 1 (1999), at 91-92, and L. Zegveld, supra
note 117, at 18.
122 See Final Record of the Diplomatic Conference of Geneva of 1949 , Vol. II-B, at 121.
123 C. Greenwood, International Humanitarian Law, Revised report for the Centennial Commemoration
of the First Hague Peace Conference 1899, in F. Kalshoven (Ed.), The Centennial of the First
International Peace Conference: Reports & Conclusions 161 (2000), at 229-230.
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are to be used, how civilian targets are to be avoided, and how prisoners of war
and the wounded are to be treated. The United Nations exercises exclusive com-
mand and control over all troops comprising its forces, which are recruited and
organized as national contingents. As a consequence of its command and control,
the United Nations is deemed a party to armed conflict and thereby subject to the
obligations of IHL.124
The operational control exercised by a NATO commander over a NATO peace
support operation similarly makes that commander the principal person able
to implement international humanitarian law.
This is not to argue that the fact that the ability of an international organ-
ization to implement the law makes it subject to that law, but simply that it
is a small step from accepting the application of international humanitarian
law to organized armed groups to accepting its application to international
organizations.
3.7 EQUAL APPLICATION OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW
It may be pointed out that for a number of decades after the establishment
of the UN writers argued that international humanitarian law did not apply
to the UN on the basis of a superior moral and legal position of the organiza-
tion. Some members of a committee established in 1952 by the American
Society of International Law to study the application of the laws of war to
the organization for example held that:
acceptance of the Charter by Member States meant acceptance by them of the
superior legal position of the United Nations as regards the use of force and that,
consequently, the United Nations may apply such rules as it wishes.125
On this view, a UN peace support operation is the equivalent of an international
police force, and different standards should be applied to the police than to
the criminal.126 The doctrine of equal application that demands that inter-
124 R. Glick, Lip Service to the Laws of War: Humanitarian Law and United Nations Armed Forces,
17 Michigan Journal of International Law 53 (1995), at 97-98.
125 Report of Committee on Study of Legal Problems of the United Nations, Should the Laws
of War Apply to United Nations Enforcement Action?, 46 ASIL Proc. 216 (1952), at 217.
126 A modern writer that adheres to this theory is Sharp. He states that:
Coercive peace-keeping and peace-enforcement action under the Charter should not be
viewed as mutual combat between states in a pre-Charter era when waging war was lawful.
To the contrary, coercive peace-keeping and peace-enforcement actions are a concerted
attempt by the international community to address a humanitarian crisis or thwart a threat
to international peace and security. It is only a visceral fright of undermining the pre-
Charter, outdated distinction between jus in bello and jus ad bellum that most rely upon
to discredit a protected status for all U.N. forces, noncombatants and combatants alike.
166 Scope of application of international humanitarian law to peace support operations
national humanitarian law be applied in a similar manner to all parties to a
conflict should make an exception for UN peace support operations.
Another version of this argument had the prohibition of the use of force
as its starting point. The UN Charter in Article 2, paragraph 4, outlawed the
use of force by states. Any state which had resorted to the prohibited use of
force had, by its original criminality, forfeited the right to be treated according
to the dictates of the law of war and toward such a state the UN could choose
not to apply that law. In other words, a state had forfeited the right to be
treated according to the law of war (ius in bello) because of its breach of the
law against war (ius ad bellum).127
As a general proposition, these views no longer find much support. One
reason is that the general view is that the ius ad bellum should be strictly
distinguished from the ius in bello. A number of decisions by international and
municipal tribunals after World War II rejected the view that an illegal ag-
gressor cannot benefit from the rules of international humanitarian law.128
The realization that the doctrine of equal application is essential to ensure
respect for international humanitarian law gained increasing ground as it
became clear that the prohibition of the use of force in Article 2, paragraph
4, of the UN Charter did not prevent armed conflicts from erupting and that
forces fighting on behalf of the UN in Korea could not hope to benefit from
international humanitarian law unless they themselves respected that law.129
The doctrine was expressly reaffirmed in the preamble to Additional Protocol
I of 1977, which states that the high contracting parties reaffirm:
that the provisions of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and of this
Protocol must be fully applied in all circumstances to all persons who are protected
by those instruments, without any adverse distinction based on the nature or origin
of the armed conflict or on the causes espoused by or attributed to the Parties to
the conflict.
A committee established by the prosecutor of the ICTY to review Operation
Allied Force concluded the same in 2000:
The precise linkage between jus ad bellum and jus in bello is not completely resolved.
There were suggestions by the prosecution before the International Military Tribunal
at Nuremberg and in some other post World War II war crimes cases that all of
the killing and destruction caused by German forces were war crimes because the
Sharp does indicate that this view is not the lex lata, however. W. Sharp Jr., Protecting the
Avatars of International Peace and Security, 7 Duke Journal of Comparative & International
Law 93 (1996), at 164-165, 96.
127 For a description and critique of this argument see D. Bowett, supra note 92, at 493-496.
128 See G. Schwarzenberger, Legal Effects of Illegal War, in K. Zemanek (Ed.), Völkerrecht und
Rechtliches Weltbilt, Festschrift für Alfred Verdross 243 (1960), at 249.
129 J.L. Kunz, The Laws of War, 50 American Journal of International Law 313 (1956), at 319-320
Chapter 3 167
Germans were conducting an aggressive war. The courts were unreceptive to these
arguments. Similarly, in the 1950’s there was a debate concerning whether UN
authorized forces were required to comply with the jus in bello as they represented
the good side in a battle between good an evil. This debate died out as the par-
ticipants realized that a certain crude reciprocity was essential if the law was to
have any positive impact. An argument that the ‘bad’ side had to comply with
the law while the ‘good’ side could violate it at will would be most unlikely to
reduce human suffering in conflict.130
The gradual recognition that international humanitarian law must be applied
equally between all parties is illustrated by studies by the Institut de Droit
International from 1957 until 1975.
From 1957 until 1959 the twenty-fifth Commission of the IDI discussed the
topic of the reconsideration of the principles of the laws of war. The Rappor-
teur, François, in his provisional report stated that in the commission the
analogy between military action under the auspices of the UN and the legal
situation of the police was recognized. Nevertheless, a majority of the members
considered that that the law of war should continue to be founded on the
equality of the belligerents during hostilities.131 The IDI adopted a resolution
on the topic in 1959 that did not include substantive provisions but divided
the topic into three questions, one of which was the “equal application of the
rules of the law of war to the parties to an armed conflict.”132
In the discussion in the Fourth Commission on that topic, the principle
of equal application found less support than it had previously. The Rapporteur
proposed that discrimination should be possible in the event of military action
by UN forces acting on the basis of a decision of the Security Council. He
proposed that only obligations of international humanitarian law “whose
purpose is to restrain the horrors of war and which are imposed on belligerents
for humanitarian reasons by Conventions in force, by the general principles
of law and by the rules of customary law, are always in force for the parties
in all categories of armed conflicts and apply equally to actions undertaken
by the United Nations.”133 The Rapporteur’s proposition was heavily
criticized by certain members of the commission who pointed out that it is
difficult if not impossible to distinguish between ‘humanitarian’ and ‘non-
humanitarian’ rules of international humanitarian law.134 The criticism did
130 Supra note 16, para. 32.
131 Reconsideration des Principes du Droit de la Guerre, Rapport Provisoire, J.P.A. François,
47 (I) Annuaire Institut de Droit International 323 (1957), at 332.
132 Resolution, Reconsideration of the Principles of the Law of War, 48 (II) Annuaire Institut
de Droit International 389 (1959).
133 L’Egalité d’application des règles du droit de la guerre aux parties à un conflit armé,
Rapport Provisoire, J.P.A. François, 50 (I) Annuaire Institut de Droit International 5 (1963),
at 10.
134 Observations de M. Eustathiades, 50 (I) Annuaire Institut de Droit International 27 (1963),
at 28-29; see also the observations by Kunz, Id., at 42 and Wengler, Id., at 105.
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not lead the Rapporteur to change his views, though he stated that the human-
itarian basis of almost all rules of international humanitarian law perhaps could
lead to the affirmation that there are very few cases in which the law could
be applied in a discriminatory way.135 The resolution adopted by the IDI on
this topic provided for discrimination in respect of non-humanitarian norms,
but only when the competent organ of the UN has determined that one of the
belligerents has resorted to armed force in violation of the rules of the law
of nations consecrated by the Charter of the UN.136
The 1963 resolution also invited the Commission to continue its study of
the question to what extent and under what conditions this inequality must
be accepted. The topic of this study was entitled “les conditions d’application
des lois de la guerre aux opérations militaires des Nations Unies”. Paul de
Visscher was appointed as the new Rapporteur on this topic. He adopted the
same approach as his predecessor by making a distinction between ‘human-
itarian’ and ‘non-humanitarian’ rules. However, he recognized that it is very
difficult to make this distinction in practice. He proposed a non-exhaustive
list of examples of ‘non-humanitarian’ rules. The only example he gave that
was not in the field of the law of neutrality or economic warfare was the
authorization for UN forces occupying the territory of the aggressor to derogate
from the laws in force in that territory and to proceed to requisitions and
contributions exceeding the needs of the occupying forces.137 The examples
of these ‘non-humanitarian’ rules led to debates in the commission. The Rap-
porteur observed that no member of the commission suggested any particular
135 “On pourrait peut-être affirmer que de cette façon le nombre des cas auxquels la discrimina-
tion pourrait s’appliquer serait assez restreint.”, Rapport Définitif, J.P.A. François, 50 (I)
Annuaire Institut de Droit International 111 (1963), at 121.
136 Resolution IV, Equality of Application of the Rules of the Law of War to Parties to an Armed
Conflict (Fourth Commission), adopted on 11 September 1963. 50 (II) Annuaire Institut
de Droit International 376 (1963):
The Institute of International Law,
Considering, on the one hand, that obligations whose purpose is to restrain the horrors
of war and which are imposed on belligerents for humanitarian reasons by Conventions
in force, by the general principles of law and by the rules of customary law, are always
in force for the parties in all categories of armed conflicts and apply equally to actions
undertaken by the United Nations;
Being of the opinion, on the other hand, subject to the above reservation, that there cannot
be complete equality in the application of the rules of the law of war when the competent
organ of the United Nations has determined that one of the belligerents has resorted to
armed force in violation of the rules of the law of nations consecrated by the Charter of
the United Nations;
Invites the fourth Commission to continue its study of the question to what extent and
under what conditions this inequality must be accepted.
137 Les conditions d’application des lois de la guerre aux opérations militaires des Nations
Unies, Rapport Provisoire, Paul de Visscher, 54 (I) Annuaire Institut de Droit International
1 (1971), at 94.
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‘non-humanitarian’ rules in the field of the actual conduct of armed con-
flict.138 This led the Rapporteur to limit the examples of ‘non-humanitarian’
rules entirely to the field of economic warfare and to drop the reference to
the regime of occupation.139 The Commission could not even agree on these
examples, however, and the resolution that was adopted did not include a
reference to ‘non-humanitarian’ rules. It only stated that:
the humanitarian rules of the law of armed conflict apply to the United Nations
as of right, and they must be complied with in all circumstances by United Nations
Forces which are engaged in hostilities.
The rules referred to in the preceding paragraph include in particular:
a. the rules pertaining to the conduct of hostilities in general and especially those
prohibiting the use or some uses of certain weapons, those concerning the
means of injuring the other party, and those relating to the distinction between
military and non-military objectives;
b. the rules contained in the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949;
c. the rules which aim at protecting civilian persons and property.140
The first Commission of the IDI continued to study the question of ‘non-human-
itarian’ rules of international humanitarian law under a new Rapporteur,
Edvard Hambro. In 1975, without much discussion, the IDI adopted a resolution
which accepted the equal application of ‘non-humanitarian’ rules of inter-
national humanitarian law to UN forces, with the exception of the law of
neutrality.141
138 Les conditions d’application des lois de la guerre aux opérations militaires des Nations
Unies, Rapport Définitif, Paul de Visscher, 54 (I) Annuaire Institut de Droit International
116 (1971), at 144.
139 Id., at 135.
140 Resolution, Conditions of Application of Humanitarian Rules of Armed Conflict to Hostil-
ities in which United Nations Forces may be Engaged, Annuaire Institut de Droit Inter-
national 54 (II) (1971) 465.
141 Resolution, Conditions of Application of Rules, other than Humanitarian Rules, of Armed
Conflict to Hostilities in which United Nations Forces may be Engaged, Annuaire Institut
de Droit International 56 (1975), at 541. The relevant part of the resolution reads:
Article 2
Subject to the exceptions provided for in the following Articles, the rules of armed conflict
shall apply to hostilities in which United Nations Forces are engaged, even if those rules
are not specifically humanitarian in character.
[…]
Article 4
Whenever United Nations Forces are engaged in hostilities, Member States of the Organisa-
tion may not take advantage of general rules of the law of neutrality in order to avoid
obligations laid upon them in pursuance of a decision of the Security Council acting in
accordance with the Charter, nor may they depart from the rules of neutrality for the benefit
of a party opposing the United Nations Forces.
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3.8 STATE PRACTICE AND PRACTICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS
3.8.1 A developing practice
Strictly speaking, the theory under which the organization is bound by inter-
national humanitarian law as an international person acting in a particular
field does not require the international organization in question to contribute
to the rules of customary international law concerned.142 The organization
is directly bound.143 In practice, the policy of the organization is of course
very important. However, until recently UN practice continued to give rise
to questions concerning the legal basis and the extent of the applicability of
international humanitarian law to UN peace support operations. Present practice
by the UN and states is consistent with the view that the UN, its organs and
peace support operations should be bound by rules of international human-
itarian law. The development in practice started with the first United Nations
Emergency Force (1956) and has for the moment culminated in the Statute
of the Special Court for Sierra Leone of 2000.
3.8.2 Correspondence with the ICRC
After the first United Nations Emergency Force had been established in 1956
the President of the ICRC wrote a letter to the UN. He proposed that the force
receive instructions ensuring that it comply with the 1949 Geneva Conventions
if the circumstances should so require.144 The UN replied that the force had
been instructed to observe the principles and the spirit of the general inter-
national conventions concerning the behavior of military personnel. These
instructions were included in the regulations issued for the force by the Secret-
ary-General. The organization however did not specify the meaning of the
term principles and spirit nor refer to specific conventions.
The President of the ICRC repeated his request after the establishment of
ONUC. The ICRC also addressed a memorandum to the governments of states
parties to the Geneva Conventions that were also members of the UN. This
memorandum first referred to the undertaking by the UN to respect the prin-
ciples and spirit of international humanitarian conventions. It noted that in
reply to ICRC communications that:
The International Committee of the Red Cross received assurances that the United
Nations Organization would respect the principles of the international humanitarian
142 H. Schermers & N. Blokker, supra note 87, at 983-984.
143 J. Stone, supra note 90, at 315; C. Emanuelli, Les Actions Militaires de l ÓNU et le Droit
International Humanitaire 51 (1995).
144 F. Seyersted, supra note 22, at 190.
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Conventions and that instructions to that effect had been given to the troops placed
under its command. It was pleased to place these assurances on record.145
The memorandum not only asserted that the UN was bound by humanitarian
law, but also that the troop contributing states remained bound with respect
to the troops they contributed. It stated that:
In fact, the United Nations Organization is not, as such, party to the Geneva
Conventions. Consequently, each State is personally responsible for the application
of these Conventions. It would therefore be highly desirable that such contingents
receive, before leaving their own countries, instructions to conform to the provisions
of the Geneva Conventions in the event of their finding themselves having to use
force.146
The force’s regulations contained a regulation on the observance of conven-
tions. This regulation stated that the force would “observe the principles and
spirit of the general humanitarian conventions.”147
3.8.3 Practice in respect of ONUC
A clear recognition that the UN is bound by international humanitarian law
are the lump sums that the organization paid to several states as a result of
damages from the force’s operations.148 The lump sum agreements themselves
did not refer to international humanitarian law, but in correspondence with
the Soviet Union the Secretary-General stated that the policy of claims settle-
ment in regard to the UN activities in the Congo was “reinforced by the prin-
ciples set forth in the international conventions concerning the protection of
the life and property of civilian population during hostilities.” Apparently,
the United Kingdom also considered a claim against the UN on the ground
that actions of the UN force were contrary to the 1907 Hague Regulations.149
Seyersted describes that operations in the Congo gave rise to accusations
from both sides of violations of international humanitarian law.150 In his
report on the developments in Elisabethville from 8 to 14 December 1961 for
example, the Officer-in-Charge of the United Nations Operation stated that
the “Kantangese forces regularly abused the Red Cross symbol, contrary to
145 International Committee of the Red Cross memorandum, Application and dissemination
of the Conventions, cited in Seyersted, supra note 22, at 191.
146 Id.
147 ONUC Regulations of 15 July 1963, UN Doc. ST/SGB/ONUC/1, Regulation 43.
148 See § 2.7.2.
149 R. Simmonds, supra note 23, at 238.
150 F. Seyersted, supra note 22, at 192-197.
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the law of war.”151 Belgium urged the Secretary-General to issue immediate
instructions that United Nations troops should scrupulously respect the obliga-
tions of the Geneva Convention and made a number of specific charges of
breaches of international humanitarian law. In response, the UN refuted the
factual accuracy of the charges but not the applicability of international human-
itarian law.152 The ICRC maintained representatives in the Congo who inter-
vened on a number of occasions in order to secure observance of international
humanitarian law, inter alia by visiting persons detained by ONUC.153
3.8.4 UNFICYP Regulations
The regulations enacted for the United Nations Force in Cyprus, established
in 1964, included a similar but slightly different worded provision as the
regulations for previous forces on the application of international humanitarian
law.154 The organization now also specified, though in a non-exhaustive man-
ner, the general international conventions in question in the participating states
agreements. The agreements stated in relation to the force regulations that:
The international Conventions referred to in this Regulation include inter alia, the
Geneva (Red Cross) Conventions of 12 August 1949 to which your Government
is a party and the UNESCO Convention on the Protection of Cultural Property in
the Event of Armed Conflict.155
3.8.5 Travaux préparatoires of Additional Protocol I
The matter of the application of humanitarian law to United Nations peace
support operations arose during the 1971 Conference of Government Experts,
leading up to the adoption of Additional Protocol I. The ICRC drew attention
to the matter as it had done in respect of specific operations. In response, the
representative of the Secretary-General of the UN at the Conference stated that:
The problem of applying the Geneva Conventions to the United Nations Peace-
Keeping Forces was not a topical issue and should not therefore concern the
Conference. In fact, each regulation issued by the Secretary-General for those forces,
151 United Nations Review, IX, No. 1 (January 1962), at 52.
152 UN Doc. S/5025 of 15 December 1961.
153 Annual Report of the International Committee of the Red Cross 1961, at 10-11.
154 UNFICYP Regulations of 25 April 1964, 555 UNTS 132, regulation 40. Observance of
Conventions. The Force shall observe and respect the principles and spirit of the general
international Conventions applicable to the conduct of military personnel.
155 See Exchange of letters (with annexes) constituting an agreement concerning the service
with the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force in Cyprus of the national contingent provided
by the Government of Canada, New York, 21 February 1966, 555 UNTS 120, at 126.
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such as that currently applying to the peace-keeping forces in Cyprus, implied not
only respect for the letter of international Conventions applying to the conduct
of military staff but also the most scrupulous respect for the spirit of such
treaties.156
At the second session of the Conference in 1972, the representative of the
Secretary-General repeated the explanations given during the first session.
He added that since the UN had neither territorial authority nor criminal or
disciplinary jurisdiction, it was for the time being incapable of implementing
the Geneva Conventions. The representative underscored that:
Though the United Nations might for the present lack the necessary authority to
ensure respect for the Conventions of Geneva, guarantees to that effect were
inscribed in the bilateral agreements with the Governments furnishing troops for
the United Nations forces. Those Governments (which were Parties to the Conven-
tions of Geneva) had in particular undertaken to furnish instructed troops and to
ensure that their contingents respect the international humanitarian norms.157
At first sight this statement seems to reject the idea that principles or rules
of international humanitarian law apply to the UN as an organization, and
to state that only troop contributing states are bound by those rules. Yet this
does not seem to have been UN policy in 1972. A legal opinion of the Secret-
ariat of that year rather emphasizes the practical obstacles for the organization
in fulfilling certain obligations of international humanitarian law that are an
obstacle to becoming party to humanitarian law treaties, but it does not exclude
that the organization is bound by certain rules of international humanitarian
law:
The United Nations is not substantively in a position to become a party to the 1949
Conventions, which contain many obligations that can only be discharged by the
exercise of juridical and administrative powers which the Organization does not
possess, such as the authority to exercise criminal jurisdiction over members of
the Forces, or administrative competence relating to territorial sovereignty. Thus
the United Nations is unable to fulfil obligations which for their execution require
the exercise of powers not granted to the Organization, and therefore cannot accede
to the Conventions.
However, the United Nations by exchanges of letters, binds governments contri-
buting contingents to its Forces to ensure respect for the Conventions by their
respective contingents, and it has itself requested the Forces, in Regulations issued
by the Organization, to respect the humanitarian principles and spirit of the Con-
ventions.158
156 Supra note 24, at 52, para. 311.
157 Supra note 25, at 194, para. 4.166.
158 Question of the Possible Accession of Intergovernmental Organizations to the Geneva
Conventions for the Protection of War Victims of 15 June 1972, 1972 UNJY 153-154.
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When in 1978 the Security Council established the United Nations Interim
Force in Lebanon,159 the President of the ICRC continued his practice of
writing letters to the UN Secretary-General to draw attention to respect for
international humanitarian law. In a letter of 23 October 1978 the Secretary-
General replied that the principles of humanitarian law “must, should the need
arise, be applied within the framework of the operations carried out by United
Nations forces.”160
Several months earlier the organization had issued an interoffice memo-
randum to all commanders of United Nations forces. This memorandum
specified that, in cases where the forces have to use their weapons in accord-
ance with their mandate, the principles and spirit of the rules of international
humanitarian law should apply, as laid down in the Geneva Conventions of
1949, the Additional Protocols of 1977 and elsewhere.161
3.8.6 Model Participating State Agreement
In 1991 the Secretary-General presented a model participating state agreement
based on established practice and previous agreements.162 Article 28 of the
model agreement provides that:
[The United Nations peace-keeping operation] shall observe and respect the prin-
ciples and spirit of the general international conventions applicable to the conduct
of military personnel. The international conventions referred to above include the
four Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and their Additional Protocols of 8
June 1977 and the UNESCO Convention of 14 May 1954 on the Protection of Cultural
Property in the event of armed conflict. [The Participating State] shall therefore
ensure that the members of its national contingent serving with [the United Nations
peace-keeping operation] be fully acquainted with the principles and spirit of these
Conventions.
This provision follows the practice developed between the UN and participating
states. The model follows established practice in as much as previous contribu-
ting states agreements, in themselves or by reference to force regulations,
included a similar obligation. In practice, however, formal agreements along
the lines of the model agreement are not always concluded with troop con-
tributing states.163
159 Security Council Resolution 425 of 19 March 1978, UN Doc. S/RES/425.
160 U. Palwankar, Applicability of International Humanitarian Law to United Nations Peacekeeping
Forces, 75 International Review of the Red Cross 227 (1993), at 232.
161 Id.
162 See § 1.8.2.
163 Information provided to the author by Professor Paul Szasz.
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3.8.7 Status of Forces Agreements
In contrast to troop contributing agreements, status of forces agreements did
for a long time not include a provision on international humanitarian law.
The 1990 model status of forces agreement does not include such a provision
either. These agreements did not entail the direct treaty-based responsibility
of the organization toward host states to ensure respect for international
humanitarian law by members of its forces.164 In 1992 such a provision on
international humanitarian law was included for the first time in the status
of forces agreement with Rwanda. Article 7 of the agreement stated that:
The United Nations shall ensure that UNAMIR carries out its operations in Rwanda
in a manner fully consistent with the principles and spirit of the general conventions
applicable to the conduct of military personnel. The relevant instruments include
the four Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and the additional Protocols thereto
of 8 June 1977, and the UNESCO Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property
in the event of Armed Conflict of 14 May 1954;165
Other status of forces agreements concluded since 1992 contained a similar
clause on respect for international humanitarian law.166
It may be noted that all the statements and instruments relating to the
application of international humanitarian law to UN peace support operations
until this point use the term ‘principles and spirit of international humanitarian
law’. The precise content of the term however was never defined. On the one
hand it definitely implied that not all the rules of the relevant conventions
applied. On the other hand it was not clear which rules did apply, nor even
which conventions other than the ones expressly named were relevant.167
After the adoption of the 1977 Additional Protocols a reference to these conven-
tions was included in relevant agreements, but did the principles and spirit
of the 1980 Conventional Weapons Convention or the 1997 Ottawa Convention
on the prohibition of anti-personnel landmines, for example, also become
applicable?
164 D. Shraga, supra note 91, at 68.
165 Agreement between the United Nations and the Government of the Republic of Rwanda
on the Status of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda of 5 November 1993,
UNTS 1748.
166 For example the Agreement between the United Nations and the Government of the
Republic of Croatia on the Status of the United Nations Confidence Restoration Operation
in Croatia of 15 May 1995, UNTS 1864.
167 C. Greenwood, International Humanitarian Law and United Nations Military Operations, 1
Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law 3 (1998), at 23.
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3.8.8 Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel
The question of the applicability of international humanitarian law was in-
directly addressed during the drafting of the Convention on the Safety of
United Nations and Associated Personnel. The genesis of the convention is
the concern over an increase in attacks on United Nations personnel in general,
and members of peace support operations in particular, in the early 1990s,
inter alia as a result of new types of peace support operations being deployed.
The UN Secretary-General stated in his 1992 An Agenda for Peace that “in-
novative measures will be required to deal with the dangers facing United
Nations personnel.”168 In 1993 the Secretary-General submitted a report to
the Security Council at the request of the Council proposing inter alia the
negotiation of a new legal instrument for the protection of UN personnel.169
In December 1993 the General Assembly established an ad hoc committee
to elaborate such a convention. The convention drafted by the committee was
adopted by the General Assembly on 9 December 1994, and entered into force
on 15 January 1999.170 The convention is not directly concerned with the
application of international humanitarian law to UN operations. Its principal
function is to oblige states parties to criminalize attacks on UN and associated
personnel and an obligation to prosecute or extradite alleged offenders. Precise-
ly this function made it necessary to consider the application of international
humanitarian law. The negotiators realized that it was necessary to have a
clear separation between the new legal regime under the instrument being
drafted and international humanitarian law. One negotiator states that:
One important reason for this was to avoid undermining the Geneva Conventions,
which rely in part for their effectiveness on all forces being treated equally. It was
widely held that the new Convention should not criminalize attacks on UN forces
engaged as combatants in an international armed conflict, as this could (by making
the very act of waging war against the United Nations a criminal offense, and thus
favoring one side over the other) lessen the willingness of opposing forces to adhere
to the laws of war.171
In other words, the negotiators held that the convention should cease to apply
where international humanitarian law starts to apply to members of UN opera-
tions as combatants.
In principle, the negotiators accepted the idea that UN operations can
become a party to an armed conflict and rejected notions of the UN as an
168 UN Doc. S/24111 of 17 June 1992, reproduced in 31 ILM 953 (1992), para. 66.
169 UN Doc. A/48/349, para 34. See also UN Doc. A/AC.242/1, paras. 11-16 (1994).
170 Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel, reproduced in 34
ILM 482 (1995).
171 E. Bloom, Protecting Peacekeepers: The Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated
Personnel, 89 American Journal of International Law 621 (1995), at 625.
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international police force morally and legally superior to its opponents. It
remained to define the point at which an operation goes from being protected
by the convention to being a party to an armed conflict. A number of pro-
visions of the convention are relevant to this determination.
The first relevant provision is Article 1, paragraph 1. This article, together
with Article 2, paragraph 1, defines the scope of application of the convention.
The convention is applicable to UN operations, which are defined in Article 1,
paragraph 1 as operations:
established by the competent organ of the United Nations in accordance with the
Charter of the United Nations and conducted under United Nations authority and
control
The wording of this provision was much debated in the ad hoc committee. A
number of states wanted to restrict the scope of application of the convention
to operations mandated by the Security Council and under the command of
the control of the United Nations itself. Other states felt that operations estab-
lished by the General Assembly should also be included. Yet again other states
advocated a broad approach whereby the convention would also cover opera-
tions authorized under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter conducted
under the control and supervision of the United Nations, presumably including
operations under the command and control of states or regional organiza-
tions.172 The final wording of the provision is a heavily negotiated com-
promise. While some writers state that the definition excludes operations
authorized by the UN but controlled by individual member states or groups
of member states, or by regional organizations such as Opération Turquoise
carried out under French command and control,173 other writers maintain
that such operations are covered by the convention.174 States parties also
interpret the provision differently. The government of the Netherlands for
example holds that KFOR is not covered by the convention because it is not
under the control of the UN.175 The United States on the other hand would
presumably consider that KFOR is in fact covered, as it considered that the
multinational force in Haiti and assistance provided by NATO to UNPROFOR
in Bosnia were covered.176
The second relevant provision is Article 2, paragraph 2 of the convention.
This provision was intended as a demarcation between the application of the
convention regime and international humanitarian law:
172 Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Work carried out during the Period from 28 March
to 8 April 1994 of 13 April 1994, UN Doc. A/Ac.242/2, para. 47, 168.
173 C. Greenwood, Protection of Peacekeepers: The Legal Regime, 7 Duke Journal of Comparative
& International Law 185 (1996), at 195.
174 E. Bloom, supra note 171, at 623.
175 Handelingen TK 2001-02, 27454 (R 1668), nr. 7.
176 See United States explanation of vote, UN Doc. A/49/PV 84, at 15.
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This Convention shall not apply to a United Nations operation authorized by the
Security Council as an enforcement action under Chapter VII of the Charter of the
United Nations in which any of the personnel are engaged as combatants against
organized armed forces and to which the law of international armed conflict applies.
This provision is also a compromise between opposing positions. Its deliberate
ambiguity creates confusion about the scope of the exclusion clause and the
point at which international humanitarian law starts to apply.
First, it is unclear how the term ‘authorized’ should be interpreted, especial-
ly if it is seen in relation to the term ‘under United Nations control and author-
ity’ in Article 1. The view that seems to have prevailed in the discussions of
the draft convention in the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly favors
a strict interpretation of the term authorized, but the above-mentioned United
States view cannot be discounted.177
Secondly, the wording of the provision suggests that operations established
under Chapter VI, or VI ½, of the United Nations Charter are a priori covered
by the convention and thus excluded from the regime of international human-
itarian law. As noted, the drafters of the convention considered that the two
regimes are mutually exclusive.178 An interpretation in which operations
under Chapter VI or VI ½ are a priori covered by the convention is supported
by the statement by one of the sponsors of the draft convention:
After pointing out that the instrument under elaboration was not intended to deal
with situations where the United Nations would be acting as a party to a conflict,
he observed that States parties to a conflict were always under an obligation to
distinguish between civilians and combatants and between civilian objects and
military objectives, the consequence being that United Nations personnel and their
property could never be made the object of attack while conducting traditional
peace-keeping operations or enforcement operations … He added that if the United
Nations, presumably further to a decision of the Security Council, assumed the
status of a party to a conflict, then the normal laws of war would apply, with the
opposing forces being placed on an equal footing.179
The delegation in question assumed that the mandate of an operation under
Chapter VI or VI ½ does not allow it to become involved in hostilities and
therefore such an operation will never become a party to an armed conflict.
Its premise is the principle of the minimum use of force in traditional peace
support operations. Such an argument is also maintained by a number of
authors, but it does not reflect the reality that even operations that are not
177 See D. Shraga, supra note 91, at 76.
178 C. Emanuelli, The Protection Afforded to Humanitarian Assistance Personnel under the Convention
on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel, 6 Humanitäres Völkerrecht Informa-
tionsschriften 4 (1990), at 6.
179 Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Work carried out during the Period from 28 March
to 8 April 1994 of 13 April 1994, UN Doc. A/Ac.242/2, para. 76.
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established under Chapter VII of the UN Charter can become involved in
protracted hostilities to which the law of armed conflict would apply if the
hostilities took place between states. It may be recalled that the concept of
self-defense is interpreted broadly in respect of UN peace support operations
as including a variety of purposes. In addition, the fact that the mandate of
an operation only allows the limited use of force does not automatically
guarantee that in practice there will be minimal use of force. The principle
of the minimum use of force is not always respected and the Brahimi Report
also seems to advocate a broad definition of the term. A peace support opera-
tion which exercises its right to self-defense might well find itself engaged
in protracted hostilities with organized armed forces, which would be subject
to the law of armed conflict. An interpretation of Article 2, paragraph 2, to
the effect that personnel of operations under Chapter VI or VI ½ are never
bound by international humanitarian law as combatants, would also run
counter to the most widely held opinions and the practice of the UN itself. As
noted, the UN has included provisions on the application of international
humanitarian law in regulations and SOFAs in respect of operations not estab-
lished under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The government of the Netherlands
therefore prefers to interpret the provision as not automatically excluding
operations under Chapter VI or VI ½ from the application of international
humanitarian law. It has stated that:
In principle International Humanitarian Law will not be applicable to operations
under Chapter VI of the Charter, since that Chapter exclusively concerns the peace-
ful settlement of disputes. However, it cannot be excluded that in case it exercises
its right to self-defense – even if based on Chapter VI – a United Nations peace
support operation becomes engaged in hostilities, and that International Human-
itarian Law becomes applicable.180
Article 2, paragraph 2 could also be read as excluding situations in which an
operation is engaged as a party to a non-international armed conflict, because
the article refers to the law of international armed conflict only. The wording
suggests that if an operation would be engaged in hostilities with a non-state
entity such an operation would not be excluded from the Convention’s scope
because the conflict would be non-international.181 The travaux préparatoires
of the convention suggest that some delegations considered this an appropriate
180 In beginsel zal het internationale humanitaire recht niet van toepassing zijn op operaties
onder hoofdstuk VI van het Handvest, welk hoofdstuk immers uitsluitend de vreedzame
regeling van geschillen betreft. Niet is echter per definitie uitgesloten dat in situaties van
zelfverdediging een VN-operatie – hoewel gebaseerd op hoofdstuk VI – betrokken raakt
bij het gebruik van geweld, en dat internationaal humanitair recht van toepassing is.
Bijlagen Handelingen TK 2001-02, 27454 (R 1668), nr. 7. English translation by the author.
181 See C. Bourloyannis-Vrailas, The Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated
Personnel, 44 International & Comparative Law Quarterly 561 (1995), at 568.
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interpretation of Article 2, paragraph 2. The report of the ad hoc Committee
states in regard to a proposal that was included in the article that several
delegations:
noted that, under the proposal, the convention would not apply in respect of an
operation: (a) authorized by the Security Council as an enforcement action; (b)
involving an international armed conflict to which common article 2 of the 1949
Geneva Conventions applied; and (c) involving United Nations personnel as a party
to the conflict.182
On the other hand, the chairman of the ad hoc Committee writes that the
wording in Article 2, paragraph 2 proved acceptable in the end because it was
generally agreed that it was impossible for the UN itself to be involved in an
internal armed conflict since once UN or associated personnel became engaged
in conflict with a local force the conflict becomes by definition international
in character.183 This appears to be a more acceptable interpretation.
The third relevant provision is Article 20, paragraph a. This provision is
a so-called savings clause in respect of the application of international human-
itarian law. It was introduced by five Nordic countries seeing the need for
a provision on obligations relating to the observance of international human-
itarian law by the UN itself.184 Article 20, paragraph a, of the convention states
that nothing in the convention shall affect:
The applicability of International Humanitarian Law and universally recognized
standards of human rights as contained in international instruments in relation
to the protection of United Nations operations and United Nations and associated
personnel or the responsibility of such personnel to respect such law and standards.
The consequences of this provision are not entirely clear. The provision can
be interpreted in the sense that in situations in which the convention is not
applicable on the basis of Article 2, paragraph 2, UN personnel have a respons-
ibility to respect international humanitarian law, adding nothing to what is
already stated in Article 2, paragraph 2. An alternative interpretation is that
international humanitarian law and the convention can apply simultaneous-
ly.185 In this case however there is a contradiction with the purported object-
ive of the negotiators to clearly distinguish between situations in which the
182 Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Work carried out during the Period from 28 March
to 8 April 1994 of 13 April 1994, UN Doc. A/Ac.242/2, para. 169.
183 P. Kirsch, The Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel, 2 Inter-
national Peacekeeping 102 (1995), at 105.
184 M.J. Thwaites, Negotiating a Convention on the Safety of UN Personnel, in H. Smith (Ed.),
International Peacekeeping; Building on the Cambodian Experience 169 (1994), at 170.
185 As suggested by C. Bourloyannis-Vrailas, supra note 181, at 583-584, and by A. Bouvier,
Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel: Presentation and Analysis,
35 International Review of the Red Cross 638 (1995).
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convention is applicable and situations in which international humanitarian
law applies. In any event, however, Article 20, paragraph a, makes clear that
though in such a case a UN operation could be a party to an armed conflict
while its opponents would not have the combatant’s privilege (of not being
criminally responsible for taking place in the armed conflict), this would not
release the UN operation from the obligation to respect international human-
itarian law.
In short, the convention seems to reaffirm that a UN peace support opera-
tion can be a party to an armed conflict and be bound to respect international
humanitarian law. The compromise wording of its most important provisions
however creates ambiguity concerning the point at which international human-
itarian law becomes applicable. In this respect the UN Secretary-General stated
in 2000 that:
It will eventually be for the practice of States or any of the competent national or
international jurisdictions, to clearly delineate the distinction between the mutually
exclusive regimes of International Humanitarian Law and the protective regime
of the Convention. In the final analysis, it is not the nature of the conflict which
should determine the applicability of International Humanitarian Law or that of
the Convention, but whether in any type of conflict, members of United Nations
peacekeeping operations are actively engaged therein as combatants, or are other-
wise entitled to the protection given to civilians under the international law of
armed conflict.186
3.8.9 Secretary-General’s Bulletin on the Observance by United Nations
Forces of International Humanitarian Law
The applicability of international humanitarian law to UN peace support
operations was unequivocally reaffirmed by the promulgation by the United
Nations Secretary-General in 1999 of the Secretary-General’s Bulletin on
Observance by United Nations Forces of International Humanitarian Law.187
The negotiations for the Convention on the Safety of United Nations and
Associated Personnel, as well as incidents in peace support operations in
Somalia and the former Yugoslavia allegedly constituting breaches of inter-
national humanitarian law, demonstrated the need for a clear policy on the
186 Report of the Secretary-General, Scope of Legal Protection under the Convention on the
Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel of 21 November 2000, UN Doc. A/55/
637, footnote 3.
187 U.N. Secretary-General’s Bulletin on the Observance by United Nations Forces of Inter-
national Humanitarian Law, 38 ILM 1656. See generally A. Ryniker, Respect du Droit
International Humanitaire par les Forces des Nations Unies, 81 International Review of the Red
Cross 795 (1999); M. Zwanenburg, The Secretary-General’s Bulletin on Observance by United
Nations Forces of International Humanitarian Law, 39 Military Law and Law of War Review
14 (2000).
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application of international humanitarian law to UN peace support operations.
In 1995 the United Nations Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations
requested the Secretary-General to “complete the elaboration of a code of
conduct for United Nations peace-keeping personnel, consistent with applicable
International Humanitarian Law.”188 The ICRC, as a strong protagonist of
such a code, played an important role in its drafting. It organized two meetings
of experts on the applicability of international humanitarian law to UN forces
in 1995. A half-dozen experts from academic and military circles and various
UN representatives as well as legal experts from the ICRC attended the meetings.
The participants analyzed provisions of humanitarian law in order to determine
their applicability to peacekeeping forces and drew up a draft code of conduct.
The project was subsequently reviewed jointly by the ICRC and the UN Secret-
ariat. On 10 May 1996 the ‘Guidelines for UN forces regarding respect for
International Humanitarian Law’ were presented to the Secretary-General.189
The term ‘Guidelines’ was later replaced with ‘Directives’. The Directives were
circulated for comments by member states at the end of June 1999, followed
by a meeting of the Office of Legal Affairs and the Department of Peacekeeping
Operations with member states for a final exchange of views on the text.190
The directives were then finalized and issued by the Secretary-General on 6
August 1999.
The Bulletin is subdivided into ten sections together comprising 34 articles.
Sections 1 and 2 address the Bulletin’s field of application and its relation to
certain other instruments and sources of law. Sections 3 and 4 deal with Status
of Forces Agreements and jurisdiction over personnel of a UN force. Sections
5-9 are concerned with different groupings of international humanitarian law
provisions. Finally, section 10 states that the Bulletin shall enter into force on
12 August 1999, exactly fifty years after the adoption of the Geneva Conven-
tions of 1949.
The preamble to the Bulletin declares that it is promulgated “for the
purpose of setting out fundamental principles and rules of International
Humanitarian Law applicable to United Nations forces conducting operations
under United Nations command and control.” The difference between the
terms ‘principles and rules’, and ‘principles and spirit’ traditionally used by
the UN, is immediately apparent. It underlines the fact that this is the first time
the UN has issued specific rules of humanitarian law for its forces in contrast
to the very general undertaking to respect the principles and spirit of human-
itarian law. In a 2001 report the United Nations Secretary-General reaffirmed
188 Report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, UN Doc. A/50/230, para.
73
189 ICRC Press Release, 15 May 1996.
190 Report of the Secretary-General on the Implementation of the Recommendations of the
Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations of 6 January 2000, UN Doc. A/54/670,
para. 42.
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that the Bulletin signals “formal recognition of the applicability of International
Humanitarian Law to United Nations peace operations.”191
The Bulletin itself however does not state the legal basis for such a formal
recognition. In particular, it does not specify whether the provisions of the
Bulletin are simply a codification of customary international law that was
already considered applicable, or whether the rules have a constitutive charac-
ter. During one of the meetings of experts organized by the ICRC an expert
remarked that the exercise amounted to identifying what rules were customary
law, since those automatically applied to the UN, but other experts held that
going through the rules to identify which applied tended in itself to support
the position that unless the UN declared itself bound it was not bound by treaty
rules or customary rules of international humanitarian law.192
From the perspective of the content of the substantive rules of the Bulletin
it seems that not all the customary rules of international law are included,
but rather a summary of what were considered the most important rules in
the context of peace support operations.
It seems that there is agreement between states that at least a number of
rules that are not included in the Bulletin constitute customary international
law, and the Nuremberg Tribunal held that the entire 1907 Hague Regulations
constitute customary international law. The ICRC for example holds that the
Bulletin only summarizes some of the core rules of humanitarian law.193 In
this respect the choice of particular rules to be included, such as for example
Section 7.3, which states that women shall be especially protected against any
attack, in particular against rape, enforced prostitution or any other form of
indecent assault, may have been influenced by specific incidents in peace
support operations.
On the other hand, the Bulletin also includes several rules that are probably
not of a customary law character. Shraga states in this respect that:
concretizing the ‘principles and spirit’ of the Geneva Conventions and their Addi-
tional Protocols, the Secretary-General did not consider himself necessarily con-
strained by the customary international law provisions of the Conventions and
Protocols as the lowest common denominator by which all national contingents
would otherwise be bound.194
191 Road Map towards the implementation of the United Nations Millenium Declaration of
6 September 2001, UN Doc. A/56/326, para. 19.,
192 Meeting of Experts on the Applicability of International Humanitarian Law to United
Nations Forces, Geneva, 6-8 March 1995, at 26. Copy on file with the author.
193 Statement to the Fourth Committee of the General Assembly, 20 October 1999.
194 D. Shraga, UN Peacekeeping Operations: Applicability of International Humanitarian Law and
Responsibility for Operations-Related Damage, 94 American Journal of International Law 406
(2000), at 408.
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In this respect it must be noted that the Bulletin is intended especially as a
teaching tool, in other words to acquaint members of UN peace support opera-
tions with the principles and rules of international humanitarian law.195 The
direct legal basis for the obligation to instruct personnel of peace support
operations is found in Status of Forces Agreements, in which the UN undertakes
to ensure that the members of the military section of an operation are made
duly aware of the principles and spirit of the general conventions applicable
to the conduct of military personnel.196 The purpose of instruction may re-
quire that the provisions of international humanitarian law are summarized,
in the same way as national armed forces have codes of conduct that only
include general references to international humanitarian law. The ultimate
legal basis for the applicability of the majority of the rules in the Bulletin,
however, is that they constitute customary international law.197 Shraga states
in respect of the rules in the Bulletin that are customary international law that
“their inclusion amounted above all to an undertaking to abide by the highest
standard of conduct within the general consensus of states.”198
In short, the Bulletin reaffirms the applicability of the customary inter-
national law of armed conflict to the UN. It is not a unilateral act of the UN.
This is clear from its main function as a teaching tool, as well as from its
promulgation as a Secretary-General’s Bulletin. A Secretary-General’s Bulletin
is an internal United Nations document, more specifically an administrative
issuance by the Secretary-General.199 It is a subsidiary instrument elaborating
the Staff Rules issued by the Secretary-General as the highest administrative
authority of the organization.200 Staff Rules in turn elaborate Staff Regula-
tions, which embody the fundamental conditions of service and the basic rights,
duties and obligations of the Secretariat.201
195 See Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council on the Protection of Civilians
in Armed Conflict of 8 September 1999, UN Doc. S/1999/957, para. 61:
I have also recently promulgated a Secretary-General’s bulletin on the observance of
International Humanitarian Law by members of United Nations forces, instructing them
on the basic principles and rules governing means and methods of warfare and the pro-
tection of civilians and other protected persons.
196 See e.g. Agreement between the United Nations and the Government of the Republic of
Rwanda on the Status of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda of 5 November
1993, UNTS 1748, Article 7.
197 Interview by the author with a senior United Nations official, 17 September 2002.
198 D. Shraga, supra note 194, at 408.
199 See: Secretary-General’s Bulletin, Procedures for the Promulgation of Administrative
Issuances of 28 May 1997, ST/SGB/1997/1.
200 C.F. Amerasinghe, The Law of the International Civil Service: As Applied by International
Administrative Tribunals, vol. I, at 146 (1988).
201 Id., at 1 (Scope and purpose of Staff Regulations of the United Nations).
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3.8.10 Statute of the International Criminal Court
The Statute of the International Criminal Court, adopted in 1998 in Rome, also
indirectly reaffirms the applicability of international humanitarian law to peace
support operations. In 1995 the United Nations legal counsel stated that:
The idea that United Nations should be directly bound by the rules of International
Humanitarian Law is certainly not new, and I am convinced that this matter will
be discussed with renewed intensity in the context of the establishment of an
international criminal court.202
The discussion the legal counsel referred to has not taken place as extensively
as he suggested. Prior to the Rome Conference, there were some suggestions
that peace support operations should be excluded from the jurisdiction of the
Court. France proposed the inclusion of a provision in the Statute according
to which “Persons who have carried out acts ordered by the Security Council
or in accordance with a mandate issued by it shall not be criminally re-
sponsible before the Court.”203 This proposal did not enjoy much support,
however, and a footnote to the report of the intersessional meeting of the
Preparatory Committee in Zutphen in 1998 states that “There were widespread
doubts about the contents and the placement of this paragraph.”204 The draft
statute in the final report of the Preparatory Committee for an International
Criminal Court, which formed the basis for negotiations at the Rome Confer-
ence, did not include a provision exempting peace support operations.205
On the contrary, the draft statute provided that the official position of a person
was irrelevant, indicating the members of peace support operations are not
above the law. Articles 25 and 27 of the Rome Statute make clear that no
person is exempted from the application of the Statute, in particular not on
the basis of immunities or special procedural rules which may attach to the
official capacity of a person. Though members of peace support operations
are not expressly mentioned they obviously fall within the scope of these
articles.206
The concerns of the United States regarding investigations and prosecutions
by the International Criminal Court (ICC) of United States personnel involved
in peace support operations established or authorized by the UN are well
202 H. Corell, Nuremberg and the Development of an International Criminal Court, 149 Military Law
Review 87 (1995), at 99.
203 Decisions taken by the Preparatory Committee at its session held from 1 to 12 December
1997, UN Doc. A/AC.249/1997/L.9/Rev.1, at 23.
204 Report of the Intersessional Meeting from 19 to 30 January 1998 in Zutphen, the Nether-
lands, UN Doc. A/AC.249/1998/L.13, at 54.
205 Final report of the Preparatory Committee for the Establishment of an International Criminal
Court of 14 April 1998, UN Doc. A/CONF.183/2/Add.1.
206 C. Stahn, The Ambiguities of Security Council Resolution 1422, 14 European Journal of Inter-
national Law 85 (2003).
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known,207 but these concerns have focused on immunity from jurisdiction
of United States personnel instead of the applicable law. The United States
from an early stage was concerned that the Court should only have jurisdiction
over members of its armed forces in general, and those members involved
in operations established or authorized by the UN in particular, in exceptional
cases. An important reason given for this concern was the fear of politicized
proceedings against United States armed forces personnel before the ICC.208
To prevent such proceedings, the United States submitted several proposals
before, during and after the Rome Conference, all of which concerned limits
to the exercise of the ICC’s jurisdiction, but not to the law applicable to peace
support operations.209 In other words, the United States has been concerned
with achieving immunity from jurisdiction for peace support operations,
implying that in principle jurisdiction exists. The United States’ efforts
culminated in the adoption of Security Council Resolution 1422 on 12 July
2002.210 The very fact that the United States has been concerned with the
possibility of prosecution of peace support operations’ personnel by the Court
implies that it considers that the personnel in question is bound by inter-
national humanitarian law and consequently is capable of committing war
crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court. This is reaffirmed by the text of
Resolution 1422 in which the Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of
the United Nations Charter:
Requests, consistent with the provisions of Article 16 of the Rome Statute, that the
ICC, if a case arises involving current or former officials or personnel from a con-
tributing State not a Party to the Rome Statute over acts or omissions relating to
a United Nations established or authorized operation, shall for a twelve-month
period starting 1 July 2002 not commence or proceed with investigation or prosecu-
tion of any such case, unless the Security Council decides otherwise;
Clearly, such a request would be unnecessary in respect of an investigation
or prosecution concerning alleged breaches of international humanitarian law
if that law is not applicable. The Security Council renewed the immunity
conferred for conduct in UN established or authorized operations for another
207 See e.g. W. Lietzau, International Criminal Law after Rome: Concerns from a U.S. Military
Perspective, 64 Law and Contemporary Problems 119 (2001).
208 See: Ambassador Bill Richardson, United States Permanent Representative to the United
Nations Statement at the U.N. Plenipotentiaries Conference on the Establishment of an
International Criminal Court Rome, Italy, June 17, 1998, United States Mission to the United
Nations Press Release No. 108 (98), June 17, 1998; Secretary Rumsfeld Statement on the
ICC Treaty, United States Department of Defense News Release No. 233-02, 6 May 2002.
209 For an overview of these proposals see e.g. D. Scheffer, Staying the Course with the Inter-
national Criminal Court, 35 Cornell International Law Journal 47 (2002).
210 Security Council Resolution 1422 of 12 July 2002, UN Doc. S/RES/1422.
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twelve months on 12 June 2003, in Resolution 1487.211 The adoption of this
resolution followed after strong diplomatic pressure from the United States.212
On 1 August 2003 the Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the
United Nations Charter, authorized a multinational force to support the
implementation of a ceasefire agreement in Liberia for a limited period of time.
The authorizing resolution includes a paragraph which essentially repeats the
immunity clauses in Resolutions 1422 and 1487.213 The paragraph in Resolu-
tion 1497 appears superfluous, because the situation is already covered by
the above-mentioned general resolutions. The United States delegation insisted
upon inclusion of the clause, although the resolution contains no specific
reference to a United States role in the multinational force or the followup
force. France, Germany and Mexico vigorously objected to the paragraph. They
stated that they supported the deployment of troops but that they could not
support the provision on immunity, which they considered superfluous and
flouting basic provisions of international law.214
3.8.11 Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone
The 2002 Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone provides more expressly
for the prosecution of members of peace support operations for serious vi-
olations of international humanitarian law. This court is a treaty-based court
established by agreement between the UN and the government of Sierra Leone.
The court is part of the peace process in Sierra Leone aimed at bringing an
end to the civil war in that country.215
The conflict in Sierra Leone was characterized by large-scale atrocities
committed by the parties to the conflict. There were also reports of violations
of humanitarian law by the Economic Community Monitoring Group
(ECOMOG), a peace support operation introduced in the country by the Eco-
nomic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).216
The impetus for the creation of a court was a letter from the government
of Sierra Leone to the UN Secretary-General requesting the establishment of
an international court similar to the ICTY and ICTR.217 This request was denied,
but on 14 August 2000 the Security Council requested the Secretary-General
to negotiate an agreement with the government of Sierra Leone to create an
211 Security Council Resolution 1487 of 12 June 2003, UN Doc. S/RES/1487.
212 C. Lynch, US Confronts EU on War Crimes Court, The Washington Post, 10 June 2003.
213 Security Council Resolution 1497 of 1 August 2003, UN Doc. S/RES/1497, para. 7.
214 F. Barringer, Security Council Support a Liberia Force, The New York Times, 2 August 2003.
215 See generally S. Beresford & A. Muller, The Special Court for Sierra Leone: An Initial Comment,
14 Leiden Journal of International Law 635 (2001).
216 See e.g. J. Miller, U.N. Monitors Accuse Sierra Leone Peacekeepers of Killings, 12 February 1999.
217 Letter from the President of Sierra Leone to the Secretary-General of 12 June 2000, UN Doc.
S/2000/786.
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independent special court to prosecute persons who bear the greatest respons-
ibility for the commission of crimes against humanity, war crimes and other
serious violations of international humanitarian law, as well as crimes under
relevant Sierra Leonean law committed within the territory of Sierra Leone.218
The Secretary-General presented a report on the establishment of the court,
including a draft statute, to the Security Council on 4 October 2000.219 He
proposed the creation of a treaty-based sui generis court of mixed international
and national jurisdiction and composition. He also proposed that the court
be responsible for the prosecution of ‘persons most responsible’ for crimes
within the jurisdiction of the court because this term reflects both a leadership
or authority position of the accused, and a sense of the gravity, seriousness
or massive scale of the crime. The Security Council, in its response of 22
December 2000 to the report, stated its continued preference for the arguably
more limiting term ‘persons who bear the greatest responsibility for the com-
mission of the crimes’ that it had used in Resolution 1315.220 More important-
ly, the Council understood the proposed jurisdiction ratione personae of the
court to include members of UN and regional peace support operations. It
proposed the inclusion of language in the agreement to be concluded between
the UN and the government of Sierra Leone and in the Statute that would only
give the court jurisdiction over peacekeepers if authorized by the Security
Council on the proposal of any state, in the event the sending state is unwilling
or unable genuinely to carry out an investigation or prosecution.221 The Secre-
tary-General in a letter of 12 January 2001 objected to this proposal on the
grounds that the amended article fell short of inducing an unwilling state to
surrender an accused person situated in its territory and could politicize the
legal process, but the Council did not agree.222 As a consequence, the text
of Article 1 of the Statute, annexed to the Agreement between the United
Nations and the government of Sierra Leone concluded on 16 January 2002,
provides:
1. The Special Court shall, except as provided in subparagraph (2), have the power
to prosecute persons who bear the greatest responsibility for serious violations of
International Humanitarian Law and Sierra Leonean law committed in the territory
of Sierra Leone since 30 November 1996, including those leaders who, in committing
218 Security Council Resolution 1315 of 14 August 2000, UN Doc. S/RES/1315.
219 Report of the Secretary-General on the Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone
of 4 October 2000, UN Doc. S/2000/915.
220 Letter dated 22 December 2000 from the President of the Security Council addressed to
the Secretary-General, UN Doc. S/2000/1234, para. 1.
221 Id.
222 Letter dated 12 January 2001 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the
Security Council, UN Doc. S/2001/40, para. 4-5; Letter dated 31 January from the President
of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General, UN Doc. S/2001/95, para. 2.
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such crimes, have threatened the establishment of and implementation of the peace
process in Sierra Leone.
2. Any transgressions by peacekeepers and related personnel present in Sierra Leone
pursuant to the Status of Mission Agreement in force between the United Nations
and the Government of Sierra Leone or agreements between Sierra Leone and other
Governments or regional organizations, or, in the absence of such agreement,
provided that the peacekeeping operations were undertaken with the consent of
the Government of Sierra Leone, shall be within the primary jurisdiction of the
sending State.
3. In the event the sending State is unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out an
investigation or prosecution, the Court may, if authorized by the Security Council
on the proposal of any State, exercise jurisdiction over such persons.
The Special Court itself will of course be competent to interpret the Statute,
but the language in Article 1, paragraph 1, strongly suggests that international
humanitarian law may apply to members of peace support operations in Sierra
Leone.
At the same time, the subject-matter jurisdiction of the Special Court
includes a crime taken from the Convention of Safety of United Nations and
Associated Personnel in Article 4, paragraph b, of the Statute:
Intentionally directing attacks against personnel, installations, material, units or
vehicles involved in a humanitarian assistance or peacekeeping mission in accord-
ance with the Charter of the United Nations, as long as they are entitled to the
protection given to civilians or civilian objects under the international law of armed
conflict;
This article could prove especially interesting if it provokes debate on whether
the United Nations operation and ECOMOG were entitled to the protection of
the Convention or were engaged as a party to the conflict.223 The Special
Court may also make clear whether it is possible that the convention and inter-
national humanitarian law apply simultaneously.
3.9 STATE PRACTICE AND NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION PRACTICE
In contrast to the UN, NATO does not seem to consider itself bound by inter-
national humanitarian law as an international legal person. The organization’s
legal officials state that it is the individual member states and not the organiza-
tion that have legal obligations.224 Member states seem to share this opinion
223 A. McDonald, Sierra Leone’s Shoestring Special Court, 84 International Review of the Red
Cross 121 (2002), at 130.
224 B. de Vidts, cited in Amnesty International, NATO/Federal Republic of Yugoslavia: Collat-
eral Damage or Unlawful Killings, Violations of the Laws of War by NATO during Opera-
tion Allied Force, at 15.
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as confirmed in a number of interviews with officials involved in NATO peace
support operations.225 Certain writers make the same point. Hampson for
example states that for the purposes of the application of international human-
itarian law:
a regional organization does not function as one unit but consists of the total
number of constituent units, unless the members work within a single command
hierarchy and system of discipline.226
The idea that the organization itself is not bound by international humanitarian
law seems to be related to the idea that the organization is not a subject of
international law and refers to the ambiguity concerning the legal status of
the organization. Moritz states that the organization:
is not an international person by itself, and the necessity for a common application
of the laws of war cannot be based on the theory that NATO is a subject of inter-
national law.227
The idea that NATO is not an international legal person is highly debatable.228
In respect of claims that the organization is not a supranational legal person,
it may be noted that the proposition that an international legal person is bound
by general international law is distinct from the question whether it is a
supranational legal person.
Another element in thinking about the application of international human-
itarian law within the organization seems to be the idea that a NATO peace
support operation is not a party to the conflict. This is the same argument used
by the UN at one time to deny the application of international humanitarian
law to operations under its control. The NATO doctrine on peace support
operations states in a section on international humanitarian law that:
The Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) is the body of international law that governs
the conduct of hostilities during an armed conflict. The PSF [Peace Support Force]
will not generally be a party to the conflict, yet certain LOAC principles may be
applied. Individual civilians along with the civilian population must never be
purposefully targeted unless they have taken active part in the armed conflict. When
225 Interview with Luitenant-Colonel Gallup, Legal Advisor, SFOR Headquarters, 9 February
2001; Interview with B. Herfst, Legal Advisor, SFOR Headquarters Multinational Division
South West, 12 February 2001; Interview with H. Boddens-Hosang, Directorate of Legal
Affairs, Dutch Ministry of Defence, 12 July 2001.
226 F. Hampson, States’ Military Operations Authorized by the United Nations and International
Humanitarian Law, in L. Condorelli, A.M. La Rosa & S. Scherrer (Eds), Les Nations Unies
et le Droit International Humanitaire 371 (1995), at 388.
227 G. Moritz, supra note 113, at 9.
228 See § 2.3.
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military force is used, every effort should be taken to minimise the risk of civilian
casualties.229
Practice in NATO peace support operations reflects the member states’ con-
ception. The cases of IFOR, SFOR and KFOR are particularly illustrative.
Security Council Resolution 1031 authorized member states to take all
necessary measures to effect the implementation of and to ensure compliance
with Annex 1-A of the Dayton Peace Agreement and that the parties to the
Yugoslav conflict shall be equally subject to such enforcement action by IFOR
as may be necessary to ensure implementation of that Annex and the protection
of IFOR. Annex 1-A to the Dayton Peace Agreement also provided that the
parties to the agreement shall be subject to such enforcement action by IFOR
as may be necessary to ensure the implementation of the annex and the pro-
tection of the operation. The need for such powers was considered as reflecting
a real possibility of the use of force. Many believed in 1995 that there was a
serious risk of renewed fighting in Bosnia.230 In other words, there was a
serious possibility that IFOR could become engaged in hostilities. In addition,
it could be argued that the law of occupation was applicable to, or at least
could provide guidance for, IFOR.231
Despite of all this, the basic documents relating to IFOR and SFOR do not
contain any reference to international humanitarian law. The Status of Forces
Agreements between the organization and Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia
and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia provide that personnel shall refrain
from activities not compatible with the nature of the Operation, but this is
a very vague obligation. Though rules from the law of occupation could have
provided guidance to IFOR and SFOR in certain situations, policy decisions were
made to deliberately avoid any reference to the law of occupation.232
Security Council Resolution 1244 authorized member states and relevant
international organizations to establish the international security presence in
Kosovo with all necessary means to fulfil its responsibilities. The responsibil-
ities in question were, described in paragraph 9 of the resolution, are very
broad. Eide states that:
in the absence of a final settlement, Kosovo is de facto occupied by NATO’s KFOR
and formally administered by the UN through its UNMIK mission. In choosing such
229 Allied Joint Publication-3.4.1 Peace Support Operations, (July 2001), para. 4B6.
230 See e.g. J. Mearsheimer & S. Van Evera, The Partition that Dare not Speak its Name: When
Peace Means War, The New Republic, 5 December 1995.
231 See § 3.12.
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a model, the international community has taken a much wider responsibility than
it normally does for the future of the province.233
Similar to the case of IFOR, it appears that at least initially it was considered
a real possibility that the force would become engaged in hostilities with
Yugoslav forces if the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia would not respect the
terms of Resolution 1244 and the Military Technical Agreement. There is also
a case to be made for the application of the law of occupation to KFOR.234
The basic documents relating to KFOR, however, including the Military
Technical Agreement and Regulation 2000/47, do not refer to international
humanitarian law. In practice international humanitarian law or the law of
occupation also does not seem to be a point of reference, as described by a
former KFOR batallion commander:
In the reality of KFOR-1 the legal basis was not really discussed. The Dutch KFOR
soldiers certainly did not think in terms of … the law of occupation.235
It seems that if the peace does not hold and conflict breaks out anew, the troop
contributing states would consider themselves bound by their treaty obliga-
tions.236 This is consistent with the obligation on troop contributing states
to respect and ensure respect for the 1949 Geneva Conventions, and if they
are states parties, the 1977 Additional Protocols. Even when states place troops
at the disposal of an international organization Article 1 of the Conventions
remains applicable, but this does not preclude the international organization
itself having obligations under general international law.
3.10 INTERNATIONAL OR NON-INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT
It was argued that international humanitarian law is in principle applicable
to international organizations as general international law, in particular custom-
ary international law. International humanitarian law consists of separate
regimes for international and non-international conflict. In recent years, the
clear distinction between these two regimes has become increasingly blurred
and there is a tendency to disregard the differences in the legal coverage of
233 E. Barth Eide, The Internal Security Challenge in Kosovo, paper prepared for UNA-USA/IAI
Conference on ’Kosovo’s Final Status’.
234 See e.g. M. Hoffman, Peace-enforcement Actions and Humanitarian Law: Emerging Rules for
“Interventional Armed Conflict”, 82 International Review of the Red Cross 193 (2000).
235 “In de realiteit van KFOR-1 was de discussie over welke juridische basis nu moest gelden
ook niet echt aan de orde. Het is zeker niet zo dat de Nederlandse KFOR-militairen in
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international and non-international armed conflicts.237 The ICTY and ICTR have
played an important role in this development, by identifying rules from the
regime of international armed conflicts that are also applicable as customary
international rules in non-international armed conflicts. The Appeals Chamber
of the Yugoslavia Tribunal in its 1995 Decision on jurisdiction in the Tadic´ case
stated that “in the area of armed conflict the distinction between interstate
wars and civil wars is losing its value as far as human beings are con-
cerned.”238 In treaty law there is also a tendency to apply the same rules
to international and non-international armed conflicts, as illustrated by the
scope of application of the Ottawa Convention on Anti-personnel Landmines
and the Protocol II to the 1954 Convention on the Protection of Cultural Proper-
ty in the Event of Armed Conflict. The distinction between international and
non-international armed conflicts has however not yet been abandoned, as
the Appeals Chamber in the Tadic´ case reaffirmed by stating that the “emerg-
ence of the aforementioned general rules on internal armed conflicts does not
imply that internal strife is regulated by general international law in all its
aspects.”239 The dichotomy between international and non-international con-
flicts was also retained in the 1998 Statute of the ICC.240
The distinction between international and non-international armed conflicts
to the extent that it is still relevant is not as obvious as it may seem. The 1949
Geneva Conventions and the first 1977 Additional Protocol apply in case of
declared war or any other armed conflict which may arise between two or
more of the High Contracting parties. Customary international law of inter-
national armed conflict obviously does not require the involvement of con-
tracting parties, but in principle it does only apply between states. In the
conventional law of non-international armed conflicts there are two regimes
which become applicable at different thresholds. Common Article 3 to the
Geneva Conventions becomes applicable in the case of armed conflict not of
an international character occurring in the territory of one of the High Con-
tracting Parties. Though the Conventions do not specify what the requirements
for such a conflict are, they are generally considered to be lower than those
required for the application of the second 1977 Additional Protocol to the
Geneva Conventions. The Protocol applies, according to Article 1, to all armed
conflicts which are not covered by Article 1 of the Protocol Additional to the
Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of
Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) and which take place
in the territory of a High Contracting Party between its armed forces and
237 See e.g. T. Meron, The Humanization of Humanitarian Law, 94 American Journal of Inter-
national Law 239 (2000), at 260-263.
238 Prosecutor v. Duško Tadic´, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on
Jurisdiction, supra note 34, para. 96.
239 Id., para. 126.
240 H. Spieker, The International Criminal Court and Non-International Armed Conflicts, 13 Leiden
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dissident armed forces or other organized armed groups which, under respons-
ible command, exercise such control over a part of its territory as to enable
them to carry out sustained and concerted military operations and to imple-
ment this Protocol. Article 1, paragraph 2 adds that the Protocol shall not apply
to situations of internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and
sporadic acts of violence and other acts of a similar nature, as not being armed
conflicts. The customary law of non-international armed conflict has come to
be applicable to a broader set of situations than its conventional counterpart,
including in particular to armed violence between non-state organized armed
groups. The Appeals Chamber of the ICTY in the Tadic´ Decision on jurisdiction
defined ‘armed conflict’ as “whenever there is a resort to armed force between
States or protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and
organized armed groups or between such groups within a State.”241 The Trial
Chamber in its judgment in the same case specified that the intensity of the
conflict and the organization of the parties to the conflict are relevant aspects
in determining whether or not there is protracted armed violence between
governmental forces and organized armed groups or between such groups
under customary law. It stated that:
In an armed conflict of an internal or mixed character, these closely related criteria
are used solely for the purpose, as a minimum, of distinguishing an armed conflict
from banditry, unorganized and short-lived insurrections, or terrorist activities,
which are not subject to International Humanitarian Law. Factors relevant to this
determination are addressed in the Commentary to Geneva Convention for the
Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the
Field, Convention I.242
The same criteria were referred to by Trial Chamber I of the Rwanda Tribunal
in the Akayesu case in the context of a determination of the threshold of ap-
plication of common Article 3.243 In the Musema case the Trial Chamber fur-
ther specified these criteria:
First, a non-international conflict is distinct from an international armed conflict
because of the legal status of the entities opposing each other: the parties to the
conflict are not sovereign States, but the government of a single State in conflict
with one or more armed factions within its territory. The expression “armed
conflicts” introduces a material criterion: the existence of open hostilities between
armed forces which are organized to a greater or lesser degree. Internal disturbances
and tensions, characterized by isolated or sporadic acts of violence, do not therefore
241 Supra note 34, para. 70.
242 Prosecutor v. Duško Tadic´, Opinion and Judgment, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Tr. Ch. II, 7 May 1997,
para. 562.
243 Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, Judgment, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Tr. Ch. I, 2 September
1998, para. 619-621.
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constitute armed conflicts in a legal sense, even if the government is forced to resort
to police forces or even armed units for the purpose of restoring law and order.
Within these limits, non-international armed conflicts are situations in which
hostilities break out between armed forces or organized armed groups within the
territory of a single State. Having defined the term in an abstract manner, to the
Chamber it is apparent that whether a conflict meets the criteria of Common Article
3 is to be decided on a case by case basis.244
These definitions do not refer to international organizations such as the UN
and NATO, and the question arises whether the dichotomy between inter-
national and non-international conflicts applies to them as well.
It is generally accepted that in case of an armed conflict between an organ-
ization and the armed forces of a state the law of international armed conflict
applies. Though the UN and NATO are not states, they are subjects of inter-
national law and as such a conflict with another subject of that law is regulated
by the international regime.245 The same logic would suggest that the law
of non-international armed conflict applies to an armed conflict between an
international organization and a non-state organized armed group, because
there is only one subject of international law involved, but the question can
also be seen from other perspectives. One possibility is to consider the inter-
national organization as analogous to a state intervening in another state in
support of the latter state’s government. The relationship between the op-
position and the forces of a state intervening on behalf of the established
government however creates an ambiguous legal situation in which it is
unclear whether the law of international or non-international armed conflict
applies, and as a consequence the analogy is not particularly instructive.
Schindler for example states that in such a case only the rules of non-inter-
national armed conflict are applicable, but other writers maintain that the law
of international armed conflict applies.246
Another perspective has its starting point in the reason behind the inter-
national- non-international armed conflict dichotomy, that is, state sovereignty.
A majority of states are unwilling to subject what they consider their internal
affairs to international scrutiny and are therefore unwilling to accept detailed
regulation of non-international conflicts. Schindler states that a Norwegian
244 Prosecutor v. Alfred Musema, Judgment and Sentence, Case No. ICTR-96-13, Tr. Ch. I, 27
January 2000, para. 246-249.
245 C. Greenwood, supra note 23, at 25; C. Emanuelli, supra note 143, at 34.
246 Pro application of the law of international armed conflict e.g. Application of Humanitarian
Law in Non International Armed Conflicts, 85 ASIL Proc. 83 (1991); E. David, Principes
de Droit des Conflits Armés 135-137 (1994). Contra: D. Schindler, The Different Types of Armed
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proposal at the Conference of Experts in 1971 and 1972 to adopt one uniform
protocol for all armed conflicts did not find much approval because:
International law has to take into account that the world is divided into sovereign
States, and that these States keep to their sovereignty. They are not willing to put
insurgents within their territory on equal terms with the armed forces of enemy
States, or members thereof.247
The UN and NATO, in contrast to states, do not have territorial sovereignty,
and as a consequence sovereignty is not a reason for them not to apply the
regime that offers the highest level of protection.248 Such an interpretation
is consistent with a more general development away from a state-sovereignty-
oriented approach to international humanitarian law observed by the Appeals
Chamber of the Yugoslavia Tribunal in the Tadic´ case.249
There is support in state practice for the idea that the law of international
armed conflict applies to an armed conflict between a peace support operation
and a non-state organized armed group. The negotiators of the 1994 Conven-
tion on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel are reported
to have held the view that it is impossible for the UN itself to be involved in
an internal armed conflict since once UN or associated personnel become
engaged in conflict with a local force, the conflict becomes by definition
international in character.250 In a case against two Belgian members of the
United Nations Operation in Somalia accused of having mistreated a Somali
child, the Belgian Military Court of Appeal was requested to find a breach
of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and the 1977 Additional Protocols. The Court
held that the operation in question had not become involved in permanent,
generalized and structured combat operations against one or more rival armed
factions. Importantly, the Court stated that if the operation had become in-
volved in such operations the conflict would have had an international charac-
ter.251
The Secretary-General’s Bulletin takes another approach. It avoids the
question of whether the conflict in which a peace support operation is involved
is international or non-international because it applies a uniform set of rules
to all conflicts in which personnel of a UN peace support operation becomes
involved as combatants. It may be recalled that meetings of experts convened
by the ICRC were the first real steps toward the Bulletin. The experts at these
meetings were not certain which regime of international humanitarian law
247 D. Schindler, id., at 154.
248 R. Glick, supra note 124, at 91.
249 Supra note 241, para. 97.
250 P. Kirsch, supra note 183, 105.
251 Belgian Military Court of Appeal (Militair Gerechtshof), Prosecutor v. C.K. and B.C., judgment
of 17 December 1997, reported in Journal des Tribunaux 1998, 286-289.
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applies to a conflict between a UN operation and an organized armed group.
The Chairman at one of the meetings concluded that “the distinction between
international and non-international armed conflicts as far as United Nations
operations were concerned was not totally clear.”252 The draft directives
provided for the application of one set of rules to all conflicts, but it still
contained a reference to the international non-international dichotomy by
stating that the directives are applicable to international and non-international
armed conflicts as may be relevant. This reference was not included in the
final version of the Secretary-General’s Bulletin. The Bulletin not only follows
the tendency of the ICTY and ICTR to apply certain rules from the law of inter-
national armed conflicts to non-international armed conflicts, but even fails
to distinguish between the two regimes.
3.11 THRESHOLD OF APPLICATION
It was argued that a UN or NATO peace support operation can become a party
to an armed conflict and its personnel combatants, and also that such an armed
conflict is an international armed conflict. This raises the question of the criteria
for determining whether there is an armed conflict, in other words the thres-
hold of armed conflict. International humanitarian law instruments, in par-
ticular the 1949 Geneva Conventions and the 1977 Additional Protocols, do
not define the term ‘armed conflict’. As noted, the Appeals Chamber of the
Yugoslavia Tribunal in its Decision on jurisdiction in the Tadic´ case defined
an armed conflict as “resort to armed force between States or protracted armed
violence between governmental authorities and organized armed groups or
between such groups within a State.”253 The main criteria used by the Tri-
bunal to determine the existence of an armed conflict are the intensity of the
conflict and the organization of the parties involved. In general there is agree-
ment that these are the criteria to determine whether there is an armed conflict,
but not on the necessary level of intensity and organization. State practice is
ambiguous because states rarely explain why they consider that a particular
situation is an armed conflict or not.
The ICRC tends to interpret the term armed conflict as broadly as possible,
but it seems that only when fighting reaches a level of intensity which exceeds
that of isolated clashes will it be treated as armed conflict.254 Situations that
252 Meeting of Experts on the Applicability of International Humanitarian Law to United
Nations Forces, Geneva, 6-8 March 1995, at 39. Copy on file with the author.
253 Supra note 34, para. 70.
254 C. Greenwood, Scope of Application of Humanitarian Law, in D. Fleck (Ed.), The Handbook
of Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflicts 39, at 42; M. Bothe, Friedenssicherung und Kriegs-
recht, in W. Graf Vitzhum (Ed.), Völkerrecht 645 (2001); F. Siordet, Commentaire de l’Article
3 de la IIIe Convention de Genève, 40 International review of the Red Cross 644 (1958).
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fall below this level of intensity are not armed conflicts but instances of internal
disturbance and tension.
The parties to the conflict need to have a certain degree of organization.
Such a level of organization probably must be such that they are capable of
carrying out the various obligations that arise under international humanitarian
law. The requirement of organization is illustrated for example by Israel, which
claims it is engaged in an armed conflict with the Palestinians. The claim is
based inter alia on the assertion that “attacks are carried out by a well-armed
and organised militia, under the command of the Palestinian political establish-
ment, operating from areas outside Israeli control.”255
General definitions require application to specific facts. As the Trial Cham-
ber of the Rwanda Tribunal stated in the Rutaganda case, the definition of
armed conflict offered by the Yugoslavia Tribunal is still termed in the abstract
and whether or not a situation can be described as an armed conflict is to be
decided on a case-by-case basis.256
In the specific case of peace support operations the UN has never made
clear statements concerning the application of international humanitarian law
in specific circumstances.
ONUC was involved in hostilities with another non-state organized armed
group, the secessionist forces of Katanga. The UN seems to have considered
itself as involved in an armed conflict because it considered international
humanitarian law applicable, but the organization did not state the criteria
on which it based the existence of a conflict. The authorities in Katanga stated
that they considered themselves in a state of war with the UN.257
In 1993, UNOSOM II was involved in hostilities with an armed group called
the United Somali Congress/Somali National Alliance. The hostilities were
certainly of a high intensity, involving the use of helicopter gunships and tanks.
There were considerable casualties on both sides. For example, five Moroccan
soldiers were killed on 17 June, two Pakistani on 28 June and three Italians
on 2 July 1993. In one single incident on 5 June 1993, twenty-four Pakistani
members of the operation were killed in an ambush after returning from an
inspection of weapons storage facilities. The non-governmental group respons-
ible for these attacks was well organized. A Commission of Inquiry established
by the Security Council to investigate the armed attacks described the group
as “a reasonably well-organised and trained group under a good command
structure.”258 The Commission described the conflict between the peace sup-
255 Sharm El-Sheikh Fact-Finding Committee, First Statement of the Government of Israel, 28
December 2000, para. 287.
256 Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, Judgment, Case No. ICTR-96-3, Tr. Ch , 6 December 1999, para.
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258 Report of the Commission of Inquiry established pursuant to resolution 885 (1993) to
investigate armed attacks on UNOSOM II personnel of 1 June 1994, UN Doc. S/1994/653,
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port operation and the armed group as a war, though it did not expressly state
that international humanitarian law was applicable. It also stated that:
the feeling of being at war is reflected in UNOSOM II fragmental orders (fragos).
Until 8 July they refer to UNOSOM II’s adversaries as ‘hostile forces’. After that date,
the fragos use the phrase ‘enemy forces’.259
The ICRC acted as a neutral intermediary between the operation and the SNA
in organizing the release of a wounded Nepalese soldier who had been
captured and detained by uncontrolled elements, in the same way it would
between parties to an armed conflict.260
It seems however that the UN did not consider itself to be involved in an
armed conflict in Somalia. The Security Council in Resolution 837 stated that
it was gravely alarmed at the premeditated armed attacks against personnel
belonging to the peace support operation and expressed “its outrage at the
loss of life as a result of these criminal attacks.”261
The United Nations Operation in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) has also been
involved in hostilities with a non-governmental armed group called the Revo-
lutionary United Front (RUF). In May 2000, the RUF detained a large number
of peace support operation personnel. Around this time there were a number
of armed clashes between the operation and the armed group, with the RUF
using small arms, rocket-propelled grenades and mortars. There were a number
of casualties on both sides. At least seven members of the peace support
operation were killed and twenty-five were reported wounded.262 There fol-
lowed a number of smaller attacks by the RUF on the peace support operation,
including an ambush during which one peacekeeper was killed and four were
wounded on 30 June 2000. A major armed clash occurred on 15 July when
the peace support operation launched a robust military operation to free a
unit of Indian peacekeepers who were surrounded by the armed group and
the operation traded heavy fire with the rebel forces.263 The UN does not seem
to have considered itself involved in an armed conflict in Sierra Leone. The
Security Council in Resolution 1315 stated its deep concern at the very serious
crimes committed within the territory of Sierra Leone against UN and as-
sociated personnel.264
The Secretary-General’s Bulletin on the Observance of International Human-
itarian Law by United Forces applies, according to Section 1, paragraph 1,
to UN forces “in situations of armed conflict they are actively engaged therein
259 Id., para. 152.
260 International Committee of the Red Cross Annual report 1995.
261 Security Council Resolution 837 of 6 June 1993, UN Doc. S/RES/837.
262 UN Doc. S/2000/455 of 19 May 2000, para. 56-71; C. Roy, UN Troops Killed by Sierra Leone
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as combatants, to the extent and for the duration of their engagement.” Experts
at the meeting organized by the ICRC in July 1995 agreed that violence in which
the UN is involved must reach a certain level of intensity before international
humanitarian law applies, but they did not clearly define that level of intensity.
Representatives of the ICRC suggested that Article 1, paragraph 2, of Additional
Protocol II provided a useful analogy. Several experts stated that the intention
behind the use of force was important. One expert maintained that in:
a situation like the former Yugoslavia, for instance, where the United Nations force
has been allowed to enter the territory in the first place, if shots were fired, then
both the facts and the intention, within an appropriate time-scale, should be taken
into account in combination to establish whether a state of armed conflict ex-
isted.265
A draft of the Bulletin, based on a code of conduct developed by the experts
and reviewed by the ICRC and the UN secretariat, provided that the rules in
question are applicable to UN forces “when in situations of armed conflict they
are actively engaged therein as combatants.”266 The final version of the
Secretary-General’s Bulletin, in section 1, paragraph 1, is identical but adds
the words “to the extent and for the duration of their engagement.” If the term
‘armed conflict’ as used in this section is interpreted in accordance with the
ordinary meaning given to the term, the threshold for the application of
international humanitarian law to UN forces is the same as the threshold under
general international law. The words “when … they are actively engaged
therein as combatants” seem superfluous, because the armed forces of a party
to an armed conflict are combatants. The words may have been included to
distinguish the situation in which the Bulletin applies from the situation in
which a UN operation is present in an ongoing conflict without becoming a
party thereto.267 They may also indicate that the hostilities require a certain
level of intensity. The words “to the extent and for the duration of their
engagement” seem to imply that a UN peace support operation personnel can
be combatants one moment and non-combatants the next. It implies that armed
conflict to which the UN is a party can be intermittent. This would be contrary
to customary international humanitarian law as interpreted by the Appeals
Chamber of the Yugoslavia Tribunal, which stated in the Tadic´ case that
international humanitarian law applies from the initiation of an armed conflict
and extends beyond the cessation of hostilities until a general conclusion of
265 Supra note 252, at 30.
266 Directives for UN Forces Regarding Respect for International Humanitarian Law, copy
on file with the author, section 1, paragraph 1.
267 This distinction seems obvious, but some writers do not make it. See e.g. A. Weyemberg,
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peace is reached; or, in the case of internal conflicts, a peaceful settlement is
achieved.268 The implication is unfortunate because it may create confusion
over the applicability of international humanitarian law in a particular situ-
ation. It is also difficult to apply in practice. It implies for example that if a
peace support operation has detained opponents in an engagement, the pro-
vision on the humane treatment of those persons in section 8 of the Secretary-
General’s Bulletin ceases to apply at the end of that specific engagement. It
is also not likely that the opponent of a peace support operation will accept
the intermittent application of international humanitarian law.
It seems that a UN peace support operation will be regarded as a party
to an armed conflict only if the hostilities in which they are involved are of
a high level of intensity. This high level of intensity probably has its origin
in the political desire of the organization to consider an operation as impartial,
and as a consequence not a party to the conflict, as long as possible. In prin-
ciple it seems to be accepted that the applicability of international humanitarian
law to UN peace support operations is to be determined by the threshold in
customary international law.269
Some writers imply that the threshold of armed conflict will not be reached
in any event in case of a peacekeeping operation as distinguished from a peace
enforcement operation. Van Hegelsom states that during traditional peace-
keeping operations the law of armed conflict cannot and should not apply
to the conduct of operations. “Should peace-keeping fail, peace-enforcement
might prove necessary. It is submitted that the law of armed conflict is ap-
plicable in such cases.”270 A degree of consent is commonly understood as
the most important difference between peacekeeping and peace enforcement.
In other words, these writers seem to raise the question whether consent plays
a role in determining whether or not there is an armed conflict between an
operation and the opposing force. The idea that a peace support operation
has received the consent of either the host state or the parties to the conflict
and simultanously be a party to a conflict may at first sight seem strange. On
the other hand, the reference to consent implies that the intention of the parties
plays a role in the determination of the existence of an armed conflict. This
is contrary to the notion that the application of international humanitarian
law is determined by objective standards. This notion is widely endorsed by
writers.271 The international criminal tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and
Rwanda also use a factual test to establish the existence of an armed con-
flict.272 Finally, the drafters of the ICC Statute also considered that objective
268 Supra note 34, para. 97.
269 D. Schraga, supra note 91, at 76.
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standards are conclusive. This is made clear by the introduction to the Ele-
ments of Crimes concerning Article 8 of the Statute. The introduction states
with respect to the element that the conduct of the perpetrator took place in
the context of and was associated with an armed conflict that applies to all
the war crimes in the Statute that:
There is only a requirement for the awareness of the factual circumstances that
established the existence of an armed conflict that is implicit in the terms ‘took
place in the context of and was associated with’.273
The objective standards referred to were described as the intensity of the
conflict and the degree of organization of the parties involved. The value of
objective standards is that they limit the possibility that persons are deprived
of the protection of international humanitarian law on the basis of a simple
statement by a party that it does not consider itself as a party to an armed
conflict. The March 1995 meeting of experts on the applicability of International
Humanitarian Law to United Nations forces convened by the ICRC discussed
the question whether the intention of the parties plays a role in determining
whether there is an armed conflict in which the UN is involved. There was
no consensus among the experts. Certain experts stated that intention had to
be taken into account.274 The Chairman of the meeting, a Red Cross official,
on the other hand, took the view that intention did not matter in the event
of an outbreak of hostilities. He considered that whether there is an armed
conflict can be determined by the facts.275 The Chairman’s view is consistent
with the present interpretation of the concept of armed conflict by writers and
international tribunals.
Another consideration is that it may be very difficult to determine whether
there is consent. Gray states that the notion of consent in UN military opera-
tions is a complex one.276 The parties to the conflict may give their consent
to the deployment of an operation. If at a later moment that operation is given
additional tasks and powers under Chapter VII of the UN Charter that do not
have the consent of one or more of the parties, it may be unclear whether the
original consent must be considered to have been withdrawn. It is also possible
that the political authorities of the party to the conflict have expressed their
consent but that this is not clearly communicated to the forces on the ground.
The Brahimi Report recognizes the complexity of consent in peace support
operations. It states that:
273 Finalized draft text of the Elements of Crimes, addendum to the Report of the Preparatory
Commission for the International Criminal Court, 6 July 2000, UN Doc. PCNICC/2000/INF/
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consent may be manipulated in many ways by the local parties. A party may give
its consent to United Nations presence merely to gain time to retool its fighting
forces and withdraw consent when the peacekeeping operation no longer serves
its interests. A party may seek to limit an operation’s freedom of movement, adopt
a policy of persistent non-compliance with the provisions of an agreement or
withdraw its consent altogether. Moreover, regardless of faction leaders’ commit-
ment to the peace, fighting forces may simply be under much looser control than
the conventional armies with which traditional peacekeepers work, and such forces
may split into factions whose existence and implications were not contemplated
in the peace agreement under the color of which the United Nations mission
operates.277
Present military doctrine also recognizes that consent is not a switch that is
either on or off but that there is a large gray area between the two.278 It is
clear that consent is a complex concept. As a consequence, it is not a clear
criterion that is helpful to determine the existence of an armed conflict.279
It is also dangerous to base a determination of whether international
humanitarian law applies simply on whether a peace support operation has
been established under Chapter VI or Chapter VII of the Charter.280 Chapter
VI or Chapter VII is relevant to the range of situations in which an operation
is entitled to use force. It does not determine whether an operation will actually
make use of that entitlement to such an extent that the objective standards
for the existence of an armed conflict are met. Greenwood observes that:
IHL applies in the event of an armed conflict, a factual concept which exists when
certain hostilities take place … whether or not it is applicable to a particular
operation will be dependent upon the existence of an armed conflict to which the
relevant United Nations force is a party, not on how the United Nations operation
277 Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations of 21 August 2000, UN Doc. S/
2000/809, para. 48.
278 D. Jablonsky & J. McCallum, Peace Implementation and the Concept of Induced Consent in Peace
Operations, 29 Parameters 54 (1999).
279 See H.P. Gasser, Die Anwendbarkeit des Humanitären Völkerrechts auf Militärische Operationen
der Vereinten Nationen, 4 Schweizerische Zeitschrift für Internationales und Europäisches
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is classified for other United Nations purposes. It is the fact of participation in
hostilities, not the existence of authority to do so which is significant.281
If the applicability of international humanitarian law depended on whether
an operation was established under Chapter VII of the Charter, SFOR and KFOR
would be parties to a conflict, which they are clearly not.282
The Secretary-General’s Bulletin confirms the view that the applicability
of international humanitarian law cuts across different chapters of the UN
Charter. Section 1, paragraph 1, of the Bulletin expresses that UN troops can
be engaged as combatants in a situation of armed conflict “in enforcement
actions, or in peacekeeping operations when the use of force is permitted in
self-defence.”
For various reasons of dubious legal validity NATO and its member states
do not seem to consider the organization as having obligations under inter-
national humanitarian law. If it is nevertheless accepted that the organization
does have such obligations, the threshold for their applicability should be the
same as that under customary international law.
3.12 OCCUPATION
International humanitarian law applies during an armed conflict, but also
during an occupation. Article 42 of the 1907 Hague Regulations states that:
Territory is considered occupied when it is actually placed under the authority
of the hostile army. The occupation extends only to the territory where such
authority has been established and can be exercised.
The provision appears to be based on an assumption that a military occupation
occurs in the context of an armed conflict, in particular by referring to the
occupying power as a hostile army. Occupation was considered to be the result
of an invasion, as illustrated by the judgment of the United States Military
Tribunal in the Hostages case.283 At the same time an important element to
determine whether there is an occupation is effective control of the territory,
and this element was also emphasized in the Hostages case. The Tribunal stated
that “an occupation indicates the exercise of governmental authority to the
exclusion of the established government.”284
281 C. Greenwood, supra note 167, at 11.
282 Although it can be argued that the Kosovo Force is an Occupying Power. See § 3.12.
283 United States v. Wilhelm List and others (the Hostages Trial), United States Military Tribunal,
Nuremberg, VIII Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals 55 (1949).
284 Id. See also E. Colby, Occupation under the Laws of War, 25 Columbia Law Review 904
(1925), at 907.
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The contextual element of armed conflict in occupation was attenuated
in the 1949 Geneva Conventions, and more emphasis was put on the factual
element of control of the territory.285 Common Article 2 of the conventions
provides:
In addition to the provisions which shall be implemented in peacetime, the present
Convention shall apply to all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict
which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties, even if the
state of war is not recognized by one of them.
The Convention shall also apply to all cases of partial or total occupation of the
territory of a High Contracting Party, even if the said occupation meets with no
armed resistance.
The first paragraph covers territory that has been occupied during hostilities
in the sense of the Hague Regulations. The second paragraph extends the scope
of the law of occupation to cases where the occupation has taken place without
a declaration of war and without hostilities. This intention was made clearer
in a proposal adopted by the 1947 Conference of Government Experts meeting
to prepare for the 1949 Conference that provided that the Conventions would
be applicable to “cases of occupation of territories in the absence of any state
of war.”286 The final text expresses the same intention, as illustrated by the
statement by the Rapporteur of the Committee at the 1949 Conference re-
sponsible for drafting this article that it “was perfectly well understood that
the word ‘occupation’ referred not only to occupation during war itself, but
also to sudden occupation without war, as provided in the second paragraph
of Article 2.”287
The extension of the concept of occupation was considered necessary to
cover situations like the occupation of Denmark and Czechoslovakia during
World War II.
Trial Chamber I of the ICTY, in its judgment in Prosecutor v. Naletilic´ and
Martinovic´ of 31 March 2003, gave a two-fold definition of ‘occupation’. It held
that for the purposes of Article 42 of the Hague Regulations of 1907, actual
control of the territory is required.288 The Chamber enumerated a number
of guidelines providing assistance in determining whether actual control is
established. The Chamber adopted a different test in respect of occupation
in the sense of Geneva Convention (IV) of 1949. According to the Chamber,
the application of the law of occupation as it affects ‘individuals’ as civilians
under Geneva Convention IV does not require that the occupying power have
285 E. Benvenisti, The International Law of Occupation 4 (1993).
286 Report on the Works of the Conference of Government Experts for the Study of the Conven-
tions for the Protection of War Victims (Geneva, April 14 – 26, 1947), Geneva, 1947, at 8.
287 Final Record of the Diplomatic Conference of Geneva of 1949, Vol II-A, at 815.
288 Prosecutor v. Mladen Naletilic´ and Vinko Martinovic´, Judgment, Case No. IT-98-34-T, Tr. Ch.
I, 31 March 2003, paras. 218.
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actual authority. For the purposes of those individual’s rights, a state of
occupation exists upon their falling into “the hands of the occupying
power.”289 The Chamber adopted this definition on the basis of the ICRC
commentary on Article 6 of Geneva Convention (IV).290
The definition of occupation, based mainly on the fact of control of territory,
applies to a wide range of situations, including occupations in times of so-
called peace.291 Arguably, it includes a situation in which a peace support
operation exercises or is capable of exercising control over a territory. Kelly
states that the customary law of occupation applies to a peace support opera-
tion if:
the force present is not just passing through, is not engaged in actual combat, and
is, in effect, the sole authority capable of exercising control over the civilian popula-
tion, or if any remaining authority requires the approval or sanction of the force
to operate.292
He considers that these elements were present in the United Nations Operation
in Somalia and the Implementation Force in Bosnia. The argument is that the
thrust of the law of occupation seeks to regulate the relationship between a
non-sovereign force in a territory and the population in that territory. The need
for such a regulation reflects a potential conflict of interests between occupant
and occupied which is largely independent of the process through which the
occupant established its control.293
The potential conflict of interests is created by the exercise of authority
by the occupant. In this sense the examples mentioned by Kelly seem to be
proper occupants. UNOSOM II for example asserted a number of governmental
or quasi-governmental powers in the state, including the rebuilding and
resuscitation of key Somali institutions such as courts, the police force as well
as political and administrative institutions that largely functioned under the
operation’s control.294 The assertion of authority was based on the assumption
that there was no sovereign authority in Somalia.295
The difference between traditional occupations and the presence of a peace
support operation is that the presence of the latter is regulated by an altern-
289 Id., para. 221.
290 J. Pictet (Ed.), The Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949: Commentary, (IV) Geneva
Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War 60 (1958).
291 For an overview of these situations see A. Roberts, What is a Military Occupation, 55 British
Yearbook of International Law 250 (1984).
292 M. Kelly, Legitimacy and the Public Security Function, in R. Oakley, M. Dziedzic & E. Goldberg
(Eds.), Policing the New World Disorder 399 (1998).
293 See E. Benvenisti, supra note 285, at 4.
294 See S. Scott, Legality in a Collapsed State: The Somali Experience, 45 International & Comparat-
ive Law Quarterly 910 (1996).
295 M.J. Kelly, Restoring and Maintaining Order in Complex Peace Operations: The Search
for a Legal Framework 67-68 (1999).
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ative legal regime. The operation has a mandate under the Security Council
resolution that established or authorized the operation. In addition there is
in many cases a Status of Forces Agreement or Military Technical Agreement
detailing the status, powers and responsibilities of the force. These elements
raise questions concerning the appropriateness of applying the law of occupa-
tion. One question is whether the consent of the host state does not preclude
the application of the law of occupation. Though the law of occupation has
been dislodged from the context of armed conflict, it could be argued that
its application still requires occupation against the will of the sovereign. In
the case a peace support operation clearly has the consent of the government,
for example UNEF, it seems that there is no occupation as the term has been
used traditionally in international law.296 This argumentation, at least in
respect of the meaning of ‘occupation’ under the 1954 Convention for the
Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, is supported
by a report of a meeting of experts convened by the government of the Nether-
lands in July 1993. The report of the meeting states:
The question was raised of whether the word ‘occupation’ in the 1954 Convention
permits the application of the relevant provisions of the Convention to activities
undertaken within the framework of peace-keeping activities. As long as the United
Nations peace-keeping forces operate with the consent of the host State, such
operations were not regarded as an ocupation under the Convention.297
In the case of UNOSOM II, however, there was no government to give consent
and it is disingenuous to claim that the operation acted with the consent of
all the factions. In the 1995 supplement to An Agenda for Peace, the UN
Secretary-General stated that the mandate of the operation led it to forfeit the
consent of the parties.298
In the case of KFOR, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has given its consent
to the presence of the operation in the Military Technical Agreement. It can
be argued, however, that the government’s consent was obtained by duress.
Article 52 of the Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties provides that a
treaty is void if its conclusion has been procured by the threat of use of force
in violation of the principles of international law embodied in the Charter of
the United Nations. Consent to the Military Technical Agreement was certainly
procured by the use of force during Operation Allied Force, and it can be
argued that this use of force was a violation of the most important principle
296 A. Roberts, supra note 291, at 291.
297 Final Report of the Meeting of Experts on the application and effectiveness of the Conven-
tion for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict (The Hague,
14 May 1954), Annex to Report by the Director-General on the Reinforcement of UNESCO’s
Action for the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage of 18 August 1993,
Doc. 142 EX/15, Ann., para. 6.1.
298 UN Doc. S/1995/1 of 3 January 1995, para. 34.
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in the UN Charter, the prohibition of the use of force.299 Cerone states that
while the presence of the operation has been rendered legal by Security Council
Resolution 1244 and must be accepted by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,
this does not directly affect the application of the 1949 Geneva Conven-
tions.300
It can be argued that even in the absence of a valid Status of Forces Agree-
ment the rights and duties of a peace support operation are derived exclusively
from its mandate in a Security Council resolution and exclude the law of
occupation, in particular in the case of a resolution under Chapter VII of the
United Nations Charter.301 A resolution under Chapter VII can override exist-
ing obligations under international humanitarian law, including the law of
occupation, as Article 103 of the UN Charter makes clear. Security Council
resolutions generally do not expressly depart from the law of occupation, and
as such do not replace that law.302 In addition, Security Council resolutions
only provide very general guidelines for a peace support operation. Security
Council mandates are notoriously vague, as recognized most recently in the
Brahimi Report.303 They do not establish clear guidance for matters such as
the handling of detainees, the procedure and standards applicable for dealing
with local officials employed or approved by the operation and the relationship
between the force and the population.304 The law of occupation may be re-
quired to give more specific guidance.
State practice in general does not support the application of the law of
occupation to peace support operations. One possible exception appears to
be Australia. The government of Australia stated at the 1998 Meeting of
Contracting Parties to the Geneva Convention (IV) that the:
Fourth Geneva Convention is a good model to use in peace operations involving
deployment without consent as it is geared to take account of the exigencies of
attempting to administer or restore order in war-like conditions as opposed to a
299 See e.g. I. Brownlie, Kosovo: House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee 4th Report, June 2000:
Memoranda, 49 International & Comparative Law Quarterly 876 (2000), para. 88-98 relating
to the Rambouillet agreement. The same argument can be applied to the Military Technical
Agreement.
300 J. Cerone, Minding the Gap: Outlining KFOR Accountability in Post-Conflict Kosovo, 12 European
Journal of International Law 469 (2001), at 484.
301 D. Schraga, intervention in L. Condorelli, A.-M. La Rosa & S. Scherrer (Eds.), Les Nations
Unies et le Droit International Humanitaire 433 (1996).
302 See T. Irmscher, The Legal Framework for the Activities of the United Nations Interim Administra-
tion in Kosovo: The Charter, Human Rights, and the Law of Occupation, 44 German Yearbook
of International Law 353 (2001), at 375-387.
303 UN Doc. S/2000/809 of 21 August 2000, para 56: As a political body, the Security Council
focuses on consensus-building, even though it can take decisions with less than unanimity.
But the compromises required to build consensus can be made at the expense of specificity,
and the resulting ambiguity can have serious consequences in the field if the mandate is
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304 M.J. Kelly, supra note 295, at 70.
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peace time human rights regime. Australian troops in Somalia found this to be
the case when they were deployed into, and given responsibility for, the Bay
province during Operation Restore Hope in 1993. Following a determination that
the Fourth Convention applied to that intervention, the Australian force relied on
the Convention to provide answers to, and a framework for, many initiatives.
A Belgian Military Court of Appeal on the other hand held in 1997 that
UNOSOM II could not be assimilated to an occupying power, because the opera-
tion did not have any of the powers or responsibilities that international
treaties confer on an occupying power.305
It seems that NATO and troop contributing states do not consider the law
of occupation applicable to KFOR.306 Burger states that one reason is that the
authority of the operation is not based on the imposition of military control
by a state upon another state, but on the authorization by the UN to keep the
peace.307
It seems that one reason for governments and international organizations
to oppose the application of the law of occupation to peace support operations
is due to the positive obligations imposed by that regime. Lorenz states that
the United States and most other governments are very reluctant to invoke
and apply Geneva Convention (IV) and the law of occupation because the
political, economic and legal ramifications of taking over functions of sover-
eignty and administration of another state are enormous.308 The most im-
portant obligation arising under the law of occupation is the obligation to take
all the measures in the power of the occupant to restore and ensure, as far
as possible, public order and civil life.309 This is a task which those operations
claimed to be subject to the law of occupation are expressly mandated to
undertake or find themselves undertaking in practice. Security Council Resolu-
tion 814 requested UNOSOM II to assume responsibility for the consolidation,
expansion and maintenance of a secure environment throughout Somalia,310
and Security Council Resolution 1244 states that one of the responsibilities
of KFOR is to ensure public safety and order until the international civil pres-
ence can take responsibility for this task.311 Other obligations under the law
of occupation concern the welfare of the population. Kelly notes in relation
to these obligations that the Geneva Convention (IV):
305 Belgian Military Court of Appeal (Militair Gerechtshof), Prosecutor v. C.K. and B.C., judgment
of 17 December 1997, reported in Journal des Tribunaux 1998, 286-289.
306 A. van Loon, Kosovo Force-1: Tussen Trauma en Toekomst (II), 169 Militaire Spectator 656
(2000).
307 J. Burger, supra note 236, at 129.
308 F. Lorenz, The U.S. Perspective of Operation Restore Hope, in R. Oakley, M. Dziedzic &
E. Goldberg (Eds.), Policing the New World Disorder (1998).
309 1907 Hague Regulations, Article 43.
310 Security Council Resolution 814 of 26 March 1993, UN Doc. S/RES/814, para. 14.
311 Security Council Resolution 1244 of 10 June 1999, UN Doc. S/RES/1244, para. 9, sub b.
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only obliges the force to assume responsibilities for the population in terms of
health, sustenance, and welfare to the extent that it has the spare capacity to do
so, beyond what it needs to deal with operational demands, and only to the maxi-
mum extent feasible. The role of meeting the needs of the population is more than
adequately met by simply allowing the array of NGOs to do their job in these
environments as they will always be present.312
3.13 CONTENT OF RULES OF GENERAL INTERNATIONAL LAW
It was argued that rules of general international law are applicable to UN and
NATO peace support operations. This makes it important to indicate which
rules of international humanitarian law are rules of general international law
or in other words customary international law or general principles of law.
It is clearly beyond the scope of this study to examine state practice in relation
to every rule of international humanitarian law because of the sheer magnitude
of the task. In addition, as the Appeals Chamber of the Yugoslavia Tribunal
in the Tadic´ case emphasized, an examination of state practice in relation to
rules of international humanitarian law is rendered extremely difficult by the
fact that not only is access to the theatre of military operations normally
refused to independent observers, but information on the actual conduct of
hostilities is withheld by the parties to the conflict. The course recommended
by the Chamber, placing reliance primarily on such elements as official pro-
nouncements of states, military manuals and judicial decisions, will mainly
be followed.313 Special emphasis will be placed on pronouncements of the
International Court of Justice.314
It may be recalled that the rules in question have developed through
application to states. The factual differences between states and international
organizations requires that the rules are applicable mutatis mutandis to the
organizations. In other words, the factual differences between states and an
international organization may require the modification of rules.315 For ex-
ample, the members of UN and NATO have not conferred criminal jurisdiction
on the organizations, requiring a modification of rules concerning criminal
prosecution.
The rules in the 1907 Hague Regulations appear to be accepted as customa-
ry international law. The International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg stated
that the 1907 Hague Regulations by 1939 were “recognized by all civilized
312 M. Kelly, supra note 292, at 399.
313 Supra note 34, para. 99.
314 See generally J. Gardam, The Contribution of the International Court of Justice to International
Humanitarian Law, 14 Leiden Journal of International Law 349 (2001); V. Chetail, The
Contribution of the International Court of Justice to International Humanitarian Law, 85 Inter-
national Review of the Red Cross 235 (2003).
315 See e.g. F. Seyersted, supra note 22, at 202-203.
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nations, and were regarded as being declaratory of the laws and customs of
war.”316 It has also been suggested that the entire mass of rules in the 1949
Geneva Conventions are customary international law. In particular, the UN
Secretary-General stated in his report on the establishment of the Yugoslavia
Tribunal that the:
part of conventional International Humanitarian Law which has beyond doubt
become part of international customary law is the law applicable in armed conflict
as embodied in: the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 for the Protection of
War Victims; the Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War
on Land and the Regulations annexed thereto of 18 October 1907.317
It is however unlikely that all the provisions of the 1949 Geneva Conventions
are customary international law, if only because some of the technical rules
in the conventions have never been implemented in practice. The Commission
of Experts for the former Yugoslavia (the Kalshoven Commission) did not go
so far as the Secretary-General, but only stated that the:
body of customary international law applicable to international armed conflicts
includes the concept of war crimes, and a wide range of provisions also stated in
Hague Convention IV of 1907, the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and, to some extent,
the provisions of Additional Protocol I.318
There is also state practice supporting a more limited scope of customary
rules.319 Nevertheless, the great majority of the rules in the 1949 Geneva Con-
ventions undoubtedly have a customary character. These include common
Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions. The International Court of Justice
in the Nicaragua case held that these rules constitutes a minimum yardstick
that applies in all armed conflicts and that they reflect ‘elementary considera-
tions of humanity’. This customary character of common Article 3 in inter-
national and non-international armed conflicts has been reaffirmed in the case
law of the Yugoslavia Tribunal.320 The Appeals Chamber emphasized that
common Article 3 is the quintessence of the 1949 Geneva Conventions in the
Cˇelebic´i case:
316 Trial of the Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal, vol. I, at 267
(1947).
317 Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution
808 (1993) of 3 May 1993, UN Doc. S/25704, para. 35.
318 Final report of the Commission of experts established pursuant to Security Council Resolu-
tion 780 (1992) of 24 May 1994, UN Doc. S/1994/674.
319 See e.g. oral statement by Australia to the International Court of Justice in the Nuclear
Weapons case, 30 October 1995, para. 8.
320 See e.g. Prosecutor v. Tadic´, supra note 242, para. 609; Prosecutor v. Miroslav Kvocˇka, Milojica
Kos, Mlaðo Radic´, Zoran Žigic´ and Dragoljub Prcac´, Judgment, Case No. IT-98-30, Tr. Ch. I,
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It is indisputable that common Article 3, which sets forth a minimum core of
mandatory rules, reflects the fundamental humanitarian principles which underlie
International Humanitarian Law as a whole, and upon which the Geneva Conven-
tions in their entirety are based. These principles, the object of which is the respect
for the dignity of the human person, developed as a result of centuries of warfare
and had already become customary law at the time of the adoption of the Geneva
Conventions because they reflect the most universally recognised humanitarian
principles.321
The International Court of Justice in the Nicaragua case also held that the 1949
Geneva Conventions are “in some respects a development, and in other
respects no more than an expression” of ‘fundamental general principles of
humanitarian law’.”322
In its Advisory Opinion in the Nuclear Weapons case the International Court
of Justice also discussed the character of certain rules of international human-
itarian law. It stated that:
It is undoubtedly because a great many rules of humanitarian law applicable in
armed conflict are so fundamental to the respect of the human person and “ele-
mentary considerations of humanity” as the Court put it in its Judgment of 9 April
1949 in the Corfu Channel case (I.C.J. Reports 1949, p. 22), that the Hague and Geneva
Conventions have enjoyed a broad accession. Further these fundamental rules are
to be observed by all States whether or not they have ratified the conventions that
contain them, because they constitute intransgressible principles of international
customary law.323
The Court specifically isolated the principle of distinction between combatants
and non-combatants, and the prohibition of the use of weapons causing
unnecessary suffering, as the “cardinal principles contained in the texts con-
stituting the fabric of humanitarian law.”324 The term ‘intransgressible and
cardinal principles’ as used by the Court, is confusing because it is unfamiliar
to international lawyers, at least in conventional international law. Despite
this ambiguity, it is clear that the Court recognized that the corpus of inter-
national humanitarian law contained in the major conventions essentially
comprises general and customary international law.325
It is generally recognized that many but not all of the rules in the Ad-
ditional Protocol I are customary international law, but there is controversy
321 Prosecutor v. Zejnil Delalic´, Zdravko Mucic´, Hazim Delic´ and Esad Landžo (“Cˇelebic´i Case”), Case
No. IT-96-21, Judgement, A. Ch., 20 February 2001, para 143.
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over precisely which rules do not have a customary character.326 The case
law of the Yugoslavia Tribunal has contributed significantly to the identifica-
tion of these rules. Trial Chamber III for example stated in the Kordic´ and Cˇerkez
case that there is no possible doubt that Article 15, paragraphs 1 and 2, of the
Protocol forms part of customary international law.327 Trial Chamber I held
in the Strugar case that it had no doubt that Articles 51 and 52 of the Protocol
constitute a reaffirmation of existing norms of customary international law.328
The methodology used by the Tribunal has however been criticized, because
it relies almost exclusively on statements rather than operational practice.329
The Tribunal seems to only formally adhere to the traditional theory of custom,
requiring practice and opinio iuris, as formulated by the International Court
of Justice in the North Sea Continental Shelf cases.
For this reason states and international organizations may attach more
importance to the results of a study undertaken by the ICRC, which is expected
to be published in 2004.330 The study was undertaken pursuant to an invita-
tion by the 1995 International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent,
which endorsed a recommendation of the Intergovernmental Group of Experts
for the Protection for War Victims. The recommendation proposed that:
The ICRC be invited to prepare, with the assistance of experts in IHL representing
various geographical regions and different legal systems, and in consultation with
experts from governments and international organisations, a report on customary
rules of IHL applicable in international and non-international armed conflicts, and
to circulate the report to States and competent international bodies.
The study specifically concerns the customary character of the rules in the
1977 Additional Protocols. The conclusions in the report are based on research
using both national and international sources. The sources in question include
not only verbal statements but also operational practice.
The majority of rules included in the Secretary-General’s Bulletin on the
Observance of International Humanitarian Law by United Forces reflect
326 “Although the United States is not a party to the Additional Protocols, many of those
provisions form part of international customary law.” Reply by the Minister of Foreign
Affairs, Question No. 224, South African National Assembly, 16 October 2002; G. Aldrich,
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customary international law applicable in international armed conflict, but
a small number only reflects conventional law. One of these rules is the pro-
hibition of the use of anti-personnel landmines. There is a clear tendency
towards an absolute prohibition of anti-personnel landmines. This is illustrated
by the rapid pace at which states have ratified the 1997 Convention on the
Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production, and Transfer of Anti-Personnel
Mines and on their Destruction.331 At the same time, however, there is state
practice that rejects the customary character of the prohibition. The United
Kingdom government for example stated in 1998 that despite its signature
of the Ottawa Convention, it does not consider that the use of anti-personnel
landmines is prohibited under customary international law.332 The United
States has also implicitly rejected a general prohibition as customary law
through the adoption of a policy according to which the security situation on
the Korean peninsula requires the use of anti-personnel landmines.333
Other rules which do not yet appear to be customary international law
include the prohibition of employing methods of warfare which are intended,
or may be expected to cause, wide-spread, long-term and severe damage to
the natural environment, and the prohibition of making installations containing
dangerous forces, namely dams, dikes and nuclear electrical generating
stations, the object of military operations if such operations may cause the
release of dangerous forces and consequent severe losses among the civilian
population.334
The Bulletin also contains rules that diverge from, or at least rephrase,
customary international law. One example is the provision in section 5, para-
graph 4, that military installations and equipment of peacekeeping operations,
as such, shall not be considered military objectives. Article 52, paragraph 2,
of Additional Protocol I is a codification of the rule of customary international
that defines a military objective.335 According to this provision military ob-
jectives are those objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use make
an effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruc-
tion, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers
a definite military advantage. Under customary international law, military
installations and equipment of peace support operations that meet these criteria
are a legitimate military objective.336
331 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-
Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction (the ‘Ottawa Convention’), 36 ILM (1997) 1507,
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Another example is section 6, paragraph 3, which states that it is prohibited
to employ methods of warfare that may cause superfluous injury or un-
necessary suffering. This is a restatement of the customary rule codified in
Article 35, paragraph 2, of Additional Protocol I.337 The provision in the Pro-
tocol prohibits not only the means but also methods of warfare that may have
the result in question.
There are many rules of customary international law that are not included
in the Bulletin. An illustrative list of these rules includes Article 9 of Geneva
Convention (I-III) and Article 10 of Geneva Convention (IV) on the activities
of the ICRC, subject to the consent of the parties to the conflict.338 Another
rule is the obligation to search for casualties in Article 15 of the first and Article
18 of Geneva Convention (II), as well as the rule that medical and religious
personnel must be identified in Article 40 Geneva Convention (I) and Article
42 of Geneva Convention (II). Many of the rules on the treatment of prisoners
of war in Geneva Convention (III) are also applicable, including those on
conditions relating to quarters, food, clothing, hygiene and medical attention
for prisoners in Articles 25 to 30. The Secretary-General’s Bulletin only contains
a general reference to the more detailed rules in the convention. Other applic-
able rules relating to prisoners of war are the rule that the use of weapons
against prisoners shall constitute an extreme measure preceded by a warning
in Article 42 of the convention, and the right to make complaints or requests
to the military authorities in whose power they are in the first sentence of
Article 78 of the convention. Rules from Geneva Convention (IV) include Article
23, concerning the free passage of consignments of medical and hospital stores
intended for civilians, and consignments of essential foodstuffs intended for
certain especially vulnerable groups of persons. Closely related to this pro-
vision is Article 54 of Additional Protocol (I), which prohibits starvation of
civilians as a method of warfare and protects objects indispensable to the
survival of the civilian population, with the possible exception of paragraph
4 prohibiting reprisals. Another related rule that is applicable as a rule of
which the core, though not necessarily the specific language and details, is
Article 70 of Additional Protocol (I) on relief actions for the civilian population.
It may be noted that the last three articles play an important role in the debate
on legal limitations to international sanctions.339 Recent practice of the mem-
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bers of the Security Council reflects a recognition that rules of international
humanitarian law must be taken into account in the design of sanctions,
presumably on the ground that the relevant principles of international law
apply to the UN as general international law. In 1995 the five permanent
members of the Council issued a short policy statement on the humanitarian
impact of sanctions. The document emphasized that further collective actions
in the Security Council within the context of any future sanctions regime
should be directed to minimize unintended adverse side-effects of sanctions
on the most vulnerable segments of targeted countries.340 In 1999 the Pres-
ident of the Security Council, in a note on the work of the sanctions com-
mittees, made certain proposals to improve the committees’ work. These
proposals were accepted by all members of the Security Council and included
the proposal to exempt foodstuffs, pharmaceuticals and medical supplies from
UN sanctions regimes, and the proposal that sanctions committees should
monitor, throughout the sanctions regime, the humanitarian impact of sanctions
on vulnerable groups, including children, and make required adjustments of
the exemption mechanisms to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assist-
ance.341 The proposals were probably influenced by the Inter-Agency Stand-
ing Committee on the Humanitarian Impact of Sanctions established by General
Assembly Resolution 46/182 of 19 December 1991. In a statement of 29 Decem-
ber 1997 to the Security Council, the Committee stated that the design of a
sanctions regime should take fully into account international human rights
instruments and humanitarian standards established by the Geneva Conven-
tions.342
Other applicable rules in Additional Protocol (I) include the requirement
of an effective advance warning of attacks which may affect the civilian popu-
lation, codified in Article 57, paragraph 2, sub c, and the protection of journal-
ists in Article 79.343
3.14 CONCLUSION
The focus in this chapter has been on the obligations of the UN and NATO under
international humanitarian law. Only if the organizations actually do have
such responsibilities can they be responsible for conduct that is attributable
to them and that breaches international humanitarian law.
871 (1996); B. Kondoch, The Limits of Economic Sanctions under International Law: The Case
of Iraq, 7 International Peacekeeping 267 (2001) at 284-288.
340 UN Doc. S/1995/300 of 13 April 1995, Annex.
341 Note by the President of the Security Council: Work of the Sanctions Committees of 29
January 1999, UN Doc. S/1999/92.
342 UN Doc. S/1998/147 of 23 February 1998, Annex, para. 1.
343 On the customary character of these provisions see T. Meron, supra note 335, at 65.
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The question whether international organizations as international legal
persons are bound by international humanitarian law has mainly focused on
the UN, and less on NATO. The legal contours of the latter organization are
beginning to be the subject of public and academic, if not diplomatic, dis-
cussion, after Operation Allied Force, the air campaign by NATO against the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1999, and applications to the International
Court of Justice, the European Court of Human Rights and national courts
related to that campaign.
In the last decade, the discussion concerning international law obligations
of the UN in general, and the Security Council in particular, has to a large
extent taken place in the context of economic sanctions imposed by the Security
Council. Economic sanctions in general, and in particular the economic
sanctions imposed on Iraq after the invasion of Kuwait were recognized as
leading in certain cases to humanitarian disasters and encroachments upon
basic principles of humanity.344 In this context certain writers even identified
a human rights paradox, in the sense that after the end of the Cold War the
UN increasingly reacted to violations of human rights by imposing sanctions,
while the sanctions themselves seemed to breach human rights. Emphasizing
international law obligations of the Security Council is considered as one
possible avenue to achieve mitigation of the sanctions and their effects.
Writers taking this avenue often simply assert international law limitations
on the Security Council, and do not analyze the origin, scope and existence
of the obligation in any detail. This is not problematic if the criticism of
sanctions is from a moral or ethical perspective,345 but it is not sufficient as
a matter of legal argument.
Obligations do not arise from international humanitarian law treaties. These
treaties only bind the contracting parties, and the organizations in question
are not states parties. The accession clauses of the main major modern inter-
national humanitarian law treaties, the 1949 Geneva Conventions and the 1977
Additional Protocols, also exclude the possibility of accession of international
organizations. This is implied in the ordinary meaning of the term ‘Powers’
used in the clauses in question, and reaffirmed by the travaux préparatoires of
the Additional Protocols. In this context it is also relevant that the evolution
in UN practice towards a recognition of the applicability of international
humanitarian law to peace support operations has not resulted in serious
consideration of the possibility of accession but in a separate instrument for
these operations.
344 See N. Schrijver, The Use of Economic Sanctions by the United Nations Security Council: An
International Law Perspective, in H. Post (Ed.), International Economic Law and Armed
Conflict 123 (1994).
345 See J. Gordon, A Peaceful, Silent, Deadly Remedy: The Ethics of Economic Sanctions, 13 Ethics
& International Affairs (1999); D. Cortright & G. Lopez, Are Sanctions Just? The Problematic
Case of Iraq, 52 Journal of International Affairs 33 (1999).
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Another possible source of humanitarian obligations are the constituent
documents of the UN and NATO. In the case of the UN there is a distinction
between action taken by the Security Council under Chapter VII of the UN
Charter and other action. In the case of the former, Articles 24 and 1, paragraph
1, provide that the Security Council can derogate from international law. The
travaux préparatoires of Article 1, paragraph 1, reaffirm that this was the inten-
tion of the drafters. The committee concerned with the drafting of Article 1,
paragraph 1, at the San Francisco Conference took a decision to move the
phrase ‘in conformity with the principles of justice and international law’ from
the first part of paragraph 1 to the latter part, so that it would apply only to
the ‘adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations’. This
change was made to ensure that existing law would not limit the vital duty
of preventing and removing threats to and breaches of the peace. In this
context the importance attached to the maintenance or restoration of inter-
national peace and security by the negotiators can hardly be overestimated.
Goodrich explains that one of the sponsoring governments of the Dumbarton
Oaks proposals, the Soviet Union, at first considered that the organization
should be exclusively limited in its functions to the maintenance of inter-
national peace and security and that while the great powers eventually agreed
to give the organization additional functions, those who wrote the Charter
were “convinced that the first job of the new organization, both in time and
in importance, was to keep the peace.”346
The possibility for the Security Council to derogate from international law
when it is acting under Chapter VII may be excluded in the case of peremptory
norms. This, however, hardly constitutes a broad limitation on the powers
of the Council, inter alia because it appears that only a limited number of
international humanitarian law rules are ius cogens.
In the exercise of powers other than under Chapter VII of the Charter, the
UN and the Security Council are expected to act in conformity with principles
of justice and international law. This includes action for the peaceful settlement
of disputes under Chapter VI of the UN Charter.347
Article 1, paragraph 3, of the UN Charter provides an obligation for the
UN to respect human rights. The travaux préparatoires make clear that an obliga-
tion for the member states was rejected but that it was retained for the organ-
ization itself. Arguably, the scope of this obligation extends to international
humanitarian law. In this context it is relevant that the recent development
of international humanitarian law has been influenced by human rights to
such an extent that some writers speak of a convergence between the two fields
of law. Article 1, paragraph 3, does not affect the conclusion that the Security
346 L. Goodrich, The United Nations 23, 159 (1960).
347 R. Higgins, The Place of International Law in the Settlement of Disputes by the Security Council,
64 American Journal of International Law 1 (1970). See also the dissenting opinion of Judge
Weeramantry in the Lockerbie cases (Provisional Measures), supra note 8.
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Council is not bound by international law in the exercise of powers under
Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. The Charter must be read as a
whole, and the phrasing of Article 1, paragraph 1 received close attention of
the drafters of the Charter, such that if they had intended paragraph 3 as an
exception to that rule they would have stated this expressly.
NATO, and the UN, except in the exercise of powers under Chapter VII of
the Charter, are both bound by customary rules and general principles of
international humanitarian law. As international legal persons they are subject
to the general rules that apply in the system in which they operate. Their
member states have entrusted certain functions to them but also the attendant
duties and responsibilities, as the International Court of Justice states in the
Reparations for Injuries case. The duty to respect international humanitarian
law is attendant to the use of force once it crosses a certain level of intensity.
In this regard it is not relevant that the organization in question has not
participated in the development of the rules concerned. Schermers and Blokker
state that in contrast to states:
International organizations, although established by states, have never possessed
a potent legal order of their own. They are established under international law.
Their constitutional roots are in international law. No superiority over international
law can be pleaded on their behalf.348
The precise contours of the body of customary rules and general principles
of international humanitarian law is subject to debate, but there are also many
rules that clearly belong in this category. The case law of the International
Court of Justice has identified the core of these rules. The case law of the ICTY
and ICTR is useful to identify a broader category of customary rules, and the
publication of the study on customary international humanitarian law by the
ICRC will bring additional guidance.
State practice in relation to UN peace support operations supports the idea
that such operations are bound by rules of international humanitarian law.
Such recognition has been incremental, in the sense that it was first ambiguous
and became increasingly clear. First the organization undertook to respect the
principles and spirit of international humanitarian law conventions in agree-
ments between the organization and states contributing troops. Though the
precise content of these principles and spirit remained unclear, practice in
relation to ONUC makes clear that it was not an empty undertaking. In parti-
cular, the organization admitted legal responsibility for crimes committed by
members of the operation with reference to the principles of international
humanitarian law. Though the drafters of Additional Protocol I rejected the
possibility of accession of international organizations to the protocols, neither
the UN nor member states rejected the idea that the organization has obligations
348 H. Schermers & N. Blokker, supra note 87, at 984.
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under international humanitarian law that are separate from those of states.
The obligation of states under common Article 1 of the 1949 Geneva Conven-
tions does not cease to operate after the transfer of powers to an international
organization, in accordance with the position of the ICRC, but this obligation
co-exists with those of the UN under general international law.
The adoption of the Convention on the Safety of United Nations and
Associated Personnel in 1994 constituted the first recognition that international
humanitarian law, and not only its principles and spirit, is applicable to peace
support operations established by the UN. The exclusion clause in Article 2,
paragraph 2, implicitly recognizes the applicability of international human-
itarian law. The savings clause in Article 20, paragraph a, of the convention
recognizes the applicability of international humanitarian law to peace support
operations, though it does not clearly determine when personnel cross the
dividing line between protected persons and combatants.
The 1999 Secretary-General’s Bulletin on the Observance of International
Humanitarian Law by United Nations Forces is an explicit recognition of the
applicability of international humanitarian law to UN peace support operations.
The preamble to the Bulletin presents a departure from the traditional reference
to ‘principles and spirit’ where it states that the document sets out the ‘funda-
mental principles and rules’ of international humanitarian law for UN forces.
The majority of the provisions of the Bulletin reflect customary international
law, but many other rules of customary international law are not included
in the document. It seems that this related to the fact that the Bulletin is mainly
intended as a tool for instruction, rather than an exhaustive list of all the
applicable rules.
The Statute of the ICC implicitly also recognizes the applicability of inter-
national humanitarian law to UN peace support operations. Under Article 8
of the Statute, attacking personnel involved in a peacekeeping mission is a
war crime within the jurisdiction of the Court, but only if such personnel were
entitled to protection given to civilians under the international law of armed
conflict. This implies that there are situations in which the personnel in ques-
tion is not entitled to this protection, in other words that they are combatants
that are bound by the rules of international humanitarian law. It is also rel-
evant that the United States chose to veto the extension of the mandate of the
United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina as one of the steps in its
efforts to exempt United States military personnel from the jurisdiction of the
Court.349 The choice of an operation under United Nations command and
control implies that the personnel in such operations are capable of committing
crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court, including serious violations of
international humanitarian law. This is reaffirmed by a letter from United
Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan to United States Secretary of State Colin
349 See C. Lynch, U.S. Fails to Get Support on Immunity for Its Peacekeepers, Washington Post,
4 July 2002.
Chapter 3 221
Powell in which the Secretary-General expressed his concern at the United
States veto. The letter recognizes that in principle personnel of a United
Nations peace support operation could commit crimes within the jurisdiction
of the Court, though in practice this is “highly improbable.”350
The Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone also expressly recognizes
that transgressions by personnel of peace support operations may come within
the jurisdiction of the Special Court, which includes serious violations of
international humanitarian law.
Almost all state practice in relation to NATO peace support operations does
not support the idea that the organization has obligations under international
humanitarian law separate from its member states.351 Documents relating
to the status of IFOR and SFOR in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia, and
KFOR in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, lack reference to international
humanitarian law. More fundamentally, it seems that officials of the organiza-
tion and member states consider that in the context of international human-
itarian law the organization cannot have obligations because it does not have
international legal personality. In other contexts however it seems that they
do recognize that the organization is an international legal person. Moreover,
there is a strong argument that the organization has international legal
personality. If the organization does have an international legal personality
and its functions include the deployment of military operations, it seems that
the inevitable conclusion must be that the organization itself must respect
customary rules and general principles of international humanitarian law.
State practice supports the idea that the international v. non-international
dichotomy in international humanitarian law is not relevant to UN peace
support operations. This practice is consistent with the idea that the ground
for making the distinction, deference to state sovereignty, is not an attribute
of international organizations. This is quite apart from, but consistent with,
the increasing tendency to de-emphasize a clear dichotomy between inter-
national and non-international armed conflicts in legal instruments and in the
case law of international tribunals.
In principle, it seems to be accepted that the threshold of application of
international humanitarian law to the UN is to be determined by the threshold
in customary international law. Under customary international law, it is
required that hostilities reach a certain level of intensity and that the opponent
is a state, or a non-governmental armed group with a certain degree of organ-
ization, making it capable of carrying out the various obligations that arise
under international humanitarian law. The case law of the Yugoslavia and
Rwanda Tribunals provides indicators for the existence of an armed conflict,
though a final determination remains to be made on a case-by-case basis.
350 Letter from the Secretary-General to Secretary of State Powell, 3 July 2002.
351 But see § 2.3.
222 Scope of application of international humanitarian law to peace support operations
State practice in relation to UN peace support operations makes clear that
hostilities need to reach a relatively high level of intensity before personnel
of a peace support operation are considered combatants. The UN does not seem
to have considered personnel of UNOSOM II as combatants for example, though
hostilities between the operation and United Somali Congress/Somali National
Alliance involved heavy armor and resulted in a number of casualties. Green-
wood states on the basis of this and other examples that it seems:
that there is a tendency to treat the threshold for determining whether a force has
become party to an armed conflict as being somewhat higher in the case of United
Nations and associated forces engaged in a mission which has a primarily peace-
keeping or humanitarian character than in the normal case of conflicts between
states.352
It is difficult to determine whether there is a consistent tendency because the
organization does not make clear statements on whether the personnel of a
peace support operation are combatants in specific situations. If such a tend-
ency exists, it is presumably the result of the desire of the organization and
member states to insist as long as possible on the impartiality of peace support
operations, a desire which at least politically does not sit well with the status
of party to an armed conflict.
The majority of state practice does not support the application of the law
of occupation to peace support operations. Only Australia has suggested that
it may consider the law of occupation to be applicable to peace support opera-
tions. De lege ferenda the development of a broad concept of occupation accord-
ing to which the law of occupation would apply to peace support operations
that are present in territory without the consent of the government and that
exercise similar functions as a military government seems to offer many
advantages. The law of occupation provides a legal framework which addresses
many issues that the UN and NATO have encountered in peace support opera-
tions.353 For example, it offers a sound basis to detain or intern persons
posing a security threat. Such a sound basis has been lacking in relation to
peace support operations. The Special Representative of the United Nations
Commission on Human Rights on the situation of human rights in Bosnia and
Herzegovina and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia for example has criticized
the ‘obscure legal grounds’ for military detentions by the Kosovo Force.354
352 C. Greenwood, supra note 167, at 24.
353 See e.g. B. Levrat, Le Droit International Humanitaire au Timor Oriental: Entre Théorie et Pratique,
83 International Review of the Red Cross 77 (2001).
354 Report of the Special Representative of the Commission on Human Rights on the situation
of human rights in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Jose
Cutileiro of 8 January 2002, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2002/41, para. 88.
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Other institutions have also questioned the legal basis of detentions by the
force.355
It is useful at this point to recall the importance of the determination of
the applicable standards to international organizations. It is often stated that
there is no right without a remedy, though as discussed in chapter 5 this is
presently not the case for rights of persons that have been violated by peace
support operations. At the same time there is also generally no remedy without
a right, at least in the context of state responsibility. The principles of state
responsibility distinguish between primary and secondary rules, but draft
article 3 makes clear that there is no responsibility without an international
obligation of the state, and this also applies to international organizations.
Accountability also requires standards of accountability, as illustrated by the
focus of the Committee on the Accountability of International Organizations
of the International Law Association on drawing up a list of standards applic-
able to international organizations. For this reason it is important to determine
the rules of international humanitarian law that bind the UN and NATO.
355 See e.g. Report by Mr. Alvaro Gil-Robles, Commissioner for Human Rights, Council of
Europe, 16 October 2002, CommDH(2002)11, at 21-23.

4 Legal consequences of accountability for
breaches of international humanitarian law
by peace support operations
4.1 INTRODUCTION
It was concluded in the previous chapters that the UN and NATO as well as
states can be responsible for violations of international humanitarian law by
members of peace support operations in certain circumstances. In case they
are responsible, the question arises what the consequences are under inter-
national law.
4.2 THE ILC’S DRAFT ARTICLES ON STATE RESPONSIBILITY AND LEGAL CON-
SEQUENCES
4.2.1 Regulation of legal consequences
The legal consequences of an internationally wrongful act of a state are
governed by Part Two of the ILC draft articles on state responsibility. The core
legal consequences of an internationally wrongful act set out in this Part are
the obligations of the responsible state to cease the wrongful conduct, and
to make full reparation for the injury caused by the internationally wrongful
act, as provided in draft articles 30-31.1
1 Draft articles 30 and 31 state:
Article 30
Cessation and non-repetition
The State responsible for the internationally wrongful act is under an obligation:
To cease that act, if it is continuing;
To offer appropriate assurances and guarantees of non-repetition, if circumstances so require.
Article 31
Reparation
1. The responsible State is under an obligation to make full reparation for the injury caused
by the internationally wrongful act.
2. Injury includes any damage, whether material or moral, caused by the internationally
wrongful act of a State.
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Chapter II of Part Two deals with the forms of reparation for injury,
spelling out in further detail the general principle stated in draft article 31.2
Chapter III of Part Two provides that there are additional legal con-
sequences in case of a serious breach by a state of an obligation arising under
a peremptory norm of general international law.3
The forms of reparation dealt with in Chapter II of Part Two represent ways
of giving effect to the underlying obligation in draft article 31 and must be
seen against this background. It is for this reason that the ILC points out that
some flexibility is shown in practice in terms of the appropriateness of re-
quiring one form of reparation rather than another, subject to the requirement
of full reparation for the breach in accordance with draft article 31.4 In other
words, Chapter II provides a flexible system for implementing the obligation
to make full reparation.
4.2.2 Cessation
Draft article 30 (a) of the draft articles presents the obligation to cease an
internationally wrongful act as an aspect of the restoration and repair of the
legal relationship affected by the breach of an international obligation.5 Ob-
viously, this obligation can only arise in case of an internationally wrongful
act that is continuing. Examples of a continuing violation of international
humanitarian law are the treatment of detainees in contravention of the applic-
able standards, maintaining in effect orders preventing the free passage of
medical and hospital stores and using the immediate surroundings of cultural
property as a base.
2 See draft article 34 which provides:
Article 34
Forms of reparation
Full reparation for the injury caused by the internationally wrongful act shall take the form
of restitution, compensation and satisfaction, either singly or in combination, in accordance
with the provisions of this chapter.
3 See draft article 41 which provides:
Article 41
Particular consequences of a serious breach of an obligation under this chapter
States shall cooperate to bring to an end through lawful means any serious breach within
the meaning of article 40
No State shall recognize as lawful a situation created by a serious breach within the meaning
of article 40, nor render aid or assistance in maintaining that situation.
This article is without prejudice to the other legal consequences referred to in this Part and
to such further consequences that a breach to which this chapter applies may entail under
international law.
4 Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its fifty-third session, 23 April
– 1 June and 2 July – 10 August 2001 (A/56/10), at 237.
5 See generally C. Deman, La Cessation de l’Acte Illicite, 23 Revue Belge de Droit International
476 (1990).
Chapter 4 227
Cessation is often confused with restitution. This has to do with the fact
that a claim to restitution during a continuing violation of international law
to a large extent coincides with the claim to stop the violation. Although the
result of cessation may be indistinguishable from restitution, there is neverthe-
less a difference. Cessation is only concerned with the future while restitution
is also concerned with the period before it is demanded.6
4.2.3 Assurances and guarantees of non-repetition
Similar to cessation, assurances and guarantees of non-repetition in draft article
30 (b) are an aspect of continuation and repair of the legal relationship affected
by the breach. The focus is on the future, not on the past. This legal con-
sequence of an internationally wrongful act has featured in the draft articles
since it was proposed by Special Rapporteur Arangio-Ruiz in 1989.7 Until
2000, assurances and guarantees were presented as an aspect of reparation
rather than in the context of the continuation and repair of the legal relation-
ship affected by the breach. Certain writers maintained that this legal con-
sequence is not an autonomous legal consequence but a form of satisfaction.8
If it is maintained, as Brownlie does, that satisfaction may be defined as any
measure which an author of a breach of duty is bound to take apart from
restitution or compensation, this is a logical conclusion.9 The 1996 ILC draft
articles on state responsibility separated assurances and guarantees of non-
repetition from satisfaction, on the ground that they are future-oriented and
have a preventive rather than a remedial function. Special Rapporteur Craw-
ford took this observation to its logical conclusion and proposed to connect
this legal consequence with cessation rather than in the chapter on repara-
tion,10 and the ILC followed the Special Rapporteur’s conclusions.
The question whether the obligation to offer assurances or guarantees of
non-repetition may be a legal consequence of an internationally wrongful act
was debated in the LaGrand case.11 The relief requested by Germany in this
case included asking the Court to adjudge and declare that the United States
6 Id., at 487-488.
7 See G. Arangio-Ruiz, Second Report on State Responsibility, YBILC 1989, Vol. II (Part 1)
1, at 42, paras. 148-163 and at 56, para. 191.
8 See F. Przetacznik, La Responsabilité Internationale de l’État a Raison des Préjudices de Caractère
Moral et Politique Causés a un Autre État, 78 Revue Générale de Droit International Public
919 (1974), at 966; P. Bissonnette, La Satisfaction Comme Mode de Réparation en Droit
International 85 (1952).
9 I. Brownlie, System of the Law of Nations, State Responsibility, Part I, 208 (1983).
10 J. Crawford, Special Rapporteur, Third Report on State Responsibility of 15 March 2000,
UN Doc. A/CN.4/507, at 26.
11 See G. Palmisano, Les Garanties de Non-Repetition entre Codification et Réalisation Juridictionelle
du Droit: A Propos de l’Affaire Lagrand, 106 Revue Générale de Droit International Public
753 (2002).
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should provide Germany with a guarantee of the non-repetition of the illegal
acts, in this case the failure by the United States to notify an accused of his
right to consular assistance. The United States disputed that such a remedy
exists in the law of state responsibility.12 In its judgment the Court seems
to have accepted the existence of assurances and guarantees of non-repetition
as a legal consequence of an internationally wrongful act:
The Court considers that the commitment expressed by the United States to ensure
implementation of the specific measures adopted in performance of its obligations
under Article 36, paragraph 1 (b), must be regarded as meeting Germany’s request
for a general assurance of non-repetition.13
Despite the judgment in LaGrand it is uncertain whether the obligation to
provide assurances or guarantees of non-repetition is customary international
law.14 Although draft article 30 (b) has not attracted much comment by states,
some question its existence under customary international law. Even Germany
in its pleadings in the LaGrand case conceded that “some doubts might exist
about its anchoring in customary law.”15 Some members of the drafting com-
mittee of the ILC held that the provision lacks substantial roots in existing state
practice and that there is no clear evidence of an emerging principle of inter-
national law in this direction.16 The drafting committee decided to retain
article 30 (b) in the draft articles not because of its roots in state practice but
because it thought the provision introduced a useful policy.17 State practice
with regard to assurances and guarantees of non-repetition is found in par-
ticular in connection with responsibility for breaches of human rights. In a
number of cases the United Nations Human Rights Committee has required
states to provide guarantees in its decisions on individual complaints. In Paul
v. Guyana, for example, the Committee stated that the “State party is under
an obligation to take appropriate measures to ensure that similar violations
do not occur in the future.”18 The Inter-American Court of Human Rights
in constant jurisprudence also requires states to provide assurances and guaran-
12 Verbatim Record, CR 2000/29, 14 November 2000, para. 5.23.
13 LaGrand case (Germany v. United States of America), reproduced in 40 ILM 1069 (2001), para.
124.
14 See also C. Dominicé, La Satisfaction en Droit des Gens, in Mélanges Georges Perrin 91 (1984),
at 109.
15 Verbatim Record, CR 2000/30, 16 November 2000, para. 5.
16 Second statement made by Mr. Giorgio Gaja on behalf of the Chairman of the Drafting
Committee, at the 2701st meeting, held on 3 August 2001.
17 Id.
18 Paul v. Republic of Guyana, 21 December 2001, UN Doc. CCPR/C/73/D/728/1996, Com-
munication No. 728/1996. Other recent examples are Des Fours Walderode v. Czech Republic,
2 November 2001, UN Doc. CCPR/C/73/D/747/1997, Communication No. 747/1997, para.
9.2 and Winata v. Australia, 16 August 2001, UN Doc. CCPR/C/72/D/930/2000, Com-
munication No. 930/2000, para. 9.
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tees. The Court finds the power to do so in the law of state responsibility. In
the Suárez Rosero case it stated:
In the matter of reparations, the applicable provision is Article 63(1) of the American
Convention, which codifies one of the fundamental principles of general inter-
national law, and is repeatedly applied in case law. (Factory at Chorzów, Juris-
diction, Judgment No. 8, 1927, P.C.I.J., Series A, No 9, p.21 and Factory at Chorzów,
Merits, Judgment No. 13, 1928,P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 17, p 29; Reparations for
Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J.
Reports 1949, p. 184). This is the sense in which this Court has applied that pro-
vision. … When a wrongful act occurs that is imputable to a State, the State incurs
international responsibility for the violation of international law, and thus incurs
a duty to make reparation.
Reparations is a generic term that covers the different ways (restitutio in integrum,
compensation, satisfaction, and assurances or guarantees that the violations will
not be repeated, among others) in which a State can redress the international
responsibility it has incurred.
The obligation to make reparations established by international courts is governed,
as has been universally accepted, by international law in all its aspects: scope,
nature, forms, and the determination of beneficiaries, none of which the respondent
State may alter by invoking its domestic law.19
The obligation to provide assurances and guarantees of non-repetition is not
a legal consequence of every internationally wrongful act. The commentary
to draft article 30 (b) states:
Assurances and guarantees of non-repetition are not always appropriate, even if
demanded. Much will depend on the circumstances of the case, including the nature
of the obligation and of the breach. The rather exceptional character of the measures
is indicated by the words ‘if the circumstances so require’ at the end of subpara-
graph (b).20
Some guidance on the conditions under which a duty to provide guarantees
and assurances arises is given by the ILC commentary to the provision on
assurances and guarantees in the draft articles adopted on first reading.21
The commentary states that:
Circumstances to be taken into consideration include the existence of a real risk
of repetition and the seriousness of the injury suffered by the claimant State as
a result of the wrongful act.22
19 Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Suárez Rosero v. Ecuador, Reparations, Judgment
of 20 January 1999, Series C, No. 44, para. 40-42.
20 ILC Report to the General Assembly on the Work of its fifty-third Session, supra note 4,
at 222, para. 13.
21 See also LaGrand case, Verbatim Records, CR 2000/27, 13 November 2000, para. 25.
22 YBILC 1993, vol. II (Part Two), at 83, para. 5.
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4.2.4 Reparation
As noted, article 31 of the ILC draft articles on state responsibility codifies the
obligation of reparation. This article, as well as the articles describing specific
forms of reparation, is formulated as an obligation of the responsible state.
In contrast, the 1996 ILC draft articles formulated reparation as a right of the
injured state.23 The immediate reason for the change is the bifurcation in the
2001 draft articles between the injured state and the state that has a legal
interest in invoking responsibility.24 There is also a more fundamental policy
choice behind it that reflects the function of state responsibility of upholding
the international rule of law. Formulating reparation as a right of the injured
state implies that that state can choose not to ask for reparation, and this is
not in the interest of the international rule of law.25 In contrast, the ILC com-
mentary maintains that the obligation of reparation is the immediate corollary
of a state’s responsibility. This is in conformity with the PCIJ’s pronouncement
in the Chorzów Factory case that it:
It is a principle of international law that the breach of an engagement involves an
obligation to make reparation in an adequate form. Reparation therefore is the
indispensable complement of a failure to apply a convention and there is no
necessity for this to be stated in the convention itself.26
The article on reparation is but one of a number of articles in which the ILC
has had difficulty in maintaining the strict separation between primary and
secondary obligations. The commentary acknowledges that the definition of
injury in article 31 leaves it to the primary obligations to specify what is
required in each case.27
4.2.5 Restitution
The ILC presents restitution as the principal form of reparation in article 35
of the ILC draft articles.28 It reflects the primacy of restitution expressed in
the Chorzów Factory case, in which the PCIJ stated that:
23 See also F. Mann, The Consequences of an International Wrong in International and National
Law, 48 British Yearbook of International Law 1 (1976), at 10; R. Jennings & A. Watts,
Oppenheim’s International Law, Vol 1, at 528 (1992).
24 See § 5.2.1.
25 Reitzer presents reparation from a third perspective. He states that a request for reparation
is an obligation of the injured state that must be fulfilled before the injured state is entitled
to take countermeasures. L. Reitzer, La Réparation comme Conséquences de l’Acte Illicite
en Droit International 48 (1938).
26 Factory at Chorzów (Germany v. Poland), Jurisdiction, 1927, P.C.I.J. Series A, No. 9, at 21.
27 Supra note 4, at 226, para. 8.
28 Draft article 35 reads:
A State responsible for an internationally wrongful act is under an obligation to make
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reparation must, so far as possible, wipe-out all the consequences of the illegal act
and re-establish the situation which would, in all probability, have existed if that
act had not been committed. Restitution in kind, or, if this is not possible, payment
of a sum corresponding to the value which a restitution in kind would bear; the
award, if need be, of damages for loss sustained which would not be covered by
restitution in kind or payment in place of it – such are the principles which should
serve to determine the amount of compensation due for an act contrary to inter-
national law.29
Certain writers have raised the question whether restitution should be con-
sidered as the primary form of reparation, considering that in practice com-
pensation is more frequently demanded and given than restitution.30 The
ILC has nonetheless opted for making restitution the first form of reparation
because restitution most closely conforms to the general principle that the
responsible state is bound to wipe out the legal and material consequences
of its wrongful act by re-establishing the situation that would exist if that act
had not been committed.31
The obligation to make restitution can be formulated as the obligation to
establish the situation that would have existed if the wrongful act had not
been committed, as the PCIJ did in the Chorzów Factory case. The ICJ continues
to apply this formulation in relation to reparation, for example in the Arrest
Warrant (Yerodia) case.32 The obligation can also be considered as the obliga-
tion to establish the situation that existed prior to the occurrence of the wrong-
ful act. The ILC has chosen not to adopt the former definition because, as the
commentary to article 35 states, it absorbs into the concept of restitution
elements of full reparation and tends to conflate restitution as a form of repara-
tion and the underlying obligation of reparation itself.33 This choice is not
in conflict with the ICJ judgments if it is considered that restitution in itself
may not lead to full reparation, and that the ILC draft articles recognize that
loss of profits may be an appropriate head of compensation.
Even though restitution is the primary form of reparation, there are situ-
ations where it is not appropriate. These situations are set out in draft article
35 and essentially concern the situations where restitution is either impossible
restitution, that is, to re-establish the situation which existed before the wrongful act was
committed, provided and to the extent that restitution:
Is not materially impossible;
Does not involve a burden out of all proportion to the benefit deriving from restitution
instead of compensation.
29 Factory at Chorzów (Germany v. Poland), Indemnity, 1928 PCIJ Series A, No 17, at 47.
30 C. Gray, The Choice Between Restitution and Compensation, 10 European Journal of International
Law 413 (1999), at 418.
31 Supra note 4, at 238, para. 3.
32 Case concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v.
Belgium), Judgment of 14 February 2002, reproduced in 41 ILM 536 (2002), para. 76.
33 Supra note 4, at 238, para. 2.
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or impracticable. Apart from the situations set out in article 35, the ILC draft
articles provide that the state invoking international responsibility may choose
the form the reparation it wants to receive in article 43, paragraph 2, under
b. The 1996 draft articles did not provide for an express right of choice, though
such a right was implied.34
4.2.6 Compensation
Where restitution is not provided or does not fully eliminate the consequences
of the injury, the responsible state must make compensation, as provided in
article 36 of the ILC draft articles.35 In the Gabcˇikovo-Nagymaros Project case
the ICJ held that:
It is a well-established rule of international law that an injured State is entitled
to obtain compensation from the State which has committed an internationally
wrongful act for the damage caused by it.36
In state practice, compensation is the form of reparation that is most frequently
asked and given: it is the usual standard of reparation.37 It may be noted that
the jurisprudence of the Iran – United States Claims Tribunal has made a
particular contribution to the law on compensation.38 The function of com-
pensation is to address the actual losses incurred as a result of the inter-
nationally wrongful act. The ILC defines the actual losses as ‘financially assess-
able damage’. Financially assessable damage is contrasted with what is some-
times referred to as ‘moral damage’ to the state, i.e. the affront or injury caused
by a violation of rights not associated with actual damage to property or
persons. This may lead to confusion because in national systems non-material
damage such as loss of loved ones, pain and suffering are referred to as ‘moral
damage’. Under international law such damage is compensable and must be
distinguished from moral damage to the state.
As noted above, article 43 provides that a state invoking responsibility can
legitimately prefer compensation to restitution, but this freedom is not un-
limited. The ILC commentary states that there are cases where a state may not,
34 C. Gray, supra note 30, at 416.
35 Draft article 36 reads:
The State responsible for an internationally wrongful act is under an obligation to com-
pensate for the damage caused thereby, insofar as such damage is not made good by
restitution.
The compensation shall cover any financially assessable damage including loss of profits
insofar as it is established.
36 Gabcˇikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary v. Slovakia), 1997 ICJ Rep. 7, at 81, para. 152.
37 C. Eagleton, The Responsibility of States in International Law 189 (1929).
38 See R. Lillich & D. Magraw (Eds.), The Iran – United States Claims Tribunal: Its Contribution
to the Law of State Responsibility (1998).
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as it were, pocket compensation and walk away from an unresolved situation,
for example one involving the life or liberty of individuals or the entitlement
of a people to their territory or to self-determination.39 The first situation
seems to be characterized by the LaGrand case, in which Germany renounced
its right to material compensation. Though this was never expressly stated
by Germany during the proceedings, its decision seems to have been related
to its contention that the rights at issue constituted individual rights of foreign
nationals and are to be regarded as human rights of aliens.40 The ILC com-
mentary does not provide guidance concerning other situations in which a
state would not be entitled to prefer compensation, but it may be noted that
the common element in the examples it gives is that the rights in question
are owed to individuals or peoples. If the ILC intended this fact to have con-
sequences for the choice between restitution and compensation, states are not
free to prefer compensation in case of certain breaches of international human-
itarian law, even if they do not involve the life or liberty of individuals.
4.2.7 Satisfaction
Article 37 of the ILC draft articles provides that the state responsible for an
internationally wrongful act is under an obligation to give satisfaction for the
injury caused by that act insofar as it cannot be made good by restitution or
compensation.41 Subject to the freedom of a state to choose a form of repara-
tion under article 43, satisfaction is the last head of reparation in the hierarchy
of forms of reparation. Paragraph 2 of article 37 lists acknowledgement of the
breach, an expression of regret, and a formal apology as examples of satis-
faction, but this list is not exhaustive. The ILC commentary gives a number
of other examples, including due inquiry into the causes of an accident re-
sulting in harm or injury and disciplinary or penal action against the indi-
39 Supra note 4, at 304, para 6.
40 Though it is implicit in the following statement by Simma on behalf of Germany made
during the oral proceedings:
Turning to compensation, Germany has decided not to raise a claim in this regard because
the policy it pursues in lodging the present Application is to ensure that German nationals
will be provided with adequate consular assistance in the future, and thus be protected
against the fatal consequences following from breaches of Article 36 in circumstances like
those leading to the death of the brothers LaGrand.
CR 2000/27, 13 November 2000, para. 14.
41 Draft article 37 reads:
The State responsible for an internationally wrongful act is under an obligation to give
satisfaction for the injury caused by that act insofar as it cannot be made good by restitution
or compensation.
Satisfaction may consist in an acknowledgement of the breach, an expression of regret,
a formal apology or another appropriate modality.
Satisfaction shall not be out of proportion to the injury and may not take a form humiliating
to the responsible State.
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viduals whose conduct caused the internationally wrongful act, but in theory
the forms satisfaction may take are unlimited.42 Satisfaction is the remedy
generally given for moral, political or other non-material injury to the state.43
The demand made by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea)
for an apology by Japan for its policy concerning so-called ‘comfort women’
during World War II is an example of a claim for an apology based on a
violation of international humanitarian law.44
4.2.8 Lex specialis
Chapter II of the ILC draft articles on state responsibility is intended to provide
for the legal consequences of all internationally wrongful acts of states. How-
ever, draft article 55 provides that they do not apply where the content of
international responsibility is governed by special rules of international law.
This provision recognizes the residual character of the draft articles. In prin-
ciple states are free, when establishing or agreeing to be bound by a rule, to
specify that its breach shall entail only particular consequences and thereby
to exclude the ordinary rules of responsibility.45 With regard to the legal
consequences of an internationally wrongful act lex specialis can have two
effects. One is to exclude one or more of the legal consequences provided in
Chapter II. The other is to change the content of one or more particular con-
sequences provided in Chapter II without affecting the other consequences.
Whether there is lex specialis with regard to the legal consequences of violations
of international humanitarian law will be discussed in § 4.4.
4.2.9 Legal consequences of serious breaches of peremptory norms
Chapter III of Part Two (draft articles 40 and 41) of the draft articles on state
responsibility sets out certain legal consequences of serious breaches of an
obligation arising under a peremptory norm of general international law. These
consequences are additional to the consequences set out in chapters I and II
(including restitution, compensation, satisfaction and guarantees of non-repeti-
tion). Articles 40 and 41 are closely related to article 48 which provides that
any state can invoke responsibility if the obligation breached is owed to a
group of states including that state, and is established for the protection of
42 Supra note 4, at 265-266, para. 5.
43 F. Przetacznik, supra note 8, at 960.
44 Letter from the Permanent Representative of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
to the United Nations Office at Geneva, addressed to the Chairman of the Commission
on Human Rights of 9 April 1996, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1996/148.
45 Supra note 4, at 62, para. 5.
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a collective interest of the group, or the obligation breached is owed to the
international community as a whole. These articles are the result of a major
debate in the ILC about whether a qualitative distinction should be recognized
between different breaches of international law.46 The debate was caused by
the development of the doctrines of peremptory norms of international law
and obligations erga omnes. The ILC recognized that these developments had
implications for the secondary rules of state responsibility. Initially this recog-
nition took the form of a distinction between ‘international crimes of state’
and ‘international delicts’. This highly controversial distinction was abandoned
by the Commission in 1998. What remains in the draft articles is the recognition
that there are certain consequences flowing from the basic concepts of per-
emptory norms of general international law and obligations to the international
community as a whole.47
Whether draft articles 40 and 41 merit discussion here depends first on
whether rules of international humanitarian law are peremptory norms of
general international law. Chapter III of Part Two only applies to the inter-
national responsibility which is entailed by a serious breach by a state of an
obligation arising under a peremptory norm of general international law.
According to the commentary to article 40:
In light of the International Court’s description of the basic rules of international
humanitarian law applicable in armed conflict as ‘intransgressible’ in character,
it would also seem justified to treat these as peremptory.48
Although this justifies the conclusion that the legal consequences set out in
draft article 41 attach to at least certain violations of international humanitarian
law, these are not discussed here. One reason is that there are serious doubts
whether the legal consequences in article 41 are a codification of customary
international law rather than a progressive development of the law.49 At the
very least the legal regime of serious breaches is in a state of development,
as the ILC states in the commentary to article 41.50 Comments by governments
on the legal regime of serious breaches also suggest that the legal consequences
set out in article 41 may not reflect present-day international law. The United
Kingdom for example in its statement to the Sixth Committee of the General
46 For an overview see N.H.B. Jørgensen, The Responsibility of States for International Crimes
(2001). See also various articles in the symposium on state responsibility, 10 European
Journal of International Law 339 (1999).
47 See J. Crawford, P. Bodeau & J. Peel, The ILC’s Draft Articles on State Responsibility: Toward
Completion of a Second Reading, 94 American Journal of International Law 660(2000).
48 Supra note 4, at 284, para. 5.
49 See e.g. D. Shelton, Righting Wrongs: Reparations in the Articles on State Responsibility, 96
American Journal of International Law 833 (2002), at 842.
50 Supra note 4, at 292, para. 14l; See also S. Wittich, The ILC’s Articles on the Responsibility
of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts Adopted on Second Reading, 15 Leiden Journal of
International Law 891 (2002).
236 Legal consequences of accountability for breaches of international humanitarian law
Assembly on the topic of state responsibility in 2001 stated that “the provisions
relating to serious breaches of fundamental obligations go far beyond codifica-
tion of customary international law.”51 A second reason for not discussing
articles 40 and 41 in this study is that for the regime to apply there must be
a breach of an obligation arising under a peremptory norm of general inter-
national law that is serious.52 A breach of an obligation is serious if it involves
a gross or systematic failure by the responsible state to fulfil the obligation.
The term ‘systematic’ refers to a breach carried out in an organized and
deliberate way, whereas ‘gross’ denotes the intensity of the breach or its effects.
Although it is not unlikely that a peace support operation may breach inter-
national humanitarian law, it seems most unlikely that such a breach will be
gross or systematic.
4.3 THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY OF INTERNATIONAL ORGAN-
IZATIONS AND LEGAL CONSEQUENCES
The law on the international responsibility of international organizations is
still underdeveloped. This is the case with regard to the element of attribution
of conduct, and maybe even more so with regard to the legal consequences
of an internationally wrongful act. The underdevelopment is partly due to
the lack of standing of international organizations before international courts
and tribunals with the result that these judicial bodies are rarely called upon
to consider the international responsibility of international organizations. It
is also partly due to the immunities enjoyed by international organizations
with the result that domestic courts rarely consider the responsibility of the
organizations.53 As discussed above, the ILC decided in 2001 to include the
responsibility of international organizations in its long-term program of work.
51 Statement by the United Kingdom to the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly, 29
October 2001, <http//www.ukun.org/xq/asp/SarticleType.17/Article_ID.340/qx/articles_
show.htm>. See also the comments by Japan and the United States, Comments and observa-
tions received from Governments, 19 March 2001,UN Doc. A/CN.4/515, at 48, 52. Statement
by Israel to the sixth committee in 2000, <http://www.israel-un.org/committees/sixth/
6_102400.htm>, and statement by the Netherlands to the sixth committee in 2001, stating
that: “while recognizing that the introduction of the concept of ‘serious breaches’ is an
acceptable compromise, what in my view is still insufficiently elaborated, are the specific
legal consequences to be attached to the commission of a serious breach”, <http://www.
pvnewyork.org/archive/c_responsibility.htm>.
52 For a critique of the requirement of ‘seriousness’, see W. Czaplin´ski, UN Codification of Law
of State Responsibility, 41 Archiv des Völkerrechts 62 (2003), at 73.
53 See also M.H. Arsanjani, Claims against International Organizations: Quis custodiet ipsos custodes,
7 The Yale Journal of World Public Order 131 (1981), at 174: “A corollary of the principle
of responsibility is the principle of remedy. The point, which would appear to be self-
evident, often is overlooked, in part because of enforcement problems.”
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The application of the rules on legal consequences in the draft articles on
state responsibility to international organizations is in principle possible, and
corresponds to the general idea that there is merit in applying, as much as
possible, the same secondary rules of responsibility to all subjects of inter-
national law.54 The rules of state responsibility have been developed to a large
extent as rules governing responsibility of subjects of international law. The
international responsibility of a state is closely linked to its international legal
personality. Only because a state has international legal personality does it
have the capacity to have obligations under international law. Only because
a state has obligations under international law can it be responsible for breach
of those obligations. The development of rules of international responsibility
has taken place with special regard to states at least in part because until
relatively recently international lawyers considered that only states are subjects
of international law. There is no reason why they cannot in principle also be
applied to other subjects of international law. Traces of such an approach to
the topic of international responsibility can be found in Special Rapporteur
García Amador’s first report on state responsibility for the ILC.55 In his report
he presented a summary of his research and some of the conclusions reached
in the form of ‘bases of discussion’ including the conclusion that the inter-
national organizations may be subjects of international responsibility in respect
of acts or omissions of their organs so far as the duty to make reparation for
the injury caused is concerned.56 In another basis of discussion concerning
the character, function and measure of reparation the Special Rapporteur did
not distinguish between international organizations and states.57 The ILC sub-
sequently limited the scope of the topic to state responsibility. It has stated
moreover that the draft articles on state responsibility are without prejudice
to any question that may arise in regard to the responsibility under inter-
national law of an international organization as provided in draft article 57.
Nevertheless, it is still possible to find traces of a more unitary approach to
international responsibility that starts from the concept of international legal
personality. The commentary on the draft articles for example includes the
statement that “It may be that the notion of responsibility for wrongful conduct
is a basic element in the possession of international legal personality.”58 In
a report to the ILC on the need to include the topic of responsibility of inter-
national organizations in the commission’s agenda, Pellet also recognizes that
54 See § 2. 2. See also E. Butkiewicz, The Premisses of International Responsibility of Inter-Govern-
mental Organizations, 11 Polish Yearbook of International Law 117 (1981-82).P. Klein , La
Responsabilité des Organisations Internationales dans les Ordres Juridiques Internes et
en Droit des Gens 305 (1998).
55 International Responsibility, report by Special Rapporteur F.V. García Amador, YBILC 1956,
at 173.
56 Id., at 220.
57 Id.
58 Supra note 4, at 67-68, para. 7.
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the “principles embodied in Chapter I of Part Two of the draft articles on State
responsibility can probably be transposed.”59
The ILC study on the responsibility of international organizations will have
to make clear precisely to what extent the rules of state responsibility apply
to international organizations. This study is limited to a discussion of state
practice and practice of the UN and NATO concerning the consequences of
alleged breaches of international humanitarian law by peace support opera-
tions.
4.4 LEX SPECIALIS IN INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW
There are several provisions in conventional international humanitarian law
that concern legal consequences of a violation of a primary rule, which could
operate as lex specialis in the sense of draft article 55. For the lex specialis
principle to apply, it is not enough that the same subject matter is dealt with
by two provisions. There must be some actual inconsistency between them,
or else a discernible intention that one provision is to exclude the other. In
other words, it will depend on the special rule to establish the extent to which
the more general rules on state responsibility as set out in the draft articles
are displaced by that rule.
One special rule on the legal consequences of a breach of international
humanitarian law is Article 3 of 1907 Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the
Laws and Customs of War on Land. This article provides that a belligerent
party which violates the provisions of the Regulations annexed to the Conven-
tion shall, if the case demands, be liable to pay compensation. The article
appears to be consistent with article 36 of the ILC draft articles, although the
meaning of the phrase ‘if the case demands’ is not immediately clear.60 The
phrase was not included in the original German proposal for the article. A
number of commentators interpret the phrase as excluding from compensation
damage that is not financially assessable.61 A Greek court also found that
the provision in Article 3 according to which the belligerent party shall pay
compensation if the case demands specifically underlines that financially
assessable damage must have been caused as a result.62 This interpretation
is consistent with draft article 36 which covers any financially assessable
59 Id., at 303.
60 M. Sassòli, State Responsibility for Violations of International Humanitarian Law, 84 International
Review of the Red Cross 401 (2002), at 418.
61 J. Kunz, Kriegsrecht und Neutralitätsrecht 35 (1935); M. Hüber, Die Fortbildung des Völker-
rechts auf dem Gebiete des Prozeß- und Landkriegsrechts, 2 Das Öffentliche Recht der Gegenwart
471 (1908), at 575
62 Prefecture of Voiotia v. Federal Republic of Germany, Case No. 137/1997, Court of First Instance
of Leivadia, Greece, 30 October 1997.
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damage including loss of profits in so far as this is established in the given
case.63
Article 3 does not exclude other legal consequences than an obligation of
compensation as arising from of a violation of the Hague Regulations. The
contrary is suggested by a statement of the president of the subcommittee of
the Second Hague Peace Conference, suggesting that the German proposal
was of great interest because it attached a sanction to rules, for which there
was not yet a sanction in place.64 Kalshoven submits:
It may be the case, though, that at the time of the Second Hague Peace Conference
the general rules were of little practical import in relation to the problem the
delegates sought to solve, so that in tackling it they were more or less oblivious
of such general rules. At any rate, the rule they purported to lay down in Article
3, with its special characteristics adapted to the perceived needs of the situation,
even today is entirely capable of coexisting with, and supplementing, the general
rules on State responsibility.65
Another special rule on the legal consequences of a breach of international
humanitarian law is Article 51/52/131/148 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions.66
There is no inconsistency between this article and draft article 36 of the ILC
draft articles. The article reaffirms draft article 36 by excluding any contractual
exemption from claims for compensation by a vanquished state. With regard
to the question whether the article excludes other legal consequences of an
internationally wrongful act, the travaux préparatoires make clear that compensa-
tion was only considered as one of different legal consequences. The report
of the Committee that drafted Article 51/52/131/148 states:
The State remained responsible for breaches of the Convention and could not refuse
to recognise its responsibility on the ground that individuals concerned have been
punished. There remained, for instance, the liability to pay compensation.67
63 Sassòli gives another interpretation. He states that the ‘if the case demands’ refers to the
subsidiary character of compensation. Only if restitution in integrum is not possible is
compensation in order. M. Sassòli, supra note 60, at 418.
64 Original French: “Cette proposition est très intéressante puisqu’elle tend à attacher une
sanction à des prescriptions, qui en sont actuellement dépourvues”, Deuxième Conférence
internationale de la Paix, La Haye 15 juin – 18 octobre 1907, Actes et Documents (Actes),
Vol. III, at 144.
65 F. Kalshoven, State Responsibility for Warlike Acts of the Armed Forces: From Article 3 of the
Hague Convention IV of 1907 to Article 91 of Additional Protocol I of 1977 and Beyond, 40
International & Comparative Law Quarterly 827 (1991), at 838.
66 These Articles provide:
No High Contracting Party shall be allowed to absolve itself or any other High Contracting
Party of any liability incurred by itself or by another High Contracting Party in respect
of breaches referred to in the preceding Article.
67 Fourth Report drawn up by the Special Committee, 12 July 1949, Final Report, Vol. IIB,
at 118.
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A third special rule with regard to legal consequences for violation of inter-
national humanitarian law is Article 91 of Additional Protocol I. The preparat-
ory work of the article indicates that it was intended to have the same meaning
as Article 3 of 1907 Hague Convention IV. This was stated among others by
the delegation of Viet Nam when it introduced the article.68 There is no actual
inconsistency between Article 91 and draft article 36 nor a discernible intention
that the provision is to exclude other legal consequences.
A final lex specialis in international humanitarian law is Article 1, paragraph
3, of Protocol I to the Hague Convention on Protection of Cultural Property
in the Event of Armed Conflict. This paragraph obliges state parties to return,
at the close of hostilities, to the competent authorities of the territory previously
occupied, cultural property which is in their territory, if such property has
been exported by the occupying power.69 This rule limits the freedom of the
state invoking international responsibility to prefer compensation in lieu of
restitution.
4.5 PRACTICE IN RESPECT OF CONDUCT OF PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS
4.5.1 Introduction
This section discusses practice in respect of the consequences of internationally
wrongful acts by peace support operations. It will seek to determine whether
the framework discussed above is reflected in practice.
In some of the situations to be discussed international humanitarian law
was considered applicable by the parties to the dispute. These situations are
of course of particular interest. In other situations the parties to the dispute
did not refer to international humanitarian law, even if that body of law may
have been applicable. A discussion of these cases is justified by the fact that
the principles with regard to legal consequences of an internationally wrongful
act are the same for all internationally wrongful acts unless lex specialis applies.
The discussion does not follow the classification of legal consequences in the
ILC draft articles on state responsibility. It will rather examine striking features
of state and organization practice in particular peace support operations.
68 Official Records of the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of
International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts, Geneva (1974-1977) (Official
Records), Vol. 9, at 355 (CDDH/I/SR.67, paras. 67, Mr. Van Luu).
69 See G. Carlucci, L’Obligation de Restitution des Biens Culturels et des Objets d’Art en Cas de
Conflit Armé: Droit Coutumier et Droit Conventionnel Avant et Après la Convention de la Haye
de 1954, 104 Revue Générale de Droit International Public 289 (2000).
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4.5.2 ONUC
In 1966 the UN concluded agreements with Belgium, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg
and Switzerland relating to the settlement of claims filed against the UN by
nationals of these states.70 The Status of Forces Agreement between the UN
and the Congo provided that if as a result of any act performed by a member
of the force or an official in the course of his duties, it was alleged that loss
or damages that might give rise to civil proceedings had been caused, the UN
would settle the dispute by negotiation or any other method agreed between
the parties, and if it was not found possible to arrive at an agreement in that
manner, the matter should be submitted to arbitration at the request of either
party.71 The procedure was open to nationals and to residents of the host
state. It seems that pursuant to this agreement the UN established local claims
review boards to settle claims. These were not responsible for the settlement
of claims by nationals of the above-mentioned states for injury as a result of
the activities of ONUC, for unknown reasons.72
Instead, the governments of the states of nationality of these individuals
exercised their right of diplomatic protection. In this capacity they entered
into negotiations with the UN. These negotiations resulted in exchanges of
letters between the states concerned and the UN in which the latter agreed
to pay certain sums to the governments in outright and final settlement of
claims lodged by the nationals of these governments. The agreements provided
that the distribution of the sum paid to the government concerned would be
effected by the government.
The agreements do not refer expressly to breaches of international human-
itarian law as the basis of the United Nations’ responsibility, but there are
several indications that this was, in fact, the case.73 First, the Belgian govern-
ment had previously complained that the UN did not respect the obligations
of the Geneva Convention to take all necessary measures to safeguard the lives
and property of the civilian population. It complained in particular of the death
70 Exchange of letters constituting an agreement relating to the settlement of claims filed
against the United Nations in the Congo by Swiss nationals of 3 January 1966, 564 UNTS
193; Exchange of letters constituting an agreement relating to the settlement of claims filed
against the United Nations in the Congo by Greek nationals of 20 January 1966, 565 UNTS
3; Exchange of letters constituting an agreement relating to the settlement of claims filed
against the United Nations in the Congo by Luxembourg nationals of 28 December 1966,
585 UNTS 147; Exchange of letters constituting an agreement relating to the settlement
of claims filed against the United Nations in the Congo by Italian nationals of 18 January
1967, 588 UNTS 197.
71 Agreement between the United Nations and the Republic of the Congo Relating to the Legal
Status of the United Nations in the Congo, 27 November 1961, UN Doc. S/5004, Art. 10
(b).
72 J. Salmon, Les Accords Spaak-U Thant du 20 Février 1965, 11 Annuaire Français de Droit
International 468 (1965), at 485.
73 Id., at 480-482.
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of several Belgian civilians killed by UN forces.74 It is very likely that some
of the claims arose from the facts complained about by the Belgian government.
Secondly, the agreements between the UN and the various governments provide
that the UN agrees to settlement of claims arising from harmful acts committed
by ONUC personnel and not arising from military necessity. The expression
‘military necessity’ is an expression that derives from international human-
itarian law and that is not used in any other field of international law. It is
widely recognized as one of the underlying principles of modern international
humanitarian law.75 A third indication is the reference by the UN Secretary-
General to international humanitarian law in connection with the agreements.
In a reply to a diplomatic note by the Soviet Union concerning the agreements,
he stated that the policy of compensation was reinforced by the principles set
forth in the international conventions concerning the protection of the life and
property of civilian population during hostilities.
4.5.3 UNPROFOR
In 1998, the United Nations General Assembly requested the Secretary-General
to submit a report on Srebrenica. It contains a description of the events in
Srebrenica as well as an assessment of these events. The assessment repeatedly
uses the word ‘responsibility’. In particular the report concludes that:
The international community as a whole must accept its share of responsibility
for allowing this tragic course of events by its prolonged refusal to use force in
the early stages of the war. This responsibility is shared by the Security Council,
the Contact Group and other Governments which contributed to the delay in the
use of force, as well as by the United Nations Secretariat and the Mission in the
field.
In 1996 the Netherlands government commissioned a report on the events prior
to, during and after the fall of Srebrenica by the Netherlands Institute for War
Documentation, an independent body. The Institute was requested to list and
classify the relevant factual material in order to present a historical perspective
of the causes and events which led to the fall of Srebrenica and the dramatic
developments which ensued. For this reason the report submitted by the
Institute does not speak in terms of responsibility.76 The report submitted
by the parliamentary commission of inquiry, established in 2002 to examine
the events in Srebrenica, does speak of responsibility in its report submitted
74 See F. Seyersted, United Nations Forces in the Law of Peace and War 194 (1966).
75 See e.g. H. McCoubrey, The Nature of the Modern Doctrine of Military Necessity, 30 Revue
de Droit Militaire et de Droit de la Guerre 215 (1991).
76 Srebrenica, A ‘Safe’ Area: Reconstrcution, Background, Consequences and Analyses of the
Fall of a Safe Area (2002).
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in January 2003.77 This is a consequence of the objective of the report to give
a definite judgment concerning the political responsibility for the events.78
One of the main conclusions is that the Netherlands has accepted political
responsibility through the resignation of the government.79
A report submitted by a French parliamentary commission of inquiry
examines the role, and possible responsibility, of France in the Srebrenica
drama.80 The conclusion of the report discusses the findings in terms of re-
sponsibility, of persons, structures and states.81 In particular, the report finds
that France has a share of political responsibility for the events in Srebrenica.82
More generally, at a memorial ceremony in Sarajevo on 11 October 1999
the United Nations Secretary-General expressed his regrets on behalf of the
organization for the failure of the international community to take decisive
action to halt the suffering and end a war that had produced so many vic-
tims.83
Although the majority of the above-mentioned reports and the Secretary-
General’s statement refer to responsibility, it seems that this expression is not
used in the sense of international legal responsibility. The reports and the
statement do not refer to the attribution of conduct to states or the organiza-
tion, nor do they refer to any international norms allegedly breached by the
UN or governments. In particular, no connection is made with allegations that
the conduct of the peacekeeping contingent in Srebrenica was in breach of
an obligation under international humanitarian law. There is only one brief
paragraph in the Dutch parliamentary report stating that there have been
accusations that Dutch military personnel committed crimes, but that no
evidence has been found to substantiate these accusations and the crimes
concerned were likely to have been committed by Bosnian Serb personnel
dressed in UN attire.84
This conclusion is not fully consistent with a memorandum by the public
prosecutor’s office in Arnhem concerning alleged crimes committed by mem-
bers of the Netherlands contingent deployed in Srebrenica (Dutchbat).85 The
memorandum gives an overview of investigations by the public prosecutor
into the alleged crimes.86 These investigations were based on the information
77 Rapport Enquete Srebrenica, TK 2002-03, 28506, nr. 3 .
78 Id., at 413.
79 Id., at 452.
80 Rapport d’Information par la Mission d’Information Commune sur les Evénements de
Srebrenica (2001).
81 Id., at 184.
82 Id., at 189.
83 UN Press Release SG/SM/7168, 11 October 1999.
84 Supra note 77, at 442.
85 TK 1999-00, 26122, nr. 17.
86 See also A. Simons & B. Vandenberghe, Der Fall der UN “Safe Area” Srebrenica und die Rolle
des niederländischen Bataillons Dutchbat – Eine Zusammenfassung der niederländischen Unter-
suchungen, 61 Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht 681 (2001).
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contained in a factual account of declarations by members of Dutchbat released
by the Ministry of Defense to the public prosecutor’s office in September 1998.
The memorandum states that information in the factual account called for
criminal investigations. In particular, the office investigated five categories
of incidents: allegations of civilians being run over by Dutchbat vehicles; an
allegation by a member of Dutchbat that civilians had been pushed off a
Dutchbat vehicle and run over; allegations of withholding medical aid to
civilians; allegations of aid to the Bosnian Serb Army and allegations of threats
or mistreatment of civilians. In respect of all these allegations the public
prosecutor’s office found that there was no ground for prosecution. In some
cases there was lack of evidence, in some mens rea was lacking, in some cases
a statute of limitation applied and, finally, in some cases a prosecution was
not appropriate because it would not be within a reasonable time-period. It
may be recalled that the public prosecutor’s office considered that the applic-
able law was the Dutch Penal Code. In particular, it held that international
humanitarian law was not applicable because the force did not become a party
to the conflict and the personnel did not become combatants. It considered
in this respect that the combat activities in which the Netherlands personnel
were involved did not exceed their mandate under Security Council Resolution
836, which implied that they could not have committed war crimes. It has
also been noted that this observation is not directly relevant to the deter-
mination of the applicability of international humanitarian law.
Responsibility in relation to the events in Srebrenica was raised during
the consideration of the third periodic report submitted by the Netherlands
to the United Nations Human Rights Committee. In its concluding observations
the Committee stated that:
The Committee remains concerned that, six years after the alleged involvement
of members of the State party’s peacekeeping forces in the events surrounding the
fall of Srebrenica, Bosnia and Herzegovina, in July 1995, the responsibility of the
persons concerned has yet to be publicly and finally determined. The Committee
considers that in respect of an event of such gravity it is of particular importance
that issues relating to the State party’s obligation to ensure the right to life be
resolved in an expeditious and comprehensive manner (articles 2 and 6 of the
Covenant).
The State party should complete its investigations as to the involvement of its armed
forces in Srebrenica as soon as possible, publicize these findings widely and examine
the conclusions to determine any appropriate criminal or disciplinary action.87
87 Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee: Netherlands, 27 August 2001,
UN Doc. CCPR/CO/72/NET, para. 8.
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4.5.4 UNOSOM
Practice in respect of accusations against members of UNOSOM relates in par-
ticular to Belgian and Italian personnel. In respect of accusations against
Belgian personnel, the Belgian Minister of Defense in September 1993 estab-
lished an administrative commission of inquiry following press reports of
incidents involving Belgian soldiers in UNOSOM. Civil servants and military
officers were appointed to serve on the commission. Their mandate was to
investigate the conduct of the Belgian UNOSOM contingent as well as circum-
stances and factors directly or indirectly leading to that conduct. The main
objective was to “examine whether collective or individual reprehensible acts
had been committed against the Somali population, and also to attempt to
reconstruct and analyze the specific context of the operations”. The report of
the commission of 24 November 1993 was discussed in parliament. One of
the conclusions was that there had been isolated cases of unacceptable conduct
that had been addressed by the command and/or the military magistrate, and
that “during the whole operation there was never any serious problem in
respect of the application of the law of armed conflict.”88
Belgium did not pay compensation to victims of the incidents involving
Belgian soldiers in UNOSOM. Claims by third parties were processed and paid
by the United Nations.89 After consultations with the Belgian Ministry of
Defense a sum of US $ 2,800,000 was paid.90
In 1998 a Belgian Military Tribunal convicted Dirk N. of acts of racism,
of intentionally causing personal injury to a child and of threatening the child
with an attack on the child’s person or property.91 The sergeant was accused
of forcing an Muslim child to eat pork and of ordering his subordinates to
tie another child behind a truck and driving the truck a short distance while
he was a member of UNOSOM II. He was sentenced to a year in prison of which
six months suspended and suspension of civil rights for five years. In the
operative part of its judgment the Tribunal found that the accused had inter-
fered with the right to freedom of religion which the child enjoyed under the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the African Charter on Human
and Peoples Rights.
88 Translation by the author. Original Dutch text: “Alhoewel er tijdens het ganse verloop van
de aktiviteiten nooit een ernstig probleem werd vastgesteld inzake de toepassing van het
oorlogsrecht.” Report Commission of Inquiry Somalia, Chapter 3 (Synthesis and conclu-
sions), para. 3.6, copy on file with the author.
89 Letter to the author from J. Vergauwen, Belgian Ministry of Defense, Legal Division,
Directorate of International Affairs, 19 December 2001.
90 Letter to the author from J.Y. Mine, Auditor-General at the Military Court at Brussels, 21
January 2002.
91 Brussels Military Tribunal (Krijgshof), Military Prosecutor CGKR v. Dirk N., 7 May 1998,
copy on file with the author.
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In 1997 the same Tribunal reaffirmed the acquittal by Court Martial of C.K.
and B.C. They were accused of having held a Somali child above a fire while
they were members of UNOSOM II, thereby intentionally causing personal injury
and threatening the child with an attack on its person or property. The pro-
ceedings were joined by the Center for Equal Opportunity and Combat against
Racism (Centrum voor Gelijke Kansen en Racismebestrijding) as a civil party
(partie civile). The Center requested a requalification of the alleged facts as
violations of the Belgian law implementing the 1949 Geneva Conventions and
the 1977 Additional Protocols, as well as the Belgian law against race discrim-
ination. The Tribunal held that it had no evidence to conclude that UN forces
in Somalia were involved de facto in sustained, general and structured combat
operations against one or more armed groups, so that international human-
itarian law was not applicable. It also held that UNOSOM II could not be as-
similated to an occupying power.
In 1995 a Court Martial convicted V.G.C. and R.E. on a count of having
intentionally caused personal injury (Articles 66 and 392 of the Belgian criminal
code).92 They were accused of having ill-treated a detained Somali whom
they were guarding at their base in Kismayo. The indictment stated that they
had kicked and punched the handcuffed detainee and subjected him to electric
shocks. One of the accused was sentenced to three month’s suspended im-
prisonment and the other to two month’s suspended imprisonment.
In 1995 a Belgian Military Tribunal acquitted M.E. of involuntary man-
slaughter on appeal from a Court Martial.93 The soldier had killed an un-
armed Somali man with the board gun of a helicopter while firing a warning
shot. These criminal cases were considered by the United Nations Human
Rights Committee in 1999 during the examination of Belgium’s report under
Article 40 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).
A representative of the Belgian government submitted to the Committee that:
Many members had asked how Belgium’s commitments under the Covenant and
other international instruments could be implemented when Belgian nationals
committed certain acts outside the country – for instance in Somalia. Irrespective
of where an act was committed, Belgian jurisdiction applied, as could be seen by
the proceedings instituted in Belgium against a number of Belgian nationals in
which some had been convicted and others acquitted.94
92 Reported in Rechtskundig Weekblad 1995-1996, nr. 26, 9 March 1996, at 949.
93 Reported in Rechtskundig Weekblad 1995-1996, nr. 28, 9 March 1996, at 949.
94 Summary Record of the 1707th Meeting of the Human Rights Committee, 27 October 1998,
UN Doc. CCPR/C/SR.1707, para. 22.
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In its concluding observations the Committee “acknowledges that the State
party has recognized the applicability of the Covenant in this respect and
opened 270 files for purposes of investigation.”95
The Italian government established a governmental fact-finding Commission
by a Decree of the Ministry of Defense on 16 June 1997 to investigate reports
of ill treatment by Italian personnel in UNOSOM and Operation Restore Hope.
The Commission had five members and was chaired by a former President
of the Constitutional Court. The Commission collected evidence in Italy,
Ethiopia and Kenya but not in Somalia. Its report was presented on 8 August
1997 and found that several allegations of ill treatment were credible but that
superior officials were not aware of the ill-treatment and therefore not respons-
ible.96
Days after the publication of the report, there were new reports of ill
treatment by Italian troops in Somalia. The Minister of Defense asked the
Commission to reopen its inquiry. The Commission presented its final report
on 26 May 1998.97 The report concludes that incidents of ill treatment by
Italian personnel were sporadic and localized.98 Neither the 1997 report nor
the final report address issues of state responsibility or the applicability of
international humanitarian law.
Criminal proceedings were also initiated in Italy in response to accusations
of mistreatment of Somalis by Italian personnel in UNOSOM and Operation
Restore Hope.99
The criminal law division of the Livorno Tribunal on 13 April 2000 con-
victed Valerio Ercole on a count of abuse of authority over arrested or detained
95 Concluding observations of the Human Rights Committee, 19 November 1998, UN Doc.
CCPR/C/79/Add.99, para. 14.
96 See N. Lupi, Report by the Enquiry Commission on the Behaviour of Italian Peace-keeping Troops
in Somalia, 1 Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law 375 (1998).
97 Commissione Governativa d’Inchiesta per i fatti di Somalia, Relazione Conclusiva, 26 May
1998, copy on file with the author.
98 “Ed è anche confermato che gli episodi di violenza sono stati sporadici e localizzati, e non
stesi e generalizzati, come l’inchiesta ha accertato, indipendentemente dal fatto che cappel-
lani e infermiere volontarie della Croce Rossa italiana, ma anche giornalisti e rappresentati
delle organizzazioni non governative, presenti in Somalia all’epoca dei fatti, hanno un-
animamente dichiarato di non aver mai avuto notizia di comportamenti violenti dei nostri
soldati in Somalia prima che i mezzi di informazione ne riferissero nell’estate dello scorso
anno. Ma ciò non attenua la gravità di avere accettato o tollerato come comportamenti
“goliardici” atteggiamenti grossolani, espressione di una sottocultura che le Forze Armate
devono respingere in linea di principio, ma anche nel rispetto delle finalità educative del
servizio di leva. Esempi di tali riprovevoli comportamenti sono il frequente dileggio nei
confronti dei somali, nonché l’ostentazione presso talune unità di simboli e slogans nazisti
e fascisti.”, Id., at 109.
99 See F. Lattanzi, Le Accuse al Contingente Italiano in Somalia alla Luce del Diritto Internazionale,
Diritto Penale e Processo 1131 (1997).
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persons.100 As a member of the Italian contingent of Operation Restore Hope
Ercole had participated in the mistreatment of Aden Abukar Ali by ad-
ministering electrical shocks to the victim’s testicles. He was sentenced to
eighteen months suspended imprisonment.
On 9 February 1997, an investigating judge of the Livorno tribunal dis-
continued criminal proceedings against Italian members of the UNOSOM. The
soldiers were accused of having killed three Somalis in a car on 3 June
1993.101 Criminal proceedings in connection with a gang rape by Italian mem-
bers of the UN operation at a checkpoint in Mogadishu in June 1993 were also
closed because it was not possible to identify the perpetrators or the victim.
Criminal proceedings in connection with the peace support operation were
reported by the government to the Committee against Torture in Italy’s third
periodic report in 1998. The report did not distinguish between acts committed
by members of Operations Restore Hope and acts committed by members of
the United Nations Operation. It reported that:
Thorough and complex investigations are currently being carried out by various
Italian judicial authorities in connection with the acts of violence committed by
Italian soldiers in Somalia. Four such investigations are currently in progress at
the Public Prosecutor’s Office attached to the Court of Livorno.
As regards the proceedings for alleged torture suffered by a Somali man arrested
at Jhoar and the alleged rape of a Somali woman by soldiers at a roadblock in
Mogadishu, a probatory hearing was arranged so as to have the testimonies of the
victims and a witness collected directly by the judge. Expert examinations are being
carried out to ascertain the after-effects of the violence on the victims and also to
see whether they corresponded to the photographs published by a weekly journal.
The expert work is now in progress. Investigations are also being continued in the
other two proceedings.
The Public Prosecutor’s Office attached to the Court of Milan, for its part, is
diligently continuing its investigations regarding an alleged case of carnal violence
committed by an Italian soldier in Mogadishu.
100 Tribunal of Livorno, Criminal Division, Sentence No. 439, 13 April 2000, copy on file with
the author. The crime for which Ercole was convicted is defined in Article 608 of the Italian
penal code. The English translation of this provision is:
Article 608. Abuse of authority over arrested or detained persons
A public officer who subjects an arrested or detained person of whome he has custody,
even temporarily, or a person who has been placed in his charge pursuant to an order of
competent authority, to restrictions which are not authorized by law, shall be punished
by imprisonment for up to thirty months.
The same punishment shall apply if the act was committed by another public officer who
is vested, by reason of his office, with any authority whatever over the person in custody.
E. Wise, The Italian Penal Code, The American Series of Foreign Penal Codes 23, 204-205
(1978).
101 Third periodic report of Italy to the Committee against Torture, 15 December 1998, UN
Doc. CAT/C/44/Add.2, para. 79.
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By means of a decree dated 9 February 1997, the Preliminary Examination Judge
of the Court of Leghorn ordered that the case based on the facts denounced by
Abdi Hasn Addò be filed. Addò had accused Italian soldiers of having shot and
killed three Somalis in a car on 3 June 1993. But the investigations showed that
on the day in question the soldiers had been engaged in a military operation known
as “Illach 26” that was taking place in another part of Somalia from that indicated
by Addò.102
The Committee against Torture, in its Concluding Observations on Italy’s
report, expressed its concern over the lack in training in the field of human
rights, in particular, the prohibition against torture to the troops participating
in peacekeeping operations and the inadequate number of military police
accompanying them, which was responsible in part for the unfortunate in-
cidents that occurred in Somalia.103
On 16 November 1993 the United Nations Security Council established
a Commission of Inquiry to investigate armed attacks on UNOSOM II.104 Unlike
the commissions of inquiry established by Belgium and Italy, the mandate
of the Commission seems to have been focused on abuses committed against,
rather than by, UNOSOM personnel. Resolution 885, which established the
Commission, used neutral language to describe its mandate, which was “to
investigate armed attacks on personnel of the United Nations Operation in
Somalia II which led to casualties among them.”105 In a previous resolution
adopted under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, however, the
Security Council had already strongly condemned the attacks to be investigated
by the Commission, and described them as ‘criminal attacks’ and as “un-
provoked armed attacks … which appear to have been part of a calculated
and premeditated series of cease-fire violations to prevent by intimidation
UNOSOM II from carrying out its mandate.”106
In response to reports of ‘allegations of criminality in peacekeeping mis-
sions’, an apparent reference to accusations against UNOSOM personnel, the
United Nations Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, Bernard
Miyet, stated in 1997 that when troops are in the field “the United Nations
had the responsibility to investigate to cover all the aspects and determine
what was going on.”107 He also stated that even in case of the slightest doubt
over allegations of crimes committed by personnel of a peace support operation
the United Nations would ask the troop contributing country to repatriate
102 Id., paras. 76-79.
103 Concluding Observations of the Committee against Torture: Italy, 7 May 1999, Un Doc.
A/54/44, paras. 163-169, at para. 168.
104 Security Council Resolution 885 of 16 November 1993, UN Doc. S/RES/885.
105 Id., para. 1.
106 Security Council Resolution 837 of 6 June 1993, UN Doc. S/RES/837, preambular para.
5 and para. 1.
107 Allegations of Criminality in Peacekeeping Missions: ’UN Cannot be Indifferent’, 34 United Nations
Chronicle no. 3 (1997), at 39.
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its troops, make investigations, take disciplinary measures or begin a judiciary
process, as appropriate. It is not clear to what extent UN practice in response
to accusations of crimes committed by peace support operations is in conform-
ity with official policy as stated by the Under-Secretary-General. There is no
evidence that the organization investigated accusations against members of
UNOSOM.
4.5.5 SFOR
In 1997 SFOR personnel from the United Kingdom stole a Bosnian flag. SFOR
itself started an investigation into the incident and apologized.108 Similarly,
the SFOR commander is reported to have sent a letter of apology to the Croation
Minister of Foreign Affairs in December 2002. The letter expressed deepest
regrets after SFOR personnel damaged a monument to Croatians who were
killed or disappeared in the 1991-1995 war, in Zagreb. Croatia then lodged
a protest with SFOR, urging a thorough investigation.109
4.5.6 KFOR
Investigations have been conducted and disciplinary and criminal action have
been taken by authorities of troop contributing states concerning alleged crimes
committed by KFOR personnel. Some of the conduct concerned would seem
to constitute human rights violations.
In 1999 a team from the United Kingdom ministry of defense special
investigation branch investigated three British soldiers serving in KFOR for the
murder of two men and malicious injury of three others.110
Belgian military police conducted an inquiry into the alleged killing of
a man by Belgian KFOR personnel in December 2000.
In 2000 United States authorities conducted an investigation into allegations
of abuses committed by United States KFOR personnel.111 The report pres-
enting the findings of the investigation stated inter alia that personnel inti-
midated and beat the members of the local population.
108 “Our investigation into the allegations is now complete, and SFOR would like to apologize
for any offense caused by the actions of members of the Stablization Force”, SFOR Press
Conference Transcript, 3 December 1997.
109 NATO Commander Apologises to Croatia for Vandalism by Soldiers, Agence France Presse, 12
December 2002.
110 Kosovo’s Love Affair with NATO Keeps Tempers Down, The Guardian, 4 December 2000.
111 Army Report Says Soldiers Abused Civilians in Kosovo, Washington Post, 17 September 2000,
at section A, at 8.
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In 2000 a member of United States troops in KFOR was prosecuted and con-
victed by national authorities for the rape and murder of a local girl.112
4.6 CONCLUSION
It is difficult to draw conclusions from the practice examined above, because
it is unclear in respect of the majority of measures described whether they
were taken in recognition of international responsibility, and can consequently
be considered as legal consequences of international responsibility. The pay-
ment of compensation by the UN for harm resulting from actions of ONUC is
the only measure that was accompanied by a clear recognition of international
responsibility. As a matter of principle the legal consequences of an inter-
nationally wrongful act arise automatically from the wrongful act itself. In
other words, their coming into existence does not depend on a claim being
pressed. The new legal relationship created by the internationally wrongful
act comes into existence before any injured subject would press a claim for
reparation.113 The coming into existence of the obligation to make full repara-
tion for the injury caused by the internationally wrongful act can a fortiori not
depend on the admission of responsibility by the responsible entity. The
automatic coming into existence of legal consequences is underlined by the
wording of article 28 of the ILC draft articles on state responsibility.114 In
practice, however, it is difficult to conclude that a specific measure is a legal
consequence of an internationally wrongful act unless the responsible entity
states that it is, or the measure is imposed by an international tribunal.
It may be noted that in as far as the measures described above can be
regarded as legal consequences of internationally wrongful acts, in all cases
except the compensation of injury caused by ONUC, responsibility seems to
have been considered to arise from the breach of an international norms other
than international humanitarian law. In the case of criminal investigations into
conduct by Dutchbat personnel for example, which could possibly be a form
of satisfaction, the public prosecutor held explicitly that international human-
itarian law was inapplicable. This does not lead to the conclusion that the
practice is not relevant to this study. It has already been established that the
provisions in international humanitarian law on the legal consequences of a
breach of its rules are consistent with the general principles concerning legal
112 G. Boehmer, Ohio GI Gets Life Sentence for Killing Ethnic Albanian Girl in Kosovo, Washington
Post, 2 August 2000, Section A, at 25.
113 See F. Mann, The Consequences of an International Wrong in International and National Law,
48 British Yearbook of International Law 1 (1976-77), at 14.
114 The draft article reads:
The international responsibility of a State which is entailed by an internationally wrongful
act in accordance with the provisions of Part One involves legal consequences as set out
in this Part.
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consequences of an internationally wrongful act. It seems that the legal con-
sequences of a breach of international humanitarian law would not necessarily
have been different from the legal consequences of the breach of another
international obligation. In the present case it seems that in as far as the
measures described are reactions by the author state or organization to an
internationally wrongful act, the obligations involved were in most cases
obligations under human rights law. The ILC does state in its commentary to
article 34 of the draft articles that the “primary obligation breached may also
play an important role with respect to the form and extent of reparation”,115
but in the present case it is not obvious that this would have led to a different
result if the primary obligation were an obligation under international human-
itarian law.
The above-mentioned practice is especially interesting to the extent that
it can shed light on two questions. The first is whether the practice is in
conformity with the conclusions in Chapter 2 concerning attribution of conduct
of peace support operations. If a state or international organization takes
measures to meet the secondary obligations arising from responsibility, this
implies that conduct is attributed to that entity. Without attribution there
would be no responsibility and consequently no legal consequences. The
second is whether the practice confirms the application of the principles in
Part Two, Chapters I and II of the draft articles on state responsibility, to
responsibility of states and international organizations for breaches of inter-
national law committed by a peace support operation.
With regard to UN peace support operations, the legal consequence of
compensation for internationally wrongful acts seems to be borne by the UN.
A clear example is the compensation for violations of international human-
itarian law committed by ONUC personnel to the state of nationality of the
victims. This payment of lump sums by the UN was accompanied by recog-
nition of its international responsibility. It seems to confirm the application
of the general principles concerning legal consequences of state responsibility
to the UN. Salmon observes that the analogy between the agreements, and
agreements concluded between states at the conclusion of the World War II
concerning compensation, is striking.116
The refusal by Belgium to provide compensation in connection with alleged
wrongful acts committed by Belgian personnel in UNOSOM suggests that troop
contributing states consider that the UN should bear the legal consequence
of an obligation to compensate for wrongful acts committed by UN peace
support operations.
The official policy of the UN to investigate alleged crimes committed by
peace support operation personnel could be considered as a form of satisfaction
115 Supra note 4, at 236. See also I. Brownlie, System of the Law of Nations: State Responsibility,
Part I, at 236 (1983).
116 J. Salmon, supra note 72, at 487.
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if the crime was a breach of an international obligation of the UN. In this regard
it may be noted that a UN official confirmed the need for the Secretary-General
to take action in response to internationally wrongful acts by UN peace support
operations. She added that the kind of action taken by the Secretary-General
depended inter alia on the nature of the act committed. If this act was very
serious then an apology by the Secretary-General might be appropriate, but
no conduct of peace support operation personnel had hitherto been of such
a serious character.117
It may be added that while the UN official policy in principle may confirm
the conclusion that the organization bears the legal consequences of inter-
nationally wrongful acts by peace support operations, in practice official policy
frequently does not seem to be followed. Amnesty International for example
concluded that in respect of accusations against UNOSOM personnel investiga-
tions by the UN into killings or abuses were in most cases non-existent or
minimal.118
The national authorities of troop contributing states undertook criminal
investigations and prosecutions of alleged crimes committed by personnel in
UNPROFOR and UNOSOM. This raises questions from the perspective of inter-
national responsibility. The ILC recognizes disciplinary or penal action against
the individuals whose conduct caused an internationally wrongful act as a
form of satisfaction. As a consequence it seems that in this case it is implied
that troop-contributing states are responsible. This would however not be a
correct conclusion. That the UN does not prosecute the perpetrators of breaches
of human rights or international humanitarian law is not a result of disowning
responsibility. It is rather a result of conventional agreements between the UN
and troop contributing states and the absence of a full-fledged criminal justice
system in the UN. The UN has consistently held that from a practical perspective
it cannot take disciplinary or penal action against peace support operation
personnel. This position has been articulated in respect of international human-
itarian law conventions that impose an obligation to prosecute or extradite
persons responsible for grave breaches of those conventions as a primary
obligation, but it also applies to disciplinary or penal action as a secondary
obligation that is a legal consequence of international responsibility. The UN
position is set out inter alia in a memorandum by the Office of Legal Affairs
drafted in connection with the possible accession of the organization to the
1949 Geneva Conventions. This memorandum states that:
the United Nations is not substantively in a position to become a party to the 1949
Conventions, which contain many obligations that can only be discharged by the
exercise of juridical and administrative powers which the Organization does not
117 Interview with an official in the United Nations Office of Legal Affairs, 18 September 2002.
118 Amnesty International, Peace-keeping and Human Rights 14 (1994).
254 Legal consequences of accountability for breaches of international humanitarian law
possess, such as the authority to exercise criminal jurisdiction over members of
the Forces.119
It seems that the UN not only considers that there is no mechanism available
to the organization to exercise disciplinary or criminal jurisdiction, but that
the organization does not have the power to establish such a mechanism. A
UN official states that:
It is not a question of a lack of certain mechanisms, but it is a question which goes
to the roots of the competence, powers and legal nature of the Organization. This
is why it cannot penalize in the way that you understand it in all criminal sys-
tems.120
This suggestion that somehow the establishment of criminal jurisdiction and
a mechanism to exercise that jurisdiction is incompatible with the competence,
powers and legal nature of the UN must be rejected. There is no legal obstacle
preventing the organization from establishing such a mechanism.121 In gen-
eral, the power to create such a mechanism could be based on an implied
power of the organization. Implied powers are those powers which, though
not expressly provided in the Charter, are conferred upon it by necessary
implication as being essential to the performance of its duties. If the exercise
of disciplinary and criminal jurisdiction by troop contributing states is not
considered adequate to enforce respect for international humanitarian law by
peace support operation personnel, and the enforcement of international
humanitarian law is necessary for the effective exercise of the Security Coun-
cil’s function to maintain international peace and security, then there is no
legal impediment to the creation of a mechanism to exercise jurisdiction. In
other words it could be argued that the establishment of such a mechanism
is a functional necessity, in the same way as the establishment of an Admin-
istrative Tribunal was essential to ensure the efficient working of the Secret-
ariat.122
The argument that the UN does not have the competence to establish
judicial mechanisms also flies in the face of the establishment by the Security
Council of ad hoc international criminal tribunals for the former Yugoslavia
and Rwanda (ICTY and ICTR). Both these Tribunals, in exercising their ‘compé-
119 Question of the Possible Accession of Intergovernmental Organizations to the Geneva
Conventions for the Protection of War Victims, United Nations Juridical Yearbook 1972,
at 153.
120 D. Schraga, in L. Condorelli, A.M. La Rosa & S. Scherrer (Eds), Les Nations Unies et le
Droit International Humanitaire: Actes du Colloque International à l’Occasion du Cinquan-
tième Anniversaire de l’ONU 436 (1996).
121 M. Bothe, Peacekeeping and International Humanitarian Law: Friends or Foes?, 3 International
Peacekeeping 91 (1996), at 94.
122 Effect of Awards of Compensation Made by the United Nations Administrative Tribunal,
Advisory Opinion of 13 July 1954, 1954 ICJ Reports 57.
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tence de la compétence’, have examined the legality of their establishment and
concluded that the Security Council can establish subsidiary organs with
judicial powers. Moreover, the scope of jurisdiction of these tribunals would
comprise any serious violation of international humanitarian law committed
by peace support operation personnel in the former Yugoslavia or Rwanda
in a specified period. The ICTY actively investigated certain accusations against
UNPROFOR personnel from the Netherlands, although this did not lead to an
indictment.123
It may be concluded that if the Security Council wanted to establish a UN
mechanism to exercise disciplinary and criminal jurisdiction over peace support
operation personnel, there would be no legal impediment. That such a mechan-
ism has not been established is a reflection of political rather than legal im-
pediments. The UN depends on states to contribute troops for peace support
operations, and those states make exclusive national jurisdiction a condition
for such contributions.
To the extent that an obligation to take disciplinary or penal action against
peace support operation personnel arises, either as a primary norm or as a
legal consequence of international responsibility, the UN delegates the execution
of this obligation to troop contributing states.124 To this end it makes arrange-
ments with troop contributing states that those states will exercise their juris-
diction. In exchanges of letters between the UN and troop contributing states
concerning the status of troops, the Secretary-General requests assurances that
the government of a troop contributing state will be prepared to exercise firm
and effective jurisdiction with respect to any crime that might be committed
by a member of the contingent and to report to the UN in each case on the
action taken.125 Statements by UN officials suggest that the organization would
remind a troop contributing state of its obligation in case of specific allegations.
The delegation of the obligation to take disciplinary or penal action by
the UN implies a duty to supervise the execution of that obligation. The United
Nations should ensure that an appropriate authority carries out prosecutions
when warranted, even if an individual’s national government is unable or
unwilling to do so.126 To this end the organization has recently started to
monitor the follow-up in troop contributing states to reports of crimes com-
mitted by members of peace support operations.
123 TK 1999-00, 26122, nr. 17, at 35.
124 See e.g. C. Emanuelli, Les Actions Militaires de l’ONU et le Droit International Humanitaire
66 (1997).
125 See e.g. Exchange of letters constituting an agreement between the United Nations and
Canada concerning the service with the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus
of the national contingent provided by the Government of Canada, 21 February 1966, 555
UNTS 120.
126 B. Tittemore, Belligerents in Blue Helmets: Applying International Humanitarian Law to United
Nations Peace Operations, 33 Stanford Journal of International Law 61 (1997), at 111; C.
Emanuelli, supra note 124, at 66.
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In summary, the exercise of disciplinary and penal jurisdiction over peace
support operation personnel by troop contributing states does not constitute
the recognition of responsibility by those states. It is an example of the applica-
tion mutatis mutandis of a principle of state responsibility to an international
organization necessitated by the absence of a UN court martial structure.
The practice of human rights treaty monitoring bodies, referred to in
paragraphs 4.5.3 and 4.5.4, calls for careful scrutiny, because it suggests that
these bodies have focused on legal consequences for troop contributing states
arising from conduct by UN peace support operations. Unless the conduct in
question was carried out under the effective control of a troop contributing
state, this would be inconsistent with the proposition that the legal con-
sequences of the international responsibility of the UN fall on the organization
itself.
The first instance of practice is the concluding observations of the Com-
mittee against Torture concerning Italian personnel in UNOSOM. In these ob-
servations the Committee expressed its concern over the lack of training of
troops participating in peacekeeping operations and the inadequate number
of military police accompanying them, and it recommended that Italy inform
the Committee of the progress and result of the judicial proceedings resulting
from the incidents in Somalia. It is interesting to note that the concerns ex-
pressed by the Committee relate to conduct by Italian authorities prior to the
actual deployment of the troops under United Nations command, and not to
conduct taking place while the troops were under the organization’s control.
The Committee’s recommendation relates to Italy’s obligation under Article
7 of the Convention to prosecute any person alleged to have committed torture
present in its territory. This obligation extends to all cases of torture and not
only cases of torture for which the state is internationally responsible. In
summary, the Committee’s observations can be reconciled with the proposition
that only the United Nations is responsible for the conduct of the Italian
personnel in UNOSOM.
The second instance of practice is the Concluding Observations of the
Human Rights Committee on the third periodic report submitted by the
Netherlands. The Committee expresses its concern about the “alleged involve-
ment of members of the State Party’s peacekeeping forces in the events sur-
rounding the fall of Srebrenica”, and the Committee states that these events
relate to the state party’s obligation to ensure the right to life under Articles
2 and 6 of the Covenant. In this case the Committee does seem to base obliga-
tions, including an obligation to complete its investigations as to the involve-
ment of its armed forces in Srebrenica as soon as possible, on conduct under
the command and control of the UN. It may be recalled however that initially
there have been allegations that the Dutch government directly gave orders
to the Dutch troops in Srebrenica, which would make the Netherlands re-
sponsible for conduct resulting from those orders, allegations that the Dutch
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government denied.127 These allegations may have played a role in the con-
cluding observations of the Committee. The government, in its reply to the
Human Rights Committee’s Concluding Observations, did not make any
statement on whether or not the conduct concerned could be attributed to the
Netherlands. Rather, it argued that the citizens of Srebrenica did not fall within
the jurisdiction of the Netherlands in the sense of Article 2 of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.128
The final instance of practice is the Concluding Observations of the Human
Rights Committee on the third periodic report of Belgium. The Committee
in its observations expresses its concern about the behavior of Belgian soldiers
in Somalia under the aegis of UNOSOM and acknowledges that Belgium has
recognized the applicability of the Covenant in this respect and opened a
number of investigations. The Committee suggests that Belgium has an obliga-
tion to investigate the conduct of personnel under the effective control of the
United Nations on the basis of the Covenant. There is no evidence that the
Committee applied the theory that a state is responsible for breaches of the
Covenant if that state has transferred powers to an international organization
without adequate guarantees that the organization will respect the Covenant,
in which case the transfer of powers is attributed to the state. Rather, the
Committee seems to have based legal consequences for Belgium on conduct
attributable to the United Nations.
The inquiries and the expression of regret by the UN Secretary-General
relating to the fall of Srebrenica seem to be consequences of accountability
and of political responsibility rather than of international responsibility in the
legal sense. Reports submitted by the UN, French and Dutch commissions of
inquiry use the expression responsibility but do not refer to any international
norm that the UN or states would have breached. The monitoring of conduct
of international organizations and states through the submission of reports,
the collection and dissemination of information and inspections carried out
is an essential component of accountability.129
Practice in respect of NATO peace support operations is so limited that
extreme caution must be taken in drawing any conclusions from it. Neverthe-
less, the apology offered by SFOR for an incident involving the theft of a
Bosnian flag merits special attention. It seems that the apologies were offered
by SFOR to the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina.130 The conduct concerned seems
127 R. Siekmann,The Fall of Srebrenica and the Attitude of Dutchbat from an International Legal
Perspective, 1 Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law 301 (1998), at 303-305.
128 Replies of the Government of the Netherlands to the Concerns Expressed by the Human
Rights Committee of 29 April 2003, UN Doc. CCPR/CO/72/Net/Add.1.
129 International Law Association Committee on Accountability of International Organizations,
First Report 18 (1998).
130 See also the transcript of SFOR joint press conference of 27 November 1997, in which a
reporter asks “Will SFOR make an official apolgize [sic] to Bosnian state because two SFOR
soldiers played game with the Bosnian flag on the national holiday?”
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to be a clear example of an insult to the symbol of a state giving rise to inter-
national responsibility. In other cases in which international responsibility arose
from the insult to the flag of a state an apology was generally considered as
appropriate reparation or at least part of the measures constituting repara-
tion.131 This similarity is an indication that the apology could be considered
as a legal consequence of international responsibility. In view of the arguments
by NATO that it cannot be internationally responsible, it is remarkable that the
apology was made by SFOR and not by the United Kingdom.
Criminal investigations and prosecutions can in certain cases constitute
a form of satisfaction for an internationally wrongful act. In the case of SFOR
and KFOR disciplinary and penal action is exclusively exercised by the author-
ities of the troop contributing states. This is not necessarily an indication that
troop-contributing states bear the legal consequences of an internationally
wrongful act attributable to NATO. Like the UN, NATO presently does not have
a criminal justice system. Investigation or prosecution by the organization is
presently not an alternative. As in the case of the UN, however, impediments
to the establishment of a NATO criminal justice system are political rather than
legal.
131 Compare the case that arose from the insult to the French flag in Berlin discussed in C.
Eagleton, The Responsibility of States in International Law 186-187 (1928).
5 Existing mechanisms for invoking
accountability for violations of international
humanitarian law by peace support
operations
5.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter discusses the implementation of international responsibility and
of accountability for violations of international humanitarian law by peace
support operations. Responsibility is a component of accountability for which
there is a relatively formal framework in international law.Within this frame-
work, implementation of responsibility relates to the ways andmeans of giving
effect to the obligations that arise for a responsible state or international
organization by virtue of its commission of an internationally wrongful act.
A discussion of implementation of responsibility and accountability must
address troop contributing states, as well as the UN and NATO. Chapters 2 and 3
made clear that violations of international humanitarian law by a peace support
operation can be attributable to one or the other or both, depending in parti-
cular on which entity exercises effective control.
Another distinction that needs to be made concerns the actor wishing to
implement responsibility or accountability. Traditionally, the invocation of
international responsibility is a prerogative of states. The regime of the ILC
draft articles on state responsibility only extends to implementation of re-
sponsibility of states by states, although in draft article 33 it expressly leaves
the possibility open that a right to invoke responsibility may accrue to any
person or entity other than a state. The corpus of law concerning the imple-
mentation of responsibility of international organizations is small, because
few claims have been made against international organizations.1 Because the
concept of accountability has only recently been discussed in the context of
international law, the situation with respect to implementation of accountabil-
ity, whether of states or international organizations, is much the same.
Between the responsibility and accountability of states and international
organizations, there is potentially a large number of implementingmechanisms.
Particularly the flexibility of the concept of accountability imposes few limits
on potential means of implementation. This chapter does not presume to
discuss all potential mechanisms. Rather, it focuses on those mechanisms that
have in practice played a role in implementation of responsibility and account-
1 P. Klein, La Responsabilité des Organisations Internationales Dans Les Ordres Juridiques
Internes et en Droit des Gens 567 (1998). See generally K. Wellens, Remedies Against
International Organisations (2002).
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ability for unlawful conduct by peace support operations on the one hand,
and onmechanisms that have the potential to effectively implement responsib-
ility or accountability on the other hand.
This chapter takes a broad view of implementation of responsibility for
violations of international law, in the sense that it also discusses implementa-
tion of responsibility under private law that is based on an underlying violation
of international law. Strictly speaking it is contestable whether such a proced-
ure is a means of implementing international responsibility. On the other hand,
it can at aminimumbe qualified as amechanism of implementing accountabil-
ity.
5.2 THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF INVOCATION OF INTERNATIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY BY A STATE
5.2.1 Invocation of international responsibility of a state by another state:
Part Three of the draft articles on state responsibility
The implementation of the international responsibility of a state is regulated
in Part Three of the ILC draft articles on state responsibility. Chapter I of Part
Three deals with the invocation of state responsibility by states and with
certain associated questions. Chapter II deals with countermeasures taken in
order to induce the responsible state to cease the conduct in question and to
provide reparation.
The traditional paradigm of international law as law between states still
has its consequences for the law of international responsibility. As Brownlie
states in respect of individuals as potential claimants in international law:
Although there is no rule that individuals cannot have procedural capacity before
international jurisdictions, the assumption of classical law that only states have
procedural capacity is still dominant and affects the content of most treaties pro-
viding for the settlement of disputes which raise questions of state responsibility.2
This traditional paradigm is reflected in the ILC draft articles. These deal
exclusively with the invocation of international responsibility by a state. It
may be noted that the first Rapporteur of the ILC on the topic of state respons-
ibility, Garcia Amador, did not exclude the possibility that the draft articles
would deal with the invocation of state responsibility by individuals or inter-
national organizations.3 He submitted that the traditional view, that only the
state itself can be considered as the passive subject of international responsibil-
2 I. Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law 585 (1998).
3 Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its eighth session, 23 April
to 4 July 1956, Vol II, UN Doc. A/3159, at 194.
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ity, was incompatible with certain contemporary legal realities and theories,
as well as patently inconsistent with itself. He referred in particular to the
recognition of fundamental human rights and freedoms, which he held
amounts to recognition of the individual as a legal person independent of the
state. This did not necessarily mean that the individual has the capacity to
bring an international claim in all cases. Certain prerequisites could be con-
sidered.
It is well known that the Commission chose to deal exclusively with states
as active and passive subjects of international responsibility and that it has
been criticized for this choice as not taking into account developments in
international law.4 Even without taking into account the added complexities
of non-state actors, however, the drafting of articles on invoking responsibility
proved an arduous task. The principal reason was that the ILC wished to
recognize the multilateral dimension of state responsibility. As stated, the
classical conception of state responsibility, of which Anzilotti is considered
the main intellectual author, was as a relationship between states. More
specifically, it was a conception of state responsibility as a bilateral relationship
between the author state and the state whose subjective right has been violated.
In the course of the ILC’s work on state responsibility it came to be recognized
that state responsibility also has a multilateral dimension: other states than
the state whose subjective right had been violated could also be concerned
by an internationally wrongful act. This recognition was closely connected
to the introduction of the notion of erga omnes obligations. The ICJ stated in
the Barcelona Traction case:
An essential distinction should be drawn between the obligations of a State towards
the international community as a whole, and those arising vis-à-vis another State
… By their very nature the former are the concern of all States. In view of the
importance of the rights involved, all States can be held to have a legal interest
in their protection; they are obligations erga omnes.5
In the specific context of state responsibility Rapporteur Ago introduced the
notion of ‘crime of state’ to express the community dimension. As is well
known, the ILC in 2000 dropped the notion of crime of state, but not the idea
that state responsibility is more than a bilateral relationship. The ILC came to
recognize that the multilateral dimension should have consequences for the
4 E. BrownWeiss, Invoking State Responsibility in the Twenty-First Century, 96 American Journal
of International Law 798 (2002), at 816.
5 Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited, Judgment, 1970 ILC Reports 3,
para 32.
262 Mechanisms for invoking accountability for violations of international humanitarian law
rules on the invocation of responsibility, but there was much controversy
concerning which consequences.6
One important question in this respect was whether states other than those
whose subjective right had been breached could be considered to be an injured
state. The draft articles adopted by the ILC in 1996 as well as the draft articles
on invocation of 2000 answered the question in the positive. At the same time
it was clear that not all the states concerned were in a similar position. A state
that has a legal interest in invoking responsibility merely because a crime of
state has been committed, is in another position than the state whose subjective
interest has been directly affected by that crime. In other words, they are not
equally injured. More concretely, a state victim of aggression is clearly not
in the same position as a state that merely has a legal interest in the protection
of the prohibition of aggression. This difference in position found its expression
in the different legal consequences to be attached to the commission of an
international crime toward the different states. Certain commentators maintain
that the difference can be expressed by stating that a state whose subjective
interest is not injured can nevertheless be ‘legally’ injured.7 The ‘legal injury’
would consist of the fact that an obligation to which they subscribe has been
breached and its status could therefore be threatened unless action is taken
to enforce the obligation. This however begs the question, because this reason-
ing can be applied to all international obligations, and not only a limited
category. The same criticism applies to the distinction between directly and
indirectly injured states.8 For this reason it is fortunate that the ILC on the
suggestion of Special Rapporteur Crawford,9 chose to distinguish between
injured states and states with a legal interest in the 2001 draft articles.
In the 2001 draft articles on state responsibility the basic principle is that
an ‘injured state’ in the strict sense is entitled to invoke international respons-
ibility. This is the state whose individual right has been denied or impaired
by the internationally wrongful act or which has otherwise been particularly
affected by that act. Article 42 of the draft articles identifies three cases of an
6 See e.g. D. Bederman, Article 40 (2) (E) & (F) of the ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility:
Standing of Injured States under Customary International Law and Multilateral Treaties, 92 ASIL
Proc. 291 (1998).
7 B. Stern, Et Si l’On Utilisait le Concept de Préjudice Juridique? Retour sur une Notion Délaissée
à l’Occasion de la Fin des Travaux de la CDI sur la Responsabilité des Etats, 47 Annuaire Français
de Droit International 3 (2002).
8 See on this distinction M. Spinedi, From One Codification to Another: Bilateralism and Multi-
lateralism in the Genesis of the Law of Treaties and the Law of State Responsibility, 13 European
Journal of International Law 1099 (2002), at 1122-1113. In addition, this distinction creates
the risk of confusion with the distinction between moral and material injury.
9 See J. Crawford, Responsibility to the International Community as a Whole, 8 Indiana Journal
of Global Legal Studies 303 (2001), at 319-320.
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injured state.10 In the first case, in order to invoke the responsibility of another
state as an injured state, a state must have an individual right to the per-
formance of an obligation, in the way that a state party to a bilateral treaty
has toward the other state party. Secondly, a state may be specially affected
by the breach of an obligation to which it is a party, even though it cannot
be said that the obligation is owed to it individually. The ILC commentary
mentions as an example a case of pollution of the high seas in breach of Article
194 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea that may parti-
cularly impact on one or several states whose beaches may be polluted by
toxic residues or whose coastal fisheries may be closed.11 Thirdly, it may be
the case that performance of the obligation by the responsible state (or organ-
ization) is a necessary condition of its performance by all the other states. Such
obligations are so-called ‘integral’ or ‘inderdepent’ obligations.12 Examples
are disarmament conventions or agreements demilitarizing certain regions.
This category is based on Article 60, paragraph 2, subparagraph c of the 1969
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which recognizes a category of
treaties of such a character that a material breach of its provisions by one party
radically changes the position of every party with respect to the further per-
formance of its obligations. Pierre-Marie Dupuy includes conventions pro-
hibiting certain weapons or methods of warfare in this category, presumably
referring to conventions such as the 1980 Certain Conventional Weapons
Convention.13 A breach of this convention however does not seem to radically
change the position of the other parties to the Convention. Rather, another
state would be injured if a prohibited weapon was used against it, which
would constitute a situation falling under draft article 42, paragraph b, sub-
paragraph i rather than subparagraph ii. It seems that only the adverse party
10 Draft article 42 reads:
A State is entitled as an injured State to invoke the responsibility of another State if the
obligation breached is owed to:
(a) That State individually; or
(b) A group of States including that State, or the international community as a whole, and
the breach of the obligation:
(i) Specially affects that State; or
(ii) Is of such a character as radically to change the position of all the other States to which
the obligation is owed with respect to the further performance of the obligation.
11 Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its fifty-third session, 23 April
– 1 June and 2 July – 10 August 2001 (A/56/10), at 299, para. 12.
12 L.A. Sicilianos, Classification des Obligations et Dimension Multilatérale de la Responsabilité
Internationale, in P.M. Dupuy, (Ed.) ObligationsMultilaterales, Droit Impératif et Responsabi-
lité Internationale des Etats 57 (2003), at 65.
13 P.M. Dupuy, A General Stocktaking of the Connections between the Multilateral Dimension of
Obligations and Codification of the Law of Responsibility, 13 European Journal of International
Law 1053 (2002), at 1071.
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in an international armed conflict, the state on the territory of which a violation
has occurred or the national state of the victims can be considered as injured.14
Article 48 of the draft articles provides for the invocation of responsibility
by states that are not injured but that do have a legal interest.15 Invocation
by these states is possible in the first place if the obligation is owed to a group
of states including that state, and is established for the protection of a collective
interest of the group. According to the ILC commentary, the obligations coming
within the scope of this provision are not limited to arrangements established
only in the interests of the member states but would extend to agreements
established by a group of states in some wider common interest. The com-
mentary adds that the principal purpose of obligations falling within subpara-
graph (1) (a) will be to foster a common interest, over and above any interests
of the states concerned individually. Customary international humanitarian
law rules binding on the author state, as well as the 1949 Geneva Conventions
and the 1977 Additional Protocols seem to be included in this category. The
principal purpose of these obligations is protecting the victims of armed
conflict. It may be noted that the right to invoke responsibility for violations
of international humanitarian law in the 2001 draft articles is broader than
in draft article 40 of the 2000 draft. The latter provided that if the right in-
fringed by the act of state arises from amultilateral treaty, any other state party
to the multilateral treaty can invoke responsibility, if it is established that the
right has been expressly stipulated in that treaty for the protection of the
collective interests of the states parties thereto, and excluded obligations under
customary international law.16
Secondly, under draft article 48 any state other than an injured state is
entitled to invoke the responsibility of another state if the obligation breached
is owed to the international community as a whole. According to the ILC
commentary this subparagraph intends to give effect to the International Court
14 M. Sassòli, State Responsibility for Violations of International Humanitarian Law, 84 International
Review of the Red Cross 401 (2002), at 423.
15 Draft article 48 reads:
1. Any State other than an injured State is entitled to invoke the responsibility of another
State in accordance with paragraph 2 if:
(a) The obligation breached is owed to a group of States including that State, and is
established for the protection of a collective interest of the group; or
(b) The obligation breached is owed to the international community as a whole.
2. Any State entitled to invoke responsibility under paragraph 1 may claim from the
responsible State:
(a) Cessation of the internationally wrongful act, and assurances and guarantees of non-
repetition in accordance with article 30; and
(b) Performance of the obligation of reparation in accordance with the preceding articles,
in the interest of the injured State or of the beneficiaries of the obligation breached.
3. The requirements for the invocation of responsibility by an injured State under articles
43, 44 and 45 apply to an invocation of responsibility by a State entitled to do so under
paragraph 1.
16 D. Bederman, supra note 6, at 292.
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of Justice’s statement in the Barcelona Traction case, in which the ICJ held that
all states have a legal interest in obligations owed to the international com-
munity as a whole. Whereas subparagraph (a) concerns so-called obligations
erga omnes partes, subparagraph (b) concerns obligations erga omnes.
The ILC does not state which obligations have an erga omnes character,
stating that it is not the function of the draft articles to provide a list of those
obligations. This raises the question whether obligations under international
humanitarian law are owed to the international community as a whole, and
the related questionwhether the category of erga omnes obligations is identical
to the category of peremptory norms referred to in Article 40 of the ILC Articles
on State Responsibility. To start with the last question, the ILC commentary
does not answer it. It merely states that:
whether or not peremptory norms of general international law and obligations to
the international community as a whole are aspects of a single basic idea, there
is at the very least substantial overlap between them.17
There is certain logic to the idea that two concepts that express a hierarchy
between international obligations should have the same content. A practical
advantage of identical categorieswould be that it would facilitate the identifica-
tion of obligations erga omnes.18 In the Barcelona Traction case the ICJ did not
state how obligations erga omnes are to be identified, other than on the basis
of their content. Article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
on the other hand does provide for a primitive procedure for the identification
of a peremptory norm in stating that it is a norm accepted and recognized
by the international community of states as a whole as a norm from which
no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent
norm of general international law having the same character. If the categories
of obligations to which the concepts of erga omnes and ius cogens refer are
identical, then there is only a difference in the concepts to the extent that they
attach different consequences to those obligations: one concerning the legal
consequences of their breach, and the other concerning the states entitled to
invoke responsibility of a breach of the obligation.
However, there is no reason why as a matter of principle the two con-
sequences have to attach to precisely the same obligations. The international
community is not precluded from considering that all states should be able
to invoke the responsibility of the author state for a breach of a particular
obligation but that additional legal consequences are not attached to that
17 Supra note 11, at 281, para. 7.
18 See A. DeHoogh, Obligations Erga Omnes and International crimes: A Theoretical Inquiry
into the Implementation and Enforcement of the International Responsibility of States 45-48
(1995).
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breach. Consistent with this view a number of writers maintain that the circle
of erga omnes obligations is broader than the circle of peremptory norms.19
With respect to the second question, it is not clear to what extent obliga-
tions under international humanitarian law are obligations erga omnes. There
is evidence in state practice that states consider at least certain obligations
under international humanitarian law to have an erga omnes character.20 The
Statute of the ICC supports this. The preambular paragraph to the Statute,
which states that “the most serious crimes of concern to the international
community as a whole must not go unpunished”, is clearly a reference to
obligations erga omnes and implies that the states parties to the Statute consider
that the war crimes in Article 8 of the Statute constitute breaches of obligations
erga omnes.21
5.2.2 The concept of injured state in international humanitarian law
Some writers state that common Article 1 to the 1949 Geneva Conventions
makes all contracting parties to the conventions injured states in case of a
breach of the conventions.22 In other words, common Article 1 is lex specialis
in respect of draft article 42 of the draft articles on state responsibility. In this
case all contracting parties to the first Additional Protocol would also be
injured states in case of a breach of the Protocol because Article 1 paragraph
1 of the Protocol repeats common Article of the 1949 Conventions.
Claims that common Article 1 makes all contracting parties injured states
must be seen against the background of the earlier broad definition of injured
state used by the ILC. Draft article 40 adopted by the Commission in 1996
19 G. Gaja, Obligations Erga Omnes, International Crimes and Jus Cogens: A Tentative Analysis
of Three Related Concepts, in J. Weiler, A Cassese & M. Spinedi (Eds.), International Crimes
of States: A Critical Analysis of the ILC’s Draft Article 19 on State Responsibility 151 (1989);
L.A. Sicilianos, The Classification of Obligations and the Multilateral Dimension of the Relations
of International Responsibility, 13 European Journal of International Law 1127 (2002), at 1136-
1137.
20 At the Expert Meeting on the Fourth Geneva Convention held in Geneva on 27-29 October
1998 for example, the German representative stated that the “respect for International
Humanitarian Law, and the respect for human rights, is an obligation erga omnes, an
obligation owed to the international community and to each of its members.” See also the
statement by Canada during the oral proceedings in the Legality of the Use of Force case,
CR 99/16 of 10 May 1999, para. 42.
21 But note Article 10 of the Statute, which provides that “Nothing in this Part shall be
interpreted as limiting or prejudicing in any way existing or developing rules of inter-
national law for purposes other than this Statute.”
22 K. Sachariew, States’ Entitlement to Take Action to Enforce International Humanitarian Law,
29 International Review of the Red Cross 177 (1989), at 184 and N. Levrat, Les Conséquences
de l’Engagement Pris par les Hautes Parties Contractantes de “Faire Respecter” les Conventions
Humanitaires, in F. Kalshoven&Y. Sandoz (Eds.), Implementation of InternationalHuman-
itarian Law 263 (1989), at 274.
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included in its definition of ‘injured state’ any state party to a multilateral
treaty or bound by the relevant rule of customary international law, if it was
established that the right infringed had been created or established for the
protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms. In case of an inter-
national crime all other states were also injured states. Draft article 40 was
binary in the sense that a state was either an injured state with all the con-
nected rights concerning invocation of responsibility, or a statewas not injured
and consequently did not have any right concerning invocation of responsibil-
ity. Article 40 was also closely connected to the very controversial concept
of crime of state.
In the draft articles adopted in 2001, the ILC abandoned this system together
with the concept of international crimes of states.23 Draft article 42 gives a
much narrower definition of the injured state. As compensation the Com-
mission introduced a special rule on the invocation of responsibility by a state
other than an injured state with a legal interest in draft article 48, abandoning
the system of draft article 40.
In the system of the draft articles adopted in 2001 it seems much more
appropriate to consider common Article 1 as a forerunner of draft article 48,
paragraph 1.24 Contracting parties have a legal interest in the invocation of
responsibility, but they are not injured states in the strict sense. They do not
have a subjective right that has been breached.
Article 89 of Additional Protocol I also seems relevant as potential lex
specialis.25 The Article directly deals with questions of consequences of inter-
national responsibility, including the right to take countermeasures, rather
thanwith the invocation of international responsibility. However, this implies
that responsibility has been invoked in a prior phase and that the states entitled
to take action are a fortiori entitled to invoke responsibility. In relation to draft
article 48, paragraph 1, subparagraph a, of the ILC draft articles, Article 89 is
both broader and narrower. It is broader because it is in the form of an under-
taking rather than a right. It is narrower because it only attaches to serious
violations. As far as invocation of responsibility is concerned, Article 89 adds
nothing to common Article 1 of the Geneva Conventions and Additional
Protocol 1.
As far as legal consequences of responsibility are concerned, Article 89
corresponds to draft article 41, paragraph 1, of the ILC draft articles, which
provides that states shall cooperate to bring to an end through lawful means
23 See Report of the International Law Commission Report on the work of its fifty-second
session, 1May-9 June and 10 July-18 August 2000 (A/55/10), Chapter IV (State Responsibil-
ity), 37-48.
24 M. Sassòli, supra note 14, at 424.
25 Article 89 reads:
In situations of serious violations of the Conventions or of this Protocol, the High Con-
tracting Parties undertake to act, jointly or individually, in co-operation with the United
Nations and in conformity with the United Nations Charter.
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any serious breach of an obligation arising under a peremptory norm of general
international law.26 Whether or not Article 89 is lex specialis in this respect
depends on whether all serious violations of the Geneva Conventions and the
Protocol are also serious breaches of peremptory norms. The similarities
between draft article 41 and Article 89 are striking. Both mainly seem to call
for an institutionalized reaction through the United Nations, but seem not to
exclude action outside that forum.27 The ILC commentary to draft article 41
states that “Cooperation should be organized in the framework of a competent
international organization, in particular the United Nations. However, para-
graph 1 also envisages the possibility of non-institutionalized cooperation.”28
The text of Article 89 refers to action “in co-operation with the United
Nations”. The travaux préparatoires do not remove the ambiguity of this ex-
pression. According to one of the sponsors of the article, there was no need
to spell out the nature of the action proposed. The action concerned:
was, in fact, the action prescribed by the United Nations Charter and could not
be undertakenwithout the consent of the General Assembly or the Security Council.
General international lawwould apply during a legal vacancy, in other words when
neither the General Assembly nor the Security Council was in session.29
On the other hand many delegations stated that the wording of the article
was unclear and a number of them abstained during the vote on the article
for that reason.30
5.2.3 Diplomatic protection
A state can be injured directly, for example because of legal injury to its agent
in breach of international law. Legal injury to a national of the state that is
not an agent of that state in contravention of international law, is an indirect
injury to the state and gives rise to the right of diplomatic protection. The ILC
is presently addressing the topic of diplomatic protection under the guidance
of Special Rapporteur Dugard. In 2002 the Commission adopted the text of
26 M. Sassòli, supra note 14, at 430.
27 See on draft article 41 P. Klein, Responsabilité pour Violation Grave d’Obligations Découlant
de Normes Impératives de Droit International et Droit des Nations Unies, in P.M. Dupuy, (Ed.)
Obligations Multilaterales, Droit Impératif et Responsabilité Internationale des Etats 189
(2003).
28 Supra note 11, at 287, para. 2.
29 Official records of the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of
International Humanitarian LawApplicable in Armed Conflicts (1974-1977), Vol. VI, CDDH/
SR.46, at 347, para. 46.
30 Id., at 374 (India), at 376 (Italy).
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draft articles 1 to 7. In 2003, the ILC adopted three more draft articles on first
reading. Draft article 1, paragraph 1, describes diplomatic protection as follows:
Diplomatic protection consists of resort to diplomatic action or other means of
peaceful settlement by a State adopting in its own right the cause of its national
in respect of an injury to that national arising from an internationally wrongful
act of another State.31
The right of diplomatic protection is occasioned by the legal injury to an
individual but it is not a procedural right of the individual. The doctrine of
diplomatic protection, at least as it is traditionally conceived, rests on the
assumption that the national of a state constitutes a legal interest of the state;
it is a corollary of the personal jurisdiction of the state over its population.
An individual may benefit from the exercise of diplomatic protection but it
is her state of nationality that is exercising her procedural right. The classical
formulation of this positionwas stated by the Permanent Court of International
Justice in the Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions case:
It is an elementary principle of international law that a State is entitled to protect
its subjects, when injured by acts contrary to international law committed by
another State, from whom they have been unable to obtain satisfaction through
the ordinary channels. By taking up the case of one of its subjects and by resorting
to diplomatic protection or international judicial proceedings on his behalf, a State
is in reality asserting its own right – its right to ensure, in the person of its subjects,
respect for the rules of international law.32
The consequence of the classical position on diplomatic protection is that an
individual does not have any guarantee that his state of nationalitywill protect
him. His state is entitled to exercise diplomatic jurisdiction but it is not obliged
to do so.33 In this respect the concept of diplomatic protection is an expression
of the fact that while it is increasingly recognized that individuals have sub-
stantive rights under international law, her remedies are limited.34
31 Report of the International law Commission on the Work of its Fifty-fourth Session, 2002,
(A/57/10), at 169.
32 Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions Case (Jurisdiction) (Greece v. United Kingdom), 1924
P.C.I.J., series A, No. 2, at 12.
33 See Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company Limited case (Belgium v. Spain), 1970
ICJ Rep. 3, at 44.
The Statemust be viewed as the sole judge to decidewhether its protection will be granted,
and to what extent it is granted, and when it will cease. It retains in this respect a dis-
cretionary power the exercise of which may be determined by considerations of a political
or other nature, unrelated to the particular case.
34 See First Report on Diplomatic Protection by Mr. John R. Dugard, Special Rapporteur, of
7 March 2000, UN Doc. A/CN.4/506, at 8, para. 24.
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This classical position was questioned by Special Rapporteur Dugard in his
first report to the ILC. He formulated a draft article providing for a number
of situations in which the exercise of diplomatic protection would be
mandatory, in particular if the injury to the national resulted from a grave
breach of a ius cogens norm attributable to another state.35 Although he under-
lined that the proposal was de lege ferenda in the field of progressive develop-
ment of the law, a majority of the Commission was not willing to accept it.
It was reiterated that diplomatic protection is a sovereign prerogative of the
state, exercised at the state’s discretion.36
5.3 INVOCATION OF INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY OF AN INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATION BY A STATE
5.3.1 General principles
There is little practice in respect of the implementation of international re-
sponsibility of an international organization. Claims are not frequently made
against international organizations. In this context, one UN official stated that
one of the reasons for persistent ambiguity concerning the binding nature of
international humanitarian law for UN peace support operations has been that
few claims have been lodged against the organization.37
The ILC established a working group on responsibility of international
organizations following the decision to include the topic in the Commission’s
program of work. In its report, which was considered and adopted by the
Commission,38 the working group sets out a general orientation of the topic
intended as guidance to the Special Rapporteur.39 The report notes the com-
plexities of implementation of responsibility and suggests to leave open the
question of whether the Commissions’s study should includematters relating
to implementation of responsibility of international organizations and, in the
affirmative, whether it should consider only claims by states or also claims
by international organizations.40 The complexities signaled by the working
group appear to relate in particular to claims that international organizations
may submit against other organizations. With respect to the issue of states’
entitlement to invoke responsibility, draft articles 42 and 48 of the draft articles
on state responsibility do not appear to present insurmountable problems if
35 Id., at 27-34.
36 Supra note 31, at 156-158.
37 Interview by the author with a official in the Office of Legal Affairs, 17 September 2002.
38 Supra note 31, at 228, para. 464,
39 Report of the Working Group on Responsibility of International Organizations of 6 June
2002, UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.622.
40 Id., at 8, para. 24.
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applied in the context of the responsibility of international organizations. Such
application is consistent with the basic assumption that the principles of state
responsibility should be applied in the context of responsibility of international
organizations unless other special rules are required.41
Writers on the responsibility of international organizations do not hesitate
to apply the principles derived from state responsibility.42 Applied to breach
of international humanitarian law, the consequences are that potentially injured
states include the adverse party in an international armed conflict, the state
on the territory of which a violation has occurred or the national state of the
victims. In case of a breach of an obligation erga omnes, any other state is also
entitled to invoke the responsibility of the organization.
5.3.2 Diplomatic protection
In case an international organization has committed an internationally wrongful
act causing harm to a state’s national, that state is entitled to exercise diplo-
matic protection. In practice there have been few instances in which states
have exercised this right. One of these instances was the espousal by Belgium
and a number of other states of claims of their nationals for damage caused
by ONUC. These cases of diplomatic protection resulted in the conclusion of
agreements between the UN and the states concerned in which the organization
agreed to pay lump-sum compensation. The work of the ILC on diplomatic
protection is limited to action taken by a state against another state.
In spite of the relative lack of practice there seems to be no doubt con-
cerning the possibility of diplomatic protection in respect of an international
organization. The UN recognized the possibility in an amicus curiae brief in
the case of Broadbent v. Organization of American States.43 Writers also reaffirm
the possibility.44
The modalities of diplomatic protection are the same whether a state or
an international organization is the respondent. This means that the right to
exercise diplomatic protection is at the discretion of the state. An individual
does not have a right to diplomatic protection, unless his state has created
such a right under domestic law. This was illustrated in the Manderlier case,
41 Special rules may be required for the implementation of responsibility of an organization
by a state that has not recognized the organization as a separate international legal person.
See also M. Perez-Gonzalez, Les Organisations Internationales et le Droit de la Responsabilité,
92 Revue Générale de Droit International Public 63 (1988), at 76-77. Non-recognition seems
unlikely in the case of the United Nations or the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
42 P. Klein, supra note 1, at 529-531.
43 Brief for the United Nations as Amicus Curiae, United Nations Juridical Yearbook 1980,
at 227.
44 See e.g. J.P. Ritter, La Protection Diplomatique à l’Egard d’une Organisation Internationale, 8
Annuaire Français de Droit International 427 (1962).
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which arose from the agreement concluded between Belgium and the UN, as
referred to above. Manderlier was one of the Belgian nationals whose claims
had been espoused by his government. He was not satisfied with the part of
the lump sum the government allocated to him and sought an order from the
Brussels Court of First Instance, and subsequently the Court of Appeals, against
the UN for the payment of compensation for damage to his property in the
Congo and a declaration against Belgium that it had failed to fulfil its obliga-
tion of diplomatic protection. It can be implied from the fact that the Court
of First Instance examinedwhether there was a specific source of an obligation
in this case that it considered that there was no general obligation on Belgium.
The Court found neither a specific obligation in domestic legislation nor did
it find that statements by government officials that theywould exert their best
efforts to protect Belgian nationals and their property in the Congo resulted
in such an obligation.45 The Court of Appeals also considered that Manderlier
was unable to establish the existence of the alleged undertaking that he in-
voked.46
The applicability of the local remedies rule to diplomatic protection in
respect of an international organization raises special problems and is a modal-
ity that cannot simply be transposed.47 The principle that an international
organization should have the opportunity to give redress is acknowledged
by writers. In the case of states this is usually achieved through the domestic
courts of the state that are able to exercise jurisdiction over the individual when
an injury has been inflicted on that individual. International organizations
usually lack this possibility. This difference in institutional structure leads to
an interpretation of the local remedies rule that is not centered on domestic
courts, but is more flexible.48 An individual needs to exhaust any judicial
mechanisms of redress that are available within the organization, as long as
they are effective. In the case of the European Community for example an
individual has recourse to the European Court of Justice.49 In the UN and
NATO, there are no judicial bodies to which individuals, other than employees
of the organization, have access in case they have been injured by a breach
of international humanitarian law for which the organization is responsible.
45 Manderlier v. United Nations and Belgium, Court of first instance of Brussels, 11 May 1966,
81 Journal des Tribunaux No. 4553 (1966), 723. See also J. Salmon, De Quelques Problèmes
Posés aux Tribunaux Belges par les Actions des Citoyens Belges contre l’O.N.U. en Raison des
Faits Survenus sur le Territoire de la République Démocratique du Congo, 81 Journal des Tribu-
naux 713 (1966), at 718-719.
46 Manderlier v. United Nations and Belgium, Court of Appeals of Brussels, 15 September 1969,
69 ILR 139 (1985).
47 C. Eagleton, International Organization and the Law of Responsibility, 76 Recueil des Cours
1950-I, 352.
48 P. Klein, supra note 1, at 536.
49 See P. Pescatore, Les Relations Extérieures des Communautés Européennes, 103 Recueil des Cours
1961-II, at 232; M. Jones, The Non-Contractual Liability of the EEC and the Availability of an
Alternative Remedy in the National Courts, 1 Legal Issues of European Integration 1 (1981).
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An individual will also have to exhaust special mechanisms put in place by
the organization to resolve disputes with individuals, including arbitral and
administrative procedures.50 These include claims settlement procedures
established in peace support operations. In respect of the UN, Amrallah states
that procedures such as the local claims review boards “should be considered
as local remedies whichmust be exhausted before the individual’s state could
be allowed to interpose a claim on his behalf.”51 It must be noted, however,
that although UN claims settlement procedures do not explicitly exclude non-
nationals of the host state, NATO claims settlement procedures are exclusively
open to nationals of the host state.52
5.4 INTERIM CONCLUSION
The paragraphs above discussed the possibilities for a state to invoke the
responsibility of another state or an international organization for a breach
of international humanitarian law by a peace support operation. It is however
unlikely that injured states, and even less states with a more indirect interest,
will use the available possibilities. One reason is that an injured state may
not have a government to invoke responsibility, such as Somalia in 1993.
Another reason is that if a state submits a claim against an international
organization of which it is a member, the state may end up paying part of
the compensation itself. A third reason is that the exercise of diplomatic
protection is a discretion of the state and not a right of the individual. There
aremany policy reasonswhy a statemay not be inclined to exercise diplomatic
protection. Claimants are therefore likely to prefer remedies which they are
entitled to pursue in their own name, whether under an individual complaints
mechanism or at the international level or through civil litigation.53
50 J.P. Ritter, supra note 44, at 454.
51 B. Amrallah, The International Responsibility of the United Nations for Activities Carried out
by U.N. Peace-Keeping Forces, 32 Revue Egyptienne de Droit International 57 (1976), at 76.
52 See Claims Annex to the Technical Agreement between the Republic of Bosnia and Herze-
govina Ministry of Justice and the Implementation Force, Art. 2; Agreement between the
Government of the Republic of Albania and NATO Concerning the Status of NATO and
its Personnel Present on the Territory of the Republic of Albania of 25 June 1999, Art. 17
(copy on file with the author).
53 C.Wickremasinghe &G. Verdirame, Responsibility and Liability for Violations of Human Rights
in the Course of UN Field Operations, in C. Scott (ed.), Torture as Tort: Comparative Per-
spectives on the Development of Transnational Human Rights Litigation 465 (2001).
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5.5 INVOCATION OF INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY BY AN INDIVIDUAL
5.5.1 A rights-based perspective of international humanitarian law
International humanitarian law was traditionally considered as governing
relations between states. It set out rights and obligations of the belligerent
states. Individual persons were the objects and beneficiaries of the law rather
than subjects. They did not have rights or obligations under international law.
Such a traditional view was connected with the consideration that states
were the only subjects of international law. Until the beginning of the twentieth
century it was firmly established that an individual was not a subject of
international law in the sense of having rights under international law. Today
it is generally accepted that the individual is capable of having rights under
international law, though there is a discussion whether this makes him a
subject of international law per se. International humanitarian law is considered
as a branch of international law conferring rights on individuals.54 Meron
explains that while:
even the early Geneva Conventions conferred various protections on individuals,
as well as on States, whether those protections appertained to the contracting states
or to the individuals themselves remained unclear at best. The treatment to be
accorded to persons under the Conventions was not necessarily seen as creating
a body of rights to which those persons were entitled. The 1929 POW Convention
paved the way for recognition of individual rights by using the term “right” in
several provisions. It was not until the adoption of the 1949 Conventions, however,
that “the existence of rights conferred on protected personswas affirmed” through
several key provisions.55
Of particular interest in this regard is common Article 6/6/6/7 of the Geneva
Conventions. This article provides that protected persons may in no circum-
stances renounce in part or in entirety the rights secured to them by the present
conventions, and by the special agreements provided for in the conventions.
It clarifies that the rights referred to are granted to individuals instead of to
their governments, since only the holder of a right is entitled to renounce it.
This conclusion can also be drawn from the fact that the article speaks not
only to the relationship between a prisoner of war and the detaining power,
but also to the relationship between the prisoner and his state of origin. The
54 L. Zegveld,Remedies for Victims of Violations of International Humanitarian Law, 85 International
Review of the Red Cross 497 (2003); G. Aldrich, Individuals as Subjects of International
Humanitarian Law, in J. Makarczyk (Ed.), Theory of International Law at the Threshold of
the 21st Century: Essays inHonour of Krzysztof Skubiszewski 851 (1996). See also R. Teitel,
Humanity’s Law: Rule of Law for the New Global Politics, 35 Cornell International Law Journal
355 (2002), at 362-363.
55 Th. Meron, The Humanization of Humanitarian Law, 94 American Journal of International
Law 239 (2000), at 251.
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prisoner is not bound by a special agreement to which his state of origin has
consented, if that agreement encroaches on the rights of the former. The ICRC
commentary on Article 7 of Geneva Convention III even suggests that a
prisoner of war could have a legitimate claim against his state of origin if
violations of his rights are the consequence of an agreement signed by his state
of origin.56
Other articles in the conventions also use the term ‘right’, including Articles
5, 52, 72, 73, 75 and 101 of the fourth Geneva Convention, as does Additional
Protocol I. Other provisions of the 1949 Conventions and Additional Protocol
I use analogous terms such as ‘entitlement’, ‘privilege’ and ‘claim’.
Article 118 of Geneva Convention III provides that prisoners of war shall
be released and repatriated without delay after the cessation of active hostil-
ities. The article does not use the term ‘right’ or a similar term. Nevertheless,
repatriation of prisoners of war has been interpreted as an individual right
of those prisoners. The United Nations Command determined after the Korean
conflict that many priosoners of war in its custody were opposed to being
repatriated to North Korea or China. The latter insisted that the obligation
to repatriate was owed to them and not to the prisoners of war themselves.
The prisoners should therefore be repatriated without consideration of their
wishes. The UN Command however determined that force would not be used
against prisoners of war to prevent or effect their return to their homelands.
This interpretation was reaffirmed in a UN General Assembly Resolution of
3 December 1952.57 The United States interpreted Article 118 similarly after
Operation Desert Storm. The official Department of Defense after action report
notes that:
Article 118, GPW [Geneva Convention of Prisoners ofWar], establishes a POW’s right
to be repatriated. In conflicts since the GPW’s adoption, this principle has become
conditional: Each POW must consent to repatriation rather than being forced to
return.58
The Eritrea Ethiopia Claims Commission, established to decide among others
claims between the governments for loss, damage or injury resulting from
violations of international humanitarian law, including the 1949 Geneva
Conventions, or other violations of international law, handed down a partial
award on Eritrea’s claim concerning prisoners of war on 1 July 2003. The
award notes that on 29 November 2002 Ethiopia released all prisoners of war
56 J. Pictet (Ed.), The Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949; Commentary; III Geneva
Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War 92 (1960).
57 General Assembly Resolution 610, UN Doc. A/2361 (1952).
58 United States Department of Defense Report to Congress on the Conduct of the Persian
Gulf War – Appendix on the Role of the Law of War, 10 April 1992, reproduced in 31 ILM
612 (1992), at 631.
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registered by the ICRC remaining in its custody.59 It also states that some chose
to remain in Ethiopia for family or other reasons, apparently accepting that
this was their choice and not that of their government.
Case law of the ICTY also provides an example of the concept of individual
rights in the interpretation of the 1949 Geneva Conventions. In the Cˇelebic´i
case, for example, the accused Delic´ contended inter alia that because Bosnia
and Herzegovina acceded to the 1949 Geneva Conventions after the events
alleged in the indictment, his acts committed before that date could not be
prosecuted under the treaty regime of grave breaches. The Prosecution con-
tended that Bosnia andHerzegovina was bound by the conventions as a result
of their instrument of succession deposited on 31 December 1992, which took
effect on the date on which Bosnia and Herzegovina became independent,
6 March 1992. The Appeals Chamber examined the question on the basis of
the 1978 Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties.
It held that Bosnia and Herzegovina formally succeeded to the 1949 Geneva
Conventions on 6 March 1992 on the basis of Article 23 paragraph 1 of the
Vienna Convention. It also stated that:
irrespective of any findings of formal succession, Bosnia and Herzegovina would
in any event have succeeded to the Geneva Conventions under customary law,
as this type of convention entails succession without automatic succession, i.e.,
without the need for any formal confirmation of adherence by the successor State.
It may be now considered in international law that there is automatic State
succession to multilateral treaties in the broad sense, i.e., treaties of universal
character which express fundamental human rights.60
5.5.2 Procedural capacity
Being a bearer of a right under international law must be distinguished from
being able to enforce that right on the international level. The ILC has recog-
nized this distinction. Draft article 33, paragraph 2, of the draft articles pro-
vides that Part Two of the draft articles, concerning the content of state
responsibility, is without prejudice to any right, arising from the international
responsibility of a state, which may accrue directly to any person or entity
other than a state. In the system of the draft articles, this provision merely
makes clear that the draft articles do not deal with the possibility of the
invocation of responsibility by persons or entities other than states, but it has
much wider implications, as the Commission’s commentary makes clear:
59 Eritrea Ethiopia Claims Commission, Partial Award, Prisoners of War, Eritrea’s Claim 17,
1 July 2003, at 33, para. 144.
60 Prosecutor v. Zejnil Delalic´, Zdravko Mucic´, Hazim Delic´ and Esad Landžo, Judgment, Case No.
IT-96-21, A. Ch, 20 February 2001, para. 111 (emphasis added).
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In cases where the primary obligation is owed to a non-State entity, it may be that
some procedure is available whereby that entity can invoke the responsibility on
its own account and without the intermediation of any State.61
The commentary gives human rights treaties which provide for a right of
petition to a court or some other body as an example. But not every case of
responsibility for breach of a primary obligation owed to a non-state entity
can be invoked by that entity:
It will be amatter for the particular primary rule to determinewhether and towhat
extent persons or entities other than States are entitled to invoke responsibility of
their own account.62
ILC Special Rapporteur on Diplomatic Protection Dugard considers that the
lack of procedural rights for individuals under international law is an argu-
ment for retaining diplomatic protection. He states that “while the individual
may have rights under international law, her remedies are limited”.63
International humanitarian law at present does not provide for an indi-
vidual to invoke international responsibility on her own account.64 Article
3 of Hague Convention (IV) 1907 andArticle 91 of the first Additional Protocol
do not provide for a private right of action, though some writers maintain
the contrary. Kalshoven for example states that:
the records of the conference that adopted the text, i.e. the Second Hague Peace
Conference 1907, provide convincing evidence that the delegates sought not so
much to lay down a rule relating to the international responsibility of one State
vis-à-vis another, as one relating to a State’s liability to compensate the losses of
individual persons incurred as a consequence of their direct (and harmful) contact
with its armed forces.65
Applicants in national court proceedings have also made such an argument.
In an amicus curiae brief to the United States Supreme Court in Lindo Maduro
S.A. and others v. United States, for example, the government of Panama stated
61 Supra note 11, at 234, para. 4.
62 Id.
63 Supra note 34, at 8, para. 24.
64 See e.g. R. Dolzer, The Settlement of War-Related Claims: Does International Law Recognize a
Victim’s Private Right of Action? Lessons after 1945, 20 Berkeley Journal of International Law
296 (2002).
65 F. Kalshoven, State Responsibility for Warlike Acts of the Armed Forces: From Article 3 of Hague
Convention IV of 1907 to Article 91 of Additional Protocol I of 1977 and Beyond, 40 International
& Comparative Law Quarterly 830 (1991).
278 Mechanisms for invoking accountability for violations of international humanitarian law
that Article 3 sought to provide individual victims of violation of the regula-
tions with a cause of action against the responsible party to the Convention.66
The travaux préparatoires of the Convention however do not support such
an interpretation. A statement by Belgium at the Hague Peace Conference
suggests that this delegation considered Article 3 as relating to inter-state
responsibility by referring to the settlement of cases by the states concerned.67
Other delegations did not object to this statement, nor did they make clear
that they interpreted the article differently, which would have been a radical
departure from contemporary theories of international responsibility.
In a great majority of cases in which individual claimants have based their
claim on Article 3, national courts have rejected such an interpretation of the
article. United States courts have held that Article 3 does not create a right
to invoke international responsibility for individuals.68 In Princz v. Federal
Republic of Germany, for example, the plaintiff, a Holocaust survivor, brought
suit against the defendant to recover damages for injuries suffered while he
was a prisoner in a concentration camp.69 The Court of Appeals considered
whether the respondent could claim immunity under the relevant United States
legislation, the Federal Sovereign Immunities Act. Princz argued that the
compensation provisions of the Hague Convention provided for a right of
action for individuals, which would bring the case within an exception to the
Act’s immunity provision. The Court held that nothing in the Convention even
impliedly grants individuals the right to seek damages for violation of its
provisions and that consequently there was no exception to the rule of
immunity.70
In a series of complaints against the Japanese government for violations
of the Hague Convention toward individuals, the Japanese courts have held
that there is no private right of action for these violations and that compensa-
66 Brief of the Government of Panama as amicus curiae in support of petition for writ of
certiorari, reproduced inM. Sassòli & A. Bouvier, HowDoes Law Protect inWar 944 (1999).
67 “Le règlement des indemnités dues à des neutres pourra, le plus souvent, avoir lieu sans
retard, par la simple raison que l’Etat belligérant responsible est en paix avec leur pays
et continue avec ce dernier des relations pacifiques qui permettront aux deux Etats de liquider
aisément et sans délai tous les cas venant à se présenter. La même facilité ou possibilité
n’existe pas entre les belligérants, par le fait même de la guerre, et, bien que le droit à une
indemnité naisse en faveur de leurs ressortisants respectifs aussi bien qu’en faveur de
neutres, le règlement des indemnités, entre belligérants, ne pourra guère être arrêté et effectué
qu’à la conclusion de la Paix.”, Deuxième Conférence internationale de la Paix, La Haye
15 juin – 18 octobre 1907, Actes et Documents (Actes), Vol. III, at 147 (emphasis added).
68 Goldstar (Panama) S.A. v. United States, 967 F.2d 965 (4th Cir. 1992).
69 Princz v. Federal Republic of Germany, 307 U.S. App. D.C. 102; 26 F.3d 1166.
70 See also Handel v. Artukovic, 601 F. Supp. 1421, 1425 (C.D. Cal. 1985) and Tel-Oren v. Libyan
Arab Republic, 233 U.S. App. D.C. 384, 726 F.2d 774, 810 (D.C. Cir. 1984 (Bork, J., concurring)).
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tion may be claimed only by another state.71 Such an interpretation of Article
3 was also given by the Tokyo district court in Shimoda and others v. Japan:
Indeed, international law permits a state to demand from the other country repara-
tions for damage caused to its nationals, in the name of the state for the sake of
its nationals. This is called diplomatic protection, as is generally known. Diplomatic
protection is, however, an act based on the state’s own right of diplomatic pro-
tection and the individual’s claim itself is not asserted by this act. The claim for
damages is asserted as the state’s own claim. Whether the state exercises the right
of diplomatic protection is decided by the state in its own judgment, and the state
exercises the rights in its name. It does not follow that the state acts on behalf of
its nationals. Borchard and others call this phenomenon “immersion of the indi-
vidual’s claim into the state’s claim.” In this case, the state is not interfered with
at all by the nationals in regard to how andwhat the state claims, and how it solves
the question of the claim. With regard to the amount of compensation which the
state claims, it does not always claim the compensation for the whole damage
caused to the nationals. Further, the state can determine freely by its intention how
the state distributes the compensation thus obtained. Therefore, in this case, we
must say that there is no room for regarding the individual as the subject of right
in international law.
The German Supreme Court (Bundesgerichtshof) held in a decision of 26 June
2003 that on the basis Article 3 a ‘Party to the conflict’ has an obligation to
compensate another ‘Party to the conflict’, and not individuals.72 The case
concerned a claim for damages by Greek nationals for a massacre committed
by the German armed forces during World War II. They based their claim
on, inter alia, Article 3 of the 1907 Hague Convention (IV). A German Court
of Appeals rejected the claim on the grounds that Germanywas immune from
jurisdiction, and that individuals do not have legal standing to make claims
regarding violations of international humanitarian law. The Supreme Court
upheld both arguments. With respect to the latter argument, however, it limited
its analysis to the state of law at the time of the events concerned. The Court
stated that:
In case of breaches of international law arising from acts in respect of aliens it is
not the victims themselves, but their state of nationality that can make a claim.
The state asserts its own right to respect for international law vis-à-vis its nationals.
71 See M. Igarashi, Post-War Compensation Cases, Japanese Courts and International Law, 43
Japanese Annual of International Law 1 (2000). See also the case of Danikovic´ et al. v. the
Netherlands, Supreme Court of the Netherlands, 29 November 2002 (copy on file with the
author). In this interlocutory judgment the Supreme Court held that no action before the
civil court in interlocutory proceedings lies for individuals against the state for breach of
International Humanitarian Law. This raises the question whether this would be possible
in regular (not interlocutory) proceedings.
72 Bundesgerichtshof, Judgment of 26 June 2003, III ZR 245/98.
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This principle, that only states have rights, also applied to the breach of human
rights between 1943 and 1945. … As a consequence, on the basis of Article 2 of
the Hague Convention on the Laws and Customs of War on Land of 18 October
1907 (Hague Regulations [sic]) its provisions “do not apply except between Con-
tracting Powers”, and in accordance wih Article 3 of the Hague Regulations [sic]
a “Belligerent Party” is liable to pay compensation (to another Belligerent Party).73
The Court did not specify whether the situation had changed since 1945,
although it did state that only recent developments in international law con-
ferred rights on individuals and created treaty-based systems of protection,
on the basis of which an individual couldmake a claim. This statement implies
that such a right to make a claim does not (yet) exist outside the framework
of treaty-based systems.74
The discrepancy has led some writers to argue for a general individual
complaints procedure for violations of international humanitarian law, arguing
that individual humanitarian rights should be justiciable and subjected to the
scrutiny of a supervisory organ on the basis of the principle that where there
is a right there must be a remedy.75 This notion of ‘no right without a remedy’
is already deeply rooted in human rights law. The right to an effective remedy
is itself a human right, recognized in Article 8 of the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights and Article 2, paragraph 3, of the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights. Whether the right to an effective remedy also
operates as a general principle outside the human rights sphere is contestable.
Wellensmaintains that an important reasonwhy international organizations
should provide appropriate remedies for those entities whose interests have
been or may have been affected by their conduct emanates from the ‘right
to a remedy’.76 As stated, the right to a remedy is set out in a number of
international human rights instruments, and it is claimed that in this particular
73 Id., at 19. Translation by the author. The original wording is:
Bei völkerrechtlichen Delikten durchHandlungen gegenüber fremden Staatsbürgern steht
ein Anspruch nicht dem Betroffenen selbst, sondern nur seinem Heimatstaat zu. Der Staat
macht im Wege des diplomatischen Schutzes sein eigenes Recht darauf geltend, daß das
Völkerrecht in der Person eines Staatsangehörigen beachtet wird. Dieses Prinzip einer
ausschließlichen Staatenberechtigung galt in den Jahren 1943 bis 1945 auch für die Ver-
letzung von Menschenrechten … Dementsprechend finden nach Art. 2 des Abkommens
betreffend die Gesetze und Gebräuche des Landkriegs vom 18. Oktober 1907 (Haager
Landkriegsordnung – HKLO) deren Bestimmungen “nur zwischen den Vertragsmächten
Anwendung”, und gemäß Art. 3 HKLO ist gegebenenfalls “die Kriegspartei” (gegenüber
der anderen Kriegspartei) zum Schadenersatz verpflichtet.
74 Id., at 20.
75 J. Kleffner & L. Zegveld, Establishing an Individual Complaints Procedure for Violations of
International Humanitarian Law, 3 Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law 384 (2000);
J. Kleffner, Improving Compliance with International Humanitarian Law Through the Establishment
of an Individual Complaints Procedure, 15 Leiden Journal of International Law 237 (2002).
76 K. Wellens, supra note 1, at 16-19.
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context it is part of the corpus of customary international law.77 The right
to a remedy has been discussed in the Sub-Commission on the Promotion and
Protection of Human Rights (previously the Sub-Commission on the Prevention
of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities). In 1989 the Sub-Commission
entrusted Theo van Boven with the task of undertaking a study concerning
the right to restitution, compensation and rehabilitation of victims of gross
violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms. In 1993 he presented
a final report in which he proposed a set of “basic principles and guide-
lines.”78 The report encompassed breaches of international humanitarian law
as ‘gross violations of human rights’. In the body of the report, van Boven
concluded that:
The obligations resulting from State responsibility for breaches of international
human rights law entail corresponding rights on the part of individual persons
and groups of persons who are under the jurisdiction of the offending State and
who are victims of those breaches.79
This finding is hardly convincing, since most of the evidence adduced by van
Boven for such a principle is from the case law of human rights monitoring
bodies, whose jurisdiction has expressly been accepted by states parties to
human rights conventions. The lack of state practice is acknowledged by van
Boven who states that “the perspective of the victim is often overlooked.”80
Nevertheless, general principle 2 of the proposed basic principles and guide-
lines states that every “State has a duty to make reparation” in case of the
obligation to respect and to ensure respect for human rights and fundamental
freedoms, and that the obligation to ensure respect includes “the duty to afford
remedies to victims”. Interestingly, a footnote to this principle notes that
“where these principles refer to States, they also apply, as appropriate to other
entities exercising effective power”, thus apparently providing for their applica-
tion to international organizations. In 1996 van Boven, at the request of the
Sub-Commission, presented a revised set of basic principles. This set was
unequivocal on the right to a remedy. Principle 4 provided that:
Every State shall ensure that adequate legal or other appropriate remedies are
available to any person claiming that his or her rights have been violated. The right
77 D. Shelton, Remedies in International Human Rights Law 358 (2001).
78 Final Report submitted by Mr. Theo van Boven, Special Rapporteur, Study concerning the
right to restitution, compensation and rehabilitation for victims of gross violations of human
rights and fundamental freedoms of 2 July 1993, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/8.
79 Id., at 19, para. 45.
80 Id., at 53, para. 133.
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to a remedy against violations of human rights and humanitarian norms includes
the right of access to national and international procedures for their protection.81
The revised principles no longer included a reference to ‘other entities ex-
ercising effective power’. In 1998 the Commission on Human Rights, the Sub-
Commission’s parent body, appointed Cherif Bassiouni to prepare a revised
version of the basic principles with a view to their adoption by the General
Assembly. Bassiouni presented his final report in 2000, including a proposed
set of principles. Principle 11 of the ‘Bassiouni principles’ states that:
Remedies for violations of international human rights and humanitarian law include
the victim’s right to:
a. Access justice;
b. Reparation for harm suffered; and
c. …82
In Resolution 2000/41 the Commission called “upon the international com-
munity to give due attention to the right to restitution, compensation and
rehabilitation for victims of grave violations of human rights”, and requested
the Secretary-General to circulate to all member states the text of the principles
and to request that they send their comments thereon to the Office of the
United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights.83 In the Commission’s
2002 resolution on the topic, 2002/44, the Commission repeated the request
to the Secretary-General to circulate the “Bassiouni principles” and:
Calls upon the international community to give due attention to the right to a
remedy and, in particular, in appropriate cases, to receive restitution, compensation
and rehabilitation, for victims or violations of international human rights law.84
In October 2002, the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for
Human Rights convened an international consultation meeting on the
‘Bassiouni principles’. The final outcome of the meeting included a summary
81 Revised set of basic principles and guidelines on the right to reparation for victims of gross
violations of human rights and humanitarian law prepared byMr. Theo van Boven pursuant
to Sub-Commission decision 1995/117 of 24 May 1996, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1996/17.
82 Basic principles and guidelines on the right to a remedy and reparation for victims of
violations of international human rights and humanitarian law, Annex to Report of the
Special Rapporteur, Mr. M. Cherif Bassiouni, The right to restitution, compensation and
rehabilitation for victims of gross violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms
of 18 January 2000, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2000/62.
83 Commission onHuman Rights Resolution 2000/41 of 20 April 2000, UNDoc. E/CN.4/RES/
2000/41, para. 1.
84 Commission onHuman Rights Resolution 2002/44 of 23 April 2002, UNDoc. E/CN.4/RES/
2002/44.
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of the discussion during the meeting as well as the Chairperson’s con-
clusions,85 but not a final document codifying the principles. One of the Chair-
person-rapporteur’s conclusions is that:
It was recognized that, in international law, while the forms and modalities of
reparation may differ, the right to reparation applies both to violations of human
rights and violations of humanitarian law.86
The Commission on Human Rights in 2003 took note of the report of the
Chairperson-Rapporteur, and requested him to prepare a revised version of
the principles. The Commision also requested the United Nations High Com-
missioner for Human Rights to hold a second consultative meeting, which,
if appropriate, could consider options for the adoption of these principles and
guidelines.87 The Commission Resolution also repeated the call on the inter-
national community to give due attention to the right to a remedy, and, in
particular, in appropriate cases, to receive restitution, compensation, and
rehabilitation, for victims of grave violations of international human rights
law and humanitarian international law.88 The second consultative meeting
took place on 23 October 2003. The revised text of the principles submitted
to this meeting includes the principle that the victim of a ‘serious violation
of humanitarian law’ has a right to ‘reparation for harm suffered or other
appropriate remedy’ as well as ‘access to justice’.89
It may be noted that the Human Rights Commission has not stated that
the ‘Bassiouni principles’ reflect the content of the right to a remedy.Moreover,
its resolutions suggests that a right to receive restitution, compensation and
rehabilitation, only exists in ‘appropriate cases’. This is hardly an unequivocal
adoption of the ‘Bassiouni principles’ and its formulation of the right to a
remedy in particular. In other words, there is reason to doubt that states
recognize an unbounded right of access to justice and to reparation for harm
suffered even in the field of human rights, unless they have expressly accepted
such a right in conventional law. On the other hand, there is unquestionably
a development to pay more attention to remedies for individual victims, as
illustrated for example by the establishment of a Committee on Compensation
for the Victims of War by the International Law Association in 2003. This
85 Report of the Consultative Meeting on the Draft Basic Principles and Guidelines on the
Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Violations of International Human Rights
and Humanitarian Law of 27 December 2002, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2003/63.
86 Id., at 11, para. 47.
87 United Nations Commission on Human Rights Resolution 2003/34 of 23 April 2003, UN
Doc. E/CN.4/RES/2003/34.
88 Id., para. 1.
89 Basic principles and guidelines on the right to a remedy and reparation for victims of gross
violations of international human rights law and serious violations of international human-
itarian law, Rev. 23 October 2003 (copy on file with the author), para. 12 (b).
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increased attention may, and should, eventually lead to increased remedial
rights for victims.
5.5.3 Procedural capacity under national law implicating a violation of
international law
In the absence of a private right of action under international law, national
law can confer such a right. Generally speaking, such an opportunity can be
created in the national law of torts. In such a case the action by an individual
is grounded directly on a domestic tort but implicates an international law
violation. Such a possibility is only available in exceptional cases. In 1999 a
Canadian judge decided on such a claim in connection with the mistreatment
and killing by Canadian Forces personnel of a Somali national, Shidane Arone,
during Operation Restore Hope. Justice Cunningham of the Ontario Superior
Court of Justice struck out a claim on behalf of the family of Shidane Arone
against the Canadian government.90 Abubakar Arone Rage and Dahabo Omar
Samow, the parents of Shidane Arone, claimed damages founded in negligence
as well as assault, battery and fiduciary duty for the torture, wrongful death
and/or murder of their son. Justice Cunningham determined that the action
was improperly commenced because the claim was submitted on behalf of
the parents by a litigation guardian appointed by them living in Ontario and
the rules of the court made no provision for the commencement of legal
proceedings by a litigation guardian for persons of full age and capacity. In
other words, the parents should have gone to Canada to start proceedings
themselves. Justice Cunningham also held that action was barred by statute
because under section 7 of the Public Authorities Act and section 269 (1) of
the National Defence Act it could not be instituted after six months after the
cause of the action arose.
This case illustrates some of the procedural difficulties involved in tort
proceedings against governments under national law. It does not seem reason-
able for example to personally require the parents of a victim in Somalia to
travel to the troop contributing state concerned. Such a requirement effectively
discriminates against victimswho cannot afford travel to the state in question.
Attorney-General v. Nissan is another example of the limitations of an action
under the domestic law of torts.91 In that case the House of Lords could only
give redress to Nissan because he was a United Kingdom national. Lord Reid
stated that the:
90 Abubakar Arone Rage and Dahabo Omar Samow by their Litigation Guardian Abdullahi
Godah Barre v. The AttorneyGeneral of Canada (unreported, 6 July 1999, Ontario Superior
Court of Justice, Cunningham J.) (copy on file with author).
91 See also § 2.7.3.
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other case which is, I think, clear is where the act complained of was done against
an alien outside her majesty’s dominions. Since Buron v. Denman it has been
accepted that if the act was ordered or has been ratified by the British government
the English courts cannot give redress to that alien. He may enlist the support of
his own government who may make diplomatic representations, but he has no
legal remedy in England.92
Another possible obstacle is immunity from jurisdiction of states and inter-
national organizations before national courts. Manderlier v. United Nations and
Belgium is an example of immunity barring an action under national law.93
On 9 November 2003, lawyers representing families of persons killed in
Srebrenica announced that theywould file suit against the UN and theNether-
lands before appropriate courts for breaching international laws and the
European Convention of Human Rights.94 The families hold the UN and the
Netherlands responsible for failing to protect the enclave. Pursuant to this
announcement, lawyers for the families initiated a procedure before the Court
of First Instance of the Hague on 29 August 2003, with a view to obtaining
an injunction to hear a number of witnesses.95 They contended that hearing
the witnesses concerned was necessary to establish certain facts, necessary
to determine whether the facts of the case justified a claim against the Nether-
lands. In this regard, the plaintiff noted that it had the intention of submitting
a claim against the Netherlands under tort law on the grounds that: the Nether-
lands in July 1995 had the opportunity to take upon itself the evacuation of
the muslim population, which would have prevented their deportation; the
compound of the Dutch contingent had room for more persons that had been
admitted and there were no other obstacles to admitting more; the Dutch
soldiers did not offer sufficient protection to those not admitted to the com-
pound, though they received signals of executions and abuse; and theNether-
lands facilitated the deportation of the population from the safe area, inter
alia by expelling them from the compound, even though there was an alter-
native to forced expulsion.
The plaintiff maintained that the Netherlands exercized insufficient super-
vision over respect for fundamental norms of international law, aswell as that
it interfered in the UN command structure.
The respondent submitted that the conduct concerned related to the re-
lationship between states and the UN on the one hand, and the state where
the conduct occurred on the other. This relationship, the state maintained, is
92 Attorney-General v. Nissan, House of Lords, 11 February 1969, [1969] 1 All ER 629, at 634.
93 Manderlier v. United Nations and Belgium, Court of Appeals of Brussels, 15 September 1969,
69 ILR 139.
94 Srebrenica Survivors to Sue UN, AFP, 9 November 2003.
95 Court of First Instance of the Hague, Decision of 27 November 2003, case no. 03.531 (copy
on file with the author).
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governed by international law. According to the respondent, only the UN could
be responsible for this conduct.
The Court, in its decision of 27 November 2003, noted that the plaintiff
agreed with the respondent that in principle the UN is exclusively responsible
for conduct by UN peace support operations. The plaintiff however pointed
to a report by an advisory committee to the government of 14 February 2002,
which formulated certain exceptions to this principle. One exception is the
situation where a state has interfered in UN command and control. Another
exception is that a troop contributing state is responsible in case of violations
of international humanitarian law, if the state has transferred powers without
guarantees that the Geneva Conventions will be respected. It may be noted
that this is precisely the ground for responsibility discussed above.96 The
Court noted that the plaintiff assumed that the views of the commission state
the current law. The Court however stated that, in the absence of any case
law in this field, it first has to be decided whether, and if so in which cases,
the state can be responsible for the conduct of a contingent under UN command
and control. The Court concluded that the hearing of witnesses was premature
and unnecessary as long as there is no legal certainty concerning these complex
questions, and rejected the application.
Claims settlement procedures established by peace support operations are
in a sense analogous to tort proceedings under national law. The practice in
UN operations has been to base claims review board decisions on the types
of injury and loss compensable under local law of the host state and the
prevailing practice in the mission area, in particular, as well as on the past
practice of the organization. Claims settlement procedures in NATO peace
support operations also use the local law of the host state as reference.97
In contrast to a court, however, the bodies created by claims settlement
procedures are not per se independent. Sorel states that the replacement in
practice of claims commissions by local claims review boards is a transition
from a quasi-judicial to a unilateral system.98 Wellens also underlines that
the fact that local claims review boards are composed exclusively of United
Nations staff members raises concerns over the boards’ independence and the
objectivity of their rulings, which are two elements in assessing any kind of
claims settlement procedure as an adequate alternative system for protection.99
The lack of any obligation to make their decisions public also contributes to
the assessment that they do not function as proper mechanisms of account-
ability. Under the SFOR claims settlement procedure as it has developed in
practice, claims are adjudicated in first instance by officers of the operation,
96 § 2.10.3.
97 J. Prescott, Claims, in D. Fleck (Ed.), The Handbook of the Law of Visiting Forces 159 (2001).
98 J.M. Sorel, La Responsabilité des Nations Unies dans les Opérations de Maintien de la Paix, 3
International Law Forum 127 (2001), at 134.
99 K. Wellens, supra note 1, at 104.
Chapter 5 287
although a claims commission can hear appeals from the claimant when a
claims dispute cannot be resolved between the claimant and the unit respons-
ible for the loss or damage. A claims commission consists of four members:
two SFOR representatives and two receiving state representatives.100 An appeal
is possible from a decision of the claims commission to an Arbitration Tribunal.
Under the Technical Arrangements and the subsequent agreements, the de-
cisions of the SFOR Claims Commissions and Arbitration Tribunals101 are
supposed to be final and binding, but in the first case before the Croatian
Arbitration Tribunal, the United States informed the Tribunal that it did not
accept the final and binding nature of any decision the Tribunal might reach.
5.6 USING HUMAN RIGHTS MACHINERY TO INVOKE INTERNATIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY FOR VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW
BY PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS
5.6.1 Availability of human rights monitoring bodies
Some writers argue that human rights machinery could be used indirectly to
enforce international humanitarian law. Greenwood for example states that:
Various mechanisms for the enforcement of international human rights law may
be able to offer a measure of assistance in improving compliance with the laws
of war. Although such bodies have no jurisdiction to apply the laws of war as such,
it is possible that in cases involving allegations of human rights violations during
an armed conflict (international or internal), a human rights tribunal will look to
the laws of war for guidance in relation to such issues as whether the deprivation
of life in a particular case was arbitrary.102
In the field of human rights a number of monitoring bodies exist that are
independent and that bypass the need for governments to act. In other words,
individuals can invoke state responsibility before these bodies. Some of these
agencies are linked to a regional human rights instrument. The European Court
ofHumanRightsmay receive applications from any person, non-governmental
organization or group of individuals claiming to be the victim of a violation
by one of the High Contracting Parties of the rights set forth in the European
100 J. Prescott, supra note 97, at 175.
101 See § 2.8.1.
102 C. Greenwood, International Humanitarian Law, in F. Kalshoven (Ed.), The Centennial of
the First International Peace Conference 161 (2000), at 251. See also F. Hampson, Using
International Human Rights Machinery to Enforce the International Law of Armed Conflicts, 31
Military Law and Law ofWar Review 117 (1992), F. Martin, Application du Droit International
Humanitaire par la Cour Interaméricaine des Droits de l’Homme, 83 International Review of
the Red Cross 1037 (2001).
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Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
(ECRM) or the Protocols thereto. Under the American Convention on Human
Rights any person or group of persons may lodge petitions with the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights containing denunciations or com-
plaints of violation of the Convention by a state party. Only the states parties
and the Commission have the right to submit a case to the Inter-American
Court of HumanRights. Human rightsmonitoring agencies that are not limited
to a geographic area include the UN Human Rights Committee established
under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. A state that
is party to the Optional Protocol to the Covenant recognizes the competence
of the Committee to receive and consider communications from individuals
subject to its jurisdiction who claim to be victims of a violation by that state.
The Committee against Torture established under theUnitedNations Conven-
tion against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment may receive and consider individual complaints against those
states that have expressly accepted its jurisdiction.
A number of human rights treaties also provide for a state’s obligation
to submit reports on measures adopted to give effect to the rights recognized
by the treaty in question. Several cases were considered above in which vi-
olations of human rights by peace support operations were considered in state
reporting procedures. State reporting procedures such as those in the Inter-
national Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the United Nations Con-
vention against Torture consist of a mandatory submission of reports by
contracting states, examination of the reports by the monitoring body in
question and the adoption of concluding observations that aremade public.103
Monitoring bodies cannot enforce these observations and recommendations
but rely on political pressure on governments in a human rights dialogue.
So-called ‘charter-based mechanisms’ are another part of the UN human
rights monitoring machinery. The United Nations Commission on Human
Rights is the principal charter-based human rights body.
Reports by the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in
Somalia are an example of a Commission procedure. The Special Rapporteur
is an example of the so-called special public procedures of the Commission.104
Special procedures are individuals or groups of individuals appointed by the
Commission to study the situation of human rights in a specific country or
103 See R. Bank, International Efforts to Combat Torture and Inhuman Treatment: Have New Mechan-
isms Improved Protection?, 8 European Journal of International Law 613 (1997) and I. Boerefijn,
The Reporting Procedure under the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Practice and
Procedures of the Human Rights Committee (1999).
104 See M. Bossuyt, The Development of Special Procedures of the United Nations Commission on
Human Rights, 6 Human Rights Law Journal 179 (1985).
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a specific theme. The names given to these individuals or groups of indi-
viduals105 vary considerably as well as the mandate conferred on them de-
pending on the resolution creating it, but they have in common that their main
function is fact-finding and reporting the facts to the Commission.106 In
practice a Special Rapporteur has considerable freedom concerning the
methodology of his or her inquiry and the form of the report. The Commission
has not adopted specific rules of procedure for Rapporteurs and in practice
they have a role in interpreting their own mandate.
Special procedures are not judicial or quasi-judicial procedures. Their
function is to report to the Commission. Action by the Commission on the
basis of a report consists mainly of adoption of a resolution. The Commission
is a political organ that does not make legally binding findings of state re-
sponsibility giving rise to a claim of reparation in the sameway as for example
the ECHR. The most important instruments at the disposal of the Commission
are political and moral pressures.
The availability of procedures for invoking international responsibility or
accountability in the field of human rights and the undisputed correspondence
between international humanitarian law strengthened by a rights-based per-
spective of international humanitarian law raise the question whether human
rights monitoring bodies can play a role in enforcing international human-
itarian law in general, and in respect of peace support operations in particular.
5.6.2 Subject-matter jurisdiction as an obstacle
One obstacle to such use of human rights machinery is that the subject-matter
jurisdiction or mandate of the various agencies in question does not expressly
include international humanitarian law. Human rights monitoring agencies
nevertheless sometimes take into account international humanitarian law, but
to a varying extent. So far, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
has been the sole human rights monitoring agency to directly apply inter-
national humanitarian law. In its report in the Tablada case, the Commission
gave several arguments why it could apply international humanitarian law
without an explicit legal basis in the Inter-American Convention on Human
105 Names include Special Rapporteur, Independent Expert, Special Representative and Special
Envoy for individuals and Special Committee and Working Group for groups. I will use
the term Special Rapporteur to refer to all Special Procedures whatever their name because
in the context of peace support operations the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human
rights in Somalia has been most active. Note that the Commission has now renamed the
Special Rapporteur on Somalia into the Independent Expert on Somalia.
106 J. Pastor Ridruejo, Les Procédures Spécialisées de la Commission des Droits de l’Homme des Nations
Unies, 228 Recueil des Cours 183 (1991-III), at238.
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Rights.107 In 2000 however, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights held
that the Commission’s approach could not stand up to scrutiny. In its decision
on preliminary objections in the Las Palmeras case, the Court admitted the
preliminary objections by the respondent state to the effect that the Com-
mission and the Court are not competent to apply international humanitarian
law.108 The Commission argued before the Court that international human-
itarian law could be applied as customary international law. It also argued
that international humanitarian law could be applied as lex specialis in relation
to the American Convention. It considered that, in an armed conflict, there
are cases in which the enemy may be killed legitimately, while, in others, this
was prohibited. The Commission stated that the American Convention did
not contain any rule to distinguish one hypothesis from the other and, there-
fore, the Geneva Conventions should be applied. Colombia on the other hand
emphasized the importance of the principle of consent. The Court accepted
the Colombian argument in the sense that a state which is a party to the
American Convention and that has accepted the contentious jurisdiction of
the Court has not accepted the competence of the Court to determine whether
the acts or the norms of the state are compatible with the 1949 Geneva Conven-
tions.109 The Court stated:
When a State is a Party to the American Convention and has accepted the conten-
tious jurisdiction of the Court, the Court may examine the conduct of the State
to determine whether it conforms to the provisions of the Convention, even when
the issue may have been definitively resolved by the domestic legal system. The
Court is also competent to determinewhether any norm of domestic or international
law applied by a State, in times of peace or armed conflict, is compatible or not
with the American Convention. In this activity, the Court has no normative limita-
tion: any legal norm may be submitted to this examination of compatibility.
In order to carry out this examination, the Court interprets the norm in question
and analyzes it in the light of the provisions of the Convention. The result of this
operation will always be an opinion in which the Court will say whether or not
that norm or that fact is compatible with the American Convention. The latter has
only given the Court competence to determine whether the acts or the norms of
the States are compatible with the Convention itself, and not with the 1949 Geneva
Conventions.110
107 IACHR Report No. 55/97, Case No. 11.137, Argentina, OEA/Ser/L/V/II.97, Doc. 38, October
30, 1997. See for an analysis L. Zegveld, The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
and International Humanitarian Law: A comment on the Tablada Case, 38 International Review
of the Red Cross 505 (1998).
108 Las Palmeras case (Preliminary Objections), 4 February 2000, Inter-American Court of
Human Rights, Series C, No 67.
109 See for a discussion of the Las Palmeras case F. Martin, supra note 102.
110 Supra note 108, paras. 32-33.
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Short of applying international humanitarian law directly, human rights
monitoring bodies may use it indirectly as authoritative guidance in interpreta-
tion of human rights norms. It appears that the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights did not exclude this possibility in the Las Palmeras case.111
In several cases the European Commission and Court of Human Rights have
used concepts from that body of law to interpret states’ obligations under the
European Convention. But they have been careful not to refer to international
humanitarian law directly. Applicants in the Bankovic´ case invited the ECHR
to use international humanitarian law more explicitly in its interpretation of
Articles 2 and Article 15 of the Convention. Article 15 of the Convention
provides that states parties can derogate from the Convention in time of
emergency. The second paragraph states that no derogation can be made from
the right to life (Article 2) except in respect of deaths resulting from lawful
acts of war. Applicants stated that in the case in question Article 15 was not
applicable. In the alternative, they stated that the attack in question was not
a lawful act of war. According to the applicants, in determining what con-
stitutes a lawful act of war, the Court should have regard to the conventional
and customary law of war obligations of states as lex specialis.112
Special Rapporteurs appointed by the UN Commission on Human Rights
do not apply international humanitarian law consistently.113 One obvious
reason is that the mandate of some of them includes that body of law, while
the mandate of others is limited to human rights. Special Rapporteurs whose
mandate does not include international humanitarian law nevertheless do
apply it, but not consistently. Some use it as a means of interpretation of
human rights. In his 1992 report, for example, the Special Rapporteur on
Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions explained that he applied the
Geneva Conventions and their Protocols, in particular common Article 3 to
the Conventions, Article 51 of Additional Protocol I and Article 13 of Addi-
tional Protocol II, because these standards could be used to determinewhether
deaths occurring in the context of armed conflict were ‘arbitrary’ or not, and
thus whether or not they violated the right to life.114
Other Special Rapporteurs apply international humanitarian law directly.
The Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Afghanistan, for
example, in his 2002 report urged all parties in Afghanistan and members of
the international coalition to respect the provisions of the Geneva Conventions
111 J. Kleffner & L. Zegveld, supra note 75, at 389.
112 Application, file on copy with the author.
113 SeeD.O’Donnell, Trends in the Application of International Humanitarian Law by United Nations
Human Rights Mechanisms, 38 International Review of the Red Cross 481 (1998).
114 UN Doc. E/CN.4/1992/30, paras 19-28.
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notwithstanding the fact that his mandate does not refer to international
humanitarian law.115
In the specific context of peace support operations, the Special Rapporteur
on Somalia, in her 1998 report, also applied international humanitarian law.
In the first section of her report she reviewed her mandate to report on the
human rights situation in Somalia, but in the section on allegations against
Belgian, Canadian and Italian troops she stated that she:
believes that it is essential for the credibility of international action in the field of
human rights in Somalia that these allegations are fully investigated, the complete
truth about the behaviour of the international troops in Somalia is revealed, and
all the perpetrators of unlawful acts are brought to justice. In addition to the legal
obligations imposed on States to respect international law, it is essential that proper
action is taken with regard to the alleged violations of international law by the
international forces because the international community ought to send positive
signals to and set correct examples for Somalis with regard to maintaining full
respect of human rights and humanitarian law.116
In her report, the Special Rapporteur focused specifically on the obligation
in the 1949 Geneva Conventions to investigate and prosecute grave breaches
of the conventions. She concluded that the perpetrators of wrongful acts that
amount to grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions, and other serious
violations of international humanitarian law, must be brought to justice.
Her successor, in his 2002 report to the Commission on Human Rights,
repeated concern for allegations of violations of international law by the United
Nations Operations in Somalia.117 In his report he refers expressly to human
rights as well as to international humanitarian law, but in the context of
allegations against the United Nations operation he does not make this dis-
tinction but rather refers to ‘past atrocities’. He states that given thewidespread
support for the idea of pursuing serious and independent investigation into
past atrocities, he has urged the Security Council to consider a proposal for
the establishment of a committee of experts to investigate allegations of past
atrocities in Somalia. He emphasizes that the investigation should also include
the conduct of the United Nations in Somalia.118
115 Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Afghanistan by Mr. Kamal Hossain, Special
Rapporteur, of 6March 2002, UNDoc. E/CN.4/2002/43, para. 12. The Special Rapporteur’s
mandate is “ to examine the human rights situation in Afghanistan, with a view to for-
mulating proposals which could contribute to ensuring full protection of the human rights
of all residents of the country, before, during and after the withdrawal of all foreign forces”,
see UN Doc. E/RES/1984/37, para. 1.
116 Situation of Human Rights in Somalia, Report of the Special Rapporteur, Ms. Mona Rish-
mawi, of 16 January 1998, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1998/96, para. VI (2).
117 Report by the Independent Expert on the situation of human rights in Somalia, Dr. Ghanim
Alnajjar, of 14 January 2002, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2002/119.
118 Id., para. IX.
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It seems that the strongest human rights monitoring bodies, courts which
can make legally binding decisions concerning state responsibility and order
reparation, are the bodies that are least likely to apply international human-
itarian law. Special Rapporteurs on the other hand, who can only make their
views public and recommend action by the Commission on Human Rights,
a political organ, are more likely to do so.
5.6.3 Territorial application of human rights: another obstacle
A second potential obstacle to using human rights machinery to invoke state
responsibility for violations of international humanitarian law is that states
parties to human rights treaties are only obliged to secure human rights to
persons within their jurisdiction. The ECHR’s inadmissibility decision in the
Bankovic´ case illustrates that a narrow interpretation of jurisdiction can limit
the situations in which the treaty applies extraterritorially. The Court held
that Article 1 of the Convention, which states that theHigh Contracting Parties
shall secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms of
the Convention, must be considered as reflective of an essentially territorial
notion of jurisdiction, other bases of jurisdiction being exceptional and re-
quiring special justification in the particular circumstances of the case. After
reviewing its own case law, the Court concluded that it had recognized the
exercise of extra-territorial jurisdiction by a contracting state only:
when the respondent state, through the effective control of the relevant territory
and its inhabitants abroad as a consequence of military occupation or through the
consent, invitation or acquiescence of the Government of that territory, exercises
all or some of the public powers normally to be exercised by that Government.119
In the case in question this test was not met. It seems that peace support
operations could meet the test, because their mandate often includes the
exercise of some of the public powers normally to be exercised by the govern-
ment. On the other hand, there are indications in the decision that the Court
will not easily find jurisdiction in the case of peace support operations. In
particular, the Court stated that it finds:
State practice in the application of the Convention since its ratification to be indica-
tive of a lack of any apprehension on the part of the Contracting States of their
extra-territorial responsibility in contexts similar to the present case. Although there
have been a number ofmilitarymissions involving Contracting States acting extra-
119 Vlastimir and Borka Bankovic´, Živana Stojanovic´, Mirjana Stoimenovski, Dragana Joksimovic´ and
Dragan Sukovic´ v. Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary,
Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Turkey and the
United Kingdom, Decision of 12 December 2001 (Appl. No. 52207/99), para. 71.
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territorially since their ratification of the Convention (inter alia, in the Gulf, in
Bosnia and Herzegovina and in the FRY), no State has indicated a belief that its
extra-territorial actions involved an exercise of jurisdiction within the meaning of
Article 1 of the Convention by making a derogation pursuant to Article 15 of the
Convention.120
The pending case of Ilas¸cu, Les¸co, Ivant¸oc and Petrov-Popa v. Moldova and the
Russian Federation may give the Court occasion to provide additional guidance
as to the scope of the word ‘jurisdiction’.121 This case concerns an application
by a number of Moldovan nationals detained in the breakaway ‘Moldovan
Republic of Transdniestra’ in Moldova, an entity of Transdniestran separatists
that is allegedly supported by the Russian Federation. The applicants complain
that the Russian Federation shares responsibility for violation of their rights
under the European Convention caused by their unlawful detention, conviction
and abuse while in detention, on the ground that the territory of Transdniestra
was de facto under the Russian Federation’s control. The Russian Federation
argued before the Court that the Court had no jurisdiction to consider the
merits of the case in so far as the application was directed against the Russian
Federation, since the acts complained of did not comewithin the ‘jurisdiction’
of the Russian Federation within the meaning of Article 1 of the Convention.
It maintained that the Russian military presence on the territory of Moldova,
with the latter’s consent, for the purpose ofmaintaining peace in the Republic,
could not engage the Russian Federation’s responsibility. The Russian forces
in the area had “been given peacemaking duties and had prevented the conflict
fromworsening and the number of victims among the civilian population from
rising.” It argued that the Russian Federation did not de facto control the
territory of Transdniestra. In its decision on admissibility, the Court held in
respect of these arguments that the concept of ‘jurisdiction’ within the meaning
of Article 1 of the Convention is not limited to the contracting parties’ national
territory, but that responsibility can also arise when as a consequence of
military action – whether lawful or unlawful – it exercises effective control
of an area outside its national territory.122 The Court held that on the question
of whether that requirement was met in this specific case, it did not have
sufficient information to enable it to make a ruling and reserved a deter-
mination of the issue to the merits stage of the proceedings.
It is possible but not certain that other human rights monitoring bodies
could interpret the term ‘jurisdiction’ (Article 2 paragraph 1 Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights; Article 1 paragraph 1 of the American Convention on
Human Rights) broader than the European Court has done in the Bankovic´
120 Id., para. 62.
121 Ilas¸cu, Les¸co, Ivant¸oc and Petrov-Popa v. Moldova and the Russian Federation, Application No.
48787/99, Decision on Admissibility of 4 July 2001.
122 Id., at 21.
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case, whereby the European Court has arguably excluded most or all peace
support operations. In 1995 the Human Rights Committee in commenting on
the report submitted by the United States noted that it could not share the
view of the United States government that the Covenant lacks extraterritorial
reach under all circumstances.123 In two views resulting from communications
concerning the alleged abduction by Uruguay of two persons fromArgentina
and Brazil, the Human Rights Committee held that it had jurisdiction for acts
perpatrated on foreign soil.124 The Committee held that the expression ‘subject
to its jurisdiction’ refers not to the place where the violation occurred, but
rather to the relationship between the individual and the state in relation to
a violation of any of the rights set forth in the Covenant, wherever they
occurred. It stated that:
it would be the unconscionable to so interpret the responsibility under article 2
of the Covenant as to permit a State party to perpetrate violations of the Covenant
on the territory of another State, which violations it could not perpetrate on its
own territory.125
The Committee is presently drafting a General Comment on Article 2 of the
Covenant. In this regard it is reported that the draft states that the term ‘juris-
diction’ applies to anyone within the power or effective control of a state party
even if not situated within the territory of a state party, and that that principle
applies to those within the power or effective control of the forces of a state
party acting outside that state party’s territory, including a national contingent
of a state party assigned to international peace-enforcement operations or
peacekeeping.126
The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights in its report in Coard
et al v. United States determined that its jurisdiction on the basis of the Ameri-
can Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man is not limited to the territory
of the states parties. In the case in question the Commission held the United
States was responsible for violations of human rights committed by its agents
during the United States’ intervention in Grenada. The reason given by the
Commission to apply the Declaration to extraterritorial acts is also valid for
the American Convention on Human Rights:
The Commission finds it pertinent to note that, under certain circumstances, the
exercise of its jurisdiction over acts with an extraterritorial locus will not only be
123 UN Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.50 (1995), para. 19.
124 Sergio Euben Lopez Burgos v. Uruguay, Communication No. R.12/52 (6 June 1979), UN Doc.
Supp. No. 40 (A/36/40) at 176 (1981); Lilian Celiberti de Casariego v. Uruguay, Communication
No. 56/1979 (29 July 1981), UN Doc. CCPR/C/OP/1 at 92 (1984).
125 Id., para. 10.3.
126 United Nations press release, Human Rights Committee Continues Consideration of Draft
General Comment on Article 2 of the Covenant, 29 October 2002.
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consistent with but required by the norms which pertain. The fundamental rights
of the individual are proclaimed in the Americas on the basis of the principles of
equality and non-discrimination – ‘without distinction as to race, nationality, creed
or sex.’ Given that individual human rights inhere simply by virtue of a person’s
humanity, each American State is obliged to uphold the protected rights of any
person subject to its jurisdiction. While this most commonly refers to persons within
a state’s territory, it may, under given circumstances, refer to conduct with an
extraterritorial locus where the person concerned is present in the territory of one
state, but subject to the control of another state – usually through the acts of the
latter’s agents abroad. In principle, the inquiry turns not on the presumed victim’s
nationality or presence within a particular geographic area, but onwhether, under
the specific circumstances, the State observed the rights of a person subject to its
authority and control.127
5.6.4 Lack of jurisdiction over international organizations: a third obstacle
Human rights monitoring bodies are concerned mostly with states and not
with international organizations. Even if human rightsmachinery can be used
to invoke responsibility for violations of international humanitarian law, this
possibility is limited in respect of the UN and NATO. Clear examples are treaty-
basedmechanisms such as theHuman Rights Committee and the ECHRwhich
have the task of monitoring respect for the rights in a particular treaty by the
parties to that treaty. Only states can become parties to these treaties.128 Inter-
national organizations cannot appear as respondents before these bodies. The
conduct of international organizations may be scrutinized indirectly in a case
in which a troop contributing state is also responsible for its own acts or
omission in connection with an act of the organization, or possibly in a case
in which a member state is held directly responsible for the conduct of an
organization.
In such a case the theory of ‘indispensable third parties’ could be an
obstacle to the exercise of jurisdiction by the court or body in question. Accord-
ing to this theory, a court cannot exercise jurisdiction in a case where the legal
interest of a state not party to the proceedings would be affected.129 The
theory, developed in the case law of the International Court of Justice, has
127 Coard et al v.United States, Inter-American Commission onHuman Rights, CaseNo. 10.951,
Report No. 109/99, 29 September 1999, para. 37. The Commission stated the same inter-
pretation of jurisdiction ratione loci in Armando Alejandre Jr. et al v. Cuba, Case No. 11.589,
Report No. 86/99, 29 September 1999, para. 23. This case concerned the shooting down
of two airplanes by the Cuban air force in international airspace.
128 See Article 48 paragraph 1 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Article
59 of the European Convention and Article 74 of the American Convention.
129 S. Torres Bernárdez, The New Theory of “Indispensable Parties” Under the Statute of the Inter-
national Court of Justice, in K. Wellens (Ed.), International Law: Theory and Practice: Essays
in Honour of Eric Suy 737 (1998).
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also been invoked by respondent states before other courts and tribunals. In
the Monetary Gold Removed from Rome in 1943 case, the International Court of
Justice refused to exercise jurisdiction because it would have to adjudicate
upon the international responsibility of Albania. The Court stated that it can
only exercise jurisdiction over a state with its consent. Noting that Albania
had chosen not to intervene, the Court stated:
In the present case, Albania’s legal interests would not only be affected by a
decision, but would form the very subject matter of the decision. In such a case,
the Statute cannot be regarded, by implication, as authorizing proceedings to be
continued in the absence of Albania.130
This principle was also at issue before the ICJ in the East Timor case.131 In
that case, Australia objected that the application by Portugal would require
the Court to determine the rights and obligations of a third state, Indonesia,
in the absence of consent of that state. The Court emphasized that it is not
necessarily prevented from adjudicating when the judgment it is asked to give
might affect the legal interests of a state which is not a party to the case.
However, in the present case it considered that Indonesia’s rights and obliga-
tions would constitute the very subject-matter of such a judgment in the
absence of that state’s consent. For that reason, it concluded that it could not
exercise jurisdiction.132
In the Bankovic´ case, the respondent states held that the application was
inadmissible inter alia on the basis of this principle, because, they stated, the
court cannot decide themerits of the case as it would be determining the rights
on obligations of the United States, of Canada and of NATO itself, none of
which are contracting parties to the Convention. In the case in question the
European Court did not consider it necessary to examine this question. In-
cidentally, the submission that a decision by the court would determine the
rights and obligations of NATO implies that the organization is capable of
having international rights and obligations or, in other words, has international
legal personality.
Special Rapporteurs of the Commission on Human Rights are not limited
by strict procedural rules. Some Special Rapporteurs have addressed conduct
by field operations of international organizations. One example is the Inde-
pendent Expert on the Situation of Human Rights in Somalia’s call for an
investigation into the conduct of the UN in Somalia. Another example is found
in the Special Representative on the situation of human rights in Bosnia and
130 Monetary Gold Removed from Rome in 1943 (Italy v. France, United Kingdom and the United
States), 1954 ICJ Reports 32.
131 Case conderning East Timor (Portugal v. Australia), Judgment, 1995 ICJ Reports 90.
132 See for an analysis N. Sybesma-Knol, The Indispensable Parties Rule in the East Timor Case,
in E. Denters &N. Schrijver (Eds.), Reflections on International Law from the LowCountries:
In Honour of Paul de Waart 442 (1998).
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Herzegovina and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia’s 2002 report. In the
section on Kosovo the Special Representative expresses a number of human
rights concerns in relation to the United Nations Mission in Kosovo and the
Kosovo Force. He states on detention of persons by the Kosovo Force that
‘military holds’ may be incompatible with basic human rights principles and
the rule of law, and in relation to the United Nations Mission he:
remains concerned that human rights principles are not sufficiently integrated into
the process by which legislation and administrative procedures are promulgated
and implemented. There seems to be some uncertaintywithin UNMIK as towhether
its activities as a transitional government are governed by international human
rights norms.133
Human rights monitoring bodies can potentially play an important role in
the implementation of responsibility and accountability where states are
responsible for a breach of human rights by peace support operations. The
more the idea that states have a due diligence obligation to ensure respect
by an international organization for human rights and international human-
itarian law is accepted, the more likely that there will be an important role
for human rightsmonitoring bodies. Above, a number of caseswerementioned
in which human rights monitoring bodies have addressed states concerning
the conduct of troops placed at the disposal of the UN. One example was the
concern expressed by the Human Rights Committee that several years after
the alleged involvement of members of the Netherlands’ peacekeeping forces
in the events surrounding the fall of Srebrenica, the responsibility of the
persons concerned has not yet been publicly and finally determined. The
Committee considered that in respect of an event of such gravity it is of
particular importance that issues relating to the state party’s obligation to
ensure the right to life be resolved in an expeditious and comprehensive
manner.134 The factors discussed above135 may limit the role of human
rights monitoring bodies in the implementation of the responsibility and
accountability of troop contributing states.
5.7 CONCLUSION
This chapter demonstrated that there are many potential obstacles to the
invocation of international responsibility of a state or an international organiza-
133 Report of the Special Representative of the Commission on Human Rights on the Situation
of Human Rights in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, José
Cutileiro, 8 January 2002, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2002/41, paras 90, 92.
134 Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee, Netherlands, 27 August 2001,
UN Doc. CCPR/CO/72/NET.
135 See § 5.6.2 and § 5.6.3.
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tion for a violation of international humanitarian law by a peace support
operation.
Traditional international law is based on rights of redress by the state
whose nationals are victims of a violation of the law and not for the victims
themselves. Human rights law has changed this by granting individuals rights
and in some cases the possibility to invoke a violation of those rights on the
international level. International humanitarian law, influenced by human rights,
now also recognizes individual rights but so far without jettisoning the inter-
state implementation scheme. On the international level, only states can invoke
international responsibility for violations of international humanitarian law
in accordance with the basic principle in draft article 42 of the draft articles
on state responsibility. Central to the invocation of responsibility is the concept
of the ‘injured state’, the state whose individual right has been denied or
impaired by the internationally wrongful act or which has otherwise been
particularly affected by that act. The recognition that other states than the
injured state may also invoke responsibility in case of a breach of an obligation
erga omnes, widens the circle of states entitled to invoke responsibility for
breach of obligations under international humanitarian law, because these can
be considered as obligations erga omnes partes. In addition, at least certain
obligations under international humanitarian law seem to be obligations owed
to the international community as a whole. Apart from these secondary rules,
common Article 1 of the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol I as
a primary rule gives all states parties the right to invoke responsibility for
violations of the Conventions or the Protocol.
In case of a breach of international law by a peace support operation there
are many policy reasons to prevent a state from invoking the responsibility
of the responsible state or international organization, whether directly or in
diplomatic protection of a national of the state. In some cases such as in
Somalia there may not even be a government to protect its interests or those
of its nationals. In practice diplomatic protection exercised by states in the
United Nations operation in the Congo is the only example of such exercise.
Claims settlement procedures are a possibility for an individual – but often
for those of the host state only – to pursue a claim based on a violation of the
law by a peace support operation without the intermediation of his state of
nationality. But such procedures are not established in every operation. In
ONUC for example there was no claims settlement procedure, nor was there
a clear policy until recently in KFOR.
Claims settlement procedures principally use the national law of the host
state as applicable law in their procedures. It is uncertain whether a claim
could be based directly on a breach of international law, or whether this
possibility is contingent on how international law is incorporated in the
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national law of the host state.136 For this reason Wickremasinghe and
Verdirame note that while:
Such procedures would appear suitable to deal with straightforward private law
claims, for example for personal injury, death, or damage to property resulting
from road traffic accidents, it may be questioned whether the procedural regime
is also appropriate to deal with cases in which allegations of serious violations of
human rights are at issue, even though the conduct in question may be simul-
taneously characterised as falling within standard tort categories related to harm
to persons.137
Other features of specific claims settlement procedures are also potential
obstacles to a claim based on a breach of international humanitarian law, in
particular the exclusion of claims relating to ‘combat damage’ from the scope
of admissible claims. Claims settlement procedures also raise questions of
independence because of the composition of claims settlement bodies. In the
case of UN local claims review boards, which are composed exclusively of UN
staff, the Secretary-General has admitted that the organization may, rightly
or wrongly, be perceived as acting as a judge in its own case.138 Lack of any
clear formulation of the law to be applied by claims settlement bodies and
the fact that their decisions are not made public also raises concerns over the
objectivity of their rulings.
Domestic private law of the host state or the troop contributing state may
give an individual a cause of action. In such a case the action is grounded
directly on a domestic tort but implicates an international law violation. Causes
of action under domestic law however are generally accompanied by onerous
procedural and jurisdictional requirements. In many cases the international
organization or troop contributing state in question will also have immunity
from jurisdiction before a national court. In theory a national court could
interpret jurisdictional immunity restrictively, but on the sole occasion on
which the question has been raised in relation to the immunity of the United
Nations, in Manderlier v.United Nations and Belgium, a restrictive interpretation
was rejected.139
International human rights machinery can provide another forum in which
to invoke international responsibility for violations of international human-
itarian law by a peace support operation. Of special interest are independent
judicial or quasi-judicial bodies before which individuals can invoke inter-
national responsibility such as the European Court ofHumanRights, the Inter-
136 A senior United Nations official interviewed by the author stated that local claims review
boards have never dealt with violations of international humanitarian law. Interview on
17 September 2002.
137 C. Wickremasinghe & G. Verdirame, supra note 53, at 483.
138 UN Doc. A/51/903 of 21 May 1997, para. 10.
139 See C. Wickremasinghe & G. Verdirame, supra note 53, at 475-478.
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American Court of Human Rights and the United Nations Human Rights
Commission.
It may be questioned whether such procedures are effective in the case
of an alleged violation of international humanitarian law by a peace support
operation. Exercise of subject-matter jurisdiction by these bodies over breaches
of international humanitarian law is contested by states on the ground that
they have not consented to such subject-matter jurisdiction, as illustrated by
the United States’ response to a request for provisional measures by the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights with respect to persons held in
Guantanamo Bay.140
Another potential obstacle to the effectiveness of human rights bodies is
that states parties to human rights treaties are only obliged to secure human
rights to persons within their jurisdiction. A restrictive interpretation of which
persons fall under the jurisdiction of a state such as the interpretation by the
European Court of Human Rights in the Bankovic´ case may exclude victims
of human rights violations by peace support operations from the protection
of human rights treaties. Finally, the jurisdiction of judicial or quasi-judicial
human rights monitoring bodies does not extend to international organizations.
In other words, there are not many effective possibilities for invoking the
responsibility of a state or an international organization for a breach of inter-
national humanitarian law by a peace support operation. In particular, the
invocation of responsibility of an international organization is constrained.
This situation is patently at odds with the present discourse on the account-
ability of international organizations. It may be recalled that international
responsibility is a component of accountability. Accountability, as well as
responsibility as a component of the former, relate to both primary rules
governing the conduct of organizations and secondary rules to enable those
potentially affected in their interests to means of redress and remedies.141
As Wellens states, the “efficacy of any accountability regime for international
organisations depends to a large extent, if not entirely, on the nature of the
remedies afforded.”142
The system of remedies is particularly weak in respect of the rights of
individuals. As stated above, accountability is increasingly considered from
the perspective of individuals. In the case of international humanitarian law
the position of individuals is reinforced by the fact that they can be considered
to enjoy rights in their own name under international law. These substantive
rights are however not matched by procedural rights, despite claims that there
is a ‘right to a remedy’ under human rights law and international humanitarian
140 41 ILM 1015 (2002).
141 Second Report of the International Law Association Committee on Accountability of
International Organisations 2 (2000).
142 K. Wellens, supra note 1, at 15.
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law. In respect of international humanitarian law, this is confirmed by a body
of domestic case law holding that there is no right of individual action.143
Whether or not there is a legal obligation to provide an effective remedy
to individuals for breaches of international humanitarian law by peace support
operations, there is an undeniable practical need. The goodwill of the local
population in the host state and of the population of the troop contributing
states is crucial for the accomplishment of the mandate of a peace support
operation. Implementation of accountability and responsibility can be an
important contributing factor in preserving that goodwill. A UN report on
lessons learned from peacekeeping operations states that:
support of the local population is essential to the success of a peacekeeping opera-
tion. Lack of local support not only hinders the operation in the implementation
of its mandate and the conduct of daily activities, but can also pose a physical
danger to the mission’s personnel.144
If the local population considers a peace support operation as not being
accountable there is a grave risk that their support will be lost. The local
population will not fail to see the contradiction between the mandate of peace
support operations, which often contains an element of fostering a culture of
accountability in the host state, and lack of accountability of the operations
themselves. Wilde calls this a ‘representational problem’ that risks creating
a perception that accountability is for ‘us’ the local people, not ‘them’ the
international officials.145 Or, as a United Nations report on the Operation
in Somalia states, “The United Nations was perceived by many in Somalia
to be ‘above the law’, which undercut its efforts to promote human rights”.146
143 See § 5.5.2.
144 United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Multidisciplinary Peacekeeping;
Lessons from Recent Experience, para. O.
145 R. Wilde, Accountability and International Actors in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and East
Timor, 7 ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law 455 (2001), at 459.
146 United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, The Comprehensive Report on
Lessons Learned fromUnitedNations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM), April 1992 –March
1995, para. 57.
6 Proposals for new mechanisms for invoking
accountability
6.1 INTRODUCTION
There is a need to improve themechanisms for implementing the accountability
of both troop contributing states, and international organizations, especially
for violations of international humanitarian law by peace support operations.
First, the prevailing accountability discourse requires that organizations
are accountable to any group or individual who is affected by the activities
of the organization. Deploying a peace support operation is an activity that
has the potential to directly affect many individuals in the host state. Inter-
national organizations cannot and should not isolate themselves from this
discourse.
Secondly, accountability contributes to the credibility and accomplishment
of peace support operation mandates by preserving the cooperation of the
local population. Where accountability is not sufficiently guaranteed, the
activities of international organizations will be affected as there is increased
resistance to international organizations taking action without the possibility
for those who experience the consequences to hold them accountable for such
action. The credibility of peace support operations is compromised if they do
not practice what they preach.
In respect of breaches of international humanitarian law the responsibility
component of accountability plays an important role. Individuals have certain
rights under international humanitarian law, and states and international
organizations have corresponding obligations. Theremay be a legal obligation
for states and international organizations to provide mechanisms of redress,1
but in any case the practical need discussed previously also operates on this
level. The Security Council cannot for example credibly discuss ways in which
it can improve the legal protection of civilians in armed conflict while there
are hardly any possibilities to hold the organization responsible when it
breaches international humanitarian law.
Below, the establishment of effective mechanisms to ensure the account-
ability of states and international organizations for breaches of international
humanitarian law by peace support operations is proposed. A distinction is
made between UN and NATO operations. A distinction is also made between
1 See § 5.7.
304 Proposals for new mechanisms for invoking accountability
mechanisms to implement responsibility and mechanisms to implement a
broader notion of accountability. The latter distinction is arbitrary to some
extent because the components of accountability are “interrelated andmutually
supportive”.2 The distinction is nevertheless useful because it allows making
use of existing mechanisms and expanding on them. This is likely to be more
acceptable to states and international organizations than creating entirely new
mechanisms.
6.2 A MECHANISM TO IMPLEMENT THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE UNITED
NATIONS
In its 1971 resolution on the application of humanitarian rules of armed conflict
to UN forces, the IDI stressed the need for a complaints procedure for indi-
viduals injured by a breach of those rules. Article 8 of the resolution states
that it is:
desirable that claims presented by persons thus injured be submitted to bodies
composed of independent and impartial persons. Such bodies should be designated
or set up either by the regulations issued by the United Nations or by the agree-
ments concluded by the Organization with the states which put contingents at its
disposal and, possibly, with any other interested State.3
The standing claims commission provided for in Article 51 of theModel Status
of Forces Agreement does not meet the criteria laid down by the IDI and in
any case it has never been established in practice. However, it is an appropriate
starting point for harnessing a mechanism that does. Article 51 provides for
the establishment of a standing claims commission as a mechanism for the
settlement of claims of a private law character to which the UN operation or
any member thereof is a party and over which the local courts have no juris-
diction because of the immunity of the organization or its members. The
commission is to be composed of threemembers: one member to be appointed
by the UN Secretary-General, another by the government of the host state and
a chairman jointly by the Secretary-General and the government. If no agree-
ment is reached as to the chairman, the President of the International Court
of Justice may, at the request of either party, appoint the chairman. The article
also provides for the competence of the commission to determine its own
procedure and the legally binding nature of its awards.
2 First Report of the International Law Association Committee on Acountability of Inter-
national Organizations 17 (1998).
3 Conditions of Application ofHumanitarian Rules of ArmedConflict toHostilities inwhich
United Nations Forces May be Engaged, 54 Annuaire de l’Institut de Droit International
465 (1971-II).
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Several modifications to the claims commission are required to make it
an effective mechanism for implementing responsibility for violations of
international humanitarian law by a peace support operation. The reference
in Article 51 to a ‘standing’ claims commission does not appropriately describe
the commission. The article envisages the establishment of a claims commission
for each peace support operation and not a real standing commission. A real
standing or central claims commission should be established that can receive
claims against all peace support operations.4 This would ensure that the
establishment of a claims commission does not depend on the conclusion of
a status of forces agreement. Individual victims should not be deprived of
the possibility to submit claims because it is not possible to conclude an
agreement or because there is no government to represent them. The
permanent character of the institutionwould alsomake it possible to preserve
gained expertise. If the claims commission becomes a permanent institution,
the procedure for appointment ofmembers in Article 51 can no longer be used.
Another procedure will have to devised that guarantees the independence
of the commission. The need for independence follows from the principle that
justice should not only be done but also be seen to be done. Hence, it would
be wise policy to involve independent persons and not to serve as judge in
its own case. The UN Secretary-General has underlined the applicability of
this principle to claims settlement in peace support operations.5
The claims commission in Article 51 only has jurisdiction over claims of
a private law character. A claim based on a violation of international human-
itarian law can only be made if the conduct in question can be simultaneously
characterized as falling within standard tort categories. This is not an ap-
propriate procedural regime for claims based on violations of international
humanitarian law.6 Themandate of the permanent claims commission should
be enlarged to expressly include violations of international humanitarian law.
In practice, local claims review boards exclude compensation for claims
that result from ‘operational necessity’. ‘Operational necessity’ is defined as
where damage results from necessary actions taken by a peacekeeping force
in the course of carrying out its operations in pursuance of its mandates.7 The
Secretary-General has proposed to include this ground for exemption in Article
4 The ‘Commissie van Advies inzake Volkenrechtelijke Vraagstukken’ (CAVV) recommended
the establishment of such a central claims commission . Advies Nr. 13, 14 februari 2002,
at 19.
5 UN Doc. A/51/903 of 21 May 1997, para. 10.
6 Compare C. Wickremasinghe & G. Verdirame, Responsibility and Liability for Violations of
Human Rights in the Course of UN Field Operations, in C. Scott (Ed.), Torture as Tort: Com-
parative Perspectives on the Development of Transnational Human Rights Litigation 465
(2001), at 483 (stating that it may be questioned whether the procedural regime of private
law claims is appropriate to deal with cases in which allegations of serious violations of
human rights are in issue).
7 UN Doc. A/51/389 of 20 September 1996, para. 13.
306 Proposals for new mechanisms for invoking accountability
51 of the Model Status-of-Forces Agreement.8 This proposal is undesirable
for several reasons.9 International humanitarian law does not recognize opera-
tional necessity as a circumstance precluding wrongfulness. It does contain
the concept of ‘military necessity’, which is however not a circumstance pre-
cluding wrongfulness. Kalshoven and Zegveld state that “a given rule can
only be set aside on grounds of military necessity when it expressly so per-
mits.”10 Though operational necessity can only be invoked in case of claims
for the ordinary operation of the force, as opposed to claims for combat-related
damage, violations of the law of occupation could fall in the first category.
There also seems to be lack of clarity concerning the concept of ‘operational
necessity’ which could lead to its being applied in situations in which inter-
national humanitarian law applies. It may be noted that thewording proposed
by the Secretary-General to incorporate the principle of operational necessity
in Article 51 does not distinguish between claims for the ordinary functioning
of an operation and claims for combat-related activities.11
The permanent claims commission should have investigative capacities.
The Secretary-General has proposed the establishment of ad hoc fact-finding
commissions, as necessary, to examine reports on alleged breaches of inter-
national humanitarian law and human rights law committed by members of
UN forces.12 Giving the permanent claims commission an investigative branch
would have a number of advantages over that proposal. It would make it
possible to start an investigation immediately after an allegation has been
made. It would also prevent political considerations from influencing the
establishment, work or findings of an ad hoc committee.
The permanent claims commission should also have expansive remedial
powers. The claims commission referred to in Article 51 can only award
compensation, but sometimes reparation of the wrongmay require other forms
of reparation, for example guarantees of non-repetition or an apology, instead
of, or in addition to, compensation.
The permanent claims commission should have jurisdiction over the UN
as well as troop contributing states. The legal basis for jurisdiction over troop
contributing states could be a provision in the participating state agreement
between the UN and the troop contributing states. Submitting to the jurisdiction
of the permanent claims commission would provide a mechanism for imple-
8 Id., para. 15.
9 See also J. Prescott, Claims, in D. Fleck (Ed.), The Handbook of the Law of Visiting Forces
159 (2001), at 173.
10 F. Kalshoven & L. Zegveld, Constraints on the Waging of War 37 (2001). On the principle
of military necessity see H. McCoubrey, The Nature of the Modern Doctrine of Military
Necessity, 30 Military Law and Law of War Review 215 (1991).
11 Supra note 7, para. 15.
12 UN Doc. S/1999/957 of 8 September 1999, para 61.
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mentation of responsibility that would be available to victims, unlike in most
cases the national courts of troop contributing states at present. It would also
provide a mechanism that meets minimum standards of due process.
6.3 A MECHANISM TO IMPLEMENT THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE NORTH
ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION
In a similar vein, NATO should also establish a permanent claims commission.
Themember states of the organization and the international secretariat, in the
ad hoc working group of legal experts, are presently engaged in formulating
a general ‘out-of-area’ claims policy. The policy is intended as guidance for
the establishment of claims settlement procedures in future operations. These
discussions offer a unique opportunity for the creation of a permanent claims
commission to implement the responsibility of the organization itself. It seems
however that this is not the direction in which the discussions are moving.
The point of departure taken by the working group is the claims policies and
procedures established in SFOR and KFOR. As discussed, these policies and
procedures do not reflect the responsibility of the organization as the legal
person that exercises effective control over the operations because they make
settling claims primarily a function of troop contributing states, even though
the conduct of personnel acting under the direction and control of NATO is
attributable to the organization. It may be that one reasonwhy the organization
is not in favor of a system such as that of the UN is budgetary.13 However,
this ought not be problematic since member states have an obligation to the
organization of paying additional contributions in order to enable the organiza-
tion to meet its obligations toward third parties.14
The establishment of a permanent claims commission by NATOwould avoid
the need for complicated negotiations at the beginning of each peace support
operation concerning a claims settlement mechanism. It would provide legal
certainty for residents of the host state and it would ensure that a claims
settlement mechanism exists from the deployment of the operation.
Existing claims mechanisms in NATO peace support operations have juris-
diction over claims of a private law character. The jurisdiction of the permanent
claims commission should expressly include violations of international human-
itarian law. Existing claims procedures expressly disallow claims for damage
arising from ‘combat damage’ or ‘combat related activities’. Article VI, para-
graph 9, of Annex 1A to the Dayton Agreement for example states that “The
13 Interview with an official in the legal department of the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, 31 January 2003.
14 See H. Schermers, Liability of International Organizations, 1 Leiden Journal of International
Law 3 (1988).
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IFOR and its personnel shall not be liable for any damages to civilian or govern-
ment property caused by combat or combat related activities.”
In the context of claims settlement for IFOR this kind of damage has also
been referred to as ‘operational necessity’.15 This demonstrates the confusion
that can arise concerning the distinction between ordinary operations of a force
and combat activities. It should be made clear that a permanent claims com-
mission could receive claims based on alleged violations of international
humanitarian law. Legally, absolution from responsibility incurred in respect
of grave breaches of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol
I is not allowed.16 As a matter of policy there should also be no absolution
from responsibility for other violations.
The permanent claims commission should be an independent institution.
A procedure will have to be devised to ensure this independence.
It should have jurisdiction over NATO as well as the troop contributing
states. The legal basis for jurisdiction over troop contributing states could be
a provision in the participating state agreement between the organization and
the troop contributing states. Because the organization does not conclude
participating state agreementswithmember states concerning their participa-
tion in peace support operations, a decision by the NACwould be an alternative
way for member states to accept the jurisdiction of the claims commission.
Existing claims settlement procedures provide only for claims of nationals
of the host state. There is no valid reason to continue such a discriminatory
practice in relation to the permanent claims commission. The commission
should be able to receive claims from all victims of violations of international
humanitarian law by peace support operations even if they are not nationals
of the host state.17
The permanent claims commission should have extensive remedial powers.
It should be able to impose other forms of reparation than compensationwhere
necessary.
If the organization and its member states do not adopt the above proposal
or a similar proposal, they should consider dispensing with the principle that
combat-related claims are inadmissible in claims settlement procedures.
Legally, absolution from responsibility toward the host state incurred in respect
of grave breaches of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol
I is not allowed.18 As a matter of policy there should also be no absolution
15 Private information of the author.
16 Article 51,52,131 and 148 respectively of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and Article 85 (1)
of Additional Protocol I.
17 Compare B. Amrallah, The International Responsibility of the United Nations for Activities Carried
out by U.N. Peace-Keeping Forces, 32 Revue Egyptienne de Droit International 57 (1976), at
80.
18 Article 51,52,131 and 148 respectively of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and Article 85 (1)
of the first Additional Protocol.
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from responsibility for other violations, in respect of the host state as well as
individuals harmed by such violations.
6.4 A MECHANISM TO ENSURE THE ACCOUNTABILITY OF PEACE SUPPORT
OPERATIONS
6.4.1 Previous proposals
In addition to a mechanism for implementing responsibility there is also a
need for a mechanism to implement accountability in a broader sense. In 1994
Childers and Urquhart proposed the establishment of an ombudsman-type
mechanism for this purpose:
The need for an ombudsman-type function is also increasingly obvious regarding
UN peace and security operations. The greater the UN’s involvement in peace-
enforcement and other operations that may employ force, the more vital it becomes
to have transparent and independent human rights supervision. This is needed
as much to protect the organization from false or inflated charges of human rights
abuse as to ensure that if these occur they are properly investigated and reported.
A recent example of this need was the alleged actions and behavior involving
civilians by UNOSOM II forces in Mogadishu, Somalia.19
More recently other writers have launched similar calls for the establishment
of accountability mechanisms. One such proposal calls for the establishment
of an international humanitarian ombudsperson, whowould handle allegations
of abuse by peacekeeping staff and peacekeeping missions at the global level
as well as independent mission-based ombudsperson offices.20
The need to provide an accountability mechanism has recently started to
receive recognition by the UN itself. A report by the Department of Peace-
keeping Operations evaluating UNOSOM states that:
In UNOSOM, no independent oversight existed which could serve as an ombudsman
to consider grievances registered by the local population against the UnitedNations.
Without such amechanism, the UnitedNationswas perceived bymany in Somalia
to be “above the law”, which undercut its efforts to promote human rights … It
19 E. Childers & B. Urquhart, Renewing the United Nations System 111 (1994).
20 F. Rawski, To Waive or Not to Waive: Immunity and Acountability in U.N. Peacekeeping Opera-
tions, 18 Connecticut Journal of International Law 103 (2002), at 129-130. See also C.
Bongiorno, A Culture of Impunity: Applying International Human Rights Law to the United
Nations in East Timor, 33 Columbia Human Rights Law review 623 (2002), at 648-688; and
B. Bedont, International Criminal Justice: Implications for Peacekeeping, Report for the
Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (2001).
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was suggested that consideration should be given to appointing an ombudsman
to some peacekeeping operations.21
In 1999, the UN Secretary-General adopted this proposal. In his first report
to the Security Council on the protection of civilians in armed conflict hemade
clear that although normally the activities of peace support operations con-
tribute to the protection of civilians in armed conflict, abuses do occur.22 He
underlined that in order to protect civilians in armed conflict, as well as to
protect the legitimacy and respect of peacekeeping operations and their per-
sonnel, the organization needs to address cases in which peacekeepers are
involved in unacceptable behavior, including abuses of the civilian population.
For this purpose the Secretary-General recommended that the Security Council:
Support a public ‘ombudsman’ with all peacekeeping operations to deal with
complaints from the general public about the behavior of United Nations peace-
keepers and establish an ad hoc fact-finding commission, as necessary, to examine
reports on alleged breaches of international humanitarian and human rights law
committed by members of United Nations forces.23
The recommendation has not been receivedwithmuch enthusiasm bymembers
of the Security Council. The Council discussed the Secretary-General’s report
in open meetings in September 1999 and April 2000.24 At these meetings no
delegation spoke in favor of the recommendation and one delegation expressly
stated that it was undesirable because of the financial implications it could
have.25
Nevertheless, an ombudsperson institution has been established in the
United Nations Mission in Kosovo. This institution, with limited powers, is
discussed below. At this point it is sufficient to note that the particular nature
of the United Nations Operation in Kosovo, which acts as a surrogate govern-
ment, seems to have been an important impetus for the establishment of the
ombudsperson institution. These particular characteristics may not be re-
produced in other, future, operations
In contrast to the UN, NATO does not (yet) seem to be convinced of the need
for accountability in its peace support operations. There have been no propo-
sals for accountability mechanisms in the organization. In Kosovo the com-
21 The Comprehensive Report on Lessons Learned fromUnited Nations Operation in Somalia
(UNOSOM), para. 57.
22 Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council on the Protection of Civilians in
Armed Conflict of 8 September 1999, UN Doc. S/1999/957, para. 61.
23 Id.
24 See Provisional Verbatim record of the 4046th Meeting of the Security Council, 16-17
September 1999, UN Doc. S/PV.4046; Provisional Verbatim Record of the 4130th Meeting
of the Security Council, 19 April 2000, UN Doc. S/PV.4130.
25 Id.
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mander of KFOR has not made arrangements for the exercise of jurisdiction
by the United Nations-established ombudsman over the Force.
6.4.2 The ombudsperson concept26
It may be noted that all the above-mentioned proposals refer to an ombuds-
person or an ombudsperson-type institution. This is in conformity with the
assertion that is frequently made that an ombudsperson is an appropriate
mechanism to ensure accountability. This assertion implies that the character-
istics of an ombudsperson correspond to the elements makingmonitoring and
scrutiny of an international organization possible, such as transparency, in-
cluding access to information, responsiveness and reporting. In order to
determine whether this assertion is warranted, a closer analysis of the ombuds-
person concept is required.
The ombudsman concept developed as amechanism to ensure accountabil-
ity of (parts of) national governments. The first ombudsman was established
in Sweden in 1809. The institution was the result of a power struggle between
parliament and the executive. In 1809 parliament gained the upper hand and
an ombudsman was created in the new constitution to control the executive
power and its administration on behalf of parliament. The word ‘ombudsman’
in Swedish means ‘representative, agent, delegate’. The ombudsman was an
agent of parliament to control the executive. The present commonly understood
function of the ombudsman, to receive complaints from the public, was at that
time not a major part of his work but developed over time.27 The present
legal basis for the Swedish ombudsman is found in Article 6 of Chapter 12
of the Instrument of Government or constitution. This article states that the
parliament (Riksdag):
Shall elect one or more Ombudsmen to supervise in accordance with the in-
structions laid down by the Riksdag the application in public service of laws and
other statutes.
The instructions referred to are found in the Act with Instructions for the
Parliamentary Ombudsmen of 13November 1986.28 The Swedish ombudsman
has largely been the model on which other ombudsperson institutions have
been based. In 1919 Finland also created an ombudsman, followed byDenmark
in 1954. Since that timemany other countries have established an ombudsman.
26 A number of institutions use the term ‘ombudsman’, while others use the term ‘ombuds-
person’. In the following, the terms will be used interchangeably.
27 T. Bull, The Original Ombudsman: Blueprint in Need of Revision or a Concept with More to Offer?,
6 European Public Law 334 (2000), at 335.
28 Lag [1986:765] med instruktion för Riksdagens ombudsmän of 13 November 1986.
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This development is related to the proliferation of large government bureau-
cracies and the perceived need for an instrument of accountability. Most of
the institutions established after 1954 follow the model of the Swedish and
Danish institution. Thismodel has become the archetypal or ‘classical’ ombuds-
man. Gottehrer and Hostina discuss the characteristics of such a classical
ombudsman. They state that the irreducible characteristics are independence,
impartiality and fairness, credibility of the review process and confidential-
ity.29 In practice, these requirements have the following consequences. The
ombudsman is usually appointed by the legislative power to investigate the
activities of the executive power. The institution is established in the constitu-
tion or a law to make it more difficult to challenge the legal basis of the office,
because constitutions are often difficult to amend. The ombudsperson is not
appointed by the organizations or arm of government he reviews. This is why
he is almost always appointed by the legislative power and why he functions
on behalf of that power. The ombudsman has a fixed, long term of office and
may be reappointed. He can be removed only on specific grounds. This guaran-
tees that he will not be removed for political reasons or because the results
of his investigations have offended those in political power. The ombudsperson
must to a certain extent also be financially independent.
To be impartial and fair and to be seen to avoid even the appearance of
partiality the ombudsmanmust be highly qualified so that hewill be respected
among different groups. Complaints can be directed to the ombudsmanwith-
out paying a fee so that there is no discrimination. The ombudsman has the
right to criticize officials and make recommendations to resolve specific situ-
ations or prevent their reoccurrence, and he is immune from liability and
criminal prosecution for acts performed in his official capacity. The classical
ombudsman does not have the power to make binding decisions. He relies
on powers of persuasion, reason and criticism.
The ombudsman usually has the power to initiate an investigation on the
basis of a complaint he has received, or on his own initiative. The authority
to initiate an investigation allows him to act when information warranting
an investigation comes to his attention in the absence of a willing complainant.
The classical ombudsman has a number of powers to make an investigation
effective. These usually include access to records and premises and the power
to compel individuals to testify or produce evidence. The standards used by
the ombudsman to conduct a review are usually stated broadly and in terms
of maladministration. Fairness, in the sense of broader notions of justice than
mere compliance with relevant statutory law, is also an important component
of the standards under which complaints are investigated. The ombudsman
29 D. Gottehrer & M. Hostina, Essential Characteristics of a Classical Ombudsman, Annex
1 to Ombudsman and Human Rights Protection Institutions in OSCE Participating States,
OSCE Human Dimension Implementation Meeting October 1998, Background paper.
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should also be accountable, for example through an obligation to report annually.
The classical ombudsman may determine that certain information, in
particular the identity of a complainant, should remain confidential. Officials
who are the subject of a complaint may also warrant protection during the
process of investigation. As stated, the standard of review of the ombudsman
is traditionally whether there has been a case of maladministration. The precise
wording of the standard varies. The mission of the Greek ombudsman for
example is the protection of citizen’s rights, opposition to maladministration
and observance of legality,30 the ombudsman in the Netherlands “shall deter-
minewhether or not the administrative authority acted properly in thematter
under investigation,”31 and the Norwegian ombudsman’s task is to “endeav-
our to ensure that injustice is not committed against the individual citizen by
the public administration.”32 Though the wording varies, the standard in all
these cases is whether there has been a violation of law or administrative rules
and principles.
The ombudsman traditionally does not have an express human rights or
international humanitarian law mandate. In the past decades, however, he
has increasingly been considered as an instrument for the protection of rights
of the individual. This development has accompanied a general trend in
international institutions which recognizes the importance of national human
rights institutions.33 One important step in this development was a 1991 UN
international workshop on national institutions for the promotion and pro-
tection of human rights. The workshop resulted in the drafting of guiding
principles referred to as the ‘Paris principles’ which were adopted by the
General Assembly in 1993 and which reaffirm the importance of developing,
in accordance with national legislation, effective national institutions for the
promotion and protection of human rights.34 Other international organizations
have also stressed the role of the ombudsman as a tool for the promotion and
protection of human rights. The Committee of Ministers of the Council of
Europe adopted a recommendation to member states in 1985 to consider the
possibility of appointing an ombudsman and to consider empowering the
ombudsman, where this is not already the case, to give particular consideration
30 Law No. 2477 signed by the President on 17 April 1997 The Ombudsman and the Public
Administration Inspectors-Controllers Body, Art. 1.
31 National Ombudsman Act, Act of 4 February 1981 (Bulletin of Acts and Decrees 1981, 35),
most recently amended by Act of Parliament of 12 May 1999 (Bulletin of Acts and Decrees
1999, 214), Art. 26.
32 Act concerning the Storting’s Ombudsman for Public Administration of 22 June 1962 No.
8, amended by Acts of 22 March 1968 No 1, 8 February 1980 No. 1, 19 December 1980 No.
63, 6 September 1991 No. 72 , 11 June 1993 No. 85 and 15 March 1996 No. 13, Art. 3.
33 See L. Reif, Building Democratic Institutions: The Role of National Human Rights Institutions
in GoodGovernance andHumanRights Protection, 13HarvardHumanRights Journal 1 (2000).
34 UN Doc. A/RES/48/134 of 20 December 1993, para. 2.
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to the human rights matters under his scrutiny.35 In 1997 the Committee of
Ministers recommended that the governments of member states consider the
possibility of establishing effective national human rights institutions, in
particular human rights commissions or ombudsmen.36 The OSCE has also
supported the importance of the ombudsman as a way to promote and protect
human rights. The member states of the CSCE, the forerunner of the OSCE,
agreed at the Second Meeting on the Human Dimension of the CSCE to “facil-
itate the establishment and strengthening of independent national institutions
in the area of human rights and the rule of law.”37 Since that time, support
for national human rights institutions, expressly including the ombudsman,
has been part of the human dimension.38
As a result of this development, human rights protection has become a
major focus of national ombudsmen. Many pre-existing ombudsmen have
started to put a stronger emphasis on human rights and interpret theirmandate
accordingly.39Many of themore recently established ombudsman institutions
have been given an express human rights mandate. Especially in Latin
America, where the creation of an ombudsman was considered an important
mechanism to prevent the recurrence of human rights violations such as those
pervasive on that continent in the 1970s and 1980s. For example, in 1991
Colombia established the ‘Defensor del Pueblo’, El Salvador a ‘Procurador
para la Defensa de los Derechos Humanos’ in 1992 and Argentina a ‘Defensor
del Pueblo’ in 1993. These ombudsperson institutions were based to a large
extent on the model of the Spanish and Portugese ombudsmen.40 The Spanish
ombudsman (Defensor del Pueblo) inter alia protects the human rights con-
tained in the constitution for which purpose he may supervise the activity
of the administration. These rights include civil and political rights, economic,
social and cultural rights as well as certain collective rights.
Another region in which many ombudsmen have been established with
a human rights mandate is Central and Eastern Europe. Ombudsman institu-
tions have been established in Poland, Hungary, Croatia, Bosnia andHerzego-
35 Recommendation No. R (85) 13 of the Committee of Ministers to member states on the
institution of the ombudsman, 23 September 1985.
36 Recommendation No. R (97) 14 of the Committee of Ministers to member states on the
establishment of independent national institutions for the promotion and protection of
human rights of 30 September 1997, para. a; see generally Council of Europe Directorate
of Human Rights, Non-judicial means for the protection of human rights at the national
level, May 1998, H/INF (98) 3.
37 Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the
CSCE, 5 June – 29 July 1990, para. 27.
38 See e.g. Consolidated Summary, Human Dimension Implementation Meeting, Warsaw,
9-19 September 2002, IV.
39 See e.g.M. Oosting, The National Ombudsman of the Netherlands and Human Rights, 12 Inter-
national Ombudsman Journal 1 (1994).
40 F. Alvarez de Miranda y Torres, Human Rights and their Functioning in the Institutional
Strengthening of the Ombudsman, 2 International Ombudsman Yearbook 146 (1998).
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vina and Slovenia. These have specific human rightsmandates, often combined
with more traditional functions. The Human Rights Ombudsman of Slovenia
for example is established to “protect human rights and fundamental freedoms
against the state bodies, local self-government bodies, and bodies entrusted
with public authorities”,41 but while intervening he may also invoke “the
principles of equity and good administration.”42 The Polish Commissioner
for Civil Rights Protection also has an express human rights mandate. Article
208 of the Polish Constitution states that he “shall safeguard the freedoms and
rights of persons and citizens specified in the Constitution and other normative
acts.”43
6.4.3 The ombudsman concept and international humanitarian law
The development of the ombudsman as a national human rights institution
demonstrates that it is generally considered as an appropriate mechanism to
ensure accountability for the violation of individual rights. Does this also
include rights under international humanitarian law? The author is not aware
of any ombudsman mandate that expressly includes the protection of inter-
national humanitarian law. On the other hand, at least two ombudsman do
apply that branch of law as a standard of review in their investigations.
One is the Peruvian ombudsman (‘Defensor del Pueblo’). He has amandate
to defend the constitutional and fundamental rights of the individual and
society, and to supervise the fulfillment of the obligations of the public admin-
istration and the public service.44 He has carried out a number of investiga-
tions into persons injured by anti-personnel landmines. He has also published
a general report on anti-personnel landmines. The discussion in this report
is based on the one hand on the consideration that accidents caused by land-
mines are a violation of the right to life and the right to physical integrity,
and on the other hand on the obligations of the state of Peru under an instru-
ment of international humanitarian law, the Ottawa Convention.45 In his first
annual report of 1998 the ombudsman also condemned the hostage taking
in the Japanese Ambassador’s residence in Lima in 1996 as a violation of
41 Law on the Ombudsman, Official Journal of the Republic of Slovenia, No. 71/1993, Art. 1.
42 Id., Art. 3.
43 See generally E. Letowska, The PolishOmbudsman (The Commissioner for the Protection of Civil
Rights), 39 International & Comparative Law Quarterly 206 (1990).
44 Organic Law of the Ombudsman institution, Law No. 26520 of 8 August 1995, Art. 1 (A
la Defensoría del Pueblo cuyo titular es el Defensor del Pueblo le corresponde defender
los derechos constitucionales y fundamentales de la persona y de la comunidad; y supervisar
el cumplimiento de los deberes de la administración pública y la prestación de los servicios
públicos).
45 Ombudsman Report 35 (Informe Defensorial 35: El Problema de las Minas Antipersonales
dentro del Territorio Nacional).
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international humanitarian law.46 In short, the Peruvian ombudsman applies
international humanitarian law, but only to a limited extent.
The Colombian ombudsman (‘Defensor del Pueblo’) makes much more
systematic reference to international humanitarian law. The Colombian Con-
stitution states that themandate of the ombudsman is to ensure the promotion,
protection and dissemination of human rights.47 In the Colombian context,
human rights is understood as including international humanitarian law. In
a 1995 decision concerning the constitutionality of Additional Protocol II to
theGenevaConventions, the Constitutional Tribunal decided that international
humanitarian law is part of a normative corpus of human rights, because
similar to human rights in the strict sense it is composed of rules of ius cogens
the main purpose of which is to protect the dignity of the human person.48
It determined that the 1949 Geneva Conventions and the 1977 Additional
Protocols are among those conventions that take precedence over other rules
of domestic law on the basis of Article 93 of the Constitution, and that they
are part of a ‘constitutional bloc’ of rules that are integrated in the Constitution
without formally appearing in that document.49 This provides a solid legal
basis for the ombudsman to use international humanitarian law as a standard
of review in his investigations, and the ombudsman regularly makes use of
46 First Annual Report to Congress, May 1998 (Primer Informe del Defensor del Pueblo al
Congreso) at 94. For an account of the Hostage crisis see R. Panjabi, Terror at the Emperor’s
Birthday Party: An Analysis of the Hostage-Taking Incident at the Japanese Embassy in Lima,
Peru,16 Dickinson Journal of International Law 1 (1997).
47 Article 282 of the Constitution.
El Defensor del Pueblo velará por la promoción, el ejercicio y la divulgación de los derechos
humanos, para lo cual ejercerá las siguientes funciones:
1. Orientar e instruír a los habitantes del territorio nacional y a los colombianos en el
exterior en el ejercicio y defensa de sus derechos ante las autoridades competentes
o entidades de carácter privado.
2. Divulgar los derechos humanos y recomendar las políticas para su enseñanza.
3. Invocar el derecho de habeas corpus e interponer las acciones de tutela, sin perjuicio
del derecho que asiste a los interesados.
4. Organizar y dirigir la defensoría pública en los términos que señale la ley.
5. Interponer acciones populares en asuntos relacionados con su compentencia.
6. Presentar proyectos de ley sobre materias relativas a su competencia.
7. Rendir informes al Congreso sobre el cumplimiento de sus funciones.
8. Las demás que determine la ley.
48 Decision No. C-225/95 of 18 May 1995, para. 11 (“Para ello conviene tener en cuenta que
estos convenios hacen parte, en sentido genérico, del corpus normativo de los derechos
humanos, puesto que, tanto los tratados de derechos humanos en sentido estricto como
los convenios de derecho humanitario son normas de ius cogens que buscan, ante todo,
proteger la dignidad de la persona humana.”) See also F. Kalshoven, A Colombian View
on Protocol II, 1 Yearbook of International Humanitarian 262 (1998).
49 Decision No. C-225/95 of 18 May 1995, para. 12 (“el bloque de constitucionalidad está
compuesto por aquellas normas y principios que, sin aparecer formalmente en el articulado
del texto constitucional, son utilizados como parámetros del control de constitucionalidad
de las leyes, por cuanto han sido normativamente integrados a la Constitución, por diversas
vías y por mandato de la propia Constitución.”)
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this standard. Investigations into specific cases result in the adoption of resolu-
tions by the ombudsman in which he presents his conclusions and recom-
mendations. The ombudsman stated in his 2001 annual report that he will use
these resolutions to condemn serious violations of international humanitarian
law committed in non-international armed conflict.50 In practice, he has
adopted a number of resolutions that are exclusively concerned with violations
of international humanitarian law. For example, in a resolution of 8 April 2002
the ombudsman discusses a case inwhich theAutodefensasUnidas de Colom-
bia (AUC), a paramilitary armed group, boobytrapped the body of a member
of the insurgent FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia).51 As a result
one civilian was killed and two others were seriously wounded when they
tried to recover the body. The ombudsman recalls that rules of international
humanitarian law, including the 1949 Geneva Conventions and the 1977
Additional Protocols, as well as Protocol II to the 1980 UnitedNations Conven-
tion on ConventionalWeapons, are directly applicable in domestic Colombian
law. He concludes that the act of booby-trapping constituted a violation of
the prohibition of perfidy in Article 37 of Additional Protocol I, a violation
of Article 7, paragraph b, of Protocol II to the 1980 Conventional Weapons
Convention, and a violation of the principle of discrimination. As of 12 Decem-
ber 2002, the ombudsman had adopted as many as fourteen resolutions
specifically concerning international humanitarian law.
6.4.4 The application of the ombudsman concept to international organiza-
tions
6.4.4.1 Preliminary observations
As stated, the ombudsman evolved as a mechanism to ensure accountability
in the domestic context. This begs the question whether the concept can be
applied in the context of peace support operations which are an organ of, or
closely linked to, an international organization. An international organization
does not have the legislative, executive and judicial division of powers which
is largely followed in most municipal legal systems52 and which pervades
the structure of many national ombudsmen. It may be recalled that the first
ombudsman was established by parliament as a mechanism to control the
executive. The international environment in which peace support operations
50 NinthAnnual Report of theOmbudsman toCongress (Noveno InformeAnnual del Defensor
del Pueblo al Congreso de la República) 255 (2001).
51 OmbudsmanHumanitarian Resolution 011 (Resolución Defensorial Humanitaria No. 011)
of 8 April 2002.
52 Prosecutor v. Duško Tadic´, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on
Jurisdiction, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, A. Ch., 2 October 1995, para. 43.
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operate also differs from the domestic sphere in many other ways. Peace
support operations involve not one authority but several international legal
persons which have certain powers over national contingents in an operation.
Most international organizations do not have citizens or residents with which
they have a direct connection. These differences have been given as grounds
for opposing proposals for the establishment of ombudsman schemes at the
international level. For example, the European Parliament at a certainmoment
opposed the establishment of an ombudsman in the European Community
based on the view that the existing differences between national legal systems
and the Community legal system made it impossible purely and simply to
transpose the institution of the ombudsman on to the Community system.53
Nevertheless, the concept of the ombudsman does exist at the international
level. It has developed mainly as a corollary of the demand for accountability
of international organizations, and in particular accountability toward indi-
viduals. Three institutions and one proposal for such an institution can be
identified.
6.4.4.2 The World Bank Inspection Panel
The first ombudsman-like mechanism to emerge out of this debate was the
World Bank Inspection Panel.54 The Panel’s creation was the result of both
internal and external demands on the Bank to be more accountable in its
operational work by providing the Bank’s Board with an independent review
mechanism. These pressures led to a number of proposed solutions to increase
the Bank’s accountability. One of the three main solutions proposed by Bank
officials and other persons and organizations was to establish a Bank ombuds-
man.55 This proposal was not put into practice, but in 1993 the Executive
Directors of the Bank established an Inspection Panel (the Panel) that was
heavily influenced by the ombudsman proposal.56 The Panel has a mandate
to receive complaints by groups of individuals whose rights or interests have
been or are likely to be affected by an action or omission of the Bank as a result
of a failure by the Bank to follow its operational policies and procedures with
respect to the design, appraisal and/or implementation of a project financed
by the Bank provided in all cases that such failure has had, or threatens to
have, amaterial adverse effect. The term ‘affected individuals’ excludes a single
individual but is very broadly interpreted as including any two or more
53 See report of Mr Chanterie on behalf of the Committee on the Rules of Procedure and
Petitions, Doc A2 – 41/85, resolution adopted on 14 June 1985, OJ C175, 15 July 1985, at
273.
54 SeeD. Bradlow, International Organizations and Private Complaints: The Case of theWorld Bank
Inspection Panel, 34 Virginia Journal of International Law 553 (1994).
55 D. Bradlow, Why the World Bank Needs an Ombudsman, Financial Times, 14 July 1993, at
13.
56 Resolution No. IBRD 93-10, “The World Bank Inspection Panel”, 22 September 1993.
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persons who share common interests or concerns.57 The operational rules
and procedures of the Bank do not include binding rules of international law.
They are policy documents issued by Bank managers to staff members con-
cerning procedures to be followed in preparing and executing projects financed
by the Bank. The different Operational Policies, Bank Procedures and Opera-
tional Directives that constitute the Bank’s operational rules and procedures
cover a wide range of activities.58 As a result the standard of review available
to the Inspection Panel is very broad. It gives the Panelmuch potential to influ-
ence the development of the human rights obligations of the World Bank.59
The resolution establishing the Panel includes a number of provisions designed
to ensure the independence of the members of the Panel from the Bank’s
Management, by providing that they are appointed by the Executive Directors
and that theymay be removed from office only by decision of those Directors,
for cause. Members of the Panel are ineligible for employment by the Bank
following the end of their service on the Panel.
Under the procedure for handling complaints, the Inspection Panel, when
it receives a complaint, must notify the Board and President of the Bank. The
Bank’sManagementmust provide the Panel with evidence that it has complied
with, or intends to complywith the relevant policies and procedures. The Panel
subsequently determines whether the request for inspectionmeets the eligibility
criteria in the resolution establishing the Panel, and, based on this assessment,
make a recommendation to the Executive Directors as to whether the matter
should be investigated. An investigation only takes place if it is authorized
by the Executive Directors. In that case, the Panel carries out an investigation
and issues its findings to the Executive Directors indicating whether the Bank
has seriously violated its operational rules and policies. After the inspection
is completed, the Executive Directors decide on any actions to be taken.
The resolution establishing the Panel includes several provisions that relate
to the transparency of the process. In case of complaints by affected parties
there is an obligation to inform them of the decision of Executive Directors
on a recommendation to investigate, and to inform them of the results of an
investigation and the action taken in its respect. The Bank is also obliged to
make a request for an inspection, the recommendation of the Panel concerning
57 See Clarifications of Certain Aspects of the Resolution Establishing the Inspection Panel
(R96-204), 30 September 1996, approved by the Board of Executive Directors on 17 October
1996.
58 See L. Boisson de Chazournes, Policy Guidance and Compliance Issues: The World Bank Opera-
tional Standards, inD. Shelton (Ed.), Commitment andCompliance: The Role ofNon-Binding
Norms in the International Legal System 281 (2000).
59 D. Bradlow & S. Schlemmer-Schulte, The World Bank’s New Inspection Panel: A Constructive
Step in the Transformation of the International Legal Order, 54 Zeitschrift für ausländisches
öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht 405 (1994). Operational rules and procedures that have
a human rights element include Operational Directive 4.20, Indigenous Peoples, para. 6,
and Operational Policy 4.20, October 1999.
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investigation and the report of the Panel and the Bank’s response publicly
available within a certain period of time. The annual report of the Panel to
the President and Executive Directors is also publicly available.
The Panel is not empowered to take binding decisions. As with the om-
budsman, its mandate does not extend to determining responsibility in the
strict sense. The operational rules and procedures on which the Panel bases
its findings are not obligations that result in an internationally wrongful act
when they are breached.60
It may be noted that within the World Bank Group a second ombuds-
person-type institution was established in 1998. This institution is called the
Compliance Advisor/ Onbudsman. The purpose of the Compliance Advisor/
Ombudsman is to assist the International Finance Corporation (IFC) and the
Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) to address complaints of
people affected by projects in a manner that is fair, objective and constructive.
Themechanism has three functions, one of which is the ombudsman function,
in other words responding to complaints from project-affected people.61
6.4.4.3 The European Union Ombudsman
A second institution for accountability in international organizations is the
European Ombudsman.62 The institution was established in the 1992 Treaty
on European Union (Maastricht Treaty). This treaty inserted two new articles
in the EuropeanCommunity Treaty, the EuropeanCoal and Steel Community
Treaty63 and the European Atomic Energy Community Treaty.64 The new
Article 21 of the EC Treaty provides that every citizen of the Union may apply
to the Ombudsman established in accordance with Article 195. Article 195
provides for the establishment, mandate and powers of the ombudsman as
well as for the European Parliament to lay down more detailed regulations
for the ombudsman, after seeking an opinion from the Commission and with
the approval of the Council acting by a qualified majority. In accordance with
60 S. Schlemmer-Schulte, The World Bank’s Experience With Its Inspection Panel, 58 Zeitschrift
für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht 353 (1998), at 387.
61 See for a discussion of thismachanismA. Rigo, Process Integrity and Institutional Independence
in International Organizations: The Inspection Panel and the Sanctions Committee of the World
Bank, in L. Boisson de Chazournes, C. Romano&R.Mackenzie (Eds.), International Organ-
izations and International Dispute Settlement: Trends and Prospects 165 (2002).
62 See generally I. Harden, When Europeans Complain: The Work of the European Ombudsman,
3 Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies 199 (2000); K. Heede, EuropeanOmbuds-
man: Redress and Control at Union Level (2000) and P. Bonnor, The European Ombudsman:
A Novel Source of Soft Law in the European Union, 25 European Law review 39 (2000).
63 Article 20 (d).
64 Article 107 (d).
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this provision the European Parliament adopted the European Ombudsman
Statute on 9 March 1994.65
The genesis of the institutionmakes clear that it is a result of the increasing
focus on the direct relationship between international organizations and
individuals and a concomitant accountability of the former to the latter. In
the nation state, the concept of citizenship is an important expression of the
relationship between the state and individuals. The European Ombudsman
is rooted in the concept of European citizenship66 that expresses a similar
direct relationship between the EuropeanUnion and individuals. In the period
directly preceding the first Intergovernmental Conference on European Political
Union in 1990, the Spanish government circulated a memorandum entitled
‘The Road to European Citizenship’. The Spanish concept of European citizen-
ship called for the adoption of a catalogue of rights for citizens of the Union
accompanied by the establishment of a European Ombudsman to protect those
rights.67 The Danish government supported the main gist of the idea, first
in its proposals for the Intergovernmental Conference and later in a set of draft
treaty articles on a European Ombudsman. The core of these draft articles is
reproduced in the final treaty text of the Treaty on European Union and links
the concept of citizenship and the European Ombudsman. Article 21 of the
Treaty states that “Every citizen of the Union may apply to the ombudsman
established in accordance with Article 195.”
In contrast to the World Bank Inspection Panel, the name of the new
institution refers directly to the ombudsman concept. A closer analysis of the
European Ombudsmanmakes clear that the institution also substantively refers
to the concept in the sense that it has many characteristics of a classical om-
budsman.
Article 195 of the EC Treaty states the mandate of the Ombudsman. He
is empowered to:
Receive complaints from any citizen of the Union or any natural or legal person
residing or having its headquarters in a Member States concerning instances of
maladministration in the activities of the Community institutions or bodies, with
the exception of the Court of Justice and the Court of First Instance acting in their
judicial role.
65 Decision of the European Parliament on the Regulations andGeneral Conditions Governing
the Performance of the Ombudsman’s Duties (European Ombudsman Statute), Official
Journal L 113, 4 April 1994, at 15.
66 For an analysis of European citizenship see J. Shaw, The Interpretation of European Union
Citizenship, 61 Modern Law Review 293 (1998).
67 E. Marias, The European Ombudsman: Competences and Relations with the Other Community
Institutions and Bodies, in E. Marias (Ed.), the European Ombudsman: Working Document
71 (1994), at 73.
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The mandate demonstrates that the protection ensured by the Ombudsman
actually goes beyond the European Union citizenship, because apart from
citizens, persons residing in the Union are eligible to make a complaint. Heede
explains that the requirement that the complainant must reside in a member
state is interpreted extensively by the Ombudsman. It is not necessary that
the residence of the complainant has been legalized but it is sufficient that
the person is actually present in the territory of the Union.68 The complainant
is not required to have a direct and personal interest. An actio popularis con-
cerning broader systemic issues is also admissible. The complaint must allow
the person lodging the complaint and the object to be identified by the Om-
budsman, but the person lodging the complaint may request that his complaint
remain confidential toward others.69
The precise scope of the mandate in relation to the different Union pillars
is unclear. The transfer provisions in the Treaty of Amsterdam include the
Ombudsman in a provision on the Third Pillar concerning Justice and Home
Affairs (Article 41 EU), but the transfer provision on the Second Pillar con-
cerning a Common Foreign and Security Policy (Article 28) does not. Heede
concludes that the mandate nevertheless includes the activities of the Com-
munity authorities under the Second and Third Pillar as well as the activities
of the Union organs created under the Third Pillar.70
The independence of the Ombudsman is ensured through several provisions
in the Maastricht Treaty and the Statute of the Ombudsman. The European
Ombudsman is appointed by the European Parliament. In this sense he is
different from the classical ombudsman because an organ that is subject to
his jurisdiction appoints him. In contrast to the majority of national ombuds-
men the European Ombudsman can receive complaints against parliament.71
Attempts have however been made to ensure independence in other ways.
TheMaastricht Treaty itself provides that he shall be completely independent
in the performance of his duties. The Ombudsman Statute provides that the
incumbent shall be chosen from among persons who offer every guarantee
of independence, and meet the conditions required for the exercise of the
highest judicial office in their country or have the acknowledged competence
and experience to undertake the duties of Ombudsman.72 The Ombudsman
shall give a solemn undertaking before the Court of Justice of the European
Communities that hewill perform his duties with complete independence and
impartiality, and he is given privileges and immunities.73
68 K. Heede, supra note 62, at 117.
69 European Ombudsman Statute, Art. 2 (3).
70 K. Heede, supra note 62, at 23.
71 In practice this is not an important part of themandate of the Ombudsman. The 2001 Report
of the European Ombudsman notes that 7 percent of the inquiries started by the Ombuds-
man concerned Parliament, 2001 Report, at 271.
72 European Ombudsman Statute, Art. 6 (2).
73 European Ombudsman Statute Arts. 9 (2) and 10 (3).
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A complaint to the European Ombudsman must allege an instance of
maladministration in order to be admissible. Neither the Maastricht Treaty
nor the European Ombudsman Statute defines the term ‘maladministration’.
In his first annual report, the Ombudsman gave a provisional definition of
maladministration, including failure to respect human rights but also violation
of administrative principles such as abuse of power, negligence, avoidable
delay and unfairness.74 In his 1997 annual report the Ombudsman, at the
request of the European Parliament, stated that “Maladministration occurs
when a public body fails to act in accordance with a rule or principle which
is binding upon it.”75 According to the Ombudsman, this means that his first
and most essential task must be to establish whether the body had acted
lawfully. Other criteria are whether the body has acted in accordance with
rules and principles of good administrative behavior.76 These non-legal stand-
ards are secondary, in the sense of coming after a legality review. These rules
and principles were elaborated in a Code of Good Administrative Behaviour
proposed as draft recommendations by the Ombudsman to Union institutions
and bodies in 1999. On 6 September 2001, the European Parliament adopted
a document with the same title substantially similar to the Code proposed
by the Ombudsman and called on the Ombudsman to apply it in examining
whether there is maladministration.77 The Ombudsman has stated that institu-
tions and officials who follow the Code can be sure that they will thereby avoid
instances of maladministration.78
Even if there is no complaint, the Ombudsman can conduct inquiries on
his own initiative, according to Article 195 EC Treaty. In this case, as well as
in case of complaints thatmeet the requirements of admissibility, theOmbuds-
man has a discretionary right but no obligation to start an inquiry. In case
of a complaint he must find that there are ‘grounds for an enquiry’ (Article
195, paragraph 1, EC Treaty) or consider the enquiry ‘justified’ (Article 3, para-
graph 1, Statute).
The Ombudsman does not have the power to take binding decisions at
the outcome of investigations. The most he can do, in cases where maladmin-
istration is established and follow-up action appears necessary, is to make a
draft recommendation to the institution or body concerned. The institution
or body must respond with a detailed opinion within three months. If it fails
to respond satisfactorily to a draft recommendation, the Ombudsman can send
a report to the European Parliament. The outcome of investigations is reported
in the annual, public, report submitted to the European Parliament.
74 The European Ombudsman, Report for the Year 1995, paragraph I.3.2.
75 The European Ombudsman, Report for the Year 1997, at 23.
76 Id., at 25-27
77 The European Ombudsman, Report for the Year 2001, at 19. The text of the Code can be
found at www.euro-ombudsman.eu.int/code/en/default.htm.
78 Letter from the European Ombudsman to the President of the European Parliament con-
cerning the European Code of Good Administrative Behaviour, 11 March 2002.
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The person lodging the complaint shall be informed by the Ombudsman
of the outcome of the inquiries, of the opinion expressed by the institution
or body concerned and of any recommendations made by the Ombudsman.79
6.4.4.4 The Kosovo Ombudsperson Institution
The UN established an ombudsman institution in Kosovo inNovember 2000.80
The legal basis for the institution is Regulation 2000/38 issued by the Special
Representative of the Secretary-General in Kosovo. Regulations are instruments
used by theUnitedNationsMission in Kosovo to legislate. Regulation 2000/38
provides that the Ombudsperson shall:
promote and protect the rights and freedoms of individuals and legal entities and
ensure that all persons in Kosovo are able to exercise effectively the human rights
and fundamental freedoms safeguarded by international human rights standards,
in particular the European Convention on Human Rights and its Protocols and
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
It appears that the establishment of the institution is closely linked to the
characteristics of the operation in Kosovo. This operation is not an operation
with a limitedmandate and powers, but a full-fledged transitional administra-
tion of the territory. In Kosovo the United Nations asserts extensive adminis-
trative powers that would normally be exercised by the executive of a national
government.81 It has for example determined the applicable law in the territ-
ory, it levies taxes, and it appoints and removes judges and has established
post and telecommunications services. In other words, in Kosovo the United
Nations acts very much as any other government does in its territory. This
similarity between the administrative activity of the Mission and a state
coupled with the lack of a comparable regulatory regime (mainly caused by
the immunity from jurisdiction of the Mission before domestic courts) was
considered as necessitating the establishment of an ombudsman. The Ombuds-
person stated in this regard in his first Special Report that “UNMIK acts as a
surrogate state” and that “no democratic state operating under the rule of law
accords itself total immunity from any administrative, civil or criminal re-
sponsibility.”82
79 European Ombudsman Statute, Art. 3 (7).
80 See C. Waters, Human Rights in an International Protectorate: Kosovo’s Ombudsman, 4 The
International Ombudsman Yearbook 141 (2000).
81 See M. Ruffert, The Administration of Kosovo and East-Timor by the International Community,
50 International & Comparative Law Quarterly 613 (2001).
82 Special Report No. 1, On the Compatibility with Recognized International Standards of
UNMIK Regulation No. 2000/47, 26 April 2001, at 8, para. 23. See also R.Wilde,Accountabil-
ity and International Actors in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and East Timor, 7 ILSA Journal
of International & Comparative Law 455 (2001), at 457.
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The Kosovo Ombudsperson Institution has many of the characteristics
of the archetypal ombudsman. For the purpose of achieving his mandate the
ombudsperson can receive and investigate complaints from any person or
entity in Kosovo concerning human rights violations and actions constituting
an abuse of authority by the interim civil administration or any emerging
central or local institution.83 The Ombudsperson however does not have
jurisdiction to receive complaints against the international security presence
in Kosovo. Regulation 2000/38 provides that “in order to deal with cases
involving the international security presence, the Ombudsperson may enter
into an agreement with the Commander of the Kosovo Forces”.84 No such
agreement has been concluded yet.
A number of provisions in the regulation establishing the institution are
designed to ensure the independence of the Ombudsperson. The regulation
states that the Ombudsperson shall act independently and that no person or
entity may interfere with his or her functions.85 The Ombudsperson shall be
an eminent international figure of high moral character, impartiality and
integrity, and he and his staff are given privileges and immunities.86 On the
other hand, the officeholder is appointed and removed by the Special Repres-
entative of the Secretary-General, the head of the administration which the
Ombudsperson supervises, without consultation with local or international
partners. This provision must be seen in the light of the specific political
arrangements on the ground. At the time of the drafting of the regulation there
were no domestic organs. The drafters thus considered that there was no
institutional choice and that only the civilian administration could appoint
the ombudsman.87
The Ombudsperson’s standard of review is whether there has been a
violation of human rights and ‘abuse of authority’. The interim administration
in determining the applicable law in Kosovo has included a variety of inter-
national human rights instruments. These instruments bind all persons in
Kosovo, including international personnel. There is no definition of ‘abuse
of authority’ in the regulation or the rules of procedure for theOmbudsperson
nor has the Ombudsperson given a definition. Waters identifies the failure
to explicitly include maladministration as grounds for investigation in the
regulation as a shortcoming.88 In practice however the Ombudsperson seems
83 UNMIK regulation No. 2000/38 on the Establishment of the Ombudsperson Institution
in Kosovo, 30 June 2000, UNMIK/REG/2000/38, section 3 (1).
84 Id., section 3 (4).
85 Id., section 2 (1).
86 Id., sections 6 (1) and 13.
87 See Kosovo International Human Rights Conference, 10-11 December 1999, Conference
Documents and Report 127.
88 C. Waters, supra note 80, at 145. It may be noted that a draft regulation on the Ombuds-
person did includemaladministration. See Kosovo InternationalHumanRights Conference,
10-11 December 1999, Conference Documents and Report 121.
326 Proposals for new mechanisms for invoking accountability
to interpret the term ‘abuse of authority’ broadly to include many elements
of maladministration as defined by, for example, the EuropeanOmbudsman.89
The reports of the Ombudsperson make it clear that the focus is on human
rights.
Of special interest is the fact that the Ombudsperson has used international
humanitarian law as a standard of reference. In a Special Report on the legality
of the UNMIK regulation granting UNMIK and KFOR immunity from jurisdiction
in the Kosovar courts (Regulation 2000/47), the Ombudsperson focuses on
the consequences of the immunity from legal process. One consequence is the
lack of compensation and proceduralmechanisms for obtaining compensation
in respect of the taking and continuing occupation of private property of
individual residents of Kosovo. It is worthwhile to cite extensively from the
Ombudsperson’s Report:
Section 7 of UNMIK Regulation 2000/47, which addresses third party liability of
KFOR, UNMIK or their respective personnel for, inter alia [sic], reads in pertinent
part as follows:
Third party claims for property loss or damage …. arising from or directly
attributed to KFOR, UNMIK or their respective personnel andwhich do not arise from
‘operational necessity’ of either international presence, shall be settled by Claims
Commissions established by KFOR and UNMIK, in the manner to be provided for.
The Ombudsperson recalls that Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 of the European Conven-
tion onHuman Rights can be considered to provide certain procedural protections
that are necessary to ensure the effective protection of the right to property. The
Ombudsperson also recalls that the European Court of Human Rights has found
the inability of an individual to participate in fair proceedings that are determinative
of his or her property rights to be a significant factor in concluding that an inter-
ference imposed an ‘individual and excessive burden’ on an individual so that that
interference failed to strike the necessary fair balance between the relevant com-
peting interests (Hentrich v. France judgment of 22 September 1994, Series A No.
296, pp. 20-21, paras. 43-48).
Regarding the procedures envisioned under Section 7 of UNMIK Regulation 2000/47,
the Ombudsperson first observes that an individual wishing to lodge a claim against
KFOR or UNMIK must meet two threshold requirements in order to have the claim
reviewed by the future Claims Commissions. First, he or she must establish that
the matter at issue arose from or was directly attributed to KFOR, UNMIK or their
respective personnel. Second, he or she must show that the matter at issue did not
arise from ‘operational necessity’ of either international presence. The Ombuds-
person observes that, whereas an individual may reasonably be expected to establish
an arguable claim regarding the former criterion, with regard to the latter criterion
89 In his second annual report the Ombudsperson states that complaints concerning failure
of administrative authorities to respond to proper requests and arbitrary or discriminatory
administrative decisions were treated as complainst against abuse of authority. Second
Annual Report of the Ombudsperson Institution in Kosovo, at 9.
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both the individual and the respondent party or parties must necessarily have their
views heard. However, neither Section 7 nor any other Section of Regulation 2000/
47 envisions procedural mechanisms for the conduct of any effective inquiry into
the ‘operational necessity’ of the contested act, whether as a threshold requirement
for gaining access to the future Claims Commissions or in the context of procedures
before the future Claims Commissions. As this preliminary inquiry is therefore
directly decisive of the outcome of any ensuing civil proceeding, the full panoply
of procedural protections afforded by Article 6 of the European Convention on
Human Rights must be guaranteed (Ringeisen v. Austria judgment of 16 July 1971,
Series A No. 13).
In this respect the Ombudsperson investigated whether the provision on third party
liability in UNMIK Regulation 2000/47 compliedwith certain procedural protections
provided by Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the European Convention on Human
Rights. He determined that this was not the case because the requirement that an
individual wishing to lodge a claim against KFOR or UNMIK must show that the
matter did not arise from “operational necessity” of either international presence
is not accompanied by a provision that the views of both parties are heard. In this
context the Ombudsperson observed that:
Going beyond consideration even of standards set forth under Article 15 of the
Convention, the Ombudsperson observes that even in the event that Kosovo were
to be considered in a state of armed conflict, as opposed to a state of emergency
or a state of peace, the 1949 Geneva Conventions reinforce the views expressed
in the preceding discussion. Article 147 of the Geneva Convention Relative to the
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time ofWar of August 12, 1949 (Geneva Conven-
tion IV), for example, includes in its definition of ´grave breaches of the Geneva
Convention the following:
…wilful killing, torture or inhuman treatment, …wilfully causing great suffer-
ing or serious injury to body or health,… and extensive destruction and ap-
propriation of property, not justified by military necessity and carries out
unlawfully….
The Ombudsperson considers that the additional requirement, even during wartime,
of ‘military’ necessity for the appropriation of property, implies a much stricter
standard than does the ‘operational’ necessity provided for in Section 7 of UNMIK
Regulation 2000/47. The Ombudsperson therefore considers that by permitting
UNMIK and KFOR to invoke ‘operational necessity’ to preclude any review of allega-
tions that their actions caused harm that could fall within the category of grave
breaches of Geneva Convention IV, Section 7 of UNMIK Regulation 2000/47 fails
to meet any reasonable standard of proportionality.90
Several conclusions can be drawn from the passages cited. First, the reference
to international humanitarian law is apparently an indirect reference in the
sense that international humanitarian law is used to interpret human rights.
90 Special Report No. 1, On the Compatibility with Recognized International Standards of
UNMIK Regulation No. 2000/47, 26 April 2001, at 13.
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Regulation 2000/38 does not include international humanitarian law as such
in the standards of review that the Ombudsman is mandated to use.
Secondly, the Ombudsperson appears to deliberately leave open the
possibility that international humanitarian law does apply to the situation in
Kosovo. If this is a valid conclusion, it is however unclear why the Ombuds-
person has refrained from referring to international humanitarian law in any
of his other special or annual reports.
Finally, the passage cited makes clear that where possible the Ombuds-
person indirectly exercises jurisdiction over KFOR, in spite of the lack of a
formal basis for jurisdiction.
6.4.4.5 The Humanitarian Accountability project
A final element in the accountability ‘project’ is the proposal for an ombuds-
man in the field of humanitarian assistance made by the ‘Humanitarian Ac-
countability Project’. This project emerged out of a broader debate on account-
ability in humanitarian assistance. In the beginning of the 1990s external and
internal pressure on humanitarian agencies increased to improve their per-
formance. Improving performance was interpreted as enhancing the quality
of humanitarian assistance and as being more accountable toward other
institutions and persons together frequently referred to as ‘stakeholders’. The
debate was given impetus by the chaotic delivery of humanitarian assistance
in Rwanda. An evaluation of this episode revealed that a number of NGOs
performed in an unprofessional and irresponsible manner that may have
contributed to an unnecessary loss of life.91 It called for the dissemination
of standards and for the establishment of a body to serve as an ombudsman
to which any party can express a concern related to the provision of assist-
ance.92 The debate in question resulted in the drafting of a number of stand-
ards.93 The first is the Code of Conduct developed by the Red Cross move-
ment and non-governmental organizations.94 The code seeks to safeguard
high standards of behavior and includes standards derived from humanitarian
law, Red Cross principles and moral notions. Another set of standards was
developed in the ‘Sphere’ project launched in 1996 which brought together
a large number of non-governmental agencies.95 The project drafted a hand-
bookwhichwas published in 2000 andwhich contains a humanitarian charter
91 Relief and Rehabiliation Network, The Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda:
Study III Principal Findings and Recommendations 23 (1996).
92 Id., at 26.
93 See A. Griekspoor & E. Sondorp, Enhancing the Quality of Humanitarian Assistance: Taking
Stock and Future Initiatives, 16 Prehospital and Disaster Medicine 209 (2001).
94 Principles of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and
NGOs in Disaster Response Programmes (The Code of Conduct), www.ifrc.org/publicat/
conduct/code.asp
95 See www.sphereproject.org
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and minimum standards in five areas of humanitarian assistance.96 The
‘People in Aid Code of Best Practice’, published in 1997, is a third set of
standards.97 These codes have in common that they are voluntary. Although
many humanitarian agencies have accepted these codes as universal standards,
others object to them on various grounds. One problem with the standards
is that they are partly based on legal standards, in particular from the Geneva
Conventions, but that another part is based onmoral obligations also referred
to as ‘humanitarian principles’.98 Moral obligations are very much open to
different interpretations, and different agencies give some principles more
importance than others.
In 1997 a consortium of non-governmental organizations initiated the
‘Humanitarian Ombudsman Project’ out of concern that the standards devel-
oped were not being monitored or enforced.99 This concern had been ex-
pressed in the Rwanda evaluation that recommended the international com-
munity should identify a respected, independent organization or network of
organizations to act on behalf of beneficiaries of humanitarian assistance to
serve as an ombudsman to which any party can express a concern related to
provision of assistance. The project undertook research into the possibility and
the possible features of a humanitarian assistance ombudsman. To this end
it carried out a feasibility study to examine whether an ombudsman is ap-
propriate for the sector.100 The second phase of the project sought to deter-
mine the international community’s understanding and possible commitment
to the project through stakeholder consultations. In a third phase a pilot field
study was carried out in Kosovo in 1999 and a study on the legal framework
for an ombudsman was presented. In 2001 the Humanitarian Ombudsman
Project was succeeded by the ‘Humanitarian Accountability Project’ to carry
the accountability project forward.101 The project has carried out several field
trials in order to test mechanisms for enhanced accountability and research
and advocacy. A November 2002 report by the project recommended the
96 See www.sphereproject.org/handbook_index.htm See for commentary L. Gostelow, The
Sphere Project: The Implications of Making Humanitarian Principles and CodesWork, 23 Disasters
316 (1999).
97 www.peopleinaid.org.uk/code/code01.htm
98 Slim for example states that the Codes of Conduct are full of a demand for an ‘ethics of
care’ in humanitarian work. H. Slim, Claiming a Humanitarian Imperative: NGOs and the
Cultivation of Humanitarian Duty, www.hapgeneva.org/pdf/H%20slim%20on%20Duties.pdf
, at 9. Lancaster states that the introduction of the Red Cross Code and Sphere Project is
in essence “an initiative to establish an consistent ethical ethos within the sector.” W.
Lancaster, The Code of Conduct: Whose Code, Whose Conduct?, Journal of Humanitarian Affairs,
April 1998, www.jha.ac/articles/a038.htm
99 See The Humanitarian Ombudsman Project: Summary of Work to Date: 1997-1999 (2000),
at www.oneworld.org/ombudsman/todate.htm, and other reports on this website.
100 See J. Mitchell & D. Doane, An Ombudsman for Humanitarian Assistance? 23 Disasters 115
(1999).
101 See thewebsite www.hapgeneva.org , and in particular A. Callamard,Why aHumanitarian
Accountability Project? at this website.
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establishment of amembership-based, self-regulatory body at the inter-agency
level whose secretariat will provide both technical support and monitoring
functions.102 The recommendations were endorsed by the heads of parti-
cipating agencies in January 2003 and a mechanism was created called
‘Humanitarian Accountability Partnership International’. The mechanism is
different from the ombudsman concept since it is principally a mechanism
for self-regulation. It will take the institutional form of a non-governmental
organization based in Switzerland.
6.5 PROPOSAL FOR AN OMBUDSMAN IN PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS
The discussion of the ombudsman concept in national and international context
makes clear that the ombudsman is potentially an appropriate mechanism
to ensure, or at least improve, accountability for breaches of individual rights
under international humanitarian law, and that the concept has been intro-
duced successfully at the international level. At the root of the concept is the
idea that an ombudsman can be a remedial mechanism where the rights of
individuals are affected by the administration. This administration can be
complete, as in the case of a state or an international transitional administra-
tion, but individual rights can also be affected where administration is not
complete, as in the case of peace support operations. Moreover, in the case
of peace support operations there are generally few alternatives for individuals
to implement the accountability of the operation. In particular in peace support
operations the following statement by Wellens applies:
The distinct, remedial role of an ombudsman within the accountability regime of
international organizations becomesmore important as its complementary character
is so low given the limited availability of other non-legal or legal remedial oppor-
tunities and mechanisms.103
The cases of theWorld Bank Inspection Panel, the European Ombudsman and
the Ombudsperson Institution in Kosovo make clear that an ombudsman at
the international level must have certain indispensable characteristics to be
an effective accountability mechanism. These characteristics are the same as
the irreducible characteristics of the ‘classical’ ombudsman at the national level:
independence, impartiality and fairness, credibility of the review process and
confidentiality. The constituent documents of the institutions all contain
provisions designed to ensure these requirements. This observation provides
a basis for a proposal for an ombudsman in peace support operations. The
102 Visions and Plans for a Permanent Accountability Mechanism 7 (2001), www.hapgeneva.
org/pdf/Vision.pdf.
103 K. Wellens, Remedies Against International Organisations 181 (2002).
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proposal concerns the establishment of an ombudsman for United Nations
peace support operations, and another for North Atlantic Treaty Organization
peace support operations.
An ombudsman in peace support operations should preferably be a
standing institution. This would ensure that an accountability mechanism is
available at the start of an operation. In contrast, the Kosovo Ombudsperson
Institution was established more than a year after the beginning of the inter-
national administration. A General Assembly resolution would be the preferred
legal basis for an ombudsman for United Nations peace support operations.
Such a resolution adopted by the United Nations primary organ with the
widest representation would lend the institution legitimacy. However, negoti-
ations in the General Assemblywould probably lead to a political compromise
and therefore an ombudsman that would not have the required characteristics.
The United Nations Secretary-General could also establish such an ombudsman
in his capacity as the commander of peace support operations.104 The legal
basis for a NATO peace support operations ombudsman should be a decision
by the North Atlantic Assembly. This is the only NATO organ institutionally
capable of taking such a decision. A decision by the Secretary-General is not
appropriate because he has only limited powers. He is responsible for pro-
moting and directing the process of consultation and decision-making through-
out the alliance. He may propose items for discussion and decision and has
the authority to use his good offices in cases of dispute between member
countries.105
The UN ombudsman could be appointed by the Secretary-General in
consultation with the ICRC and the UN General Assembly Special Committee
on PeacekeepingOperations. Consultationwith the ICRCwould provide input
from an organization with special expertise. Consultation with troop con-
tributing states would increase trust in these states that the ombudsman is
impartial and has no hidden political agenda.
The NATO ombudsman could be appointed by the the North Atlantic
Council in consultation with the ICRC.
The standing character of the ombudsman would contribute to the inde-
pendence of the office because the ombudsman would be free to criticize
without fear that the office would be abolished or not created in a next peace
support operation. Anothermeasure to ensure independencewould be to give
the ombudsman privileges and immunities. There should also be a requirement
that candidates for the office be of high moral character, impartiality and
integrity, who possess a demonstrated commitment to respect for, and expertise
in, international humanitarian law. The office should also be adequately staffed
and financed.
104 See also C. Bongiorno, supra note 20, at 683-685.
105 NATO Handbook 220 (2001).
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The ombudsman’s mandate should be to receive and investigate complaints
from any person or entity in the host state concerning violations of inter-
national humanitarian law. Violations of international humanitarian law should
include not only grave breaches of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and the
Additional Protocol I, but also ‘common’ violations. This subdivision of viola-
tions of international humanitarian law is important mainly in respect of
individual criminal liability but not for accountability purposes. A ‘common’
violation can have great impact on the lives of individuals in the host state.
International law can be defined as customary international lawwhere conduct
is attributable to the UN or the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and addi-
tionally the treaty obligations of troop contributing states where conduct is
attributable to them. Where necessary the ombudsman will need to apply
international humanitarian lawmutatis mutandis. In this way he can contribute
to the development of doctrine in this field of law. The institution is particular-
ly suitable for this task: because the ombudsman’s recommendations are not
binding, he can be more flexible. Secondly, application of the law will be well
argued because the ombudsman depends on well- argued recommendations
and the power of persuasion to gain the trust and cooperation of the com-
plainants and respondents.
The ombudsman should have jurisdiction over the UN and NATO respective-
ly, and over troop contributing states, each for conduct of peace support
operations that is attributable to them. Jurisdiction should not be limited to
the international organizations. This would provide an escape clause for the
organizations that could point to troop contributing states instead of engaging
in meaningful dialogue with the ombudsman. Jurisdiction over troop con-
tributing states could be provided by including a clause in participating state
agreements inwhich the states accept the jurisdiction. The organization should
make acceptance mandatory for participation in a peace support operation.
It should be possible for individuals and legal entities to lodge a complaint
with the ombudsman. This would enable non-governmental organizations to
play a role to protect the rights of individuals who might be too intimidated
tomake a complaint themselves. Non-governmental organizations have proven
that they can play an important role in exposing violations of the law by peace
support operations. For this reason an entity should not have to demonstrate
that it has an interest of its own. The ombudsman should have the power to
maintain the confidentiality of complainants. Complainants may have a legit-
imate fear of persecution, intimidation or retribution by the entity or person
that they complain about and it should be possible to protect the com-
plainant.106
106 African Rights reported that several Somalis who tried to complain against conduct by
the United Nations Operation in Somalia were intimidated. African Rights, Somalia: Human
Rights Abuses by the United Nations Forces 16 (1993).
Chapter 6 333
The ombudsman should have broad powers of investigation as well as
access to places and documents, but there should also be a possibility for
international organizations and troop contributing states to protect vital
security interests. Protection of such information is particularly necessary in
situations where international humanitarian law applies and disclosure of
information may directly endanger the lives of members of the operation.
The ombudsman should state the outcome of an investigation in his
findings. If he finds that there has been a violation of international human-
itarian law, he should make recommendations to the respondent to remedy
the situation. The respondent should be obliged to respond to the findings.
The findings and recommendations of the ombudsman as well as the reaction
of the respondent should bemade public by the ombudsman. The UN ombuds-
man should have the obligation to present a public annual report to the UN
Secretary-General. The NATO ombudsman should have the obligation to present
a public annual report to the North Atlantic Council.
The specific function of the ombudsman makes the office complementary
to the claims commission proposed above. For this reason the fact that a claims
commission is dealing with the same matter should not make a complaint to
the ombudsman inadmissible. To preserve the independence and avoid the
impression that the ombudsman is concernedwith formal responsibility there
should be no direct relationship between the two institutions.
6.6 CONCLUSION
This chapter has proposed mechanisms for implementing the responsibility
and accountability of peace support operations. It has focused in particular
on mechanisms that are available to individuals. This focus is justified on the
one hand by the fact that the present remedial regime is in an immature state
especially for non-state claimants in comparison to states,107 and on the other
by the practical need for peace support operations to foster the support of those
individuals. As Bedont argues in respect of the UN:
The crimes committed by peacekeepers bring the UN into disrepute and reduce
the trust of the local community in the mission. This lack of confidence of the local
community in the peacekeeping operation can further compromise the success of
the mission.108
To avoid such a reduction of trust it is not sufficient to acknowledge that
international rules are applicable. It is also necessary to provide redress when
107 K. Wellens, supra note 103, at 265.
108 B. Bedont, supra note 20.
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these rules are breached. This is slowly being recognized in the UN, but NATO
lags far behind.109
The mechanisms proposed are to a large extent based onmechanisms that,
although not used in practice, are provided for in institutional instruments
or institutional proposals. In other words, the basis for these mechanisms is
on the table. Hopefully this will make the proposals for a permanent claims
commission and an ombudsman forUnitedNations peace support operations
more acceptable to states and the organization. On the other hand, the addi-
tional elements proposed are revolutionary. One new element is the possibility
of directly invoke the breach of an international right, making the claims
commission from a private law or sui generismechanism into an international
mechanism. Another element is the extension of a permanent claims commis-
sion’s jurisdiction over troop contributing states. The same can be said of the
proposals for a permanent claims commission and ombudsman for NATO peace
support operations. The organizations and their member states will have to
muster considerable political will to realize these proposals, and there is a
possibility that theywill not be able to do so. In the case of NATO, the direction
that negotiations on an out-of-area claims policy seem to be taking is an
indication. This is why this chapter proposes that at the very least, the organ-
ization and its member states consider dispensing with the principle that
combat-related claims are inadmissible in claims settlement procedures. In
respect of UN operations it may be noted that the government of the Nether-
lands did not adopt the recommendation by a governmental advisory commit-
tee to lobby for the establishment of a Central Claims Commission that would
be able to receive claims from victims of wrongful acts by UN peace support
operations.110
The more the idea takes root that troop contributing states cannot free
themselves from their own obligations under human rights and international
humanitarian law by placing troops at the disposal of an international organ-
ization, and it is accepted that monitoring mechanisms enforce these obliga-
tions, the less imperative it is that permanent claims commissions have juris-
diction over troop contributing states. At the same time, this could make the
proposal more attractive to troop contributing states because if there is an
independent claims commission, the chances that states would have to appear
before human rights monitoring bodies would decrease.
It must be noted that the permanent claims commission and an ombudsman
are complementary mechanisms. They are both necessary if accountability is
109 Non-governmental organizations do urge the establishment of accountability mechanisms
in North Atlantic Treaty Organization peace support operations. See e.g. Amnesty Inter-
national, Kosovo: Amnesty Urges Accountability in KFOR, 6 January 2000, AI Index EUR
70/01/00; Kritiek Amnesty op VN en KFOR, NRC Handelsblad 14 March 2000.
110 Bijlage Handelingen II, 2001-02, 28000 V, 68.
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to be implemented in all its components.111 The ombudsman cannot imple-
ment responsibility in the legal sense, and the permanent claims commission
is not the most appropriate mechanism for implementing accountability in
the more political sense.
111 K. Wellens, supra note 103, at 179.

Findings and conclusions
1 FINDINGS
This study examined the scope and content of responsibility and accountability
for breaches of international humanitarian law by peace support operations.
More specifically, it examined peace support operations under the command
and control of the UN and NATO. The term ‘peace support operation’ denotes,
for the purposes of this study, the following:
Multifunctional operations, conducted impartially, normally in support of an
internationally recognized organization such as the UN or OSCE, involving military
forces and diplomatic and humanitarian agencies. Peace support operations are
designed to achieve a long-term political settlement or other specified conditions.
They include peacekeeping and peace enforcement as well as conflict prevention,
peacemaking, peacebuilding and humanitarian relief.
This definition is taken from NATO doctrine. Since international humanitarian
law is principally relevant in relation to armed forces, and peacekeeping and
peace enforcement are the types of peace support operations that are mainly
the province of the armed forces, this study focuses mainly on these types
of peace support operations. These types of operationsmust be distinguished,
on the grounds of the principle of impartiality which is central to them, from
action described by the ICJ in the Certain Expenses case as “preventive or
enforcement measures against any state under Chapter VII”.1 The term ‘peace
support operations’ gives rise to questions concerning the relationship of this
term to the different international operations that have been established with
a peace function. Many of these questions are directly relevant to international
policy and national and internationalmilitary doctrine, but not to international
law. From a legal perspective, and in particular from the perspective of the
responsibility for breaches of international humanitarian law, the legal or
institutional status, and command and control relationships in these operations
are important, principally because of their consequences for the attribution
of conduct of peace support operations. Though these quantities are determined
separately for every peace support operation, practice in the UN and NATO
1 Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Article 17, paragraph 2 of the Charter), Advisory
Opinion of 20 July 1962, 1962 ICJ Reports 151, at 177.
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demonstrates certain patterns. UN operations comprise national contingents
placed at the disposal of the organization by troop contributing states. The
operations are subsidiary organs of the Security Council, or, exceptionally,
of the General Assembly or the Secretary-General. They are brought under
UN command and control by agreement between the organization and troop
contributing states, though the troop contributing states do not always respect
this agreement.
NATO peace support operations are also composed of troops contributed
by states, including non-member states of the organization. These operations
are subsidiary organs of the organization, being established by the organization
and command and control being conferred on a NATO commander who
delegates it to the force commander. It is not correct to say that member states
merely use NATO as a facilitating instrument in establishing peace support
operations.
It onlymakes sense to refer to peace support operations as organs of NATO
if the organization has international legal personality. Considerable confusion
is caused in this respect because some writers incorrectly equate having
international legal personality with being a supranational international organ-
ization. Once this confusion is dispelled, it seems that NATO does have inter-
national legal personality and has on occasion been treated accordingly by
states, including member states, and other international bodies.
One reason why this finding is important is that this study argues that
legal personality is central to the application of the principles of international
responsibility. International legal personality is the capacity to have rights and
obligations under international law. International responsibility is in a sense
the corollary of the obligations under international law that an international
organization is capable of having by virtue of its international legal personal-
ity.2 The institution of responsibility is at least in part a defense of the legal
order against breaches by a subject of that legal order, as the ILC underlines
in respect of state responsibility when it states that:
Over and above the gravity or effects of individual cases, the rules and institutions
of State responsibility are significant for the maintenance of respect for international
law and for the achievement of the goals which States advance through law-making
at the international level.3
Now that international organizations are also subjects of international law there
is no reason to make a distinction between states and international organiza-
tions, because an internationallywrongful act of an international organization
2 P. Klein, La Responsabilité des Organisations Internationales dans les Ordres Juridiques
Internes et en Droit des Gens 3 (1998).
3 Report of the International Law Commission on the work if its fifty-third session, 23 April
– 1 June and 2 July – 10 August 2001 (A/56/10), at 213, para. 1.
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is not less detrimental and, maybe more so, to upholding the international
rule of law as an internationally wrongful act of a state.
International responsibility is a component of the broader concept of
international accountability. Accountability is a complex concept that is parti-
cularly receiving attention among international lawyers in its application
between international organizations and individuals. As such, the concept also
has certain implications for peace support operations, in that expectations are
raised for the establishment of mechanisms to implement the different com-
ponents of their accountability.
State practice in respect of UN peace support operations demonstrates the
application mutatis mutandis of draft article 6 of the ILC draft articles on state
responsibility. The conduct of troops placed at the disposal of the UN by a
state shall be considered an act of the organization if the troops are acting in
the exercise of the authority at whose disposal they have been placed. The
corresponding principle in the ILC draft articles was developed in part on the
basis of practice concerning conduct of organs placed at the disposal of inter-
national organizations, in particular national contingents placed at the disposal
of the UN for participating in ONUC. The application of this principle is sup-
ported by a body of subsequent practice. The command and control exercised
by the UN over peace support operations is the essential element and condition
for the application of this principle of attribution, because as a consequence
the national contingents constituting the operations are under the organiza-
tion’s direction and control. It is also relevant that peace support operations
have exclusively international functions and as a consequence no longer act
in the exercise of elements of the governmental authority of the respective
troop contributing states.
State practice in respect of UN peace support operations is inconclusive
concerning the responsibility of member states for the conduct of that organiza-
tion. Writers have put forward a number of different theories concerning
responsibility of member states for conduct that is attributable to the organiza-
tion, theories that are concerned with lifting the so-called ‘organization veil’.
These theories can be distinguished according to whether they make member
states responsible for conduct that breaches an obligation of the organization,
or of the member states itself. Another distinction can be made according to
whether member state responsibility is concurrent or secondary, that is whether
it can invoked at the same time as the responsibility of the organization itself
or only after the responsibility of the organization has been invoked and the
organization has failed tomake reparation. The practice examined in this study
at most justifies the conclusion that member state responsibility is secondary,
because in those cases where international responsibility has been invoked
for the conduct of UN peace support operations in breach of international
humanitarian law the claims were addressed to the UN.
State practice in respect of UN peace support operations does not provide
support for the attribution of conduct of national contingents to troop contri-
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buting states unless the troop contributing state exercises direction and control
over its contingent in a particular case. The agreement in which troop contri-
buting states transfer command and control to the United Nations establishes
a presumption that this is not the case in that particular situation. The fact
that disciplinary and penal jurisdiction lie with the troop contributing states
does not constitute a form of direction and control.
This does not exclude the possibility that troop contributing states can be
held internationally responsible for their own conduct, in particular the act
of placing a national contingent at the disposal of the UN. The 1949 Geneva
Conventions and Additional Protocol I require that states parties respect and
ensure respect for these instruments. It can be argued that placing a national
contingent at the disposal of the UN without adequate guarantees that the
organization will respect international humanitarian law is a breach of this
obligation. If in these circumstances the national contingent would breach
international humanitarian law, the troop contributing state would arguably
be responsible. The precise scope of the due diligence obligation placed on
states parties by the obligation to ensure respect needs fleshing out by state
practice. There is presently very little practice to support this theory of troop
contributing responsibility for breaches of international humanitarian law, but
more generally the theory that a state can be responsible for the transfer of
competences to an international organization is supported by human rights
case-law.
State practice concerning international responsibility in respect of NATO
peace support operations is rare if not non-existent. Claims settlement proced-
ures govern private and not international law claims. International procedures
arising out of Operation Allied Force (Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 1999)
are instructive because the command and control relationships in that operation
were similar to those in peace support operations. In both cases the troops
involved were national troops placed at the disposal of the organization and
under the command and control of a NATO commander, whowas subordinate
to the North Atlantic Council.
During the proceedings in the Bankovic´ case (ECHR) and the Legality of the
Use of Force cases (ICJ), the applicants and respondents put forward ob-
servations concerning possible bases of attribution of conduct of troops in-
volved in Operation Allied Force. The theories put forward in the Legality of
the Use of Force cases are especially interesting because the Court may have
occasion to address them at the merits stage, although it appears unlikely the
case will reach this stage. In contrast, the European Court of Human Rights
declared the application by Bankovic´ inadmissible without addressing the
question of attribution of conduct. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia appears
to have argued two separate grounds of attribution to member states in the
Use of Force cases. One is that the respondents used their military forces for
bombing, and that the military forces are organs of the state and their acts
are attributable to the state. This argument can only be made under the as-
Findings and conclusions 341
sumption that either the North Atlantic Treaty Organization does not have
international legal personality, or that the national troops were not effectively
placed under the direction and control of the organization and acted in fact
on behalf of the states. If the ICJ would accept the latter assumption in its
judgment, and considering that the command and control relationships in
peace support operations are similar, this would argue against the organization
being responsible for conduct of national contingents in peace support opera-
tions on the basis of direction and control over the contingents on an analogy
with draft article 6 of the ILC draft articles.
The second argumentmade by the applicant is that the actions of the NATO
command structure are imputable jointly and severally to individual member
states. This argument was interpreted by at least one respondent state as
referring to the theories of piercing the veil of the organization. It seems to
assume that the organization has international legal personality but that its
acts are nevertheless attributable to its member states.
Conduct that is attributed to a state, or to the UN or NATO, only leads to
international responsibility if it constitutes a breach of an international obliga-
tion of the state or organization. The obligations of states under international
humanitarian law are relatively clear, in contrast to the obligations of the UN
and NATO. Practice points to the conclusion that it is accepted that the UN is
bound by a corpus of international humanitarian law norms. From the first
peace support operations, the organization assured that it would respect the
principles and spirit of international humanitarian law, and it considered itself
responsible for breaches of those principles as illustrated by the compensation
paid pursuant to claims made in connection with ONUC. In the course of time
the recognition of the scope of the obligations has developed, to the point
where the UN Secretary-General, in the Bulletin on the Observance by United
Nations Forces of International Humanitarian Law, has acknowledged that
the UN is bound by principles and rules, instead of the principles and spirit,
of international humanitarian law. It is still not clear precisely which rules
the organization considers are applicable and which are not applicable.
State practice confirms that the UN is bound by international humanitarian
law but it does not clarify the legal basis for this conclusion. Such a legal basis
is not found in international humanitarian law treaties, towhich the organiza-
tion is not and cannot become a party. It can be found under certain conditions
in the UN Charter. Under Article 24 read together with Article 1, paragraph
1, the Security Council is bound to act in conformity with international law,
except when it is acting under Chapter VII. The only possible exception to the
possibility of derogation concerns peremptory norms. If the Council derogates
from international law, it must do so expressly and unambiguously. Under
Article 24 read together with Article 1, paragraph 3, the organization is argu-
ably also bound to respect international humanitarian law. Although this article
does not provide for the possibility of derogation by the Security Council when
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it is acting under Chapter VII, a systematic reading of the Charter points to
the possibility of such an exception.
The UN is also bound by international humanitarian law as general inter-
national law. International organizations are bound by the obligations under
general international law that are attendant to their functions. The organiza-
tions are bound by international law because they partake of personality under
this system. Their obligations are circumscribed by the principle of functional-
ity, that is to say by the question of whether the obligations are necessary for
the effective exercise of the organization’s functions. The application of inter-
national humanitarian law to UN peace support operations engaged in armed
conflict is necessary in the sense that the unrestrained conduct of armed
conflict is unthinkable, and would destroy the element of crude reciprocity
that protects personnel in peace support operations. The application of inter-
national humanitarian law is also necessary for, or at least its non-application
would be greatly detrimental to, the achievement of several of the organiza-
tion’s purposes. The application of international humanitarian law to non-state
entities is not revolutionary, its application to armed groups having been
accepted. The UN and certain other international organizations have a funda-
mental characteristic in common with armed groups, namely that they are
capable of implementing the rules. In the same way as members of armed
opposition groups to which international humanitarian law applies, peace
support operation personnel are under a responsible command.
State practice does not point to the recognition by NATO or its member
states that the organization has obligations under international humanitarian
law, although there are some signs that third parties consider it has. The
attitude in the organization seems to be linked to the rejection of the idea that
the organization has international legal personality. It seems however that the
organization does have international legal personality. Under those circum-
stances it must also be bound by general international law as circumscribed
by the principle of functionality, and consequently when it engages in armed
conflict it must be bound by international humanitarian law. The application
of international humanitarian law is an obligation that is ‘attendant to’ the
organization’s deployment of peace support operations, to use the words of
the ICJ.4
In case a peace support operation becomes a party to a conflict, the regime
of international armed conflicts, not the more limited regime of non-inter-
national conflicts, is applicable. The principal reason is that because inter-
national organizations such as the UN and NATO do not enjoy sovereignty, there
is no question of deferring to sovereignty by limiting the applicable rules. The
Secretary-General’s Bulletin avoids the question by applying a uniform regime
to all cases in which peace support operation personnel becomes combatants,
4 Reparations for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion
of 11 April 1949, 1949 ICJ reports 174, at 180.
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following a trend to blur the distinction between international and non-inter-
national conflicts. As long as the distinction still plays a role, state practice
supports the application of the regime of international conflicts to peace
support operations, including in case the opponent is not a state.
In principle it seems to be accepted that the threshold of application of
international humanitarian law to peace support operations is to be determined
by the threshold in customary international law. State practice demonstrates
that hostilities involving a peace support operation need to have a relatively
high level of intensity before the operation’s personnel is considered combatant.
It cannot be excluded that the political desire to consider an operation as
impartial as long as possible plays a role in this respect.
The major part of state practice does not support the application of the
law of occupation to peace support operations. This seems to be linked to the
policy consideration that applying the law of occupationwould be detrimental
to creating ‘ownership’ of a peace process among the local authorities and
population. It is questionable whether this policy consideration leads to the
conclusion that the law of occupation is not applicable. On the contrary, this
regime seems to provide a much-needed legal framework. In addition, the
Security Council can derogate from specific rules if necessary.
There is a close relationship between the limited number of instances in
which international responsibility for the conduct of peace support operations
has actually been invoked, and an examination of the legal consequences of
the conduct. In principle prior invocation of responsibility is not necessary
for legal consequences to arise. Legal consequences flow automatically from
an internationally wrongful act. This is underlined in the ILC draft articles on
state responsibility that state the consequences of an wrongful act in terms
of general international obligations of the responsible state and not as specific
rights of an injured party.5 Without invocation of responsibility, however,
it is frequently unclearwhethermeasures taken by an author state or organiza-
tion must be considered as legal consequences of an internationally wrongful
act.
On the whole, state practice does not contradict the application of the
provisions in the ILC draft articles on state responsibility concerning legal
consequences to UN peace support operations. Exceptions are certain forms
of satisfaction, specifically disciplinary or penal action against individuals.
The exercise of disciplinary and penal jurisdiction by troop contributing states
is a consequence of a delegation by the UN, which does not have a full fledged
judicial system, to the troop contributing states.
Expressions of apology by SFOR for conduct of personnel of national con-
tingents are difficult to reconcile with arguments that NATO does not have
international legal personality and as a consequence cannot be internationally
5 D. Shelton, Righting Wrongs: Reparations in the Articles on State Responsibility, 96 American
Journal of International Law 833 (2002), at 839.
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responsible. Apart from these instances, state practice is too flimsy to base
conclusions on.
The invocation of international responsibility for breaches of international
(humanitarian) law by peace support operations presents a paradox. States
have relatively many possibilities to invoke the international responsibility
of another state or another organization. In respect of the invocation of inter-
national responsibility this is particularly the case if the state is a member of
the organization and can consequently put forward claims in the organs of
the organization inwhich it is represented. The possibilities for the invocation
of responsibility have increased as a consequence of a shift from bilateralism
to multilaterism in the law of responsibility. This new paradigm is expressed
in the ILC draft articles, which do not only allow injured states but also states
with a legal interest to invoke responsibility. Such an interest attaches to at
least some rules of international humanitarian law. This is confirmed by
commonArticle 1 of the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol I, which
in the form of a primary rule constitute a forerunner of the secondary rule
embodied in draft article 48 of the ILC draft articles. Hitherto, states have
hardly utilized the possibilities at their disposal for invoking international
responsibility for violations of international humanitarian law by peace support
operations and this is unlikely to change. Strategic considerations play a role
when states decide whether or not to invoke responsibility. In addition, the
multilateral element of international responsibility is weighted in favor of an
institutional, particularly a UN, response that is unlikely in case this organiza-
tion has a stake in the matter because it has established or authorized the
operation concerned.
An individual on the other hand has very few effective possibilities to
invoke international responsibility for a violation of international humanitarian
law by a peace support operation, though it is likely that many individuals
wouldmake use of this possibility if it were available. The law of responsibility
and specifically the ILC draft articles neglect the individual, although this was
not the case at the beginning of the ILC project.6 Although the individual can
be said to have individual rights under international humanitarian law, this
does not automatically imply that he can invoke a breach of those rights either
directly under international law or indirectly under domestic law or through
claims settlement mechanisms. In this respect Article 3 of the Hague Conven-
tion (IV) 1907 does not provide lex specialis as is sometimes asserted.
Domestic procedures (where available), claims settlement procedures
created specifically for peace support operations, and human rightsmonitoring
bodies do not effectivelymitigate this lack of legal protection of the individual.
This is problematic for the individuals concerned but also for peace support
6 E. BrownWeiss, Invoking State Responsibility in the Twenty-First Century, 96 American Journal
of International Law 798 (2002).
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operations, as they risk losing much of their legitimacy, a loss that is likely
to have a negative impact on the achievement of their mandate.
Although a right to a remedy for individuals under international human-
itarian law has not (yet) been recognized, there is considerable logical force
to establishing mechanisms for individuals to invoke the responsibility and
accountability of states and international organizations for breaches of inter-
national humanitarian law by peace support operations. First, this is a logical
next step after the recognition that individuals are right-holders, and notmere
beneficiaries, under international humanitarian law. An individual right
without a remedy is likely to be illusory. Secondly, the lack of a complaint
mechanism diminishes the legitimacy of the international organizations con-
cerned as well as the operational effectiveness of peace support operations,
as they require the support of the local population in their area of operations.
This study proposes the establishment of a permanent claims commission
based on Article 51 of the United Nations Model Status of Forces Agreement.
The commission would be able to receive claims of a private law nature as
well as claims of breaches of international humanitarian law by UN peace
support operations. It would be able to consider complaints against the UN
and troop contributing states, depending on the entity to which the conduct
complained of was attributable.
The establishment of a similar mechanism in respect of NATO peace support
operations is also proposed. This proposal could be introduced in the present
negotiations on an out-of-area claims policy for the organization. The com-
mission would be able to receive complaints against the organization as well
as against troop contributing states. If the organization continues on the other
hand to organize claims settlement mechanisms on the model of the SFOR
claims commissions, it is proposed that it change the policy that all combat-
related claims are inadmissible, because this includes claims for alleged viola-
tions of international humanitarian law.
In addition to permanent claims commissions, this study proposes the
establishment of an ombudsperson in UN and NATO peace support operations.
Such an ombudsperson could achieve broader objectives of accountability than
claims commissions that are only concernedwith its responsibility component.
An ombudsperson is also an appropriate institution for further exploring which
rules of international humanitarian law can only be applied mutatis mutandis
by international organization, and the nature of the mutation required.
2 MAIN CONCLUSIONS
The proposal for amechanism enabling individuals to invoke the international
responsibility of the UN and NATO under international humanitarian law
implies that these organizations are responsible for their internationallywrong-
ful acts. It has long been recognized that the UN is capable of being inter-
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nationally responsible.7 This study demonstrates that in principle NATO can
also be internationally responsible. It has provided a theoretical basis for the
responsibility of international organizations that is centered on their inter-
national legal personality and on the purposes of international responsibility,
in particular the purpose of upholding the rule of law in the interest of the
international community as a whole. The practice in respect of UN peace
support operations examined demonstrates that the principles of state respons-
ibility in the ILC draft articles on state responsibility can in most cases be
applied to international organizationswithout any changes. On the other hand
it must be recognized that the state practice examined is limited and only
relates to one type of activity and that consequently its importance for the
ILC’s work on the responsibility of international organizations should not be
overestimated. This is also the case because the practice examined does not
resolve the controversial question of whether member states of an international
organization are responsible for the conduct of that organization, and if they
are subject to which conditions, though it was established that member state
responsibility is not concurrent.
The pivotal role that international legal personality plays in international
law was demonstrated. The international legal personality of international
organizations, that is to say their capacity to have rights and obligations under
international law, is the basis for holding international organizations respons-
ible. The international legal personality of international organizations is also
central to determining their rights and obligations under international law.
General international law applies to them precisely because they partake of
personality under the system of international law, and its application is circum-
scribed by the functional nature of the personality concerned. Consequently,
it is important to establish whether an international organization has inter-
national legal personality. It is insufficient to state that it “is generally recog-
nized that organizations have such capacity, unless there is clear evidence to
the contrary”,8 as the case of the NATO illustrates. In this respect it may be
recalled that the subjective theory of international legal personality seemsmore
acceptable than the objective theory. On either theory, however, NATO is an
international legal person.
This study has demonstrated that international humanitarian law is applic-
able to UN peace support operations, as well as to NATO peace support opera-
tions. Many of its findings on aspects of application of international human-
itarian law to UN peace support operations were also observed by Seyersted
7 E.g. P. de Visscher, Observations sur le Fondement et la Mise en Oeuvre du Principe de la
Responsabilité de l’Organisation des Nations Unies, 23 Annales de Droit et de Sciences Politiques
133 (1963).
8 H. Schermers & N. Blokker, International Institutional Law: Unity Within Diversity 980
(1995)
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several decades ago,9 but to arrive at those observations he could not refer
tomuch of thematerial that has been discussed abovewhich strengthens these
observations. This includes in particular the Secretary-General’s Bulletin on
Observance by United Nations Forces of International Humanitarian Law,
though it may be recalled that Seyersted noted the need for internal regulations
for UN forces that could be enacted by the Secretary-General.10 In other
respects this study refines the analysis, for example in respect of the threshold
of application of international humanitarian law, or departs from Seyersted’s
observations. The latter concerns in particular the theoretical basis for the
applicability of international humanitarian law, which this study considers
from the broader perspective of the place of international organizations, and
the United Nations in particular, in international law. It also concerns other
elements such as the finding that the Geneva Conventions and Additional
Protocol I are not open to accession by international organizations. The main
conclusion in respect of international humanitarian law is that customary rules
are applicable to peace support operations mutatis mutandis. This study does
not include a detailed examination of the customary character of rules of
international humanitarian law. In any case such an examination could not
expect to be as detailed as the study that the ICRC intends to publish.Moreover,
international organizations are not precluded from respecting rules that are
not customary international law. International humanitarian law generally
encourages the voluntary acceptance of obligations.11
The legal position of the individual under international humanitarian law
is more ambiguous than that of international organizations as referred to above,
and this has important consequences for his legal protection under international
humanitarian law, including against breaches of that law by peace support
operations. On the one hand, it is accepted that individuals have obligations
under international humanitarian law, and the enforcement of these obligations
has been one of the focal points of international law in recent years. Two ad
hoc international criminal tribunals and a permanent International Criminal
Court have been established to enforce these obligations. On the other hand,
the rights of individuals under international humanitarian law have received
much less attention, though this field of law does grant rights to individuals.
It is disputed by some that this makes individuals subjects of international
law, because being a subject of international law would require that rights
can be enforced at the international level. This however also applies to a certain
extent to international organizations, whose character as subjects of inter-
national law is not disputed even though, for example, they do not have
standing before the ICJ. More importantly, this is only one dimension of the
problem. It seems to be rather futile to give individuals rights without effective
9 F. Seyersted, United Nations Forces in the Laws of Peace and War (1966).
10 Id., at 419.
11 See common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions.
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mechanisms to which individuals can turn to have these rights enforced, which
as this study demonstrated is the case in respect of breaches of international
humanitarian law by peace support operations. There is much force to
Aldrich’s plea formore attention for efforts to improve the ability of individual
victims to enforce their rights.12 It seems particularly appropriate to start these
efforts in respect of peace support operations, as has been done in this study
through proposals for establishing remedial mechanisms. The establishment
of peace support operations is often justified at least in part in reference to
the protection of individuals, and accepting these proposals would contribute
to that objective, as well as create a best practice that statesmight be persuaded
to follow outside the specific context of peace support operations.
This course of action is ultimately in the interest of the organizations that
establish peace support operations, as has been argued throughout this study.
An international organization that asserts its own responsibility and, more
broadly, its accountability, also asserts its independence in decision-making
in general,13 and unity of command in peace support operations in particular.
Moreover, this course of action substantially contributes to the legitimacy of
these international organizations and of the activities that their member states
and civil society at large expect these organizations to perform.
12 G. Aldrich, Individuals as Subjects of International Humanitarian Law, in J. Makarczyk (Ed.),
Theory of International Law at the Threshold of the 21st centruy: Essays in Honour of
Krzysztof Skubiszewski 851 (1996).
13 P. Klein, supra note 2, at 626.
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VERANTWOORDELIJKHEID ONDER HET HUMANITAIR OORLOGSRECHT VOOR VN-
EN NAVO-VREDESOPERATIES
Deze studie heeft als uitgangspunt de noodzaak van nieuw onderzoek naar
de relatie tussen Humanitair Oorlogsrecht (HOR) en vredesondersteunende
operaties. De onderzoeksvraag is wat de omvang en inhoud van aansprakelijk-
heid en accountability1 voor schendingen vanHOR door vredesondersteunende
operaties is. Daarbij gaat het om de aansprakelijkheid en accountability van
staten en internationale organisaties, niet van individuen. De centrale onder-
zoeksvraag kan in drie subvragen worden onderverdeeld. De eerste is aan
welke rechtspersoon het handelen of nalaten van een vredesondersteunende
operatie moet worden toegerekend. De tweede subvraag is in hoeverre regels
van HOR van toepassing zijn op staten en internationale organisaties die
deelnemen aan vredesondersteunende operaties. In dit verband is onder andere
van belang de bijzondere status van de Veiligheidsraad van de Verenigde
Naties (VN). Ten derde, wie is gerechtigd om de aansprakelijkheid en account-
ability voor schendingen van HOR door vredesondersteunende operaties in te
roepen? Het onderwerp van studie is vredesondersteunende operaties onder
bevel van de VN of van de Noord-Atlantische Verdragsorganisatie (NAVO).
Deze twee organisaties dominerenmomenteel (nog) het veld van vredesonder-
steunende operaties. Aantijgingen dat ONUC, UNOSOM en KFOR HOR hebben
geschonden tonen aan dat de schending van HOR door vredesondersteunende
operaties niet louter hypothetisch is. Het eerste deel van deze studie gaat in
op de toerekening van gedrag van vredesondersteunende operaties. Het tweede
deel behandelt de toepasselijkheid van HOR op vredesondersteunende operaties.
Het derde en laatste deel bevat een analyse van de bestaande mogelijkheden
voor het inroepen van de aansprakelijkheid en accountability van vredesonder-
steunende operaties voor schendingen van HOR, aangevuld met voorstellen
voor het verbeteren van deze mogelijkheden.
Aan de uitdrukking ‘vredesondersteunende operatie’ wordt verschillend
inhoud gegeven. Dit houdt verband met de ad hoc-wijze waarop dit soort
1 Kort gezegd is ‘accountability’ het ‘verantwoording verschuldigd zijn voor het uitoefenen
van bevoegdheden’.
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operaties zich heeft ontwikkeld. Principes ontwikkeld naar aanleiding van
UNEF hebben een grote rol gespeeld in de ontwikkeling van vredesondersteu-
nende operaties. Deze principeswarenmet name: instemming van het gastland;
onpartijdigheid; en alleen geweldgebruik voor zelfverdediging. Het Internatio-
naal Gerechtshof (IGH)maakte in haar AdvisoryOpinion in deCertain Expenses-
zaak onderscheid tussen ‘coercive or enforcement action’ en vredesondersteu-
nende operaties als UNEF en ONUC. Deze laatste waren in tegenstelling tot de
eerste ‘set up with the consent of the nations concerned’. Tot het einde van
de jaren 80 van de twintigste eeuw waren deze principes vrijwel onverkort
van toepassing. Daarna trad er verandering op. ‘AnAgenda for Peace’ uit 1992
bevatte een aantal voorstellen die van de principes afweken en deze voorstellen
beïnvloedden vredesondersteunende operaties die in de jaren daarna in het
leven werden geroepen, UNPROFOR en UNOSOM II. Deze operaties kregen op
basis van hoofdstuk VII van het VN-Handvest de bevoegdheid om geweld te
gebruiken voor bepaalde andere doeleinden dan zelfverdediging en weken
af van het vereiste van instemming van de betrokken partijen. Toen deze
operaties grote tegenslagen kenden volgde een hernieuwde aandacht voor
de oorspronkelijke principes binnen de VN, weerspiegeld in het Supplement
to an Agenda for Peace uit 1995. Daarin bepleitte de Secretaris-Generaal van
de VN (SGVN) een grotere rol voor regionale organisaties in operaties in een
hoger geweldsspectrum. Sindsdien heeft het uitvoeren van vredesonder-
steunende operaties door regionale organisaties, met name de NAVO, een grote
vlucht genomen. Sinds 1998 is ook de VN weer actiever geworden bij het
creëren van vredesondersteunende operaties, in sommige gevallen met een
beperkt mandaat onder hoofdstuk VII. In 2000 presenteerde een panel, in het
leven geroepen door de SGVN, een rapport waarin aan de ene kant de traditio-
nele principes worden onderschreven maar waarin aan de andere kant wordt
gepleit voor robuust optreden door VN vredesondersteunende operaties (het
zogenaamde Brahimi-rapport).
In verband met de bovenstaande ontwikkelingen is een wildgroei aan
‘vredes’-termen ontstaan, waarvan de precieze inhoud wordt betwist. Deze
studie gebruikt de uitdrukking ‘vredesondersteunende operaties’ (peace support
operations).Deze omvat operaties die voldoen aan de drie traditionele criteria.
Mede inbegrepen zijn operaties waarin instemming van de partijen niet com-
pleet is. Hoewel instemming vaak niet absoluut zal zijn, onderscheidt het
bewust nastreven van instemming vredesondersteunende operaties van ‘en-
forcement’. Op deze manier vallen sommige operaties met de bevoegdheid
onder hoofdstuk VII van het VN-Handvest tot gebruik van geweld, ook onder
het begrip vredesondersteunende operatie. Uitgesloten zijn operaties zoals
omschreven door het IGH in deCertain Expenses-zaak als ‘preventive or enforce-
ment measures against any state under Chapter VII’; in dat geval is er geheel
geen instemming.
Vredesondersteunende operaties bestaan uit troepen geleverd door staten.
Internationale organisaties hebben geen eigen troepen. Voor wat betreft VN-
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operaties worden over de juridische status van deze nationale contingenten
afspraken gemaakt tussen de VN en de zendstaat, meestal door middel van
een formele briefwisseling. De SGVN heeft een model opgesteld voor zulke
afspraken. In principe worden tussen de VN en het gastland ook afspraken
gemaakt over de status van de operatie, in een zogenaamd Status of Forces
Agreement (SOFA). Ook hiervan is een model opgesteld door de SGVN. Natio-
nale contingentenworden integraal onderdeel van de organisatie als deel van
een subsidiair orgaan, zoals bevestigd door het IGH in de Certain Expenses-zaak
ten aanzien van ONUC. Een VN-vredesmacht staat onder bevel van de SGVN.
De SGVN is bevoegd om operationele beslissingen te nemen. Zendstaten behou-
den slechts bepaalde administratieve bevoegdheden en exclusieve strafrechtelij-
ke rechtsmacht. De bevoegdheden van de SGVN worden namens hem uitge-
oefend door een commandant van de operatie die is aangesteld door de VN,
of dezeworden uitgeoefend door een Speciale Vertegenwoordiger van de SGVN.
De VN kent geen uniform systeemvoor de benaming van bevelsverhoudingen
zoals de NAVO en om die reden is de precieze benaming en inhoud van de
bevelsverhouding tussen de internationale commandant en nationale contingen-
ten een bron van verwarring. In een aantal gevallen geven nationale autoritei-
ten instructies aan hun nationale contingent, in strijd met de afspraken tussen
dat land en de VN daarover.
De juridische status van iedere NAVO vredesondersteunende operatie is
per operatie in verschillende documenten vastgelegd, al zijn er overeenkomsten
tussen de regeling van de status van verschillende operaties, vaak gebaseerd
op bestaande NAVO-procedures en -afspraken. SOFA’s over de juridische status
van de door de VN Veiligheidsraad geautoriseerde en door de NAVO in het
leven geroepen Implementation Force (IFOR) in Bosnië-Herzegovina werden
in 1995 gesloten tussen de NAVO en Bosnië-Herzegovina, Kroatië en de Federale
Republiek Joegoslavië (FRJ). In tegenstelling tot de claims van een aantal
auteurs moet de IFOR, net als de rechtsopvolger SFOR, worden gezien als een
subsidiair orgaan van de NAVO. De operatie is in het leven geroepen door de
Noord Atlantische Raad (NAR) als orgaan van de NAVO en staat onder bevel
van een NAVO-commandant. De NAVO heeft ook verdragen gesloten ten behoe-
ve van de IFOR.
Ook de Kosovo Force (KFOR) werd in het leven geroepen door de NAVO,
daartoe geautoriseerd door de VNVR in Resolutie 1244. KFOR staat onder bevel
van een NAVO-commandant. Deze commandant is uiteindelijk verantwoording
verschuldigd aan de NAR en oefent zogenaamde ‘operational control’ uit over
nationale contingenten, met uitzondering van het Russische contingent. De
NAVO of haar vertegenwoordigers hebben verdragen gesloten ten behoeve van
KFOR, waaronder eenMilitary Technical Agreement met de FRJ en Servië. Ook
KFOR is een subsidiair orgaan van de NAVO.
In doctrine en de statenpraktijk wordt staatsaansprakelijkheid beschouwd als
het gevolg van de inbreuk op, of het niet-nakomen van, een internationale
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verplichting van een staat. Internationale aansprakelijkheid is de uitdrukking
voor de nieuwe juridische verhoudingen die het gevolg zijn van de niet-na-
koming van een internationale verplichting. Het basisbeginsel van internatio-
nale aansprakelijkheid is geformuleerd in de artikelen 1 en 2 van de ontwerp-
artikelen inzake staatsaansprakelijkheid van de VN International Law Commis-
sion (ILC).
Deze ontwerpartikelen onderstrepen onder meer dat staatsaansprakelijkheid
nauw verbonden is met internationale rechtspersoonlijkheid: het bestaan van
een internationale verplichting is een voorwaarde voor staatsaansprakelijkheid
en een staat is in staat internationale verplichtingen te hebben omdat deze
internationale rechtspersoonlijkheid bezit. Dit verband blijkt voor wat betreft
de VN impliciet uit de Reparations for Injuries-uitspraak van het IGH. In 2002
zette de ILC het onderwerp aansprakelijkheid van internationale organisaties
op haar agenda.
Aandacht voor de aansprakelijkheid van internationale organisaties wordt
onder meer aangewakkerd door toenemende interesse voor accountability. Het
begrip is uitgebreid bestudeerd door het Comité inzake de accountability van
internationale organisaties van de International Law Association (ILA). Deze
studie maakt duidelijk dat ‘accountability’ een ruimer begrip is dan aansprake-
lijkheid. Accountability van internationale organisaties wordt hoe langer hoe
meer gezien vanuit het perspectief van het individu in plaats van de lidstaat,
gekoppeld aan een toenemende erkenning van rechtspersoonlijkheid van het
individu.
In het internationaal recht wordt internationale rechtspersoonlijkheid gedefi-
nieerd als het vermogen om rechten en plichten onder internationaal recht
te hebben. Staten hebben per definitie internationale rechtspersoonlijkheid,
internationale organisaties niet. Daarom is het noodzakelijk om vast te stellen
of de VN en de NAVO internationale rechtspersonen zijn. Het IGH heeft in de
Reparations for Injuries-zaak bepaald dat de VN internationale rechtspersoon-
lijkheid bezit. Er bestaan twee theorieën over de verkrijging van internationale
rechtspersoonlijkheid. Volgens de objectieve leer ontstaat er rechtspersoonlijk-
heid als aan bepaalde objectieve vereisten is voldaan. Volgens de subjectieve
leer is de expliciete of impliciete wil van de lidstaten beslissend. Toepassing
van de ene zowel als de andere theorie leidt tot de conclusie dat de NAVO
internationale rechtspersoonlijkheid bezit.
De ontwerpartikelen inzake staatsaansprakelijkheid van de ILC bevatten
onder meer regels over de toerekening van handelen of nalaten aan staten
(met name de artikelen 4, 6, 7 en 8), die relevant zijn voor de toerekening van
het gedrag van vredesondersteunende operaties. Bij afwezigheid van uitgebrei-
de praktijk op het gebied van de aansprakelijkheid van internationale organisa-
ties wordt er doorgaans vanuit gegaan dat de principes van staatsaansprakelijk-
heid ook van toepassing zijn op internationale organisaties. Dit is in overeen-
stemmingmet het eerder gelegde verband tussen internationale rechtspersoon-
lijkheid en aansprakelijkheid. Eén van de belangrijkste functies van het feno-
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meen aansprakelijkheid is de bescherming van de rechtsorde tegen inbreuken
op die orde. De internationale rechtsordewordt op dezelfdemanier aangetast
door een inbreuk gepleegd door een internationale organisatie als door een
staat. De juridische basis voor de toepassing van de kern van de regels van
staatsaansprakelijkheid op internationale organisaties is het gewoonterechtelijk
karakter van deze regels. Een internationale organisatie die op het internatio-
nale toneel verschijnt, is gebonden aan de daar geldende regels. Het toepassen
van het rechtsregime van staatsaansprakelijkheid is ook aantrekkelijk omdat
dit regime al relatief ontwikkeld is. Niet alle regels van staatsaansprakelijkheid
kunnen echter op internationale organisaties worden toegepast vanwege de
verschillen tussen staten en internationale organisaties. Met andere woorden,
de regels moeten mutatis mutandis worden toegepast.
Verschillende theorieën zijn in de literatuur geponeerd over aansprakelijk-
heid van lidstaten voor het gedrag van een internationale organisatie. Sommige
hiervan stellen dat onder bepaalde omstandigheden een staat aansprakelijk
is voor handelen of nalaten van de organisatie dat inbreuk maakt op een
verplichting van de lidstaat. Volgens andere is een lidstaat onder bepaalde
omstandigheden aansprakelijk voor handelen of nalaten van de organisatie
dat een inbreukmaakt op een verplichting van de organisatie zelf; met andere
woorden, de gehele onrechtmatige daad wordt toegerekend aan de staat. De
meeste schrijvers zijn het erover eens dat het erom gaat onschuldige derde
partijen te beschermen: wanneer de aansprakelijkheid van lidstaten duidelijk
is beperkt in het constitutionele instrument van de organisatie kan dit aan
derden worden tegengeworpen.
Rechterlijke uitspraken over dezematerie zijn gedaan in zaken betreffende
de Internationale Tin Raad (ITC) en de Arabische Organisatie voor Industriali-
satie (AOI). De laatste was een arbitragezaak naar aanleiding van de liquidatie
van de AOI. Het arbitragetribunaal bepaalde, op basis van algemene rechts-
beginselen en goede trouw, dat het feit dat de AOI een internationale rechts-
persoonwas niet noodzakelijkerwijze uitsloot dat de lidstaten ook aansprakelijk
waren. De vraag of de lidstaten aansprakelijk konden zijn moest worden
beantwoord door naar de oprichtingsinstrumenten van de AOI te kijken. Nu
deze aansprakelijkheid niet expliciet of impliciet uitsloten, waren de lidstaten
aansprakelijk. Het Tribunaal stelde dat ook relevant was dat de lidstaten in
feite de controle uitoefenden over de AOI.
De ITC-zaken waren zaken gevoerd tegen lidstaten van de ITC voor Britse
gerechten naar aanleiding van het failliet van de ITC. De crediteuren vingen
tot aan de House of Lords bot. De Britse rechters baseerden zich met name
op Engels recht in hun uitspraken en deden tegenstrijdige uitspraken over
het al dan niet bestaan van een regel dat lidstaten subsidiair aansprakelijk
zijn voor de schulden van ‘hun’ internationale organisatie.
Bij afwezigheid van een (duidelijke) internationaal-gewoonterechtelijke
regel of algemeen beginsel van internationaal recht op dit gebied doen veel
schrijvers een beroep op beleidsargumenten. Dit was ook het geval voor het
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Institut de Droit International, dat van 1989 tot 1995 de ‘legal consequences
formember states of the non-fulfilment by international organizations of their
obligations toward third parties’ bestudeerde. In de resolutie die het Institut
over dit onderwerp aannam, wordt gesteld dat er geen algemene regel van
internationaal recht bestaat volgens welke lidstaten aansprakelijk zijn voor
tekortkoming in de nakoming van de verplichtingen van de organisatie louter
op basis van hun lidmaatschap van een internationale organisatie. Demogelijk-
heid dat lidstaten onder bepaalde specifieke omstandigheden (zoals misbruik
van recht of berusting) wel aansprakelijk zijn, werd echter niet uitgesloten.
HOR bevat een aantal lex specialis-regels over toerekening. De eerste is
Artikel 3 van de Haagse Conventie (IV) van 1907, dat alle handelen van de
strijdkrachten aan een staat toerekent. Hetzelfde geldt voor Artikel 91 van het
eerste Aanvullende Protocol van 1977 (AP I).
De travaux préparatoires laten zien dat Artikel 3 van de Haagse Conventie
(IV) van 1907 geen recht voor individuen schiep om uit eigen naam een schen-
ding van rechten in te roepen. Het overgrote deel van jurisprudentie en doc-
trine bevestigt deze conclusie.
Er bestaat een beperkte hoeveelheid statenpraktijk betreffende toerekening
van het handelen en nalaten van VN vredesondersteunende operaties. Naar
aanleiding van beschuldigingen van schendingen van het HOR door ONUC
betaalde de VN lump sums aan verschillende landen, waarbij de SGVN onder
meer aangaf dat de VN niet aansprakelijk was voor schade veroorzaakt door
derden. Sindsdien heeft de VN procedures voor de afhandeling van civielrechte-
lijke claims tegen vredesondersteunende operaties gecreëerd. In de praktijk
gebeurt dit door een ‘local claims review board’ bestaande uit vertegenwoor-
digers van de VN-operatie. Deze boards nemen geen claims in behandeling
voor handelen of nalaten van leden van een operatie dat ‘off duty’ is. De
belangrijkste factor om te bepalen of er sprake is van een ‘off duty’-situatie
is of de persoon in kwestie handelde in een ‘non-official/non-operational
capacity when the incident occurred’. De SGVN ging in een rapport uit 1996
nader in op de claims-procedures. Daarin stelde hij dat de internationale
aansprakelijkheid van de VN voor de activiteiten van VN vredesondersteunende
operaties een kenmerk is van haar rechtspersoonlijkheid en een afspiegeling
van het beginsel van staatsaansprakelijkheid. Hij stelde dat de claimsproce-
dures een erkenning waren van de internationale aansprakelijkheid van de
VN. Het rapport maakte een onderscheid tussen aansprakelijkheid voor de
‘ordinary operation’ en ‘combat-related activities’ van een VN-operatie. De
laatste is gebaseerd op de principes en regels van het HOR. De internationale
aansprakelijkheid van de VN voor combat-related-activiteiten van VN-operaties
is gebaseerd op de veronderstelling dat deze onder het exclusieve bevel van
de VN staan. Met andere woorden, toerekening is gebaseerd op (effectieve)
controle. De suggestie van de SGVN aan de AVVN ommede-aansprakelijkheid
van de zendstaat van een lid van een VN-operatie te erkennen wanneer die
het HOR schendt, is tegen dovemansoren gezegd.
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In een zaak voor de Oostenrijkse rechter bepaalde deze dat de soldaat in
kwestie als een orgaan van de VN had gehandeld en dat zijn handelen daarom
niet aan Oostenrijk kon worden toegerekend. In een zaak betreffende een
onrechtmatige daad voor de Britse rechter (Nissan v. Attorney-General) hielden
de lagere gerechten dat de handelingen van Britse leden van een VN vredes-
ondersteunende operatie toegerekend moesten worden aan de VN, op basis
van hun onderbevelstelling van de VN. De House of Lords echter besliste dat
het Verenigd Koninkrijk wel aansprakelijk was, omdat bij het uitvoeren van
het beleid van de VN een lidstaat haar soevereiniteit behoudt.
In Manderlier tegen België bepaalden Belgische gerechten dat België niet
aansprakelijk was voor schade veroorzaakt door het Ethiopische contingent
in ONUC.
De hierboven beschreven statenpraktijk laat zien dat de VN en staten
accepteren dat handelen of nalaten van VN vredesondersteunende operaties
wordt toegerekend aan de VN. In dit verband moeten de claimsprocedures
worden gezien als een ‘local remedy’ die moet worden uitgeput voordat een
claim kan worden ingediend tegen de VN. Wanneer deze er niet zou zijn, zou
er een ‘denial of justice’ zijn. Deze procedures betreffen dus niet claims onder
internationaal recht, maar zij gebruikenwel principes en regels van internatio-
nale aansprakelijkheid, zoals gesteld in het rapport van de SGVN uit 1996. Uit
dit rapport spreekt de erkenning dat toerekening is gebaseerd op controle.
Ditzelfde principe is ook gebruikt in de hierboven beschreven zaken die
werden beslist door nationale gerechten, hoewel deze zaken werden beslist
op basis van nationaal en niet internationaal recht.
De beschreven statenpraktijk is een toepassing van de regel in art 6 van
de ILC ontwerpartikelen inzake staatsaansprakelijkheid op de VN. Dit blijkt
onder meer uit het feit dat dit artikel is opgesteld onder andere onder verwij-
zing naar de praktijk van VN vredesondersteunende operaties. In de context
van toepassing van deze regel schept een bepaling in een overeenkomst tussen
de VN en een zendstaat dat de troepen onder bevel van de VN zullen staan
een presumptie dat hun gedrag toerekenbaar is aan de VN. Deze presumptie
is weerlegbaar. Statenpraktijk bevat geen voorbeeld van toerekening van
handelen of nalaten aan een lidstaat enkel omdat deze lidstaat is, maar biedt
aan de andere kant geen fundament voor de conclusie dat deze mogelijkheid
is uitgesloten, hooguit dat deze subsidiair is. Hetzelfde geldt voor toerekening
aan zendstaten.
Statenpraktijk laat zien dat de regel in artikel 7 van de ILC ontwerpartikelen
betreffende toerekening van ultra vires-handelen ookwordt toegepast op gedrag
van VN vredesondersteunende operaties. De verdergaande regel in Artikel
3 Haagse Conventie IV (1907) en Artikel 91 AP I wordt niet toegepast. Dit is
terecht, omdat de structuur (met name disciplinaire bevoegdheid van de
commandant) van de strijdkrachten van een staat, die ten grondslag ligt aan
de laatstgenoemde regel, niet aanwezig is bij VN-operaties.
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Artikel 1 van de Verdragen van Genève en van AP I verplicht partijen om
de verdragen te respecteren en te doen respecteren. Statenpraktijk en doctrine
interpreteert de verplichting om te doen respecteren overwegend als een
verplichting voor staten om bij te dragen aan respect door andere entiteiten
voor de verdragen. Het is verdedigbaar dat Artikel 1 een verplichting oplegt
aan staten die partij zijn bij de verdragen om stappen te nemen om te voor-
komen dat een VN vredesondersteunende operatie het HOR respecteert en dat
staten aansprakelijk zouden kunnen zijn als zij dit onvoldoende doen. Hoe
ver deze ‘due diligence’-verplichting precies reikt is niet helemaal duidelijk.
Hoewel het Internationale Comité van het Rode Kruis (ICRC) de bovenstaan-
de redenering heeft toegepast op troepenleverende staten aan VN-operaties,
is er verder geen statenpraktijk. Toch is de redenering volledig in overeenstem-
mingmet de principes van staatsaansprakelijkheid enmet de huidige interpre-
tatie van Artikel 1 van de Verdragen van Genève en AP I. Ook past deze
redenering in de trendwaarinmensenrechtenorganen staatsaansprakelijkheid
voor de overdracht van bevoegdheden aan een internationale organisatie, die
vervolgens een inbreuk maakt op mensenrechten, niet uitsluiten. Deze trend
is met name ingezet door de (voormalige) Europese Commissie en het Hof
voor de Rechten van deMens (EHRM). Belangrijke zaken in dit verbandwaren
M & Co. t. Duitsland en Matthews t. het Verenigd Koninkrijk.
Statenpraktijk betreffende de toerekening van gedrag van NAVO vredes-
ondersteunende operaties is er weinig. Claimsprocedures die zijn gecreëerd
voor NAVO vredesondersteunende operaties zijn niet noodzakelijkerwijze een
afspiegeling van internationale regels. In de zaken aangespannen door de FRJ
tegen NAVO-landen voor het IGH (de zogenaamde ‘Use of Force’-zaken) en in
de Bankovic´-zaak voor het EHRM ging het niet om handelen van een vredes-
ondersteunende operatie. Ook is in deze zaken (nog) geen uitspraak gedaan
over toerekening. Toch zijn de argumenten die partijen hebben gebruikt
leerzaam, omdat de bevelsverhouding in Operatie Allied Force nauw over-
eenkomt met die in NAVO vredesondersteunende operaties. In deUse of Force-
zaken stelde de FRJ in eerste instantie dat de NAVO-troepen organen van de
zendstaten bleven, maar legde niet uit of dit het geval was omdat de NAVO
geen rechtspersoon is of omdat lidstaten controle uitoefenden over de troepen.
In een latere fase van de zaak beargumenteerde de FRJ dat NAVO-lidstaten
‘jointly and severally’ aansprakelijkwaren voor het gedrag van ‘hun’ organisa-
tie, een argument dat lijkt te zijn ontleend aan de ITC-zaken. Het spreekt voor
zich dat een eventuele uitspraak van het IGH op dit punt van groot belang
zal zijn. In de Bankovic´-zaak stelden de klagers dat NAVO-lidstaten ‘jointly and
severally’ aansprakelijk waren voor een bombardement door niet nader geïden-
tificeerde NAVO-vliegtuigen. Deze conclusie berustte naar het schijnt op twee
handelingen die volgens de klagers toerekenbaar waren aan de staten. De
eerste was de beslissing van lidstaten in de NAR om tot bombarderen over
te gaan. Dit is een toepassing van het principe in artikel 16 van de ILC-ontwerp-
artikelen inzake staatsaansprakelijkheid, dat stelt dat een staat die een andere
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staat helpt bij het plegen van een internationaal-onrechtmatige daad aansprake-
lijk is. De tweede was de overdracht van bevoegdheden door staten aan de
internationale organisatie. In dit verband werd verwezen naar onder andere
de M & Co.-zaak.
De VN noch de NAVO zijn partij bij HOR-verdragen. De tekst van de toetredings-
bepalingen in de Haagse Verdragen van 1907, de Verdragen van Genève van
1949 en AP I, in samenhang met de travaux préparatoires van de laatste, sluiten
dit ook uit. Dit geldt ook voor de tekst van de Haagse Conventie ter Bescher-
ming van Cultuurgoederen ten tijde van Gewapend Conflict (1954) en de
travaux préparatoires van dit verdrag.
Artikel 24 juncto Artikel 1 van het VN-Handvest bepalen dat de VN Veilig-
heidsraad (VNVR) alleen gehouden is om te handelen ‘in overeenstemming
met de beginselen van gerechtigheid en internationaal recht’ wanneer het gaat
om ‘regeling of beslechting van internationale geschillen’ en niet wanneer het
gaat om collectieve maatregelen onder Hoofdstuk VII van het Handvest. Deze
interpretatie wordt ondersteund door de travaux préparatoires van het Handvest.
Eenmogelijke uitzondering hierop vormen regels van ius cogens. De VNVR kan
dus in een specifieke resolutie onder Hoofdstuk VII regels van HOR opzijzetten,
maar moet dan wel aangeven welke regels wél van toepassing zijn om een
juridisch vacuüm te voorkomen. De travaux préparatoiresmaken duidelijk dat
Artikel 1, lid 3, van het Handvest ook afwijking door de VNVR onder hoofdstuk
VII toestaat.
De constitutionele instrumenten van de NAVO staan geen afwijking van
internationaal recht toe.
Een internationale organisatie met eigen internationale rechtspersoonlijkheid
is in beginsel gebonden aan internationaal gewoonterecht en algemene rechts-
beginselen, omdat ze deel uitmaken van de internationale rechtsorde. Zoals
het IGH stelde in de Reparations-zaak moeten staten die functies aan inter-
nationale organisaties opdragen, geacht worden die functies te hebben opgedra-
gen inclusief de verplichtingen en verantwoordelijkheden die nodig zijn voor
de effectieve uitvoering van die functies. De toepassing van het HOR is nood-
zakelijk omde functie ‘vredesondersteunende operaties’ effectief uit te voeren.
Het IGH heeft meermalen de gebondenheid van internationale organisaties
aan algemeen internationaal recht bevestigd. Het uitgangspunt dat regels die
ontwikkeld zijn voor het verkeer tussen staten ook gelden voor internationale
organisaties, tenzij de specifieke aard van internationale organisaties daaraan
in deweg staat, werd ook gehuldigd bij het ontwikkelen van het verdragsrecht
tussen staten en internationale organisaties en tussen internationale organisaties
onderling.
De toepassing van HOR op rechtssubjecten die geen staat (namelijk ge-
wapende groeperingen) zijn is niet nieuw en de stap naar toepassing op
internationale organisaties is daarom niet zo groot.
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Theorieën die kort na de TweedeWereldoorlogwerden geformuleerd over
de ongelijke toepassing van het HOR op staten en de VNworden nu nauwelijks
meer aangehangen, vooral vanwege het strikte onderscheid tussen het ius in
bello en het ius ad bellum en het reciproce karakter van het HOR in de praktijk.
Statenpraktijk laat een ontwikkeling zien naar de aanvaarding van het
beginsel dat de VN gebonden is aan HOR. Deze ontwikkeling begon met de
toezegging door de VN aan het ICRC in 1956 dat UNEF de ‘principes en geest’
van HOR instrumenten zou respecteren. Een duidelijke erkenning dat de VN
gebonden is aan HOR vormen de lump sums betaald naar aanleiding van
incidenten in ONUC. Vanaf 1992 nam de VN een bepaling op in SOFAs waarin
ze zich direct verplichtte ten opzichte van gaststaten om te verzekeren dat
de vredesondersteunende operatie in kwestie zal handelen overeenkomstig
de principes en geest van het HOR. Bepalingen in de Convention on the Safety
of United Nations and Associated Personnel (1994) lijken te bevestigen dat
een VN vredesondersteunende operatie partij bij een gewapend conflict kan
zijn en alsdan het HOR moet respecteren, maar de ambiguïteit van de belang-
rijkste bepalingen van dit verdrag laat onduidelijkheid bestaan over het punt
waarop HOR van toepassing wordt. De Secretary-General’s Bulletin on the
Observance by United Nations Forces of International Humanitarian Law
(1999) maakt duidelijk dat VN vredesondersteunende operaties gebonden zijn
aan HOR en niet alleen de beginselen en geest daarvan. Deze erkenning lijkt
te zijn gebaseerd op de erkenning dat internationaal gewoonterecht van
toepassing is. Het Statuut van de Internationaal Strafhof impliciet en het
Statuut van het Sierra Leone Tribunaal expliciet, erkennen de mogelijkheid
dat een vredesondersteunende operatie oorlogsmisdrijven pleegt.
In tegenstelling tot de VN lijkt de NAVO zichzelf niet te beschouwen als
gebonden aan HOR. Dit lijkt verbondenmet de – onjuiste – claim dat de organi-
satie geen internationaal rechtspersoon is.
Zowel wanneer de VN of de NAVO partij is bij een gewapend conflict met
een staat, als wanneer de andere partij een niet-statelijke entiteit is, is het HOR-
regime voor internationale conflicten van toepassing. In tegenstelling tot staten
hebben internationale organisaties geen territoriale soevereiniteit die de toe-
passing van een minder vergaand regime voor niet-internationale conflicten
rechtvaardigt.
In de context van vredesondersteunende operaties hangt het antwoord
op de vraag of er een gewapend conflict is af van de intensiteit van het conflict
en de mate van organisatie van de betrokken partijen. In beginsel lijkt te
worden aanvaard dat voor een vredesondersteunende operatie dezelfde
drempel geldt voordat zij kan worden beschouwd als betrokken bij een ge-
wapend conflict als voor een staat. Toch laat statenpraktijk zien dat deze
drempel in de praktijk vrij hoog wordt gelegd voor vredesondersteunende
operaties, hetgeen waarschijnlijk verband houdt met de wens om zo lang
mogelijk als onpartijdig te willen worden gezien.
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De kern van het begrip ‘bezetting’ in het HOR is dat een vreemdemogend-
heid (overheids)autoriteit uitoefent, die potentieel in strijd is met de belangen
van de lokale bevolking. Op deze basis kan goed worden beargumenteerd
dat ook vredesondersteunende operaties een gebied kunnen bezetten. Het
verschil tussen een ‘traditionele’ bezettingsmacht en een vredesondersteunende
operatie is dat de laatste vaak onder een alternatief rechtsregime opereert, zoals
een VNVR-resolutie of SOFA. Een VNVR-resolutie biedt echter vaak maar sum-
miere richtlijnen voor handelen en stelt niet expliciet dat afgeweken mag
worden van het HOR. Statenpraktijk ondersteunt tot nog toe niet de toepassing
van het bezettingsrecht op vredesondersteunende operaties. Dit hangt mis-
schien samenmet de politieke overweging en vrees dat uit de toepasselijkheid
van het bezettingsrecht omvangrijke verplichtingen voortvloeien.
Eerder is gesteld dat regels van HOR die internationaal gewoonterecht
vormen of een algemeen rechtsbeginsel vormen in beginsel van toepassing
zijn op VN en NAVO vredesondersteunende operaties. Deze studie kan geen
volledig overzicht geven van al deze regels en daarom worden slechts enkele
genoemd. Gemeenschappelijk Artikel 3 van de Verdragen van Genève is
zonder twijfel een gewoonterechtelijke norm.Mede uit jurisprudentie van het
IGH blijkt dat een groot aantal andere regels uit het Haags Landoorlogregle-
ment IV (1907) en de Verdragen van 1949 ook dit karakter hebben. Een studie
van het ICRC die binnenkort zal verschijnen zal mogelijk meer licht werpen
op de gewoonterechtelijke status van de bepalingen in AP I.
Deel Twee van de ILC-ontwerpartikelen inzake staatsaansprakelijkheid bevat
regels over de juridische gevolgen van staatsaansprakelijkheid. Het gaat hierbij
om de verplichtingen van een staat die aansprakelijk is die voortvloeien uit
die aansprakelijkheid. De verplichting om onrechtmatig handelen of nalaten
te beëindigen en het bieden van garanties voor niet-herhaling zijn beide een
aspect van de voortzetting en reparatie van de juridische relatie die aangetast
is door de onrechtmatige daad. Zij hebben vooral een preventief karakter.
Herstellen van schade (reparation) daarentegen heeft een herstellend karakter
en kan bestaan uit restitutie, schadevergoeding of genoegdoening. Restitutie
is de verplichting om de situatie te herstellen zoals die was voordat de inter-
nationaal-onrechtmatige daad plaatsvond, te onderscheiden van de situatie
zoals die geweest zou zijn wanneer de onrechtmatige daad niet had plaats-
gevonden. Schadevergoeding vindt plaats voor financieel bepaalbare schade.
Er zijn additionele gevolgen aan het schenden van dwingende internationale
rechtsregels (ius cogens). Hoewel een aantal regels van het HOR aan deze
kwalificatie voldoen, zijn genoemde bepalingen in de ILC-ontwerpartikelen
hier toch niet erg relevant, omdat deze alleen ‘ernstige’ inbreuken op dergelijke
normen betreffen en omdat getwijfeld kanworden aan de gewoonterechtelijke
status van genoemde ontwerpartikelen.
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De regels betreffende de gevolgen van staatsaansprakelijkheid kunnen in
beginsel ook worden toegepast op internationale organisaties om dezelfde
redenen als de regels betreffende toerekening toegepast kunnen worden.
De Haagse Conventie (IV) van 1907, de Verdragen van Genève van 1949
en AP I bevatten geen lex specialis ten opzichte van de algemene regels. Het
Haags Cultuurgoederenverdrag beperkt demogelijkheid om schadevergoeding
te verkiezen boven restitutie.
Het is moeilijk om statenpraktijk binnen vredesondersteunende operaties
te evalueren op de gevolgen van internationale aansprakelijkheid, omdat
vrijwel geen van de genomenmaatregelen die als een gevolg van aansprakelijk-
heid gezien zouden kunnen worden, vergezeld gingen van een expliciete
erkenning van aansprakelijkheid. De betaling van lump sums door de VN naar
aanleiding van incidenten in ONUC is de enige uitzondering. Voorzover de
maatregelen wel als gevolgen van aansprakelijkheid gezien kunnen worden,
lijkt het erop dat de VN schadevergoeding betaalt voor internationaal-onrecht-
matige daden gepleegd door VN vredesondersteunende operaties. Ook lijkt
de VN te aanvaarden dat er een verplichting is om incidenten te onderzoeken
en waar toepasselijk, excuses aan te bieden als vormen van genoegdoening.
Aan de andere kant startten troepenleverende staten eigen onderzoeken en
strafrechtelijke procedures voor gedrag van personeel in VN vredesondersteu-
nende operaties. Dit is het gevolg van afspraken hierover tussen de VN en
troepenleverende staten en het ontbreken van een volledig toegerust strafrech-
telijk rechtssysteem binnen de VN. De VN delegeert deze verantwoordelijkheid
aan staten. De VN zou zelf zo’n systeem kunnen creëren op basis van haar
implied powers. Kortom, de uitoefening van strafrechtelijke rechtsmacht door
troepenleverende staten is niet een gevolg van aansprakelijkheid.
Statenpraktijk in verband met NAVO vredesondersteunende operaties is
zo beperkt dat er nauwelijks conclusies uit kunnenworden getrokken. Interes-
sant zijn wel de excuses in één geval door SFOR en niet door de troepenleve-
rende staat wiens personeel had gehandeld, aangeboden aan de Bosnische
regering.
Hoofdstuk 5 bespreektmechanismen die in de praktijk een rol hebben gespeeld
bij de implementatie van aansprakelijkheid respectievelijk accountability van
vredesondersteunende operaties en mechanismen die de potentie hebben om
aansprakelijkheid respectievelijk accountability effectief te verwezenlijken.
Deel III van de ILC-ontwerpartikelen reguleert de implementatie van aan-
sprakelijkheid; Hoofdstuk I daarvan betreft het inroepen van aansprakelijkheid
en aanverwante vragen, Hoofdstuk II tegenmaatregelen (countermeasures).De
ILC-ontwerpartikelen erkennen de multilaterale dimensie van staatsaansprake-
lijkheid door te stellen dat niet alleen een ‘injured state’ aansprakelijkheid kan
inroepen, maar ook een staat met een juridisch belang (‘legal interest’). De
eerste categorie omvat staten wiens individuele recht is geschonden of die
op een anderemanier direct worden geraakt door een internationaal-onrecht-
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matige daad. De tweede categorie (zie artikel 48 ILC-ontwerpartikelen) bestaat
uit staten die deel uitmaken van een groep staten jegens wie een verplichting
bestaat een collectief belang van de groep te beschermen en uit staten die een
schending van een verplichting erga omnes inroepen. Er zijn aanwijzingen dat
althans enkele HOR-verplichtingen erga omnes zijn.
Gemeenschappelijk Artikel 1 van de Verdragen van Genève maakt niet
alle partijen bij het verdrag ‘injured states’ ingeval van een schending van de
Verdragen maar is een voorloper van Artikel 48 ILC-ontwerpartikelen in die
zin dat alle partijen een ‘legal interest’ hebben in het inroepen van schendingen.
Artikel 89 van AP I voegt niets toe aan gemeenschappelijk Artikel 1 wat betreft
de mogelijkheid om aansprakelijkheid in te roepen. Wat betreft gevolgen van
aansprakelijkheid komt het overeen met Artikel 41 (1) van de ILC-ontwerp-
artikelen, maar is ruimer voorzover ernstige schendingen van de Verdragen
van Genève en AP I niet tevens schendingen van ius cogens zijn.
Schade als gevolg van een internationaal-onrechtmatige daad aan een
onderdaan van een staat die niet tevens vertegenwoordiger (agent) van die
staat is, is indirecte schade aan de staat en geeft recht op het uitoefenen van
diplomatieke bescherming. Diplomatieke bescherming is traditioneel een recht
van de staat en niet van het individu; een individu kan dus niet eisen dat de
staat dit recht uitoefent.
Er isweinig statenpraktijk betreffende inroeping van de aansprakelijkheid
van een internationale organisatie door staten. De regels betreffende de inroe-
ping van staatsaansprakelijkheid kunnen in beginsel ook worden toegepast
op de inroeping van de aansprakelijkheid van internationale organisaties om
dezelfde redenen als de regels betreffende toerekening en juridische gevolgen
toegepast kunnen worden.
In het algemeen lijkt er geen twijfel over te bestaan dat een staat diploma-
tieke bescherming kan uitoefenen tegenover een internationale organisatie,
onder dezelfde voorwaarden als tegenover een staat met uitzondering van
de ‘local remedies’-regel. Deze laatste regel moet flexibel worden toegepast
en omvat ook claimscommissies en soortgelijke procedures. Het indienen van
claims door België en enkele andere staten tegen de VN als gevolg van inciden-
ten in ONUC voor schade geleden door hun onderdanen was een voorbeeld
van uitoefening van diplomatieke bescherming.
Om verschillende redenen is het onwaarschijnlijk dat een staat de inter-
nationale aansprakelijkheid van een andere staat of een internationale organisa-
tie zal inroepen voor een schending van het HOR door een vredesondersteunen-
de operatie. Daarom is het van belang dat individuen zelf hun rechten kunnen
inroepen. In dit verband is het van belang dat HOR in toenemendemate wordt
gezien als een rechtsregime dat individuen rechten verleent. Drager van een
recht zijn betekent echter niet noodzakelijkerwijze ook in staat zijn een schen-
ding van dat recht in te roepen. Dit onderscheid maakt de ILC ook impliciet
in Artikel 33 van de ILC-ontwerpartikelen. HOR voorziet momenteel niet in
de mogelijkheid voor een individu om aansprakelijkheid in te roepen. Met
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name Artikel 3 van het Haags Landoorlogverdrag schept niet deze mogelijk-
heid, zoals jurisprudentie en de travaux préparatoires van het verdrag bevesti-
gen.
Bij afwezigheid van een internationaal ius standi kan nationaal recht dit
scheppen, met name door een actie op basis van onrechtmatige daadmogelijk
te maken op basis van een onderliggende schending van internationaal recht.
Deze mogelijkheid is echter maar in een zeer beperkt aantal gevallen gescha-
pen. Bovendien staan procedurele obstakels vaak in deweg aan een succesvol
beroep erop, zoals bijvoorbeeld geïllustreerd door de Britse zaak Attorney-
General tegen Nissan.
Claimsprocedures gecreëerd binnen vredesondersteunende operaties lijken
veel op onrechtmatige-daadprocedures onder nationaal recht, omdat zij het
onrechtmatige-daadsrecht in het gastland als referentie gebruiken. Het is niet
duidelijk of een claim direct gebaseerd kan worden op een schending van
internationaal recht, of dat dit afhankelijk is van demanier waarop internatio-
naal recht in het gastland is geïncorporeerd in nationaal recht. De structuur
van claims commissies roept ook vragen op over hun onafhankelijkheid.
In tegenstelling tot het HOR kent het rechtsgebied van de mensenrechten
een aantal procedureswaaronder individuen zelf schendingen van hun rechten
kunnen inroepen, zoals voor het Europees Hof voor de Rechten van de Mens
en het VN-Mensenrechtencomité. Dit roept de vraag op of deze instanties niet
een rol kunnen spelen bij het toezicht op de naleving van het HOR door vredes-
ondersteunende operaties. Aan zo’n rol staan drie obstakels in de weg.
Ten eerste omvat de rechtsmacht van toezichthoudende instanties op
mensenrechtengebied vaak niet of slechts in beperkte mate het HOR. Wel
gebruiken zij inmeerdere ofminderemate HOR bij de interpretatie vanmensen-
rechtennormen. De Speciale Rapporteur van de VN-Mensenrechtencommissie
voor Somalië heeft dit onder andere gedaan in de context van vermeende men-
senrechtenschendingen door de vredesondersteunende operatie in Somalië.
Een tweede obstakel volgt uit het feit dat mensenrechtenverdragen staten
verplichten mensenrechten te respecteren van personen binnen hun rechts-
macht. Het EHRM in de Bankovic´-zaak heeft de uitdrukking ‘rechtsmacht’
geïnterpreteerd als in de eerste plaats betrekking hebbend op het eigen territoir,
met zeer beperkte uitzonderingen voor handelingen buiten dat territoir. Andere
toezichthoudende instanties lijken een iets minder strikte interpretatie aan te
hangen, maar desondanks accepteren ook zij slechts rechtsmacht over extra-
territoriaal handelen in een beperkte categorie gevallen waarin de staat een
zekere mate van controle uitoefent over de persoon in kwestie.
Een derde obstakel is dat toezichthoudende instanties in de eerste plaats
toezien op het gedrag van staten en niet op het gedrag van internationale
organisaties.
Kortom, er zijn weinig effectieve manieren om de aansprakelijkheid van
een staat of een internationale organisatie in te roepen voor een schending
van het HOR door een vredesondersteunende operatie. Deze situatie staat in
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schril contrast met de nadruk die momenteel wordt gelegd op de accountability
van internationale organisaties. Het systeem van rechtsmiddelen is met name
zeer beperkt waar het gaat om de rechten van individuen. In dit verband is
het van belang dat wel wordt geclaimd dat er een ‘right to a remedy’ bestaat
voor individuele slachtoffers van schendingen vanmensenrechten en van HOR.
Zo’n claimwordt onder andere gemaakt in de Principes ontwikkeld door Van
Boven en Bassiouni in het kader van een studie voor de VN-Subcommissie
voor de Bevordering en Bescherming van de Mensenrechten. De reacties van
staten op deze principes bevestigen echter niet het bestaan van een algemeen
‘right to a remedy’.
Ook als er geen juridische verplichting bestaat om te voorzien in een
effectief rechtsmiddel voor slachtoffers van schendingen vanHOR door vredes-
ondersteunende operaties bestaat er een onmiskenbare praktische noodzaak
daartoe.Wanneer de lokale bevolking een operatie beschouwt als niet ‘account-
able’ is de kans groot dat de operatie het vertrouwen van de bevolking verliest.
Om verschillende redenen is het noodzakelijk om de mechanismen voor het
implementeren van accountability van staten en internationale organisaties voor
schendingen vanHOR door vredesondersteunende operaties te versterken. Ten
eerste vereist het huidige accountability-discours dit. Ten tweede draagt account-
ability bij aan ‘mission accomplishment’ door tegenstand weg te nemen en
geloofwaardigheid te vergroten.
Hoofdstuk 6 stelt voor om de claimscommissie zoals omschreven in Artikel
51 van de VN model SOFA op een aantal punten aan te passen zodat deze een
effectief middel wordt om de aansprakelijkheid van de VN in te roepen. Zo’n
commissie zou permanent moeten zijn, het mandaat van de commissie zou
claims van schendingen van het HORmoeten omvatten en er zou geen uitzon-
dering moeten zijn voor claims als gevolg van ‘operationele noodzaak’. De
commissie zou ook uitgebreide bevoegdhedenmoeten krijgen en rechtsmacht
hebben over zowel de VN als troepenleverende staten.
De NAVO zou ook een permanente claims commissie moeten creëren met
rechtsmacht over claims van schendingen van het HOR naast claims op basis
van civiel recht. Deze commissie zou onafhankelijk moeten zijn en rechtsmacht
hebben over zowel de NAVO als over troepenleverende staten. De juridische
basis voor het laatste zou neergelegd kunnen worden in afspraken tussen de
organisatie en troepenleverende staten voor wat betreft niet-NAVO leden en
in een beslissing van deNoordAtlantische Raad voorwat betreft NAVO-leden.
Als de organisatie en haar lidstaten niet een dergelijke commissie willen
instellen, zouden ze in ieder geval moeten overwegen om het beginsel dat
‘combat-related’ claims niet ontvankelijk zijn, opzij te zetten.
Naast een mechanisme voor het implementeren van aansprakelijkheid is
ook een mechanisme voor het implementeren van accountability in bredere
zin nodig. Andere auteurs hebben al eerder het instellen van een ombudsman-
achtig instituut bepleit en de noodzaak daartoe is ook door de SGVN erkend.
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De ombudsman is traditioneel een instituut dat toeziet op de accountability
van met name de uitvoerende macht binnen een staat en die als maatstaf
naleving van de wet en administratieve regelgeving gebruikt en lijkt daarom
niet direct een toepasselijk instrument in het kader van dit onderzoek. In
toenemende mate wordt de ombudsman echter gezien als een toepasselijk
instrument voor toezicht op de naleving van mensenrechten. In een aantal
gevallen passen ombudsmannen HOR toe als toepasselijk recht. Daarnaastwordt
het instrument van de ombudsman of een vergelijkbaar instrument inmiddels
door een aantal internationale organisaties toegepast. Dit betreft met name
het World Bank Inspection Panel, de Ombudsman van de Europese Unie en
de Kosovo Ombudsperson Institution.
Dit laat zien dat het concept van een ombudsman potentieel een doeltref-
fendmechanisme is omde accountability voor inbreuken op individuele rechten
onder het HOR te verzekeren althans te vergroten en dat het concept op een
succesvolle manier is geïntroduceerd in internationale organisaties. Op basis
van deze ervaringen doet deze studie een voorstel voor het creëren van een
ombudsman voor vredesondersteunende operaties binnen de VN zowel als
binnen de NAVO.
Deze zou een permanente instelling moeten zijn. Binnen de VN zou een
AVVN-resolutie de beste grondslag zijn uit legitimiteitsoverwegingen, maar
de SGVN zou de instelling ook kunnen creëren. Binnen de NAVO zou de grond-
slag een beslissing van de NARmoeten zijn. De ombudsmannen zoudenmoeten
worden aangesteld door de respectievelijke Secretarissen-Generaal van de VN
en de NAVO in consultatie met het ICRC.
Het mandaat van de ombudsman zou moeten bestaan uit het ontvangen
en onderzoeken van klachten van personen en entiteiten betreffende schendin-
gen van het HOR. Hij zou rechtsmacht moeten hebben over de VN respectieve-
lijk de NAVO en over troepenleverende staten voor handelen dat aan hen
toerekenbaar is. Hij zou brede onderzoeksbevoegdheden moeten hebben. De
bevindingen en aanbevelingen van de ombudsman zouden moeten worden
gepubliceerd.
Bovenstaande voorstellen zijn gebaseerd op bestaande bepalingen c.q.
instellingen maar gaan op belangrijke punten verder. Staten zullen de politieke
wil moeten opbrengen om deze voorstellen te implementeren willen zij de
noodzakelijke ‘hearts and minds’ van de lokale bevolking in een gastland
winnen.
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